Talk:Suez Crisis/Archive 1

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Misc

Link that from some pages on the WWI Sinai campaign come here. Can somebody fix this?

A television play by the BBC called Lipstick on Your Collar deals with the social and generational shift of Operation Musketeer in Britain. It's about the officers and men in a British Army office in London whose job it is to analyze Soviet troop movements. As the episodes continue (it's in several parts), the American rock'n'roll listened to by the young men is shown in clear contrast to the music favoured by their elders.

It's by Dennis Potter. Quite good. It may be worth a mention.

One of the bits of trivia included in the play is the debate over the landing zone selections. According to the play, and someone who knows about these things should comment, most of the bridges in the area couldn't support tanks, and the harbour wasn't deep enough to accomodate larger supply ships.

Undated pre-2003 discussions

The name used most for this war (per Google) is "Suez Crisis" (afaik, that's also the name used in Dutch and German, but that's not the issue here), rather than "Suez War". In both cases, the article should be renamed, removing the rather obsolete 1956 in the title. Any other thoughts on this? jheijmans

Vandal warning

The Chevaline page has attracted the attention of a vandal who seems concerned to obliterate any reference to the threats made by Nikita Khushchev at the time of the Suez Crisis. External references were provided in the Chevaline text and to help rebut his assertion an addition reference was made by me to the Nikita Khushchev page and the Suez Crisis page, but his seems not to have had the intended effect, as he now asserts on the Chevaline talk page that these are wrong. I fear I may have diverted his attentions here so you should be alert to vandalism here too. During the 1980's when I was an elected officer of CND we commonly referred to these defenders of the Soviet Union's absurdities as 'the Friends of Leonid Breshnev' who were an embarrassment within CND, but who couldn't be expelled. The world moves on, but some people never do.

There's a problem with most names, since:
  1. It included actual warfare, as Israel took over Sinai, U.K. and France were very close to sending in their troops. So it can't be called a "crisis"
  2. The operation's various parts had different names (Israeli attack: Operation Kadesh, joint U.K./French attack: Operation Musketeer), that cover different parts of the attack
My proposal is Suez Campaign, which seems to evade both these difficulties. What do you think? --Uriyan

I checked for "Suez Campaign" as well, which appears to be used as well, but even less than "Suez War". Of the three options, I would prefer War, since it is the only accurate description as far as I am concerned. However, we are not in the situation where we can name this situation ourselves; we have to use the common name or names for it. It appears that "Suez Crisis", no matter how "wrong" the title may be, is most widely used, followed by "Suez War" and "Suez Campaign". Therefore, I say we should name the article Suez Crisis, and create redirects for the other two. The different operations could actually deserve separate articles, in case enough information on them is available which doesn't belong at the general article (as do specific battles, for example). jheijmans

Ok, Yet Another Alternative (tm): Sinai Campaign (which in Google seems to rank less than Suez War but more than Suez Campaign). I'm lousy at choices so I leave that to you :-) I don't think the individual operations deserve articles of their own, first as they were bound together from the very beginning, secondly because there isn't too much to write on Operation Musketeer anyway (the British and the French withdrew when the Soviets began to shake their nukes). --Uriyan
I agree with jheijmans. This war is called the Suez Crisis. That doesn't mean it wasn't a war. But we have to use the name it has in English. --rmhermen

I have moved the article, including this talk page jheijmans

Can we have some citations for the allegations made in the final paragraph. They are very POV. i.e.

There were a few thousand casualties, mostly Egyptian, many civilian. in the course of the invasion the British stormed an Egyptian police station that held out under intense fire and killed almost all the policemen inside. The French were seen machine-gunning to death peasants who had jumped into the canal in fear. There were acusations of torture against the British and racism was a clear factor which allowed the invaders to justify their own inhumanity towards the Egpytian soldiers and civilians. The poorest area of Port Said, for example, was marked on British maps as "Wog-Town".
Mintguy
I've given the reference to the newspaper article I got that from. The article seems scholarly and balanced. Slaughter is "POV" by definition. AW
A newspaper article is hardly ever scholarly. Even an august body like the Independent. Robert Fisk's articles always have a slant. It's not really objective. Mintguy

I did a major update to this page because I have been reading a little about this recently and the Wikipedia page on it seemed to miss the basics of the war entirely, focusing almost exclusively in the Israeli involvement. It seems to me that this misses the essential imperial point. Also, the last version claimed that the invaders were vitorious! Even the most right-wing of tabloid papers in the UK considers Suez to be a historical disaster and an embarrassment.

I have not looked at the text that you may have replaced regarding this claim, but I suspect that the intended meaning may have been that the British and/or French military regarded their operations as having gone according to plan. The political wisdom of the instructions they received and the propaganda cost of the conduct of the operation may have been regarded as irrelevant from such a point of view. Compare the Tet Offensive in the Vietnam War -- Alan Peakall 14:58 Jan 22, 2003 (UTC)

Consequentaly, it is not talked of very often: a "forgoten war" in UK history. It's ghost has been floating about recently beacuse of the uncanny parallels that Blair faces between Suez and the current impending war against the Iraqis.

I have not removed the details of the Israeli involvement, just refocused the article, including the main points of the war from a UK perpective. It could probably use a French perspective too, and definately needs more of an Arab POV in the mix.

AW

Asa. Musslini of the Nile are Robert Frisk's words. Please show me reference to the term not written by Robert Frisk. Mintguy

The opening clause "To persuade the British public of the need for war..." suggests that Eden didn't have conviction in terms of his fear of Egyptian nationalism, which is unfair to Eden, who BTW was a knight of the realm at the time. Mintguy

Eden compared Nasser to Hitler and Mussolini in a letter to Eisenhower and when after British troops landed he is quoted (from a Robert Frisk article) as saying "If we had allowed things to drift," he said, "everything would have gone from bad to worse. Nasser would have become a kind of Muslim Mussolini, and our friends in Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and even Iran would gradually have been brought down. His efforts would have spread westwards, and Libya and North Africa would have been brought under his control." Mintguy "

"Mussolini of the Nile" is a quote by Fisk which seems to be not his own words. I have seen this used in another newpaper article too - this newspaper does not publish online - UK Dail Mail. Google only picks up Fisk articles for the term, so it may be that it is in fact his own phrase, though from your quote it is clearly Eden's thought. Perhaps it should be in single quotes rather than double. I've yet to see a source claim that Eden compared him to Hitler - Mussolini was an expansionist too. As to Eden's convictions: he may well have convinced himself that "Egyptian nationalism" was a great threat to the world, but from the Sevres meeting, it is clear that this happened only after he had convinced himself of the need to recapture British interests. Imperial expansionism always justifies itself in terms of the "needs" or "best interests" of the population of other countries. This goes for everything from Rome, to British Empire, to Hitler, to the current US empire (though let's not argue about that last one here, as it is beside the point...). Lastly, the fact that Eden had been decorated by the monarchy belongs in his article page, not on this page. AW

