User:Smolee3/Taoist Paradoxes
The Taoist Paradoxes (Chinese: dào jiā bèi lùn 道家悖論) are a series of paradoxes found in the writings of Taoist thinkers Laozi and Zhuangzi by Mozi, a Mohist thinker of the Spring and Autumn Period of China, and Yangxiong, a Confucian thinker of the Western Han Dynasty. These consist of: all words are contradictory (yán jǐn bèi 言尽悖) (no words are capable of expressing the truth), learning is of no benefit(xué wú yì 学无益), non-rebuttal (fēi fěi 非诽) (one should not refute others), and no victory in disputing (biàn wú shèng 辩无胜) (there are no winners in a debate). Mozi and Yang Xiong analysed these paradoxes in their writings and used them to criticise Taoist doctrine[1][2][3][4][5].。
All words are contradictory[edit]
The expression "all words are contradictory", meaning "all expression is wrong" or "no words are capable of expressing the truth", has been used in the writings of Laozi and Zhuangzi to express the esoterism of the Tao (which broadly refers to the cosmic laws which govern the universe and everything in existence).
In his book Zhuangzi - On the Equality of Things, Zhuangzi mentions:
The Way has never known boundaries; speech has no constancy. But because of [the recognition of a] "this," there came to be boundaries. Let me tell you what the boundaries are.
There is left, there is right, there are theories, there are debates, there are divisions, there are discriminations, there are emulations, and there are contentions. These are called the Eight Virtues. As to what is beyond the Six Realms, the sage admits its existence but does not theorize. As to what is within the Six Realms, he theorizes but does not debate. In the case of the Spring and Autumn, the record of the former kings of past ages, the sage debates but does not discriminate. So [I say] those who divide fail to divide; those who discriminate fail to discriminate. What does this mean, you ask? The sage embraces things. Ordinary men discriminate among them and parade their discriminations before others. So I say, those who discriminate fail to see.
The Great Way is not named; Great Discriminations are not spoken; Great Benevolence is not benevolent; Great Modesty is not humble; Great Daring does not attack. If the Way is made clear, it is not the Way. If discriminations are put into words, they do not suffice. If benevolence has a constant object, it cannot be universal. If modesty is fastidious, it cannot be trusted. If daring attacks, it cannot be complete. These five are all round, but they tend toward the square.
Therefore understanding that rests in what it does not understand is the finest. Who can understand discriminations that are not spoken, the Way that is not a way? If he can understand this, he may be called the Reservoir of Heaven. Pour into it and it is never full, dip from it and it never runs dry, and yet it does not know where the supply comes from. This is called the Shaded Light.
According to Zhuangzi, the Tao cannot be expressed in language alone and doing so would greatly diminish the original meaning, thus leading to the reasoning that "no words are capable of expressing the truth". This further corresponds to the statement in Laozi's book, Tao Te Ching - Chapter 1:
The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao. The name that can be named is not the eternal name.
The nameless is the beginning of Heaven and Earth. The named is the mother of the ten thousand things.
Ever desireless, one can see the mystery. Ever desiring, one sees the manifestations.
These two spring from the same source but differ in name; this appears as darkness.
Darkness within darkness. The gate to all mystery.
"The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao. The name that can be named is not the eternal name." refers to the formlessness and ineffability of the Tao which makes it difficult to be expressed in words.
However, as a Mohist thinker, Mozi criticised the claim that there is "no truth in words" in his writings in Mozi:
To take words to be completely false is false. The explanation lies in his words.
- Chapter 41
To take: False equates with inadmissible. If this person's words are admissible and this is not false, then it is also admissible. If this person's words are inadmissible in terms of validity, they are certainly not valid.
- Chapter 43
According to Mozi, the expression "no truth in words" is inherently fallacious. If the premise is that "all words cannot express the truth", then is the premise itself the truth?
