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Top chicken[edit]

Scientific method[edit]

Idea for a wiki-wide sidebar to conncet examples[edit]

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Thoughts in writing[edit]

One can do science without being able to explain the process philosophically perfectly fine./ One can explain the scientific process philosophically without touching on the idea of science just fine as well./ So too, one can learn about the idea of science, without actually understanding anything about how scientists work.

A Wikipedian trying their hand at philosophy

The problem with writing this article is that there are 3 or more scientific methods.

  • scientific method, as in how science is practised
  • scientific method, as described in philosophical discourse
  • ... and scientific method, as it is used, pedagogically, in education

Notes on the article:

  • At present, most notes on examples of the scientific method are on iteration; on how someone improved on theory or conclusions centuries later. These examples of iteration do more to build the myth of science, than to actually explain it.
  • The section currently titled 'Scientific inquiry' seems to me like an attempt at a foundationally non-sequential explanation of the method of science. A worthwhile endeavour that is hampered by the (valid) need for the section on the 'Elements' to reflect a complete article, because of how method is taught in education.
  • Confirmation/Reproducibility should probably wander into a new category on 'Scientific integrity', as it is not technically considered an element of 'method'. One can probably build the section from the corresponding article and, maybe, talk about 'Rhetoric' as well.

Perceived consensus:

  • Do not change the lead paragraph without consensus on the talk page.
  • The reading of how scientific method is taught in education should not be disrupted unduly, since it would confuse students. (Keep 'Elements of the scientific method' clean.)
  • The article, since it is an oft visited one, may contain not strictly topical content, as long as it is confined to appropriate sections, held to a concise length, and put in context with the method of science. (The justification here is that people will use it to read further.)
  • Science is best understood through examples. This article explicitly encourages (footnotes with) examples. Since it is also edited quite a lot:
    • Example Footnotes should provide their own context when possible. Someone will change what they are attached to, and they will no longer make sense. And they will get deleted, despite being fundamentally *good*.
    • Example Footnotes should be in context with the use or, ideally, the advancement of 'method'.

Opinion:

  • Basically, it is quite alright to take isolated prior conclusions that the greats drew and build different conclusions on top of them, as long as you mind what was really meant with the prior conclusion.
Kuhn's, and others', prior conclusion of science being what scientists say it is... is a great argument in favour of ignoring what conclusions he drew from it. Because science is what scientists say it is, and not what philosophers can frame; not what sociologists can frame either; and not what educators want to use it for either. A statement made by a working scientist, that is not just offhand and repeated by other working scientists, should always be given priority in explanations of what science is. Weinert (2004) is saintlike in that regard.
  • Contrasting approaches with each other directly can be useful. Like Peirce's dismissal of "hyperbolic doubt" contrasted with Descartes.

Collection of useful statements on method[edit]

According to Fleck, scientists' work is based on a thought-style, that cannot be rationally reconstructed. It gets instilled through the experience of learning, and science is then advanced based on a tradition of shared assumptions held by what he called thought collectives. Fleck also claims this phenomenon to be largely invisible to members of the group.[1]: 177 

  • Commentary: If scientists are largely unaware of... what sociologists consider to be method, what weight can be attributed to their discussion? Why then do they consider their discourse valuable to science?

Nevertheless, predictions can have a huge influence on research, if constructed well. Stephen Hawking's paper Gravitationally Collapsed Objects of Very Low Mass (1971) for example took previous theory and observation and suggested the existence of a greater variety of objects by postulating how the currently known could fit together to produce more complete theory.[2]

Imposing an alleged uniform general method upon everybody breeds mediocrity in all but the very exceptional. And measuring originality by deviation from the mass breeds eccentricity in them.

Lost notes[edit]

Lost, self-written or attributed in hidden note, notes: [α] [β] [6] [γ] [a]

Lost notes from the article: [b]

Gauch[edit]

Notes and refs with statements attached:[11] [12] [δ] [12]

“All manner of truth-surrogates have been proposed” by some philosophers “as what science really aims for,” and scientists must reject all substitutes.

— Gauch (2002) framing Leplin (1997:28) in a statement those same some philosophers he himself admits would beat him round the head with.[13]

Planned index[edit]

  • Etymology? (not necessarily useful... but might give room to talk about vagueness)
  • Introduction
    • Note: totally not about the demarcation problem, but really all about the demarcation problem.
  • Overview of the article -- ???
    • Note: currently callen 'Scientific inquiry'
  • Elements of inquiry
    • Observation
    • Hypothesis
    • Experimentation
    • Iteration
      • Note: Should manage to differentiate between what is iterated upon, hypotheses, theory, or experimental approach
  • Elements of reason
    • Deductive & inductive reasoning
    • HDism/inductivism
    • Certainty and statistics
    • Reason and modelling
  • Elements of integrity
    • ...done for now
  • Elements of community
    • Fleck leading into... ???
  • Fundamentals - this should probably go into reasoning...
    • Logic
    • Mathematics
  • History
  • Philosophy
  • Heuristics - currently in reasoning, not sure though...
    • Confirmation theory
  • Limits of method

Etymology[edit]

Method ("methodos") has first been used by Aristotle and the ancient Greeks to broadly describe the way to reach ideas.

This broad sort of understanding continued to be used throughout the renaissance, u.a. in Descartes' On the Method, until the sciences were gradually formalized in the 1800s. Significant institutional development saw the method of science interpreted as a single unified concept, a view that held sway as the "scientific method" became popularised in science education and textbooks in the early 1900s.

This unified view was soundly rejected in the 1960s and 1970s, which led to a split in the conception of method. Educators continued to teach scientific method as the idea of how science is done, while philosophers came to a consensus that no such thing as a genuinely methodological approach to the sciences exists. Both approaches have been criticised. Educations' approach as too simplified to convey the true nature of science, and the philosophical approach as too narrow to actually explain anything.

What we are left with is Aristotle's initial understanding of the word method. The principled approach to scientific progress; the ethos of the sciences. What exactly it means subject to individual understanding, rather than popular guidelines.

Introduction[edit]

I can illustrate the ... approach with the ... image of a nut to be opened. The first analogy that came to my mind is of immersing the nut in some softening liquid, and why not simply water? From time to time you rub so the liquid penetrates better, and otherwise you let time pass. The shell becomes more flexible through weeks and months — when the time is ripe, hand pressure is enough, the shell opens like a perfectly ripened avocado! . . .

Science is not easy, and there is no easily accessible way of explaining how an idea comes to be other than anecdotal inspiration. What Grothendieck is talking about here is that scientists immerse themselves in their field, and eventually develop a view of what is currently known that helps them in their work.[ε][ζ]

That process cannot be rationally reconstructed.[15] There is, however, an accessible way of explaining the principles of science. The nature of reason and integrity inherent to it. Scientific endeavour can be introduced in different ways.[c] A fundamental split can be made between the general principles of science, and techniques specific to a field of inquiry. The former are necessary to understand science, both need to be mastered in order to advance science.[11]

Scientific inquiry[edit]

The nature of knowledge and the pursuit of truth[edit]

The demarcation problem, trying to find a definitive answer to what differentiates science from non-science... has not been fruitful. It has even been said that the very question should simply not be bothered with.[16] Still, some positive perspective on the matter is instructive.