My reference to Eden's knighthood is because you replaced Sir Anthony Eden with just Anthony Eden. Mintguy
Daily Mail - http://www.dailymail.co.uk/. Although, I'm not sure they have the online archives. Their search facility seems to be not working at the moment. Anyway, again a newspaper, especially one like the Daily Mail is not scholarly.
Well, you don't have to tell me that the Daily Mail is not a scholarly source! And I already said that they don't publish their stuff online. But the point is that the thought behind the phrase is clearly Eden's, hence my suggestion about the quote marks. AW

References to Eden comparing Nasser to Hitler - :http://history.acusd.edu/gen/20th/suez.html Mintguy 

:http://www.worldsocialist-cwi.org/Index2.htm?eng/2003/01/18history.html
:http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-7/bowie26.html
:http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~cases/papers/appeasement.html
Mintguy
Cool AW

My point is that your use of 'propagandising' in associatiion with the phrase is clearly a POV, and not what Wikipedia is about. The aim of the article on Wikipedia should be to educate and not make a political point about a perceived similarity between Suez and the current political situation with Iraq (which was the thrust of the Robert Frisk article, your main source. The fact is that Nasser had been aiding Algerian separatists (which inflamed the French), obtaining weapons from the Soviet Union (which inflamed the Americans) and wished to unite the Arab world in a way that specifically Eden saw as a repeat of expansionism and nationalism of Italy and Germany 20 years before. On top of this the nationalisation of the Suez canal meant that access to the eastern Empire was under threat. Mintguy

Firstly: please check a link properly before you remove it.
Secondly, it will not do to simply declare as "POV" a such an important paragraph and just remove it. If you think it has a slant, then work with it and reword it. But it is simply immoral to have an article about any war, and have nothing that even mentions the human costs involved. I would like to be more specific about casualities than "a few thousand", but have not had time to do any more research yet. It would be good to have more sources for some of those points raised in the article, but I see no reason to disbelive any of them, apart from a vauge (though understandable) distrust of war journalists and newspapers. I have restored the paragraph and reworded some stuff.
Thirdly, "propaganda" is a perfectly neutral term - politians openly talk about the "propaganda war" fought by "our side" on mainstream British TV for instance.
Fourth, the article as writen makes no references or allusions to the current US/UK threat to the Iraqis. The source from Fisk may make such connections, but it was not my aim to do so. If you see any such slant, again, work with it, don't just remove stuff.
Fith: don't tell me about Nasser's international connections: put it in the article! AW
Another point: it is much beter to speak of what Eden claimed rather than what he believed, becuase the former (his words) is a straight matter of record and evidence, while we can only ever draw the latter as conclusions from the records and evidence. If there is sufficient reliable record and evidence, we can be almost completely sure that someone said something, while what they believed can usually be up for debate depending on one's interpretation of the facts. I'm not, of course, arguing that we should never refer to a specific person's beliefs, but rather that it is better to instead talk about what they said, if possible. Did Eden believe genuinely believe that Nasser was an "Arab Hitler/Mussolini"? I'm sure we could long debate this particular point, but in such cases it is much better and more neutral to simply state the facts: 'this is what Eden claimed'.
My opinion (irrelavent to the encyclopedia article, but perhaps interesting to you): whether or not Eden really belived Nasser was a new Hitler, the fact that he turned out to be wrong either shows that he was foolish or just plain lying. Since we know he lied to Parliment about UK collusion with France and Israel before the war, I personaly suspect that it was mostly the latter. AW

Are there any experts watching this page that could improve the Anthony Eden entry? Pcb21 11:18 Apr 15, 2003 (UTC)


Lester B. Pearson

I noticed there was not a single mention of Lester B. Pearson, the Canadian diplomat, in the entire article about the Suez Crisis. Pearson, who later became the Prime Minister of Canada, won a Nobel Peace Prize for his role in helping to solve the crisis. It was Pearson who organized the United Nations Emergency Force, and Canada had the single largest contribution to the force of all the member countries.

I feel that this is an unwarranted omission and should be included in the article. Considering that Pearson won a Nobel Peace Prize for this contribution, its a puzzlement that nothing was said about him.

I agree that Pearson is important but he did not invent peacekeeping in the matter of Suez, as is alleged here. The UN had conducted earlier peacekeeping missions. --Ggbroad 20:27, 10 August 2006 (UTC)

change

the author incorrectly wrote that Israel held on to the Gaza strip after the war. that is not right, they gave it up as well as much of the Sinai that they captured....they held onto both after recapturing them in the 67 war

removed 2 things

I removed for being confusing (presumably to everyone who is not a member of the Royal Marine Commandos) and unencyclopedic:

As the Royal Marine Commandos moved inland, their war generals remarked, "I'm gonna knock ya.....right out boy."

And removed the last 7 words from this line, for hyperbole:

The operation to take the canal was highly successful from a military point of view, but a political disaster, and finished Britain as a world power.

Tempshill 16:29, 10 Aug 2004 (UTC)


casualties

Jewboy, you gotta be kidding me! An article about an attack on egypt fails to mention egyptian casualties, but talks about the "plight" of jews? What a load of BS! That's like an article about holocaust talking about the plight of germans while ignoring the killing of jews. Like it or not, this isn't the israeli propaganda ministry website.

