User:SilentCactus/sandbox

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one, two, three

Предвзятость подтверждения[edit]

hmhm


Biased search for information[edit]

A drawing of a man sitting on a stool at a writing desk
Confirmation bias has been described as an internal "yes man", echoing back a person's beliefs like Charles Dickens' character Uriah Heep.[1]

Эксперименты многократно показывали, что люди склонны подходить к проверке предположений однобоко, стараясь найти подтверждение той гипотезе, которой они придерживаются на данный момент.[2][3] Вместо того, чтобы искать все относящиеся к делу свидетельства, они задают вопросы в таких формулировках, что утвердительный ответ подтвердил бы их предположение.[4] Люди ищут те следствия, которые ожидаются, если их предположение верно, а не те, что ожидаются, если оно ошибочно.[4] К примеру, если человек пытается угадать число, используя вопросы с ответами да/нет, и предполагает, что это число 3, то он может спросить "Это число нечетное?" Люди предпочитают такую формулировку вопроса (называемую "положительным тестом"), даже когда отрицательный тест (вроде "Это число четное?"), дал был абсолютно такую же информацию.[5] Experiments have repeatedly found that people tend to test hypotheses in a one-sided way, by searching for evidence consistent with the hypothesis they hold at a given time.[6][3] Rather than searching through all the relevant evidence, they ask questions that are phrased so that an affirmative answer supports their hypothesis.[4] They look for the consequences that they would expect if their hypothesis were true, rather than what would happen if it were false.[4] For example, someone who is trying to identify a number using yes/no questions and suspects that the number is 3 might ask, "Is it an odd number?" People prefer this sort of question, called a "positive test", even when a negative test such as "Is it an even number?" would yield exactly the same information.[7] However, this does not mean that people seek tests that are guaranteed to give a positive answer. In studies where subjects could select either such pseudo-tests or genuinely diagnostic ones, they favored the genuinely diagnostic.[8][9]

The preference for positive tests is not itself a bias, since positive tests can be highly informative.[10] However, in conjunction with other effects, this strategy can confirm existing beliefs or assumptions, independently of whether they are true.[11] In real-world situations, evidence is often complex and mixed. For example, various contradictory ideas about someone could each be supported by concentrating on one aspect of his or her behavior.[3] Thus any search for evidence in favor of a hypothesis is likely to succeed.[11] One illustration of this is the way the phrasing of a question can significantly change the answer.[3] For example, people who are asked, "Are you happy with your social life?" report greater satisfaction than those asked, "Are you unhappy with your social life?"[12]

Even a small change in the wording of a question can affect how people search through available information, and hence the conclusions they reach. This was shown using a fictional child custody case.[13] Subjects read that Parent A was moderately suitable to be the guardian in multiple ways. Parent B had a mix of salient positive and negative qualities: a close relationship with the child but a job that would take him or her away for long periods. When asked, "Which parent should have custody of the child?" the subjects looked for positive attributes and a majority chose Parent B. However, when the question was, "Which parent should be denied custody of the child?" they looked for negative attributes, but again a majority answered Parent B, implying that Parent A should have custody.[13]

Similar studies have demonstrated how people engage in biased search for information, but also that this phenomenon may be limited by a preference for genuine diagnostic tests, where they are available. In an initial experiment, subjects had to rate another person on the introversion–extroversion personality dimension on the basis of an interview. They chose the interview questions from a given list. When the interviewee was introduced as an introvert, the subjects chose questions that presumed introversion, such as, "What do you find unpleasant about noisy parties?" When the interviewee was described as extroverted, almost all the questions presumed extroversion, such as, "What would you do to liven up a dull party?" These loaded questions gave the interviewees little or no opportunity to falsify the hypothesis about them.[14] However, a later version of the experiment gave the subjects less presumptive questions to choose from, such as, "Do you shy away from social interactions?"[15] Subjects preferred to ask these more diagnostic questions, showing only a weak bias towards positive tests. This pattern, of a main preference for diagnostic tests and a weaker preference for positive tests, has been replicated in other studies.[15]

Another experiment gave subjects a particularly complex rule-discovery task involving moving objects simulated by a computer.[16] Objects on the computer screen followed specific laws, which the subjects had to figure out. They could "fire" objects across the screen to test their hypotheses. Despite making many attempts over a ten-hour session, none of the subjects worked out the rules of the system. They typically sought to confirm rather than falsify their hypotheses, and were reluctant to consider alternatives. Even after seeing evidence that objectively refuted their working hypotheses, they frequently continued doing the same tests. Some of the subjects were instructed in proper hypothesis-testing, but these instructions had almost no effect.[16]

  1. ^ Zweig, Jason (November 19, 2009), "How to Ignore the Yes-Man in Your Head", Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, retrieved 2010-06-13
  2. ^ Nickerson 1998, pp. 177–178
  3. ^ a b c d Kunda 1999, pp. 112–115
  4. ^ a b c d Baron 2000, pp. 162–164
  5. ^ Kida 2006, pp. 162–165
  6. ^ Nickerson 1998, pp. 177–178
  7. ^ Kida 2006, pp. 162–165
  8. ^ Devine, Patricia G.; Hirt, Edward R.; Gehrke, Elizabeth M. (1990), "Diagnostic and confirmation strategies in trait hypothesis testing", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58 (6), American Psychological Association: 952–963, doi:10.1037/0022-3514.58.6.952, ISSN 1939-1315
  9. ^ Trope, Yaacov; Bassok, Miriam (1982), "Confirmatory and diagnosing strategies in social information gathering", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43 (1), American Psychological Association: 22–34, doi:10.1037/0022-3514.43.1.22, ISSN 1939-1315
  10. ^ Cite error: The named reference klaymanha was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  11. ^ a b Oswald & Grosjean 2004, pp. 82–83
  12. ^ Kunda, Ziva; Fong, G.T.; Sanitoso, R.; Reber, E. (1993), "Directional questions direct self-conceptions", Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 29, Society of Experimental Social Psychology: 62–63, ISSN 0022-1031 via Fine 2006, pp. 63–65
  13. ^ a b Shafir, E. (1993), "Choosing versus rejecting: why some options are both better and worse than others", Memory and Cognition, 21 (4): 546–556, PMID 8350746 via Fine 2006, pp. 63–65
  14. ^ Snyder, Mark; Swann, Jr., William B. (1978), "Hypothesis-Testing Processes in Social Interaction", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36 (11), American Psychological Association: 1202–1212, doi:10.1037/0022-3514.36.11.1202 via Poletiek 2001, p. 131
  15. ^ a b Kunda 1999, pp. 117–118
  16. ^ a b Mynatt, Clifford R.; Doherty, Michael E.; Tweney, Ryan D. (1978), "Consequences of confirmation and disconfirmation in a simulated research environment", Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 30 (3): 395–406, doi:10.1080/00335557843000007