He reasoned that, supposing that the statement "no words are capable of expressing the truth" is true, then, contrary to the original supposition, there are indeed statements that can express the truth. In addition, again supposing that "no words are capable of expressing the truth" is true, then this statement itself must be false, and yet the result is that the statement is proven true. This is why Mozi defines "no truth in words" as a paradox, and by extension, Taoist doctrine, which is based on paradoxes, is vague and abstruse and cannot be accurately expressed.
Learning is of no benefit[edit]
The idea of "learning is of no benefit" can be found scattered in Laozi's Tao Te Ching, e.g. "Give up learning, and put an end to your troubles", Chapter 20[7]. It is also quoted in later Taoist writings such as the Taipingjing, which was compiled by Yu Ji and Gong Chong .
In Tao Te Ching Chapter 19, Laozi writes:
Give up sainthood, renounce wisdom, And it will be a hundred times better for everyone.
Give up kindness, renounce morality, And men will rediscover filial piety and love.
Give up ingenuity, renounce profit, And bandits and thieves will disappear.
These three are outward forms alone; they are not sufficient in themselves.
It is more important To see the simplicity, To realize one's true nature, To cast off selfishness And temper desire.
He believed that troubles were acquired through learning, and that every time new knowledge was acquired, it would be accompanied by new troubles and new sins. Accordingly, he appealed to the people to give up knowledge, and to give up everything that could be gained from learning, so that the people would return to simplicity and be free from sins and evils.
In the Taipingjing compiled by Yu Ji and Gong Chong, it is also stated:
Alas! Though the six disciples study day by day, it is useless, for they are even more stupid. They are barely better than simpletons. Why is this? The laws of heaven and earth, the rise and fall of all things follow the people.
The meaning is that although one may absorb new knowledge every day, one will only grow duller and will be no better than an ignorant person. The text provides the following explanation: The laws of heaven and earth are constantly changing, and when people learn new knowledge, it soon becomes outdated and useless. Spending time to learn something that is destined to be useless, on amorphous and ever-changing laws, will only make one look stupid[9].
Yang Xiong, a Confucian thinker, was not convinced that "learning is of no benefit", and wrote a criticism in Fayan- Learning and Practice:
Someone said: Study has no benefits, what can it do for one's essence?
[Yang Xiong] said: You have not yet thought about it. If you have a knife, you sharpen it; if you have jade, you polish it. If you do not sharpen and polish them, how are they useful? Sharpening and polishing, their essence lies in these; if this was not the case, then you might as well stop.
Yang Xiong criticizes those who assert that "learning is of no benefit" and declares that they have not given proper thought. If there is no benefit to be gained from learning, then how is the essence of a person to be distilled? He used the analogy of jade, which originates as a stone but must be polished and refined in order to be made into a jade vessel. A knife is only useful if it is sharpened, and jade is a mere stone if it is not refined and is useless. The same applies to human beings. Although they have good qualities, they cannot be recognised without learning and experience. Mozi held a different view.
He criticised the saying that "learning is of no benefit" in his writings in Mozi:
"Learning is of no benefit." The explanation lies in the one criticising.
- Chapter 41
In the case of learning, consider taking someone as not knowing that learning is without benefit and therefore teaching him [this]. This causing him to know that learning is without benefit is, in fact, teaching him. To take learning to be of no benefit yet to teach is contradictory.
- Chapter 43
Mozi believed that learning has benefits and that those who claim that "learning is of no benefit" are misleading the public. He reasoned: if "learning is of no benefit" is true, then there must be 'teaching' in order to for there to be 'learning'. 'Teaching' is the cause, and 'learning' is the effect. The two are interrelated, but there is no reason why 'teaching' alone has benefits and 'learning' does not. However, Laozi has taught the public that "learning is of no benefit" so that the public could learn that "learning is of no benefit", which is contradictory to the statement that "learning is of no benefit" and so "learning is of no benefit" must be a paradox.