As legitimate as your point is, as well as your sympathy for the Holocaust, let's all try to think before using certain terms... Dpr 01:20, 10 Apr 2005 (UTC)


French incentives

  There seems to be no discussion in the article about the French incentives to involve 
 themsleves with the Suez affair, other than the generic reference to oil supplies.  While I 
 agree this was a major strategic interest of the French government (and I applaud the 
 reference to Yergin's book), they were also contending with Soviet and Egyptian backed rebels 
  in the French colony of Algeria.  Nasser's Pan-Arabism was causing headaches for the 
 French government and they sought to pressure Nasser to cease his support for the uprisings 
[after all, the French had just recently lost Morocco and Tunisie]. Most of the secret 
 French-Israeli alliance had to do with pressure on Nasser to quit supporting decolonization 
 in Northern Africa.
  For sources on French rationale for supporting Israel and the Suez affair, see Jacques 
 Soustelle's article in Foreign Affairs (1957), Avner Cohen's "Israel and the Bomb" (1998), 
 Warner Farr's analysis of Israel's nuclear weapons program (available from FAS.org). 12 Apr 2005

Dayan's memoirs

I seem to remember in the 1970's an account of the secret talks leading up to the crisis appeared in Moshe Dayan's memoirs, which were serialised in the Observer. The British did not come out well, they refused to meet the Israelis directly, only talking throught the French. Anyone thought of incorporating this? PatGallacher 12:00, 2005 Jun 5 (UTC)

Magazine article, fall 2005

In case someone would like to pursue further research for this article, see O'Brien Browne, "The Long Shadow of the Suez Crisis", in MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History, Autumn 2005. Flexiblefine 21:50, September 8, 2005 (UTC)

Fedayeen infiltration (Discussion from 67 war article, more relevant here)

Egypt sponsored fedayeen infilitration way before 1956. Not to mention, there are very pov sentences structures using Morris's claims as fact. Guy Montag 22:32, 12 September 2005 (UTC)

From The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World by historian Avi Shlaim, W.W. Norton 2001, pp.128-129:
Records of Egyptian and Jordanian military intelligence captured by the Israeli army in the course of the 1956 and 1967 wars conclusively disprove Dayan's version and substantiate Nasser's version. These records show that until the Gaza raid, the Egyptian military authorities had a consistent and firm policy of curbing infiltration by Palestinians from the Gaza Strip into Israel and that it was only following the raid that a new policy was put in place, that of organizing the fedayeen units and turning them into an official instrument of warfare against Israel.
The Jordanian documents tell a similar story. From them we learn that it was only in June 1955 that Egyptian military intelligence began to sponsor infiltration into Israel from Jordanian territory. Here, however, there was no change in the offical attitude toward infiltration. On the contrary, when the Jordanian authorities learned of the Egyptian attempt, they adopted even tougher and more comprehensive measures to counter it. These measures caused friction and tension between Jordan and Egypt.
Brian Tvedt 01:06, 13 September 2005 (UTC)

Michael Oren among others, tells another story. As far back as 1950, Colonel Mustafaa Hafez sponsored Palestinian infiltration from Gaza, many of which included sabotage attacks against Negev facilities, and terror attacks agains Israeli civilians. Sourced or not, this is a discrepency in historical fact that needs to be discussed. Guy Montag 03:02, 13 September 2005 (UTC)

Guy, if you can't cite sources this is by definition POV, i.e., unsourced editorial comment. No one is interested in the opinions of Wikipedia editors. If you want to make the claim above find a source. Expert opinion cited as such is not POV. Please don't label it as such. If you believe there is a dispute over the facts by experts of comparable standing, then just discuss that in the article and cite all the sources. Please don't restore the introduction making the POV claim that an invasion force was massing on Israel's borders. --Ian Pitchford 07:10, 13 September 2005 (UTC)

It is absurd to include more than the briefest mention of the pre 1956 and Suez war story here. Just because more people probably look at this article than the Suez war is no reason to include it and fight about it here. Attributing some things to Morris is ridiculous, it is like saying according to astronomer Homer J. Simpson, the sun rises in the east. The long accepted fact that Egypt did not sponsor the fedayeen before the Gaza raid is due to Ehud Ya'ari's Egypt and the Fedayeen, based on his publication of captured archives (in the early 70's iirc) not New Historians Shlaim or Morris much later by the way. As a common sense proposal, I also suggest using books for their main topic - e.g. Oren's 6 day war about this war, not the Suez war.John Z 08:47, 13 September 2005 (UTC)

Agreed. The material belongs in the 1956 war article, not this one. Brian Tvedt 11:14, 13 September 2005 (UTC)
When an article starts filling with peripheral material, it's a sure sign of POV pushing. Thanks for removing it. Jayjg (talk) 20:57, 13 September 2005 (UTC)

Belongs there or not, it is still wrong material. I have in my hand Israel's Secret Wars' by Ian Black and Benny Morris. He explicitly states (on p.117) that the Gaza raid was "less a consequence of the death sentences in Cairo (related to Unit 131 prisoners that Nasser promised not to execute) than of years of raiding by Palestinian and Egyptian irregulars across the frontiers of the Gaza Strip and West Bank. The Arab marauding, often as close as ten miles from Tel Aviv and on the outskirts of Jersusalem, turned large stretches of the border into virtual combat zones..." So don't tell me that this is unsourced. Morris tells a consistent story, it is not he who is taking things out of context.Guy Montag 18:15, 13 September 2005 (UTC)

There's no contradiction, (I don't think Nasser promised not to execute anyone, btw) Nobody denies that there were infiltrators, many of them terrorists before Gaza. The mufti, funded by the Saudis, for instance sponsored them. The question is whether Egypt sponsored them before Gaza. The scholarly consensus answer is no, based on captured documents and other sources - (e.g. records of negotiations between Israel and Egypt before Gaza (cf Elmore Jackson's Mission to Cairo iirc) show that Ben-G didn't really insist that Egypt was doing it) -and real negotiations were hardly likely if Israel thought there was massive state sponsored terrorism coming from Egypt. John Z 19:19, 13 September 2005 (UTC)

Egypt captured Gaza after the Israeli war of Independence in 1948. Afterwards, they turned Gaza into a virtual military base. Ben Gurion did not pressure Nasser because at that time he had just seized power. It was thought in all quarters, from London to Paris, to Tel Aviv, that he could be negotiated with. This is all sourced information. All you have to do is rent the book from any library and read the page I gave you. But on thing you are right. It was after the Gazan raid that Egypt officially amalgamated Palestinian fedayeen into their armed forces, but it doesn't mean that before that, Egypt did not unofficially sponsor terrorists. They did. Col. Mustafaa Hafez and Col. Salah Mustafaa both acted as controllers for various Palestinian terrorists in Gaza and the West Bank. Arguing that Egypt did not sponsor terrorism like for example, Iran does today, is simply a point of rhetoric, not reality. Guy Montag 00:50, 14 September 2005 (UTC)