Elements of inquiry[edit]

lost refs:[17]

nuke and NEW -[edit]

Scientists seek to make observations and predictions that lead to new theory in a reproducible manner.[18] How results are reasoned differently from either observations or predictions is described below but it is generally recognized to develop advances in knowledge through the following elements, in varying combinations or contributions: [19][20]

  • Characterizations (prior theory, observations, definitions, and measurements of the subject of inquiry)
  • Hypotheses (theoretical, hypothetical explanations of observations and measurements of the subject)
  • Experiments (tests of predictions offered by the above)
An iterative,[21] pragmatic[22] scheme of the outlined elements is sometimes offered as a guideline for proceeding.[23] This diagram represents one representation, and there are many others.

The scientific method is an iterative, cyclical process through which information is continually revised.[24][21] These methodological elements and organization of procedures tend to be more characteristic of experimental sciences than social sciences. Nonetheless, the cycle of formulating hypotheses, testing and analyzing the results, and formulating new hypotheses, will look similar.

A research question is suggested to give structure to increasingly detailed characterizations. Its formulation will usually start with a broad look at the field of inquiry, and potential questions' fruitfulness for further research, and become increasingly narrow as factors for direction and impact are identified. A small, but definitive step is often considered preferable to broadly applicable but vague answers.[25][η]

Each element of the scientific method is subject to peer review for possible mistakes. These activities do not describe all that scientists do but apply broadly to the experimental sciences (e.g., physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology). The elements above are often taught in the educational system as "the scientific method" and questions simplified in the "5Ws".[A]

There is significant discourse over how useful simple explanations are for explaining science and how such descriptions have little relation to the ways that science is actually practised that is detailed further below.[35]

The hypothesis-testing method[edit]

The scientific community and philosophers of science generally agree on the following classification of method components. These methodological elements and organization of procedures tend to be more characteristic of experimental sciences than social sciences. Nonetheless, the cycle of formulating hypotheses, testing and analyzing the results, and formulating new hypotheses, will resemble the cycle described below. The scientific method is an iterative, cyclical process through which information is continually revised.[36][21] It is generally recognized to develop advances in knowledge through the following elements, in varying combinations or contributions:[19][17]

  • Characterizations (observations, definitions, and measurements of the subject of inquiry)
  • Hypotheses (theoretical, hypothetical explanations of observations and measurements of the subject)
  • Predictions (inductive and deductive reasoning from the hypothesis or theory)
  • Experiments (tests of all of the above)

Each element of the scientific method is subject to peer review for possible mistakes. These activities do not describe all that scientists do but apply mostly to experimental sciences (e.g., physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology). The elements above are often taught in the educational system as "the scientific method".

An iterative,[21] pragmatic[22] scheme of the four points above is sometimes offered as a guideline for proceeding.[37] This diagram represents one representation, and there are many others.

While this schema outlines a typical hypothesis/testing method,[38] the scientific method is not a single recipe: it requires intelligence, imagination, and creativity.[39] In this sense, it is not a mindless set of standards and procedures to follow but is rather an ongoing cycle, constantly developing more useful, accurate, and comprehensive models and methods. For example, when Einstein developed the Special and General Theories of Relativity, he did not in any way refute or discount Newton's Principia. On the contrary, if the astronomically massive, the feather-light, and the extremely fast are removed from Einstein's theories – all phenomena Newton could not have observed – Newton's equations are what remain. Einstein's theories are expansions and refinements of Newton's theories and, thus, increase confidence in Newton's work.

In inquiry-based education "characterization" is often summed up as the formulation of a "question", [A] this simplified model of course presumes a scientist with extensive knowledge of their field knowing what questions are expected to be fruitful. The model also doesn't feature rationality, or what scientist and philosopher William Whewell (1794–1866) called "invention, sagacity, [and] genius"[40] — in other words: how ideas come to be.

There is significant discourse over simple representations ... [pre and post analysis discussion seems the most useful way of framing this // Feigl vs Feyerabend 1970?]

Some eminent scientists and philosophers even say that such descriptions have little relation to the ways that science is actually practised.[29][30]

Elements of Reason[edit]

Model dependent science[edit]

Non-statistical modelling is once again different, as its certainty is a measure of correctness. If the model accurately represents reality, it is seen as useful, and therefore as representative of reality.

This sometimes leads to weird seeming arguments when models that (as they are currently understood) represent reality equally well. The trouble here being that they do not have to contradict each other (and thereby be falsifiable mathematically) as they are abstract models. Because they are either both right or one simply hasn't been disproven yet, the argument for primacy then leads to fruitless vagary. In looking for a definitive solution to this question, scientists have argued both for the acceptance of multiple models of reality as equally valid, and denied that such abstract models make claims about reality in the first place.

Logic and mathematics // or: Mathematical fundamentals[edit]

Too often, this concern for the big picture is simply obscurantist and is put forward by people who prefer vagueness and mystery to (partial) answers. Vagueness is at times necessary and mystery is never in short supply, but I don’t think they’re anything to worship. Genuine science and mathematical precision are more intriguing than are the “facts” published in supermarket tabloids or a romantic innumeracy which fosters credulity, stunts skepticism, and dulls one to real imponderables.

There is a point to the saying that no one masters anything without hard work. No point can be made without basic logic, data analysis will almost always mean writing some kind of basic code to actually do the work, and the first semester at university will be mathematics. Foundational elements here are logic's rules of inference and mathematical proof.

It was pointed out above that scientific method cannot illustrate how ideas come to be, but only structure—and it will be pointed out below that not all consider structure to be an essential concept either.

Elements of integrity[edit]

Beliefs and biases[edit]

...additions...

An example here: Arthur Worthington's 1875 experiment studying falling fluid droplets and their behaviour upon hitting a solid surface. Initially, he studied the droplets with the naked eye, sketching radially symmetric patterns. However, when Worthington shifted to photography in 1894, he discovered that the splashes were actually irregular. Furthermore, upon revisiting his drawings, he realised he had indeed captured some asymmetrical splashes, which he had previously dismissed as insignificant anomalies. In his pursuit of documenting the ideal splash form—a uniform and regular shape—he unconsciously downplayed the irregularities of individual splashes. This case highlights how theoretical preconceptions, such as Worthington's initial belief in the perfect symmetry of the physics he studied, can influence and distort empirical findings.[42]

Daston & Galison give this example leading into their extrapolation on scientific objectivity, arguing the existence of epistemic fear. Anderson, in her review of Daston & Galison suggests that scientists should remain positive in their outlook as the ethos of objectivity is "an aspiration toward an ideal that the practitioners know cannot be reached" but strive for fearlessly anyway as otherwise "the ideal collapses into a form of defensive illusion".[43]

Value judgement or Evaluative presuppositions[edit]

The underdetermination argument establishes that scientists may use political values to guide inquiry ... the fundamental criterion of illegitimate guidance: when value judgments operate to drive inquiry to a predetermined conclusion.