Non-rebuttal[edit]
Non-rebuttal means that "one should not refute others", "one should not criticise others", "one should not argue", "one should not debate". This concept can be found in Zhuangzi - On the Equality of Things, which was written by Zhuangzi in response to the argumentative atmosphere of the Hundred Schools of Thought.
In it, he writes:
Great understanding is broad and unhurried; little understanding is cramped and busy. Great words are clear and limpid; little words are shrill and quarrelsome. In sleep, men's spirits go visiting; in wake, their bodies hustle. With everything they meet they become entangled. Day after day they use their minds in strife, sometimes grandiose, sometimes sly, sometimes petty. Their little fears are mean and trembly; their great fears are stunned and overwhelming. They bound off like an arrow or a crossbow pellet, certain that they are the arbiters of right and wrong. They cling to their position as though they had sworn before the gods, sure that they are holding on to victory. They fade like fall and winter - such is the way they dwindle day by day. They drown in what they do - you cannot make them turn back. They grow dark, as though sealed with seals - such are the excesses of their old age. And when their minds draw near to death, nothing can restore them to the light. Joy, anger, grief, delight, worry, regret, fickleness, inflexibility, modesty, wilfulness, candour, insolence - music from empty holes, mushrooms springing up in dampness, day and night replacing each other before us, and no one knows where they sprout from. Let it be! Let it be! [It is enough that] morning and evening we have them, and they are the means by which we live.
Zhuangzi believed that the so-called famous debaters, who on the surface appeared to speak with extraordinary éclat, were in fact more flair than reason, and were unforgiving and unreasonable. They articulate rapidly and with tricky words. For the sake of debate, debaters spend sleepless nights and all their waking hours in dispute; everyone they meet is an opponent and their entire day is spent in argument. At the same time, in order to defeat their opponents, they add traps to their speech. Yet they are also afraid of falling into the traps of their opponents' speech, and as such are always paranoid. The debater remains silent until he finds the flaws in his opponent's speech, but when he does, he is relentless. But reason is interpreted in different ways at different times. It is invisible and cannot be regulated, and it may even change so quickly that it is difficult to know what should be done next. Mozi states that it is too difficult to convince debaters to give up arguing because the glory of distinguishing right and wrong poses too strong a temptation. Engaging in argument again and again will deplete one's true energy, and one will gradually lose interest in other things, as though one is dead. As such, it would not be beneficial to oneself.
In addition, Zhuangzi had other views on the Confucian-Mohist debate:
Words are not just wind. Words have something to say. But if what they have to say is not fixed, then do they really say something? Or do they say nothing? People suppose that words are different from the peeps of baby birds, but is there any difference, or isn't there? What does the Way rely upon, that we have true and false? What do words rely upon, that we have right and wrong? How can the Way go away and not exist? How can words exist and not be acceptable? When the Way relies on little accomplishments and words rely on vain show, then we have the rights and wrongs of the Confucians and the Mo-ists. What one calls right the other calls wrong; what one calls wrong the other calls right. But if we want to right their wrongs and wrong their rights, then the best thing to use is clarity.
Zhuangzi pointed out that nothing will come out of the conflict between the Confucian and Mohist schools of thought. He believed that arguments were like the blowing of the wind. There were no absolutes in either side's arguments, so where was the difference between the two points of view? Even if they were to argue with each other, what was the difference between their arguments? The so-called Confucian-Mohist debate is nothing more than using one's own 'right' to refute the opponent's 'wrong', and then using one's own 'wrong' to refute the opponent's 'right'.
In Mozi - Chapters 41 and 43, Mozi refuted the notion of "non-rebuttal":
Negating criticism is perverse. The explanation lies in not negating.
- Chapter 41
Negating: If the criticism is negatable, my criticism of it is not negatable; it is criticism inadmissible to negate. Being inadmissible to negate, this is not negatable criticism.