The quote you provided from Black/Morris does not mention Col. Hafez or Col. Mustafaa. It refers only to "irregulars", with no mention that they were sponsored, officially or unofficially, by anybody. So the crucial claim you are making, that "Egypt sponsored fedayeen infilitration way before 1956", is still unsourced, and in fact contradicts the work of respected historians.
In Righteous Victims, Morris is consistent with Shlaim: "Until 1955 the Arab states officially opposed infiltration and generally attempted to curb it" (p. 270). John is correct that Shlaim's conclusion is baed on Ehud Ya'ari's investigation of captured Egyptian documents.
Brian Tvedt 12:25, 14 September 2005 (UTC)

Morris does refer to Hafez as being responsible for sending agents into Israel; 24 of these were captured in 1954 during their missions to "gather intelligence or commit acts of sabotage". These missions/raids were organised by Egyptian military intelligence (see Israel's Border Wars, pp. 65-66) However, on pages 85-86 he writes "Throughout the early and mid-1950s Israel variously charged that the Egyptian authorities were instigating or encouraging armed infiltration from the Gaza strip and Sinai, actively helping the infiltrators, and doing nothing to curb the incursions. The reality was somewhat different and more complex, with the IDF's Gaza Raid in February 1955 marking a clear watershed: before the raid Egyptian policy had, with few exceptions, consistently opposed infiltration; after it, while continuing to oppose uncontrolled civilian infiltration, the Egyptian authorities themselves initiated terrorist infiltration for political and military reasons. In their more candid moments, before 1955, Israeli officials acknowledged that Egypt opposed infiltration. In November 1953 Dayan, then OC IDF General Staff Branch, told American officials that "the problems along the border with Egypt are not the fruit of Egyptian Government plots but a fruit of its neglect, especially in the Gaza strip area, where Egyptian rule is weak and the refugee problem is going from bad to worse. The Egyptians are busy with their internal problems... and do not pay attention to what is happening in the Strip.... and therefore... the infiltration spreads". And on page 93 "Immediately after the Gaza Raid Egyptian officials - who had hitherto referred to infiltrators as mitsalilun, a negative term connoting thieves - began to refer to infiltrators as Fedayeen (men of sacrifice), a positive term. A similar change occurred in the Egyptian media, which hailed the Fedayeen, and Egyptian documents began to refer with pride to the exploits of the border-crossers and with the delight at the distress they were causing Israeli border communities." . --Ian Pitchford 15:48, 14 September 2005 (UTC)

Aftermath

"Eden's resignation marked, at least until the Falklands War, the end of the last attempt Britain would ever make to establish, as Scott Lucas writes, 'that Britain did not require Washington's endorsement to defend her interests'."

Establish what? Someone with knoweldge on this topic should fix this bit.

Never mind. The grammar was a bit unclear. I see it now. Maybe get rid of "the end of the" since it's not really necessary?

Correction: Many Jews started to leave Egypt voluntarily for Israel encouraged and financed by the Jewish Agency. One must here mention the infamous Lavon affair in which Israel used Egyptian jews to carry out clandestine operations inside Egypt. The terrorist acts were designed to scare the Egyptian jewish community into migrating to the new state east of the suez canal. I know of no evidence that Egypt expelled its own jewish citizens. A vibrant jewish community still exist in Egypt today. HAE

Actually, the Lavon affair was about discrediting the Egyptian government so that the British wouldn't give up the Suez Canal. And the Egyptians did indeed expel tens of thousands of Jews in the wake of the Lavon affair, and imprisoned at least 1,000. Jayjg (talk) 23:42, 15 November 2005 (UTC)

The west is guiltier than you think!

Nasser was able to blockade the canal with 40 ships, because the british bomber pilots failed miserably. They were only trained in dropping A-bombs post-WWII where a mile on or off doesn't matter and so they couldn't score with required accuracy to sink the ships outside the canal using conventional gravity bombs. This was great public shame for the RAF and hotly debated afterwards, as the entire conspiracy fell through because of this fiasco.

The article should clearly mention that Eden prime minister was a notorious drug, abuser high on methamphetamines and whatever common he saw between Nasser and Hitler was the imaginary projection of his own sick mind, nothing of reality. Eden was heavily drugging himself ever since the early 1930s and should have been removed from politics due to mental instability long before.

The article is totally biased. The land which "palestinians infiltrated" was their own birthland, from where jews expelled them forcibly. So the holyland arabs were right because that was the land of their ancestors. They were living there for 1500+ years, they were living there even before Prophet Muhammad started to spread the word of Allah, when they adored animisic totems!

It should also be mentioned in the article that Nasser didn't steal the Suez Canal, the nationalization law prescribed how the canal company members will receive compensation for their lost investment. Of course after the aggressive 1956 war, noone could expect compensation any more, as they committed a serious crime against the nation of Egypt.

The personal role of Mr. K. should be more emphasized and his famous "means of total destruction" remark on soviet H-bomb and ICBM mentioned. 195.70.48.242 15:18, 10 January 2006 (UTC)

marek

The description of the build-up to war is quite anti-Israeli. 1) Egypt did support the incursions from Gaza before 1956 2) Egypt's closure of the Straits of Tiran was contrary to international agreements and for Israel it constituted casus belli. So not an adventure by Daian, but an effort to secure the ONLY link with oilfields in Iran (since the Suez Canal was illegally closed to Israeli shipping by Egypt). The whole focus of the article is Britain-centred though the war was started by THREE states with different objectives. Also, not everybody who reads the English version of wikipedia is British or interested in a specifically British perspective.

Vandal alert

ref above note about Mr K and his threats to obliterate London and Paris. The Chevaline page on UK nuclear history has attracted the attention of a defender of Mr K and the former USSR's absurdities. A ref to Mr K's threats in the context of UK weapon development has been repeatedly vandalised by a bully who wishes to coerce others in agreeing to obliterate any reference to the threat from the USSR real or imagined that informed UK government weapons policy. External references were then supplemented by a citation to the Suez Crisis page and the Nikita Khruschev page, but these have been rubbished by him too. I fear that the reference to your page may have diverted his attention to you also. In the 1980's when I was an elected officer of CND these 'Friends of the Soviet Union' were a pain in the ..... but couldn't be expelled. They were a source of embarrasment to CND and undermined its efforts then. The world moves on, but some people never do. If the vandal turns to your pages you'll know it when it happens, so no names here.

Brian (User:Brian.Burnell), why don't you stop your extreme uncivilness and POV insertions? You must source properly! --maxrspct in the mud 20:48, 12 July 2006 (UTC)
I guess that the person referred to has broken cover and IDed himself. How sad. Brian.Burnell 21:30, 12 July 2006 (UTC)

It's odd that the brief summary that precedes the index in the article mentions the USSR, but the main article doesn't. Is this due to vandalism or oversight? Also worth mentioning that Eisenhower was facing re-election that November and wanted everything looking smooth and crisis-free. - AG, Stockport, UK.