Broad overview:[45]

Elements of community[edit]

Science is a hugely successful human enterprise, and progress almost always takes more than a single person to achieve. Scientists cooperate either directly through peer review or indirectly by building on previous work, such as previous theory and observation. In modern and especially big science, when hundreds of researchers across multiple institutions are working on solving aspects of the same problem, intercommunication takes on new dimensions. The availability of not only experimental data but data in general is an element. Observation can span the globe, as in the case of seismology and, yes, weather forecasting. New Hypotheses become old hypotheses faster, the more people work on crafting new theory. And experiments at Cern or on the International Space Station are planned far in advance, given a time-slot, and not ever done by the proposing scientist.[needs copy edit]

[Example on citizen science? Something about large scale observation...]

Thought collectives[edit]

Communication and community are so important to science in fact, sociologists have studied scientific ideas, and their emergence and life within a community of scientists. The sociology of knowledge is a concept in the discussion around scientific method, claiming the underlying method of science to be sociological. King explains that sociology distinguishes here between the system of ideas that govern the sciences through an inner logic, and the social system in which those ideas arise.[θ]

A perhaps accessible lead into what is claimed is Fleck's thought, echoed in Kuhn's concept of normal science. According to Fleck, scientists' work is based on a thought-style, that gets instilled through education and cannot be rationally reconstructed. It gets instilled through the experience of learning, and science is then advanced based on a tradition of shared assumptions held by what he called thought collectives. Fleck also claims this phenomenon to be largely invisible to members of the group.[48]: 177 

Fleck also suggested that members of different circles of thought tend to talk past one another, which stands in context with his more widely accepted gestation periods. Before Fleck, scientific fact was thought to spring fully formed (in the view of Max Jammer, for example), when a gestation period is now recognized to be essential before acceptance of a phenomenon as fact.[49] Following Fleck, the thought collectives within the respective fields will then have to settle on common specialized terminology, publish their results and further intercommunicate with their colleagues, in order to progress.[50]

...should?

A 2020 symposium of current and recent research on the social contextualisation of scientific inquiry lists several developing ideas on social impacts on the nature of scientific inquiry.[51] — though as with many things less than certain in the sciences, there is spirited disagreement. Fleck's assertion of scientists themselves being largely unaware of all this bears repeating here. As does his 1935 view of different collectives of thought tending to talk past one another.

Heuristics[edit]

Heuristics are indefinite expressions of



[52]

Still, if we chose to believe Popper then "[if] we have made this our task, then there is no more rational procedure than the method of trial and error--of conjecture and refutation"[53] anyway—a heuristic.

History[edit]

Philosophy[edit]

Epistemological anarchism[edit]

Paul Feyerabend examined the history of science, and was led to deny that science is genuinely a methodological process.[ι] In essence, he cautions against drawing up rules because they result in a restriction of creativity. They, in his view, guide thought to be framed in the bounds of the drawn rules, and not framed by the world as it is.

A scientist, an artist, a citizen is not like a child who needs papa methodology and mama rationality to give him security and direction, he can take care of himself, for he is the inventor not only of laws, theories, pictures, plays, forms of music, ways of dealing with his fellow man, institutions, but also entire world view, he is the inventor of entire forms of like.

— Paul Karl Feyerabend (1978) Science in a Free Society[59]

A more general inference against formalised method has been found through research involving interviews with scientists regarding their conception of method. This research indicated that scientists frequently encounter difficulty in determining whether the available evidence supports their hypotheses. This reveals that there are no straightforward mappings between overarching methodological concepts and precise strategies to direct the conduct of research.[60]

Feminist philosophy of science[edit]

?=?=?

Feminist philosophy of science is a branch of feminist philosophy that seeks to understand how the acquirement of knowledge through scientific means has been influenced by notions of gender identity and gender roles in society. Feminist philosophers of science question how scientific research and scientific knowledge itself may be influenced and possibly compromised by the social and professional framework within which that research and knowledge is established and exists.[61]

title[edit]

postmodernism, feminist studies, and social constructivism

It has been pointed out that every rule of science has been broken at some point in the quest for knowledge.[62] — It should also be pointed out, that following the "rules" will not imply correctness. Scientists will work on the same problem offering differing solutions, will offer scientific dissent, and some if not most will turn out to have been "incorrect" in their predictions. And this doesn't even have to mean that their method or their reasoning had been faulty.

In the ongoing process of science, someone will be "incorrect" with their hypothesis on the observational evidence proving our current understanding of the theory of relativity to be incomplete.[d]

...

Thomas Kuhn argued that changes in scientists' views of reality not only contain subjective elements, but result from group dynamics, "revolutions" in scientific practice which result in paradigm shifts. As an example, Kuhn suggested that the heliocentric "Copernican Revolution" replaced the geocentric views of Ptolemy not because of empirical failures, but because of a new "paradigm" that exerted control over what scientists felt to be the more fruitful way to pursue their goals.[63]

Limits of method[edit]

On the xxx of past success[edit]

A great past example of this is the fight over the existence of the atom, prior to its existence being definitively proven. In particular, the discourse between Max Plank (Plank constant), Boltzmann (Boltzmann constant) and Ernst Mach (Mach number), all eminent and very well accomplished scientists. Mach famously remarked after one of Boltzmann's lectures in 1897: "I don't believe that atoms exist!" — And from an epistemological viewpoint, he wasn't wrong then; you cannot just assume what is not yet proven.[64][8] He suffered a stroke in 1898, retired prior to the discovery of the nucleus; and died in 1916, not having changed his opinion on the atoms existence.

"A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it."

— Kuhn, quoting Max Planck's autobiography [65]

See also[edit]

(Doesn't exist, but should. See:[66] and Google, I suppose.)

Reasoning by xxx


There have been different opinions and attempts at explaining how scientific progress is achieved. Mostly in the context of the discourse surrounding the scientific method. Articles on the topic include:


Currently popular theories include:

Literature[edit]

  • Gauch Jr, Hugh G. (12 December 2002). Scientific Method in Practice. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511815034. ISBN 978-0-521-81689-2. comprehesive scientific overview
  • Godfrey-Smith, P. (2009). Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Science and Its Conceptual Foundations series. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-30061-0. Retrieved 30 April 2024. comprehensive philosophical overview
  • Burks, Arthur Walter (1977). Chance, Cause, Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-08087-1.
  • Robert, Christian P.; Chopin, Nicolas; Rousseau, Judith (2009-05-01). "Harold Jeffreys's Theory of Probability Revisited". Statistical Science. 24 (2). doi:10.1214/09-STS284. ISSN 0883-4237. ...on Bayesian Reasoning
  • Anderson, Elizabeth (2004). "Uses of Value Judgments in Science: A General Argument, with Lessons from a Case Study of Feminist Research on Divorce". Hypatia. 19 (1). [Hypatia, Inc., Wiley]: 1–24. ISSN 0887-5367. JSTOR 3810929.
  • Lipton, Peter (2004). Inference to the Best Explanation. Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203470855. ISBN 978-0-203-47085-5.
  • Hands, D. Wade (9 April 2001). Reflection without Rules: Economic Methodology and Contemporary Science Theory. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511612602. ISBN 978-0-521-79796-2.