- Chapter 43
Mozi indicates that there is a significant problem with the phrase "non-rebuttal", and that the key lies in the "non-". The phrase "one should not refute others" is itself a refutation of the person who "refutes others", which is self-contradictory. Thus, the inference is that "refutation" is itself irrefutable.
He reasoned that, supposing that 'one should not refute others', Zhuangzi - On the Equality of Things is in itself a criticism of the argumentative nature of the Hundred Schools of Thought. And Zhuangzi, by using his self-affirmed 'right' (i.e. non-rebuttal) to refute the 'wrong' of his opponents (i.e. the Confucian-Mohist polemics), has himself engaged in a debate. So Zhuangzi has simply shot himself in the foot and this must be considered a paradox.
No victory in disputing[edit]
The meaning of "no victory in disputing" is that "neither party to a debate can win" and "there can be no outcome to a debate". This concept can be found in Zhuangzi - On the Equality of Things. It is related to the concept of "non-rebuttal" and is also directed at the argumentative tone of the Hundred Schools of Thought. Zhuangzi argued that reason is formless and invisible and cannot not be expressed in words (i.e. all words are contradictory), thus debate cannot be fruitful.
In Zhuangzi - On the Equality of Things, he stated:
Without them we would not exist; without us they would have nothing to take hold of. This comes close to the matter. But I do not know what makes them the way they are. It would seem as though they have some True Master, and yet I find no trace of him. He can act - that is certain. Yet I cannot see his form. He has identity but no form. The hundred joints, the nine openings, the six organs, all come together and exist here [as my body]. But which part should I feel closest to? I should delight in all parts, you say? But there must be one I ought to favor more. If not, are they all of them mere servants? But if they are all servants, then how can they keep order among themselves? Or do they take turns being lord and servant? It would seem as though there must be some True Lord among them. But whether I succeed in discovering his identity or not, it neither adds to nor detracts from his Truth.
Zhuangzi believed that reason is the law which governs all things in existence. It is not a material object, so it cannot be caught or touched.
He used the human body as an analogy for reason. A person has bones, nine orifices and internal organs. But which part can be said to be the master of the human body? Which part should be cared for? Should every part be cared for? Or should a specific part be especially cared for? Is it that every part is subservient? If every part of the body is subservient and no part of the body is dominant over the other parts, should there still be a master? Do the different parts of the body take turns being the master of the body? If the body is functioning normally, then there must be a master, but where can the master be found? Will a debate bring forth his location?
Zhuangzi claimed that reason is scattered across heaven and earth and is inconstant through every moment in time. People appear to hold reason within their grasp in a debate, but this has nothing to do with true reason, so naturally there can be no outcome from a debate. He also stated:
Suppose you and I have had an argument. If you have beaten me instead of my beating you, then are you necessarily right and am I necessarily wrong? If I have beaten you instead of your beating me, then am I necessarily right and are you necessarily wrong? Is one of us right and the other wrong? Are both of us right or are both of us wrong? If you and I don't know the answer, then other people are bound to be even more in the dark. Whom shall we get to decide what is right? Shall we get someone who agrees with you to decide? But if he already agrees with you, how can he decide fairly? Shall we get someone who agrees with me? But if he already agrees with me, how can he decide? Shall we get someone who disagrees with both of us? But if he already disagrees with both of us, how can he decide? Shall we get someone who agrees with both of us? But if he already agrees with both of us, how can he decide? Obviously, then, neither you nor I nor anyone else can decide for each other. Shall we wait for still another person?
Zhuangzi uses himself as an analogy: If Zhuangzi engages in a debate with his opponent and his opponent wins, it does not mean that Zhuangzi's argument is wrong; if Zhuangzi wins the debate with the same argument, does that mean that Zhuangzi's argument is right? If a third party is asked to judge, they may share Zhuangzi's view, or they may share his opponent's view, or they may hold a different view from both Zhuangzi and his opponent. In any case, the third party himself has become one of the debaters, and therefore cannot make an objective judgement. Therefore, the three parties to the debate have no way of knowing who is right and who is wrong.