Source

Is there a source for de Gaulle's comments in the Aftermath section's third paragraph?

Are you sure the Americans didn't wound anyone?

Casualty Figures

A BBC documentary (Suez: A Very British Crisis) just quoted Egyptian casualties as 650. But this article states 1,650. The BBC is generally accurate. Which is correct? 84.153.87.177 22:16, 30 October 2006 (UTC)

France withdrawal from the military command of Nato in 1966

It looks like France policy has it roots at this crisis, ie the dual polor world that appear once in a while in the literature. That was really interesting to read.

Another interesting details missed by the article, but worth inclusion is the dynamics prior to the war. See attached bbc link [1]. It looked like the plan was raised by Israel, and the other two countries jumped on board.

"What we know now is that France got wind of Israeli plans for a pre-emptive strike on Egypt, and said to them 'Hang on, let's see if we can work something out with Britain'," says Mr Vial.
"Britain had its own reasons for wanting to get rid of Nasser, and the government was caught totally by surprise by France's enthusiasm."

Outright Bias

It is very disturbing to see how bias this supposed encyclopaedic article is! There is no mention of the Sevres Protocol which was a gross violation of international law, there is constant mention of Egyptian support for guerrilla incursions and terrorist raids against Israel. Yes this is true, but the incursions are a reaction to Israeli occupation of Arab Land resulting in hundreds of thousands of refugees in Egyptian administered Gaza retaliating against this racist movement. There have also been records of rightwing Jewish Zionist incursions and terrorist raids on Gaza by groups such as the Irgun. Just about every source used has been from rightwing Israeli-Jewish authors and articles, none of this information has come from revisionist Israeli’s such as Ilan Pappe, Avi Schlaim, John Rose or Tom Segev, and their certainly hasn’t been any use of books advocating the Egyptian point of view. This is not history, this is propaganda and plain Myth making. The Suez Crisis or War was in direct contravention of international law, it was a deceitful and hateful act conjured up during the secret meetings at Sevres, and should be remembered that way. The Egyptian people died defending their homeland and their property, the nationalization of the canal was a legal act (The U.N. and the U.S.A. will back me up on that) in which Nasser repaid the company shareholder’s properly and created no obstruction to international shipping (although Eden sent every ship he could obtain through the canal in hopes that the Egyptians would not be able to deal with the pressure). Thus I urge everyone who took part in writing this bias and unhistorical article to revise it and tell the truth about the events of 1956 as not to try and deceive the world of Britain, France’s and Israel’s innocents. History should be respected and not desecrated in this manner.

Political Defeat

Added 'Major Political Defeat for Britain' in the battlebox. Given the importance of this campaign in the decline of the Empire, it is certainly worthy of mention in the synopsis. Psidogretro 19:39, 13 December 2006 (UTC)

Untitled

There are serious questions to be raised as to the neutrality of this article viz a vis the British.

You're right. It does seem a tad unfavorable to the Brits.

Aftermath

After retiring from office Eisenhower came to see the Suez Crisis as perhaps his biggest foreign policy mistake. Not only did he feel that the United States weakened two crucial European Cold War allies but he created in Nasser a man capable of dominating the Arab world.

Cold War Comments

Summary: Cold War Nuclear Blackmail Shaped the Suez Crisis
Action Required: someone who knows the surrounding history should boil these comments down to a short sentence, an aside.
In 1957, Britain's colonial power was not just down, ICBM atomic missile power was also up.


My father was a CIA Case Officer in Frankfurt, Germany during the Suez Crisis. I remember my childhood anxiety on a frightening day when the adults around me acted strangely. Mothers were whispering to each other about diaper changes, "days of baby food". There was a port in France, people were frantic to learn which one, there would be a trip. Copies of long-neglected mimeographed lists were found -- never drive with less than half-a-tank of gas, it said, always carry two full 5-gal cans in the trunk. It would be a long trip.

Dad took most secrets with him to his grave, but one day much later he talked to me about that day during the Suez Crisis. A contact known to the CIA had walked into the Frankfurt station. He was thought to have access to at least some members of the Politburo, or to those who knew their deliberations. But he had no official Soviet status. He was probably not a KGB agent, and yet he wasn't appealing to recruit as an agent for our side either, because he seemed put in place by the Russians, he seemed part of some game, not a clean walk-in. On that day, the man had walked into the CIA station in Frankfurt and said he carried a simple message from the highest levels of Soviet leadership: if the United States did not pressure her French and British friends to pull the Suez Expeditionary Force out of Suez immediately, Soviet nuclear-tipped Intermediate Range ICBMs (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles) would rain down on every major US base in Western Germany.

Dad was amused at first to see how that day looked to a child. He seemed most intent on impressing upon me the ambiguity of the situation. The threat of nuclear annihilation was both real and ambiguous by design. It would be easy and plausible for the Soviet Union to deny that it had anything to do with the wildcatting agent who pursued his crazy acts without their knowledge. Yet it was the judgment of the CIA Station in Frankfurt that the threat was real and a probe of American resolve. For this reason, all dependent families were immediately instructed to prepare for travel from German bases to the French coast for evacuation from Europe.

Is any of this known? Perhaps if no one can confirm it, it's worthless. I would like to see the story preserved because it enriches the Suez Crisis dialog and, more importantly, it is a concrete example of nuclear blackmail during the Cold War. Some would like to think the Cold Wall is a mental construct of disturbed minds (paranoia, delusions, whatever). The Cold War was a real conflict that deployed real power.