Examples[edit]

Communication, review, and Darwin[edit]

Charles Darwin's theory on evolution... -- We know with certainty today that it was him and his 20 years of research that can be given sole credit not just for the comprehensive research but its conclusions also. And we know so because discussed his ideas with colleagues.

Community, and papers with a thousand authors[edit]

In 2017, the number of scientists alive was larger than the number of dead.

Discovery and neophobia[edit]

For new ideas to come into being, there has to be a lack of them prior. Being a scientists, on a regular basis, will mean not understanding something. And a scientists attitude towards their own lack of understanding is at the core it.

Lab work and the discovery of DNA[edit]

...not sure; example currently integrated with the article.

Funny way to write a History[edit]

The history of scientific method considers changes in the methodology of scientific inquiry, as distinct from the history of science itself. The development of rules for scientific reasoning has not been straightforward; scientific method has been the subject of intense and recurring debate throughout the history of science, and eminent natural philosophers and scientists have argued for the primacy of one or another approach to establishing scientific knowledge.

"A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it."

— Kuhn, quoting Max Planck's autobiography [67]

Not to give preference to some of the great thinkers over all the others, we will not attempt a condensed history of past methods of science here. Beyond general impossibility, it may not even matter that much.


Aristotle has been called the "founder of...", but been generally

The Islamic golden age has been largely ignored by European scholars in favour of their own history of achievement; and potential far eastern influence on it even more so.

Einstein called Galileo, whose work he had built on, the father of modern science.

Leftovers on a short history[edit]

Beginning in the 19th century, the idea of the method of science became more formalised with hypothetico-deductivism, which, by the early 20th century, was adopted as the scientific method as taught in education.[f]

By the mid 20th century, falsificationism, an early proponent of which was Frank Popper, rose as an important discussion alongside the post-modern refutations of formalised method, advocated for by Paul Feyerabend.

21th century discussion has been shaped by (re-)interpretations of Thomas Kuhn's views on scientific advancement as an alternating cycle of normal science and revolution; and the attempts at formulating the field of science studies.

monster[edit]

This might either be my next radical idea, or a quite good one that nobody has thought about doing yet...

I believe the History section is always going to frame the 'myth' of science better than the method of science itself. We should remove it, and we don't even lose that much by doing so. We can move the section on the current discussion into the 'Philosophy' section pretty much as is, and scatter the rest throughout the article.

We're doing just fine selling the myth of science in the other sections (which, for the record, I think is useful, positive, inspiration).

It seems to me as if the history of the 'History' section was that of first growing into a monster before discussion rectified that. It then tried... hard, at not really being a history section at all, before being cut dramatically again. It's now in a bit of a weird state, looking unfinished and with a focus on recent debate.

I gave it a structure to guide re-expansion, but do feel like we should discuss either removing it completely as I suggested or moving it to the bottom until someone feels like doing the re-expansion.

I also want to argue that anything that is 'current discussion' is not (strictly) history, and would be better covered in context; so should be moved, regardless of deletion or not, into the section on 'philosophy' entirely. This would also prevent duplication.

Dewey and Education (snippets of unused material)[edit]

The first measure of... everything should be 'usefulness'. The first question should be: 'is it useful?' and the immediate second 'why is it useful?' This way, when approaching an understanding of Dewey's sequential elements of scientific method (1910), we can put his reasoning in light of his other publications, like Industrialised Education (1916).

Dewey saw the need to canonise education, to industrialise it, in order to guarantee the well-forming of the next generation. He espoused that:

It is no accident that all democracies have put a high estimate upon education; that schooling has been their first care and enduring charge. Only through education can equality of opportunity be anything more than a phrase. Accidental inequalities of birth, wealth, and learning are always tending to restrict the opportunities of some as compared with those of others. Only free and continued education can counteract those forces which are always at work to restore, in however changed a form, feudal oligarchy. Democracy has to be born anew every generation, and education is its midwife.

— The Need of an Industrial Education in an Industrial Democracy (1916)

His assumption was systematisation would lead to broader understanding.[g]

Today, a great many teachers complain that they 'love teaching but hate education' because of how Dewey's idea of method, and the associated ideas on industrialised education, have dominated education, and because the way thought works has little to do with sequential organisation. A systematised approach might look reliable from an administrative standpoint, but a teacher's mind does not work best with a sequence of planned lessons, and it has been suggested that an 'individual education plan' should be considered not just for the student.

Scientific thought, like any other, is fostered purely by immersion in subject matter, and trying to classify its nature objectively may well be impossible.[h] One immerses oneself in a field of inquiry and, through continued yet measured exposure the nature of which can be quite individual in degree,

Lead section[edit]

  • relevant discussion archived here

[The scientific method is a] method of procedure that has characterized natural science since the 17th century, consisting in systematic observation, measurement, and experiment, and the formulation, testing, and modification of hypotheses[.]

— oxforddictionaries.com (source 2)

The citation for the The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's entry on "Scientific Method"[68]

Lead (historical contextualization)[edit]

The scientific method is an empirical method for acquiring knowledge that emphasises rational thought. It first gained prominence during the scientific revolution of the 17th century as an expansion on early empiricism, and has characterized the development of the sciences since. It is often characterized by systematic observation and experimentation, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories.

The idea of method was expanded upon by the logical positivists in the 19th century, who introduced the idea that a hypothesis ought to be 'falsifiable'. In the following century, the debate between realism and anti-realism further defined what we consider scientific methodology today.

In the early 19th century, method was canonized and introduced as an educational tool to teach the idea of science. And in the following century, debate on whether method, as a unified theory, was useful to actual science developed.

In the 1990s... [write a paragraph that gets around the not-at-all-useful term 'science wars']

Today the majority consensus gravitates towards some form of pluralism, that espouses that it is more useful for different branches of science to come up with their own way of doing things, because of how they individually understand their field. (terrible, but the idea is on the page)

This majority is opposed by the unificationists and the nihilists, who advocate degrees of either a unified methodology or find the idea of method not at all useful.

Where there is consensus is the fact that how method is taught has more to do with conveying the 'ideas' of science, and little if anything to do with how scientists actually work.