Mozi refutes the notion that there is "no victory in disputing" in Mozi:
Calling is disputation without the overcoming and certainly is not about correctness. The explanation lies in disputation.
- Chapter 41
Calling: If what is called [something] is not the same, then it is different. The case of being the same, then, is one saying, "this is a dog" and the other saying, "this is a [canine]". The case of being different, then, is one saying, "this is an ox" and the other saying, "this is a horse". Both do not overcome. Where both do not overcome, this is not disputation. Disputation is where one says, "this is this" and the other says "this is not [this]". The one who is correct, overcomes.
- Chapter 43
Mozi claims that the expression "there can be no outcome to a debate" must be incorrect. Supposing that 'there can be no outcome to a debate', is the supposition itself right or wrong? If the statement 'no victory in disputing' is true, then Zhuangzi has won the debate, and if it is false, then Zhuangzi has lost the debate. However, if it is true, then it contradicts the supposition and must be a paradox.
People say things that are either the same or different. He used the analogy of a dog, which can be referred to in two ways, one being "dog" (gǒu 狗) and the other being "canine" (quǎn 犬). If two people argue over which of these names is correct, they will inevitably discover that they are talking about the same animal. Another analogy is that if two people debate over whether an animal is a cow or a horse, they will find out whether the animal is a cow, a horse or neither in the course of the debate. A debate that does not have an outcome occurs because there is no one is willing to debate. Where there is a debate, there will always be a difference between right and wrong, and the one who holds the truth is the winner.
Per Mohist theories of logic:
That: In the correction of names, with respect to that and this [there are three cases].
i. That and this are admissible: That [name] applies to that [entity] and stops at that [entity]; this [name] applies to this [entity] and stops at this [entity].
ii. That and this are not admissible: That [name] but this [entity].
iii. That-this is also admissible: That-this stops at that-this. In this case, with respect to that and this, then there is that also as well as this, this also as well as that.
[8] In essence, "that equals that", "this equals this", "that and this equals that and this", "that and this do not equal that", and "that and this do not equal this".
| Mohist logic | that | this | that stops at that | this stops at this | that and this stops at that and this | that and this are not that or this |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Analogy | cow | horse | Cow equals cow. | Horse equals horse. | Cow and horse equals cow and horse. | Cow and horse do not equal cow, and cow and horse do not equal horse. |
| Contemporary logic | A | B | A = A | B = B | AB = AB | AB ≠ A, AB ≠ B |
References[edit]
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- ^ 万千说法：理性的癌变——悖论 的存檔，存档日期2005-03-17. 张远山著
- ^ "古代墨家的辯論之道". Archived from the original on 2012-06-05. Retrieved 2008-04-26.
- ^ 白話齊物論 的存檔，存档日期2008-03-31.
- ^ 生活中的悖论破解法 的存檔，存档日期2008-02-15.
- ^ a b c d e Mather, Richard B.; Watson, Burton; Chuang-tzu (1972-04). "The Complete Works of Chuang-tzu". Journal of the American Oriental Society. 92 (2): 334. doi:10.2307/600690. ISSN 0003-0279.
{{cite journal}}: Check date values in:|date=(help) - ^ a b c "Tao Te Ching, English by Gia-fu Feng and Jane English, Terebess Asia Online (TAO)". terebess.hu. Retrieved 2024-01-17.
- ^ a b c d e Johnston, Ian (2009). The Mozi: A Complete Translation. Chinese University Press. ISBN 9789629962708.
- ^ 《太平清領書》 于吉、宮崇編纂
- ^ "Yangzi Fayan : Learning and Practice - Chinese Text Project". ctext.org (in Chinese (Taiwan)). Retrieved 2024-01-17.
[[Category:Confucianism]] [[Category:Mohism]] [[Category:Philosophical logic]] [[Category:Taoism]]