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Robert McNamara

Robert McNamara[edit]

Nuclear Strategy- Trial Doctrine[edit]

When McNamara took over the Pentagon in 1961, the United States military relied on an all out-nuclear strike to respond to a Soviet attack of any kind. This kind of strike would lead to the death of Soviet military forces, and also civilians. This was the same nuclear strategy planned by the Strategic Air Command (SAC), led by General Curtis LeMay. McNamara did not agree with this kind of action. He sought for other options after seeing how this strategy could not guarantee the destruction of all Soviet nuclear weapons leaving the United States vulnerable to retaliation. McNamara’s alternative in the doctrine of counterforce was to try and limit the United states nuclear exchange by only targeting enemy military forces.[1] This concept would be used to prevent retaliation and escalation by holding Soviet cities hostage to a follow up strike. McNamara later concluded that counterforce was not likely to control escalation but likely to provoke retaliation. The U.S. nuclear policy remained the same.

Cuban Missile Crisis[edit]

The Cuban Missile Crisis was between the United states and the Soviet Union lasting from the end of World War II through the late 1980’s. During this time, Robert McNamara was serving as Secretary of Defense and one of John F. Kennedy's trusted advisors. When Kennedy received confirmation of the placement of offensive soviet missiles in Cuba, he immediately set up ‘Executive Committee’, refereed to as ‘ExComm’. This committee included United states government officials, including Robert McNamara, to advise Kennedy on the crisis. Kennedy instructed ExComm to immediately come up with a response to the Soviet threat unanimously without him present. During this time it was confirmed the crisis had to be resolved within 48 hours by receiving two messages from Nikita Khruschev. The first message, an informal one, stated if the United states guaranteed to not invade Cuba then they would take the missiles out. The second message, a more formal one, was broadcasted on the radio stating if the United states attacked then Cuba was prepared to retaliate with masses of military power. Although American defense planning focused on using nuclear weapons, Kennedy and McNamara saw it was clear the use of strategic weapons could be suicidal.[2] On Tuesday October 16, ExComm had their first meeting.The majority of officials favored an air attack on Cuba in hopes to destroy the missile sites, although the vote was not unanimous which brought them to other alternatives. By the end of the week, ExComm came up with four different alternative strategies to present to the president: a blockade, an air strike, an invasion, or some combination of these.[3] These actions are known as OPLAN 312, OPLAN 314 and OPLAN 316. A quarantine was a way to prevent the Soviets from bringing any military equipment in or out of Cuba. [2] During the final review of both alternatives on Sunday October 21st, upon Kennedy's request, McNamara presented the argument against the attack and for the quarantine. On Wednesday, October 24th at 10:00 a.m. EDT, the quarantine line around Cuba went into effect. Following Cuba's aftermath, McNamara stated, "There is no such thing as strategy, only crisis management."[2]

The Fog of War[edit]

These lesson's were chosen by the reporter, not Robert McNamara himself [4]

Lesson #1: Empathize with your enemy.

McNamara states "Empathize with your enemy" several times throughout the documentary. McNamara relates this lesson to the Cuban Missile Crisis when he and Kennedy were trying to keep the United States out of war but General Curtis LeMay wanted to invade Cuba. Kennedy discovered LeMay's obsession with nuclear weapons when focusing on the Laotian problem in 1961.[5] Kennedy received two messages from Nikita Khrushchev during the Cuban missile crisis. McNamara refers to them as the “hard message” and the “soft message”. McNamara differentiated the two messages because the first message was informal, whereas the second message was formal and broadcasted around the world. McNamara stated the first message sounded like it came from "A drunk man or one under a lot of stress." The first message, “soft message”, stated if the United States guaranteed to not invade Cuba then Cuba would take the missiles out. The “hard message” stated “if you [United States] attack were [Cuba] prepared to confront you with masses of military power." [6] Llewellyn Thompson, former US ambassador to Moscow, urged Kennedy to respond to the soft message. Knowing Khrushchev personally, Thompson believed that Khrushchev just wanted to be able to tell Cuba he stopped an invasion from the U.S. Although Kennedy did not agree with Thompson at first, he later did.

Lesson #2: Rationality alone will not save us.

In the documentary, McNamara emphasized it was luck that prevented nuclear war. Rational individuals such as: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro, came close to creating national destruction. McNamara states that the possibility of nuclear destruction still exist today.

Lesson #3: There’s something beyond one’s self.

This lesson was used to describe McNamara’s private life. McNamara states “there’s something beyond one’s self and a responsibility to society.” During this time in the documentary McNamara discussed when he started to court his wife, Margaret Craig, and had a child. Then the war came. McNamara was then promoted to the youngest assistant professor at Harvard.

Lesson #4: Maximize efficiency.

In this example, McNamara was brought back from the 8th air force and assigned to the first B-29, 58th Bomb Wing flying planes. It was thought the B-29s could destroy targets much more efficiently and effectively. McNamara was in charge of analyzing bombing operations, and how to make them more efficient.

Lesson #5: Proportionality should be a guideline in war.