Lead, minimal changes[edit]

The scientific method is a scholarly method for acquiring knowledge that has characterized the development of the sciences since at least the 17th century.[i] It is often characterized by systematic observation and experimentation, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories.[69]

Although procedures vary from one field of inquiry to another, the underlying process is frequently the same from one field to another. It involves careful observation coupled with rigorous scepticism, because cognitive assumptions can distort initial perceptions. Scientific inquiry includes formulating hypotheses, via inductive reasoning; the testing deductions drawn from the hypotheses through experimental and statistical analysis; and refinement (or elimination) of the hypotheses based on the experimental findings.[70][71][72] And, though these are often presented as a fixed sequence of steps, they represent rather a set of general principles.[73] Not all steps take place in every scientific inquiry (nor to the same degree), and they are not always in the same order.[74][40]

Discussion on the method of science first gained prominence during the scientific revolution with the advancement of early empiricism, as argued for by Francis Bacon, rationalism, especially as advocated by René Descartes and inductivism, rising to particular prominence with Isaac Newton and his followers.

Current discussion includes the post-modern refutations of formalised method,[j] proposed by Paul Feyerabend; falsificationism,[k] an early proponent of which was Frank Popper; postpositivism,[l] influenced by Thomas Kuhn; and the continuing discussion on the universality of scientific method in science education,[m] that is built on hypothetico-deductivism as advocated by Dewey.

New lead[edit]

The scientific method is a method of procedure that has characterized the sciences since the scientific revolution of the 17th century. It is often characterized by systematic observation and experimentation, reasoned thought, and the formation and testing of hypotheses.

Yet, though the scientific method is often presented as a fixed sequence of steps, it represents rather a set of general principles.[73] Some even consider alternative definitions like thinking of it more like a 'social construct' more useful.[80] Not all steps take place in every scientific inquiry (nor to the same degree), and they are not always in the same order.[74][40]

Since different approaches to understanding are useful to different fields, this article will endeavour to provide three different approaches. (wordy, I know)

_____

My sectioning would include the following {About} headers:

...

...

...

Scientific integrity[edit]

y[edit]

The canonical elements,[81] the 'sequence' of steps, consist of careful characterizations a hypothesis that allows for predictions, which are then tested in experiments; the results of which can then be iterated upon by peers.[82][83][84]

New lead (snippets)[edit]

The scientific method is the sociological framework that has characterized the sciences since the 17th century. It is the idea that following a method of procedure is what leads to scientific progress. It involves...

The scientific method is a method of procedure that states that careful characterization leading to the testing of hyphoseses is the core of scientific inquiry.

The scientific method is an empirical method for acquiring knowledge that emphasises rational thought. It first gained prominence during the scientific revolution as an expansion on early empiricism, and has characterized the development of the sciences since.


Its emergence developed the Aristotelian model of early empiricism and challenged scholasticism with an increasing emphasis on rational thought.



Though the scientific method is often presented as a fixed sequence of steps, it represents rather a set of general principles.[73] Not all steps take place in every scientific inquiry (nor to the same degree), and they are not always in the same order.[74][40]

The method builds upon careful characterizations a hypothesis that allows for predictions, which are then tested in experiments. The results can then be iterated upon and confirmed by peers.[85][86][87]

Old lead[edit]

The scientific method involves careful observation coupled with rigorous scepticism, because cognitive assumptions can distort the interpretation of the observation. Scientific inquiry includes creating a hypothesis through inductive reasoning, testing it through experiments and statistical analysis, and adjusting or discarding the hypothesis based on the results.

Although procedures vary from one field of inquiry to another, the underlying process is frequently the same. The process in the scientific method involves making conjectures (hypothetical explanations), deriving predictions from the hypotheses as logical consequences, and then carrying out experiments or empirical observations based on those predictions.[n][88] A hypothesis is a conjecture based on knowledge obtained while seeking answers to the question. The hypothesis might be very specific or it might be broad. Scientists then test hypotheses by conducting experiments or studies. A scientific hypothesis must be falsifiable, implying that it is possible to identify a possible outcome of an experiment or observation that conflicts with predictions deduced from the hypothesis; otherwise, the hypothesis cannot be meaningfully tested.[89]

The purpose of an experiment is to determine whether observations[A][n][o] agree or disagree with hypothesis.[90][o]

Template:Ethics in science sidebar[edit]

Template:Official BBC Historians[edit]

BBC independence, impartiality and conduct[edit]

Opinions[edit]

Seaton writes that the Thatcher government increasingly politicised appointments for the governorship of the BBC. In her view, Marmaduke Hussey's appointment to the chairmanship was politically motivated and caused great, and negative, disruption.[91]: 205–209 

Cases[edit]

Some notable examples include reporting of the 1926 General Strike,[91] the Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939,[92]

R[edit]

Further reading[edit]

BBC[edit]

The 2017 Charter[edit]

Independence[edit]

The BBC must be independent in all matters concerning the fulfilment of its Mission and the promotion of the Public Purposes, particularly as regards editorial and creative decisions, the times and manner in which its output and services are supplied, and in the management of its affairs.

— Article 3[93] of the BBC Charter, 2016a

Independence is the core tenant of the institution that is the BBC. The royal charter of 2017 lists it first, right after the name of the corporation (1) and the date the charter is to take effect (2); before even establishing what the Mission and Public Purposes are.[93] Its editorial independence is limited only by its mission of impartiality in the public interest.

The service was always known to be steadfast in its independence, despite there having been serious attempts by the government to interfere with the services' independence. The chief historic example is the Suez crisis of 1959.[94] This struggle is an ongoing one. Blumler[95] in July 2016 collected some of the more recent concerns over the services' independence and indicated worry over some of the changes made to the charter. Several papers have expressed similar opinions.[96][97]

Mission and Public Purposes[edit]

The Mission of the BBC is to act in the public interest, serving all audiences through the provision of impartial, high-quality and distinctive output and services which inform, educate and entertain.

— Article 5[93] of the BBC Charter, 2016a

That is how the BBC's mission is set out in the royal charter of 2017. Set out right after (6), the BBC's public purposes are, broadly, to provide news and information, to support learning and to strive for high-quality creating content. Interestingly, the charter explicitly allows for "creative risk" to be taken,[93] giving the institution much more liberty in that regard than otherwise.

More generally, it is to support diversity and the creative economy across the United Kingdom; and it is to reflect its culture and values to the world.

The perhaps most debated tenant of course is the BBC's impartiality. Both left-and right-leaning observers have accused the institution of bias in the past, and the question has its own section in the article on the criticism of the BBC, where alleged biases on various national and international events are discussed.

Later (11), it is clarified that the BBC is to "seek to avoid adverse impacts on competition which are not necessary for the effective fulfilment of the Mission and the promotion of the Public Purposes", also.[93]

Governance and regulation[edit]

The 2017 Charter establishes the BBC Board as the governing body, and expanded the scope of Ofcom, fully established in the Communications Act 2003, to include the BBC. Ofcom thus took the regulatory functions formerly held by the previous iteration of the BBC Board, the BBC Trust, which itself had replaced the original Board of Governors of the BBC in 2007.[93] The government is to give it "guidance" on the "content requirements" to be set, also—considered a "key element" of the charter by the BBC.[98]

Other[edit]

The BBC itself lists the following other points as "key elements" of the charter:[98]

  • A new "unitary board" consisting of four government appointed members and a Chair, and nine BBC appointed members, to consider any "issues or complaints that arise post-transmission".
  • Editorial decisions to "remain the responsibility of the Director-General".
  • The possibility of production by independent companies to exist for all BBC programmes except news and some parts of current affairs.
  • The National Audit Office to have a "stronger role" in looking at how the BBC spends its money.