I don't know what more I can add to this, but I can be reached at jerry-va at speakeasy dot net.
Jerry-VA (talk) 22:12, 6 February 2009 (UTC)

ain't part of cold war?

why not? since khrushchev threatened to attack us with nuclear bombs. Shame On You 19:43, 4 April 2007 (UTC) This article is very biased - do not use —Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.254.147.68 (talk) 09:00, 18 September 2008 (UTC)

uk in its glory -even in its fall- as ever

operation musketeer/mousquetaire reads like the british were commanding or infiltrated among the french units. actually the british and french had two different targets and zones. i've watched a documentary telling the RAF raids missed their targets... while the french mirage IV didn't, maybe because the french were still in war since 1946 in indochina, following in algeria. the documentary told the us president put the pressure on Eden, threatening to devaluate the pound sterling, the public opinion was against war in england too. the french were already in war in algeria by that time, so it did minor change (the communists were against as ever) compared to the situation in uk. due to the us pressure, Eden had to withdraw his troops, but he didn't warned his allies france and israel! the french troops advance was blocked at some point by the british positions. this perfidious move from both the uk and us changed the look of the french on the cold war allies (see the help in indochina). hence the french atomic bomb, quit from NATO and fuck off for irak in 2002. i mean this article reads from the uk pov as ever. the documentary i've seen spoke as the French-English operation... Eden came the second day only at Sèvres, Israel and France had already have a discussion without the british. according to the documentary Eden was clearly against the invasion from the beginning even though his hatred for Nasser. the french were already in war so it was different. israel was close to france, france was close to britain, but there was a tension between britain and israel by that time. i mean maybe the british role is overrated and its sudden retreat (thanks to uncle sam) without warning underrated. it had strong backeffects however. the doc said it was because of suez that britain lose its colonial empire and submitted itself to the us until today. suez explains de gaulle's position against both the uk and us. doc said nuclear targets where everywhere on the map, it included the two of them. it was a major diplomatic crisis indeed. from the french pov it had a strong impact on the french commnding officers since the military operation was a succes but politicians wasted everything turning a military victory into a defeat. it happened before in indochina, the us felt the same in vietnam. and it happened after in algeria hence the generals upheaval (see the 1961 coup or putsch as you like). finally the french governement acted against the army in algeria toon hence the cease fire and retreat, and the OAS renegade organization. feels strange how the us don't use the experience of the french and finally experience the same failure. indochina became vietnam, and algeria is the same as irak. by 1958 the french had pacificated the revolution, but it lasted with terrorism, and finally civilian opposition and pressure see what's happenning in irak, it's all the same. it will end the same. [tv doc: L'affaire de Suez, le pacte secret - 2006 now available on emule] Shame On You 17:26, 7 April 2007 (UTC)

actually the british were commanding the operations. a french official "assisted" each british commander for each arm ground, aerial, airborne, etc. learn this in the archive news. wasn't in the doc. supreme commander was british General Keightley (he's dressed in white reviewing french paras in an archive video posted here), french comander was admiral Barjot. i guess the original invasion map was designed by israeli COS Moshe Dayan and french COS Challe, since the british delegation was of diplomats not strategists during Sèvres. so the british could had negociated execution role as a counterpart. this is only a supposition though. Shame On You 22:24, 9 April 2007 (UTC)
Ahh.. typical of the British get others to do the difficult and dirty work and then walk in. The Israeli operation GUARANTEED a successful military landing for the former Imperialists. Uncle Sam —Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.181.81.43 (talk) 23:16, 2 August 2009 (UTC)
On the contrary, the Egyptians were holding back the Israelis in the mid-Sinai, until the Anglo-French attacks began two days after the Israeli attack. Nasser withdrew his air force from operations. The EAF was sucessfully engaging the IAF over Sinai, but they could not fight the British air power in comparison. So the Israelis advanced across Sinai with no Egyptian air attacks, AFTER the Anglo-French air attacks. I will add to the aviation aspects of this article, with references, in future.IAC-62 (talk) 18:11, 30 March 2010 (UTC)

Actually, unsigned, it wasn't a British plan, it was a French plan, and they wouldn't have needed Britain except that the French didn't have air bases in range of Egypt's airfields, only Britain did. Israel had their own reasons for wanting to deal with Nasser, but from the Anglo-French perspective the reason for bringing in Israel was to provide an excuse for sending in the troops - they were supposed to "stop the war" and to "protect the canal from the fighting" and the fact that Egypt wasn't going to just allow their troops in made them an "aggressor" and so justified the bombing of Egyptian air bases which Israel insisted upon. The Israel attack wasn't so Israel would do the "dirty work", but to provide a plausible excuse. Nasser had nationalised the Canal months earlier, and too many people had become used to the new situation for armed intervention to be politically plausible. Eden handled the whole affair extremely badly, with not even bothering to discuss his situation with his French and Israeli allies being just the last proof of it.

Reply to: "Actually, unsigned..." No IP, "Dirty Work" means enveloping the entire fledging Egyptian army to fight the Israelis far from the canal. This diversionary tactic practically let the former "Imperialists" walk-in. Ad-Hoc Egyptian soldiers with non-existent training were fielded against the valiant UK and French landing forces. Do not blame the French for the UK's poor decision to join in on a illegal excursion. The British knew that Nasser's control over the Suez Canal would lead to a Middle-East vexing to remove the European powers from controlling their rightful sphere of influence. The crisis played perfectly into the hands of the US, and hence the company ARAMCO was born. The old-Imperialist had gambled the whole Middle-East on the canal and lost miserably. The Dulles brothers played the game masterfully, for which the UK and France are still paying an enormous cost. --67.169.11.251 (talk) 06:34, 24 October 2009 (UTC)

missing infos on nasser's violation of treaty of 1954!

according to french news, nasser was supposed to not nationalize the canal built by the french until 1968 as agreed by a treaty involving egypt and britain too. LES ACTUALITES FRANCAISES, AF - 01/08/1956 the archive news video shows a meeting at downing street between Lloyd (foreign affairs secretary), Murphy (an american politician) and Pineau (foreign affairs minister). comment says in 1954 by signing the evacuation of the canal by the british, the regime of the canal was garantee until 1968. so what nasser did was a violation of the egyptian-british treaty of 1954. Shame On You 01:31, 9 April 2007 (UTC)

videos

damn i have too much archive videos now. i will move some in the operation musketer article and others in the operation amilcar.

is it me or it looks like a colonial expedition? :)

they thought it would be ok and nobody would notice them... LOL Shame On You 03:28, 9 April 2007 (UTC)

additionnal material (from the french ministry of defense archives), comments and scipted notes are useful for the article.

timeline notes

the french landed in port fouad on november 6th, invasion was called "egypt expedition" (expédition d'Egypte), 2eRPC airborne unit embarked Nord-2501 on november 5, 10eDP (10ème Division Parachutiste) embarked ships from Algiers on october 22 1956. source: defense archives www.ecpad.fr, keyword "suez" Shame On You 16:32, 9 April 2007 (UTC)

The Suez canal was not opened in 2009. Someone needs to find the correct year. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.102.106.105 (talk) 23:44, 12 November 2007 (UTC)

free world gentlemen invaders...