In this example, McNamara talks about the proportions of cities destroyed in Japan by the U.S. McNamara compares destroyed cities of Japan to cities in the United states before the dropping of the nuclear bomb. Tokyo, roughly the size of New York, 51% destroyed; Toyama, the size of Chattanooga, 99% destroyed; Nagoya, the size of Los Angeles, 40% destroyed; Osaka, the size of Chicago, 35% destroyed. McNamara compares the proportionality of the war on Japan to being immoral.

Lesson #6: Get the Data.

McNamara worked at Ford in an executive position where he conducted studies on buyer demographics to accident reports to make cars safer. McNamara was later promoted to president of Ford, being the first person not a family member to hold the position. Although, he quit 5 months later because of a position offered to him by John F. Kennedy. Kennedy offered McNamara a position as the Secretary of Treasury where he declined and later accepted the position as the Secretary of Defense.

Lesson #7: Belief and seeing are both often wrong.

McNamara relates lesson 7 to the Tonkin Gulf incident. “We see what we want to believe."

Lesson #8: Be prepared to reexamine your reasoning.

McNamara believed even though the United States is the strongest nation in the world, we should never use that power unilaterally. “if we can’t persuade nations with comparably values of the merit of our cause we better reexamine our reasoning.”

Lesson #9: In order to do good, you may have to engage in evil.

“Recognize at times we have to engage in evil, but minimize it."

Lesson #10: Never say never.

McNamara talks about how he believes the responsibility for the Vietnam War is on the president and if JFK had lived, the situation wouldn’t have been as bad.

Lesson #11: You can’t change human nature.

McNamara talks about the ‘fog of war’ by comparing it to the human mind and how it cannot fully comprehend it all.

Condoleezza Rice

Condoleezza Rice[edit]

Role in Nuclear Strategy[edit]

In 1986, Dr. Rice was appointed special assistant to the Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to work on nuclear strategic planning as part of a Council on Foreign Relations fellowship. In 2005, Rice assumed office as Secretary of State. Rice played a big responsibility in trying to stop the nuclear threat from North Korea and Iran.[7]

North Korea

North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, but in 2002 revealed they were operating a secret nuclear weapons program that violated the 1994 agreement. The 1994 agreement between the United States and North Korea included North Korea agreeing to freeze and eventually dismantle its graphite moderated nuclear reactors, in exchange for international aid which would help them to build two new light-water nuclear reactors. In 2003, North Korea officially withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Rice played a key role in the idea of “six-party talks” that brought China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea into discussion with North Korea and the United States. [8] During these discussions, Rice gave strong talks to urge North Korea to dismantle their nuclear power program. In 2005, North Korea agreed to give up its entire nuclear program in exchange for security guarantees and economic benefits to ensure its survival.[9] Despite the agreement in 2005, in 2006, North Korea test fires long range missiles. The UN Security Council demanded North Korea suspend the program. In 2007, Rice was involved in another nuclear agreement with North Korea (Pyongyang). Rice, other negotiators for the United States and four other nations (six-party talks) reached a deal with North Korea. In this deal North Korea agreed to close its main nuclear reactor in exchange for $400 million in fuel and aid. [9]

India

In 2008, Indian prime minister announced the Agreement for Cooperation between the United States and India involving peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As Secretary of State, Rice was involved in the negation of this agreement.[9]

notes[edit]

  1. ^ McNamara, Robert. "McNamara's No-Cities Speech". slantchev.ucsd.edu.
  2. ^ a b c Nathan, edited by James A. (1992). The Cuban missile crisis revisited. New York: St. Martin's Press. ISBN 0-312-06069-6. {{cite book}}: |first1= has generic name (help)
  3. ^ McNamara, Chester L. Cooper ; foreword by Robert (2005). In the shadows of history : fifty years behind the scenes of Cold War diplomacy. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books. ISBN 1-59102-294-0.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  4. ^ .Morris, E., Williams, M., Ahlberg, J. B., Chappell, R., McNamara, R. S., Glass, P., @Radical.media (Firm),, ... Sony Pictures Classics (Firm),. (2004). The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara.
  5. ^ Nathan, edited by James A. (1992). The Cuban missile crisis revisited. New York: St. Martin's Press. ISBN 0-312-06069-6. {{cite book}}: |first1= has generic name (help)
  6. ^ Morris, E., Williams, M., Ahlberg, J. B., Chappell, R., McNamara, R. S., Glass, P., @Radical.media (Firm),, ... Sony Pictures Classics (Firm),. (2004). The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara.
  7. ^ Bumiller, Elisabeth (2007). Condoleezza Rice : an American life : a biography (1st ed. ed.). New York: Random House. ISBN 9781400065905. {{cite book}}: |edition= has extra text (help)
  8. ^ Mabry, Marcus (2007). Twice as good : Condoleezza Rice and her path to power. Emmaus, Pa.: Rodale. ISBN 9781594863622.
  9. ^ a b c Bumiller, Elisabeth (2007). Condoleezza Rice : an American life : a biography (1st ed. ed.). New York: Random House. ISBN 9781400065905. {{cite book}}: |edition= has extra text (help)