History[edit]

AND WHEREAS it has been made to appear to Us that more than two million persons in our Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have applied for and taken out Licences to instal and work apparatus for wireless telegraphy for the purpose of receiving Broadcast programmes[.]

— George the Fifth, Royal Charter for 1927

The 1927 Charter incorporated the BBC as independent from the Government in a similar way to institutions like the Bank of England. With a royal charter—not as a governmental department, and therefore independent of it. It established the Board of Governors of the BBC and the Postmaster General was set to supervise and give license to the broadcaster. Interestingly the charter did not spell out 'independence' as such, yet.

In 1937, after having been made to appear that 7,5 million persons now used wireless telegraphy, George the Sixth had the Postmaster General continue giving Licence to the BBC.

After several subsequent charters, the 1981 Charter moved the responsibilities of Licencing the BBC to an unspecified Secretary of State. The 1997 Charter specified the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.

The BBC shall be independent in all matters concerning the content of its output, the times and manner in which this is supplied, and in the management of its affairs.

Though it is held that the BBC had throughout the history of broadcasting held a greater degree of independence than other West European broadcasters,[99]: 96  comparing the different charters, that editorial independence had developed as part of the 'object' and 'governance' of the corporation and thus largely in implication. The 2007 Charter was the first to spell it out in a manner separate.

The 2007 Charter transformed the Board of Governors into the BBC Trust.

Notes[edit]

a.^ ^ This article usually refers to different charters by their effective dates and not by the date they were passed into law. So, while they all took effect on 1 January of their respective years, they, naturally, were passed into law before their effective date and are thus dated in the year prior.
The 2016 Charter itself writes in section 2.5: "In this article, "the 2006 Charter" means the Royal Charter for the continuance of the BBC which came into force on 1st January 2007." This page does not follow that convention, as the effective date works better as historical reference.

Works cited[edit]

Feminist art[edit]

Lead section[edit]

Feminist art is a movement in art born of motivated functions and thematically focussed on the empowerment of women. It does so by highlighting the societal and political differences women experience in their lives.[100]

Media used range from traditional art forms such as painting to more unorthodox methods such as performance art, conceptual art, body art, craftivism, fiber art, video art and film. Feminist art has served as an innovative driving force toward expanding the definition of art by incorporating new media and a new perspective.[101][102]

Lede 2[edit]

The political feminist art movement arose out of the feminist movement of the 1960s and 70s and strives

The feminist art movement refers to the efforts and accomplishments of feminists internationally to produce art that reflects women's lives and experiences, as well as to change the foundation for the production and perception of contemporary art. It also seeks to bring more visibility to women within art history and art practice. The movement challenges the traditional hierarchy of arts over crafts, which views hard sculpture and painting as superior to the narrowly perceived 'women's work' of arts and crafts such as weaving, sewing, quilting and ceramics.[103] Women artists have overturned the traditional view by, for example, using unconventional materials in soft sculptures, new techniques such as stuffing, hanging and draping, and for new purposes such as telling stories of their own life experiences.[103] The objectives of the feminist art movement are thus to deconstruct the traditional hierarchies, represent women more fairly and to give more meaning to art. It helps construct a role for those who wish to challenge the mainstream (and often masculine) narrative of the art world.[104] Corresponding with general developments within feminism, and often including such self-organizing tactics as the consciousness-raising group, the movement began in the 1960s and flourished throughout the 1970s as an outgrowth of the so-called second wave of feminism. It has been called "the most influential international movement of any during the postwar period."[105]

Debate on democracy/Criticism of democracy[edit]

Lead[edit]

All debate on democracy can be understood, neutrally, as critical theory as it applies to the arguments on democracy. The field's more academic name is critical democratic theory.

There are both internal critics (those who call upon the constitutional regime to be true to its own highest principles) and external ones who reject the values embraced and nurtured by constitutional democracy; and both can have valuable, if not necessarily valid, arguments.[106]

Criticism of democracy has been a key part of democracy, its functions and development throughout history. Plato famously opposed democracy, arguing for a 'government of the best qualified'; James Maddison extensively studied the historic attempts at and arguments on democracy in his preparation for the Constitutional Convention; and Winston Churchill remarked that "No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time."[107]

Critics of democracy have often tried to highlight democracy's inconsistencies, paradoxes, and limits by contrasting it with other forms of governments, such as a less democratic epistocracy or a more democratic lottocracy. They have characterized most modern democracies as democratic polyarchies[108] and democratic aristocracies;[109] they have identified fascist moments in modern democracies; they have termed the societies produced by modern democracies as neo-feudal;[110] while yet others have contrasted democracy with fascism, anarcho-capitalism, theocracy, and absolute monarchy.

Leading contemporary thinkers in critical democratic theory include Jürgen Habermas, Robert A. Dahl, Robert E. Goodin, Bernard Manin, Joseph Schumpeter, James S. Fishkin, Ian Shapiro, Jason Brennan, Hélène Landemore, and Hans-Hermann Hoppe.

Historical figures associated with the critique of democracy include Aristotle, Socrates, Plato, Montesquieu, Thomas Hobbes, James Harrington, Thomas Carlyle, John Ruskin, Martin Heidegger, Hubert Lagardelle, Charles Maurras, Friedrich Nietzsche, Carl Schmitt, Oswald Spengler, Julius Evola, Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, and Nicolás Gómez Dávila.

Core sandbox[edit]

MOS[edit]

Valuable stuff not found in yet related to WP:MOS:

Dealing with vandalism[edit]

  • pray for auto-reversion to be available still
  • template message from here
  • msg admin via WP:AVI

Things one can do // To-Do List[edit]

Special pages[edit]

Proof that...[edit]

See also: reasons to have faith in humanity

... quality contributions by student editors exist:

  • User:PumpkinBread11

... fantastic(al) COI-requests exist:

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ Spirited disagreement has a certain history in scholarly communication. A famous example here being Plank, Ostward, and Mach disagreeing over the existence of the atom.[8] Even Galileo partook in clarifying dissent rhetorically.[9]
  2. ^ "no opinion, however absurd and incredible, can be imagined, which has not been maintained by some of the philosophers". —Descartes[10]
  3. ^ The scientific endeavour can also be approached in different ways—this article taking the explanatory approach as opposed to the philosophical one, as the latter's conclusions tend to be narrow. Scientists themselves, on the other hand, tend to give useful anecdotes on the nature of understanding. Fantastic food for thought—also lacking context.
  4. ^ For reasons regarding a positive attention economy, we will not mention that someone has been "incorrect" about string theory...
  5. ^ Dewey quote 1916
  6. ^ Proposed note on education: In education, the idea of science is typically valued more than the way scientists actually work. Method in education has been popularised and argued for by Dewey[e] and argued against by scientists in general. They include that ...
  7. ^ For historical context, Europe had been at war x times during his lifetime already when Dewey published (1910) and the First World War was entering its major stages, when he wrote on democracy's need for systematised education (1916).
  8. ^ because of how one cannot observe oneself objectively
  9. ^ The discussion on the method of science first gained prominence during the scientific revolution; for notable practitioners, especially ones in previous centuries, see history of scientific method.
  10. ^ ... Feyerabend asserts that it is not useful to impose any single methodological rule upon scientific practices, going as far as to jokingly suggest that "Anything goes!"[75]
  11. ^ ... Popper proposes that if a statement cannot be logically deduced (from what is known), it might nevertheless be possible to logically falsify it.[76]
  12. ^ Post-positivists, contrary to the logical-positivists of the early 20th century, suggest that theories, hypotheses, background knowledge and values of the researcher can influence what is observed,[77] and try to pursue objectivity by recognizing the possible effects of biases.[77][78][79]
  13. ^ (I do not know what to include here that might be considered useful.)
  14. ^ a b See, for example, Galileo Galilei (1638). His thought experiments disprove Aristotle's physics of falling bodies.
  15. ^ a b Book of Optics (circa 1027) After anatomical investigation of the human eye, and an exhaustive study of human visual perception, Alhacen characterizes the first postulate of Euclid's Optics as 'superfluous and useless' (Book I, [6.54] —thereby overturning Euclid's, Ptolemy's, and Galen's emission theory of vision, using logic and deduction from experiment. He showed Euclid's first postulate of Optics to be hypothetical only, and fails to account for his experiments.), and deduces that light must enter the eye, in order for us to see. He describes the camera obscura as part of this investigation.

efn-ua[edit]

  1. ^ a b c In the inquiry-based education paradigm, the stage of "characterization, observation, definition, ..." is more briefly summed up under the rubric of a question. This question might be as basic as the 5Ws, or is this answer true?, or who else might know this?, or can I ask them?, and so forth. — The questions of the inquirer spiral until the goal is reached. Cite error: The named reference "aQuestion" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  2. ^ Peirce (1899) First rule of logic (F.R.L)[55] Paragraph 1.136: From the first rule of logic, if we truly desire the goal of the inquiry we are not to waste our resources.[56][57]Terence Tao wrote on the matter that not all approaches can be regarded as "equally suitable and deserving of equal resources" because such positions would "sap mathematics of its sense of direction and purpose".[58]

efn-ur[edit]

efn-lg[edit]

  1. ^ "... though “the reasons of good sense do not impose themselves with the same implacable rigour as the prescriptions of logic do” (Duhem 1906: 217), they are still reasons. — Psillos (2013) framing Duhem (1906) in the context of "good sense" acquired through "training and practice".[4]
  2. ^ D. J. Hand leads his article Statistics and the Theory of Measurement (1996) with: "No modern statistician can be unfamiliar with the fact that there are different interpretations of probability, that these lead to different schools of inference and that the conclusions drawn by these schools can differ."[5] He then goes on to talk about the issues arising from measurement and its interpretation.
  3. ^ "Scientists pursue ideas in an ill-defined but effective way that is often called the scientific method. There is no strict rule of procedure that will lead you from a good idea to a Nobel prize or even to a publishable discovery. Some scientists are meticulously careful; others are highly creative. The best scientists are probably both careful and creative. Although there are various scientific methods in use, a typical approach consists of a series of steps." — Atkins; Jones; Laverman[7]
  4. ^ Gauch gives two simplified statements on what he calls "rational-knowledge claim". It is either "I hold belief X for reasons R with level of confidence C, where inquiry into X is within the domain of competence of method M that accesses the relevant aspects of reality" (inductive reasoning) or "I hold belief X because of presuppositions P." (deductive reasoning) (Quotes from p. 30, expanded on in ch. 4)
  5. ^ Cite error: The named reference Musement was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  6. ^ Cite error: The named reference continualThinking was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  7. ^ "To explain all nature is too difficult a task for any one man or even for any one age. 'Tis much better to do a little with certainty, & leave the rest for others that come after you, than to explain all things by conjecture without making sure of any thing." — Isaac Newton[26]
  8. ^

    The sociology of knowledge is concerned with "the relationship between human thought and the social context in which it arises."[46] So, on this reading, the sociology of science may be taken to be considered with the analysis of the social context of scientific thought. But scientific thought, most sociologists concede, is distinguished from other modes of thought precisely by virtue of its immunity from social determination — insofar as it is governed by reason rather than by tradition, and insofar as it is rational it escapes determination by "non-logical" social forces.

    — M. D. King leading into his article on Reason, tradition, and the progressiveness of science (1971)[47]
  9. ^ In his book Against Method Feyerabend argued that no description of scientific method could possibly be broad enough to include all the approaches and methods used by scientists, and that there are no useful and exception-free methodological rules governing the progress of science. In essence, he said that for any specific method or norm of science, one can find a historic episode where violating it has contributed to the progress of science. He jokingly suggested that, if believers in the scientific method wish to express a single universally valid rule, it should be 'anything goes'.[54] As has been argued before him however, this is uneconomic; problem solvers, and researchers are to be prudent with their resources during their inquiry.[B]