it should be noted in the article isn'it? french news said egypt civilians were warned about dangerous zones to evacuate long before the dropping operations - hence some egyptian troops had run away. also before the agnlo-french retreat and the end of of the egypt expedition, the french gave food (army supply) to the civilians. pic dec.19 1956 + detailed note (report #947) Shame On You 17:00, 9 April 2007 (UTC)

operation telescope 4 nov + operation musketeer 5-6 nov details

1st: 1st wave of airborne enters in action, 2nd Anglo-british fleet (named "Task Force") delivers marine infantry through landing craft, while LVT Alligator bring LST (Landing ship tank) on the Port Fouad beach.

departure from cyprus nov.4: 2eRPC briefing/operation telescope launch full report with live pics & comments in french ops report #887

operation musketeer nov.5: port said south full report with live pics & comments in french ops report #886

2eRPC had to meet the british panzer unit at port said (brit tank models were "Centurion").

operation musketeer nov.6: port fouad full report with live pics & comments in french ops report #868

Shame On You 17:20, 9 April 2007 (UTC)

units from algiers & french government's goal

oct.22: departure of Gen. Massu's 10e DP from algiers - full report w/pics + report #663 Shame On You 17:29, 9 April 2007 (UTC)

end of Anglo-French ops

british's unilateral cease fire on 6th november, completion of anglo-french forces withdrew on december 22nd 1956. report #947 (nice introduction to the crisis' background) Shame On You 23:17, 9 April 2007 (UTC)

french withdrewal, dec.1-30 1956: pt.1+ report #946

french withdrewal dec.22 1956 full report w/pics+report #1012 Shame On You 00:55, 10 April 2007 (UTC)

A point of clarification

I feel the following point needs clarification, for me at least. The British stake in the canal was purchased from the Egyptians as the article says, but it says nothing of the British stake in the canal after nationalisation. What I am trying to understand is, were the British out of pocket (without the canal as an asset or money as payment) after the nationalisation or were they reimbursed financially? Did the nationalisation then amount to stealing? —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 81.158.19.9 (talk) 22:24, 30 April 2007 (UTC).

actually the suez canal which is a french work -the british were against from it's very beginning!- due to sir Ferdinand de Lesseps (see the great German documentary "Durchbruch Bei Suez"!), was exploited not only by the brits but also by the french leaving only 3% to the egyptian. recently i've watched a bbc documentary ("The Other Side Of Suez") about the suez crisis, the british focused on, sir Eden and just forgot to speak a word about the french... an excellent doc is "Affaire de Suez, le pacte secret". all of which were broadcasted on TV and are now available on emule. Shame On You 18:59, 12 May 2007 (UTC)
Wow. This I never imagined there was this much intricacy to the economics behind the Suez Canal. But I cannot help but wonder if this really belongs in the Suez Crisis article, or in the Suez Canal article... Screen stalker 23:01, 14 May 2007 (UTC)

Disputed

Key figure completely excluded

How come that one of the key figures, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, is not mentioned one single time in the article? - Historian —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 213.132.125.46 (talk) 17:17, 9 May 2007 (UTC).

In this UN text [2] the Secretary-General is mentioned over 100 times!

This article: "The United Nations Peacekeeping Force was Lester Pearson's creation and he is considered the father of the modern concept "peacekeeping"."

Contradiction in UNEF: "in large measure as a result of efforts by secretary general Dag Hammarskjöld and a proposal from Canadian minister of external affairs Lester Pearson."

United Nations [3]: "This historic development was made possible mainly through the vision, resourcefulness and determination of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and Mr. Lester Pearson, who was at the time Secretary for External Affairs of Canada."

This article is not accurate.

- Historian 213.132.125.46 17:35, 9 May 2007 (UTC)

Historian, as far as I am concerned, you are welcome to add information about him to the article. The more comprehensive the article is, the better. Only be sure that the information is accurate and well-sourced (which, based off of what I've seen that you have posted so far, doesn't seem like it will be a problem for you).
Oh, and don't forgot to log on. Screen stalker 22:58, 14 May 2007 (UTC)
Since (a) this is not truly an objection to the factual accuracy of the article, but rather to how comprehensive it is, and (b) there has been no comment on this subject in a week, I am going to go ahead and remove the contention tag. If there are strong objections, please feel free to reinstate it and discuss them. Screen stalker 19:56, 21 May 2007 (UTC)


The portion of the article stating the British Helo-born assault was the worlds first is incorrect. The U.S. Marines conducted a helo-borne assault in the Korean war. Using H34 Helicopters to move an infantry battalion. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 79.178.51.173 (talk) 15:29, 20 September 2007 (UTC)

What happened after..?

I'm rather curious how Egypt used the canal after the war. It says they opened it up in 1957, but to whom? Did they keep the embargo on Israel, how about the rest of Europe?

Egyptian casualties

650 KIAs are casualties only in fighting with British/French troops. This figure comes from The Suez Crisis of 1956 article, which deals only with British operations. On Sinai front Egyptians had about 1000 additional KIAs (can't provide link right now). 195.248.189.182 20:22, 13 October 2007 (UTC)

Section on events leading to the crisis

I have placed a POV template on this section.

Some of the problems:

  • States that the "closing of the canal" was one of the events that "contributed most" to the crisis, and then devotes considerable space to discussing this issue. But that interpretation is not at all supported by the literature I have read on the subject.
  • Fails to mention Nasser was legally entitled to nationalize the canal and that he agreed to fully compensate shareholders.
  • The next section deals with "Arab economic and military pressure on Israel" which in fact had little effect on the Israeli economy. Indeed this alleged major reason for the crisis doesn't even warrant a mention in most accounts. Yet here it gets a substantial section to itself which has been promoted to near the top of the list of reasons for the war.
(response from anonymous user): -eygipt's mass of forces ont he borber caused the israeli's (wether by correct line of thought or not) to draft a large amount of the male population of israel, thus causing the "economic and military pressure on israel". so yes, there was a large amount of pressure, and there had been an estimate, that continued holding of the drafted soldeirs would cause the israeli economey to colapse within a month or two.
  • Mentions the attacks by the Egyptian fedayeen but fails to mention the punitive operations carried out by Israel in the same time frame.
  • "Egyptian arms deal" section fails to mention that following Nasser's arms deal with the USSR, Israel concluded a similar arms deal with France, thus restoring the balance of power.
  • The main reason for the attack on Egypt - fear of Nasser's growing power and influence - gets no more than a couple of lines in the middle of the section. Redundant due to recent additions, see update below.
  • "Anglo-Franco-American diplomacy" section implies that Nasser refused to compromise, and that negotiations were over. IIRC neither statement is correct.
  • "Protocol of Sevres" section says Britain and France "enlisted Israel's support" for the war, implying the war was primarily their brainchild. But Israel was a prime agitator for the war. Ben Gurion wanted an even bigger war, against all the surrounding Arab states. So the account given here is misleading to say the least. Gatoclass 04:25, 16 November 2007 (UTC)
  • Update: A lot of new information concerning Anglo-Egyptian relations has been added in recent days. The information is presented almost entirely from a British point of view, and I believe the amount of detail on this single aspect of the conflict violates WP:UNDUE. So the article still needs a lot of work to conform with NPOV. Gatoclass (talk) 05:04, 10 April 2008 (UTC)
Removed two sections as not sourced and/or not notable on subject : A New Type of Warfare and Arab economic and military pressure on Israel.[4]. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Fastboy (talk • contribs) 17:42, 30 June 2008 (UTC)