efn-lr[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Harwood, Jonathan (1986). "Ludwik Fleck and the Sociology of Knowledge". Social Studies of Science. 16 (1): 173–187. JSTOR 285293.
  2. ^ Hawking, Stephen (1 April 1971). "Gravitationally Collapsed Objects of Very Low Mass". Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society. 152 (1): 75–78. doi:10.1093/mnras/152.1.75. ISSN 0035-8711.
  3. ^ Dewey, John (1916). Democracy and Education (PDF). Retrieved 2 May 2024. For clarity: Dewey talks about education in general here, not about the scientific method specifically.
  4. ^ Cite error: The named reference Psillos 2013 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  5. ^ Hand, D. J. (1996). "Statistics and the Theory of Measurement". Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (Statistics in Society). 159 (3): 445–492. doi:10.2307/2983326.
  6. ^ Planck, M. (1909). Die einheit des physikalischen weltbildes: vortrag gehalten am 9. dezember 1908 in der naturwissenschaftlichen fakultät des studentenkorps an der Univerität Leiden (in German). S. Hirzel. p. 36. Retrieved 19 April 2024. dieses Ziel ist - nicht die vollständige Anpassung unserer Gedanken an unsere Empfindungen, sondern - die vollständige Loslösung des physikalischen Weltbildes von der Individualität des bildenden Geistes.
  7. ^ Atkins, Peter William; Jones, Loretta; Laverman, Leroy (2013). "Fundamentals — Introduction and Orientation". Chemical Principles: The Quest for Insight (6 ed.). New York, NY: Freeman.
  8. ^ a b Broda, Engelbert (5 September 1981). "The interaction of Boltzmann with Mach, Ostward and Planck, and his influence on Nernst and Einstein" (PDF). Vienna University. Retrieved 13 April 2024. Cite error: The named reference "Broda 1981" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  9. ^ Moss, Jean Dietz (1989-02-01). "The Interplay of Science and Rhetoric in Seventeenth Century Italy". Rhetorica. 7 (1): 23–43. doi:10.1525/rh.1989.7.1.23. ISSN 0734-8584. JSTOR rh.1989.7.1.23.
  10. ^ René Descartes (1637) Discourse on the Method/Part 2 Archived 2021-09-01 at the Wayback Machine Part II
  11. ^ a b Gauch Jr, Hugh G. (2002-12-12). Scientific Method in Practice. Cambridge University Press. p. 327. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511815034.011. ISBN 978-0-521-81689-2. ...the winning combination for scientists is mastery of the general principles of scientific method together with mastery of the specific research techniques of a chosen specialty. Neither can substitute for the other.
  12. ^ a b Gauch Jr, Hugh G. (2002-12-12). Scientific Method in Practice. Cambridge University Press. p. 28. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511815034.011. ISBN 978-0-521-81689-2. This question of the value of science... The answer offered here is that scientists make four principal claims: rationality, truth, objectivity, and realism. Of course, other terms or plaudits could also be voiced to praise science, but basically they would be variations... Cite error: The named reference "Gauch Jr 2002 p. 28" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  13. ^ Gauch Jr, Hugh G. (2002-12-12). Scientific Method in Practice. Cambridge University Press. p. (Quote from p. 34; (clear) indication of Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend being those who would disagree p. 71). doi:10.1017/cbo9780511815034.011. ISBN 978-0-521-81689-2. ...several of their concerns: (1) Empirical data can neither falsify nor confirm a theory, so truth is elusive. (2) Theory choices are underdetermined by data, observations are theory-laden, and multiple criteria for theory choice lead to ambiguity. (3) Paradigms are incommensurable, so science cannot progress toward truth. (4) After admitting scientists' humanity and social situatedness, what makes a belief scientific is simply that it is what scientists say, and there is nothing special about science anyway.
  14. ^ Vakil, Ravi (18 November 2017). THE RISING SEA Foundations of Algebraic Geometry (draft) (PDF). Retrieved 1 May 2024. — Vakil cites A. Grothendieck R´ecoltes et Semailles, unpublished, translation: McLarty, Colin (9 April 2013). "The Rising Sea: Grothendieck on Simplicity and Generality". Academia.edu. Retrieved 1 May 2024.
  15. ^ Cite error: The named reference Fleck_comp_w/Kuhn was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  16. ^ Laudan, Larry (1983), "The Demise of the Demarcation Problem", in Cohen, R.S.; Laudan, L. (eds.), Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: Essays in Honor of Adolf Grünbaum, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 76, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 111–127, ISBN 90-277-1533-5. Alternative source: [1]
  17. ^ a b Peirce, Charles S., Collected Papers v. 5, in paragraph 582, from 1898: "... [rational] inquiry of every type, fully carried out, has the vital power of self-correction and of growth. This is a property so deeply saturating its inmost nature that it may truly be said that there is but one thing needful for learning the truth, and that is a hearty and active desire to learn what is true."
  18. ^ SEP
  19. ^ a b Peirce, Charles Sanders (1877). "The Fixation of Belief" . Popular Science Monthly. 12: 1–15 – via Wikisource..
  20. ^ Galison, Peter (1987). How Experiments End. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-27915-2. Retrieved 29 January 2018.
  21. ^ a b c d Brody (1993), p. 10 calls this an epistemic cycle; these cycles can occur at high levels of abstraction.
  22. ^ a b Cite error: The named reference truthSought4sake was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  23. ^ Crawford S, Stucki L (1990). "Peer review and the changing research record". Journal of the American Society for Information Science. 41 (3): 223–228. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1097-4571(199004)41:3<223::AID-ASI14>3.0.CO;2-3.
  24. ^ Godfrey-Smith, Peter (2009). Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-30062-7. Archived from the original on 2023-11-29. Retrieved 2020-05-09.
  25. ^ Mattick, Karen; Johnston, Jenny; de la Croix, Anne (2018). "How to…write a good research question". The Clinical Teacher. 15 (2): 104–108. doi:10.1111/tct.12776.
  26. ^ Statement from unpublished notes for the Preface to Opticks (1704) quoted in Westfall, Richard S. (1983). Never at Rest: A Biography of Isaac Newton. p. 643.
  27. ^ Cite error: The named reference Thurs2015 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  28. ^ Cowles 2020, chapter 1.
  29. ^ a b Cite error: The named reference auto was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  30. ^ a b Cite error: The named reference Smolin 2013 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  31. ^ Cite error: The named reference Staddon 2017 p. was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  32. ^ Cite error: The named reference Bauer 1992 p. was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  33. ^ Cite error: The named reference McComas 1996 pp. 10–16 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  34. ^ Cite error: The named reference Wivagg 2002 pp. 645–646 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  35. ^ Several views are taken in opposition:
    • ... that "scientific method" is a myth (that may be useful for communication, but not at all explanatory);[27][28]
    • ... that "scientific method" does not exist in the first place;[29][30][31]
    • ... that "the scientific method" as taught in education resembles a dogma rather than an informative explanation.[32][33][34]
  36. ^ Godfrey-Smith, Peter (2009). Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-30062-7. Archived from the original on 2023-11-29. Retrieved 2020-05-09.
  37. ^ Crawford S, Stucki L (1990). "Peer review and the changing research record". Journal of the American Society for Information Science. 41 (3): 223–228. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1097-4571(199004)41:3<223::AID-ASI14>3.0.CO;2-3.
  38. ^ Gauch (2003), esp. chapters 5–8.
  39. ^ Einstein & Infeld (1938), p. 92: "To raise new questions, new possibilities, to regard old problems from a new angle, requires creative imagination and marks real advance in science."
  40. ^ a b c d William Whewell, History of Inductive Science (1837), and in Philosophy of Inductive Science (1840)
  41. ^ Paulos, John Allen (1988). Innumeracy: Mathematical Illiteracy and its Consequences. Hill and Wang. pp. 126–127. ISBN 0-8090-7447-8.
  42. ^ Daston, Lorraine; Galison, Peter (2007). Objectivity. New York: Zone Books. pp. 11–16.
  43. ^ Anderson, Amanda (2008). "Review: Epistemological Liberalism / Reviewed Work: Objectivity by Lorraine Daston, Peter Galison". Victorian Studies. 50 (4). Indiana University Press: 661. JSTOR 40060409. {{cite journal}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help)
  44. ^ Anderson, Elizabeth (2004). "Uses of Value Judgments in Science: A General Argument, with Lessons from a Case Study of Feminist Research on Divorce". Hypatia. 19 (1). [Hypatia, Inc., Wiley]: 1–24. ISSN 0887-5367. JSTOR 3810929. Retrieved 2 May 2024.
  45. ^ Elliott, K. C.; Richard, T., eds. (22 June 2017). Exploring inductive risk: Case studies of values in science. Vol. 1. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190467715.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-046771-5.
  46. ^ Here, King quotes Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality (London, 1967), 16.
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