Don't understand this:

"...Egyptian liberty to close the canal implied Israel's right to traverse the Suez Canal..." surely the word should be contravened?

IceDragon64 (talk) 21:20, 20 February 2008 (UTC)

End of hostilities question

"The operation to take the canal was highly successful from a military point of view"

As I understand it, british troops didn't make it further then about 20 miles down the length of the canal (see, e.g., http://www.historynet.com/wars_conflicts/20_21_century/3037501.html?page=3&c=y, and others - some sources seem to say no more then 10 miles). I don't see how that can be called "highly successful" in any way. Israel's operation in the Sinai to destroy the Egyption army there might be called successful, but that's about it.

Is there something I'm missing? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.69.212.74 (talk) 02:12, 29 February 2008 (UTC)

The British and French military operations were a total success, they overcame all opposition quickly. They had to stop 20 miles in due to the political situation. There is no doubt, militarily or academically, that the French and British would have reached all their objectives with minimum loss of life and minimum delay, had they had 'free reign'. However, the political issues brought it to a halt.

It should also be remembered that the French and British plan was not to take over Egypt, or even occupy the entire canal from end to end. Their intention was to seize major locations and points of significance along the canal, to deprive the Egyptians of overall control. Quite clearly, they couldn't land a force of 50,000 or 100,000 men in a few days - in fact they would never have possessed the resources to do this at all. It was not really like the Iraq War of 2003-, which aimed to 'liberate'(!) and command the entire country.

Lastly, it should be remembered that the British and French armed forces were working under difficult conditions (from their point of view). They were not allowed to bomb built-up areas or shell civilian concentrations from the sea. This hampered the attack operation.

The British/French attacks were successful from military point of view, because they met their objectives, until they were called off. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 129.215.149.99 (talk) 21:11, 13 November 2008 (UTC)

Sentance makes no sence

On 3 20 November F4U-7 Corsairs from the 14.F and 15.F Aéronavale taking off from the French carriers Arromanches and La Fayette, attacked the Cairo aerodrome. Nasser responded by sinking all 40 ships present in the canal, closing it to further shipping until early 1957.

I think that is suppose to be "On 3 November 20 F4U-7...." but i have no expertise in this area what so ever so i am refraining from changing anything.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:54, 2 December 2008 (UTC)

The best I can find is this, which says "On November 3rd, heighteen [sic] aircraft". It makes no mention of Nasser responding by sinking shipping. I'm inclined to just remove the "20" bit, since it isn't essential to the narrative in any case. Franamax (talk) 03:11, 3 December 2008 (UTC)

Suez Crisis WP:AN

Another troublesome article on my watch list, Suez Crisis, [5], previously I had an issue with LOTRrules editing the infobox to claim an Egyptian military victory against consensus and previous discussions. LOTRrules sparked an edit war with multiple edits till I issued a WP:3RR warning. This evening i noted he'd introduced the same changes and reverted again within minutes of my changes. I would also welcome admin oversight and comment on this issue. Justin talk 17:41, 5 December 2008 (UTC)


I have not "sparked an edit war". An IP had added "military victory of the colition forces" which is to an extent true but is not metioned. By adding "military victory of..." it is not only in violation of POV but Original Research. in But I have edited the article and added citations from reliable sources to proove that is was won by Egypt.

Furthermore, I am not in inviolation of WP:3RR. I had taken your advice. In case nobady had noticed the article is on real world perspective, not only on what other editors think on the article. サラは、私を、私の青覚えている。 Talk Contribs 17:56, 5 December 2008 (UTC)

Here are the sources that Justin didn't bother to read and reverted within mere minutes after I had added them.
  1. Here it states the Egyptians, although battered and bruised, had won the war with the retreat of the coalition forces
  2. Again reinforces the above idea
  3. Further supports claims made
Also what other discussions? Kindly point them out to me as there are innumerable material from sources which support the idea that Egypt won a political victory. There were no citations added or the mere mention of the coalitions "military victory" in the article itself. サラは、私を、私の青覚えている。 Talk Contribs 18:08, 5 December 2008 (UTC)
None of those source support the contention of a military victory, the Eqyptian forces were routed as specified in [1.] above. The infobox used to specify the difference between the military victory by the allies and the diplomatic victory by Egypt. That was the long standing consensus agreed, rather the POV edit you have inserted. And noting your talk page you have a recurrent history of such edits. Justin talk 18:20, 5 December 2008 (UTC)
Still you have not answered my questions and have attacked me. Nevertheless I forgive. (We are talking about the article in hand not my past history -- they are different than this). Kindly answer them. My "history" is not plagued with such edits. These things happen. I challenge. I Correct. that is what wikipedia is about.
In no where in the above sources is it cited that the coalition forces are "military victors". If they are I would kindly put it in if you find a valid source with my sources. But since you haven't, and many say it is a political victory for Egypt the citations are viable and appropriate for an article such as this. サラは、私を、私の青覚えている。 Talk Contribs 18:33, 5 December 2008 (UTC)
Also we are talking about the overall result of the war. Egypts was political, end of story. You wouldn't say that the Americans won a military victory in the Vietnam war even though their casualties were lower than the others side. But they still lost the war - ie the overall result of the war was that they lost. サラは、私を、私の青覚えている。 Talk Contribs 18:39, 5 December 2008 (UTC)
Saying it was a military victory would be basing an opinion on an article. Egypts pyrric victory which is cited as a political victory is true. サラは、私を、私の青覚えている。 Talk Contribs 18:42, 5 December 2008 (UTC)

Right Justin, kindly stop edit warring. You have raised the issue and without consultation or by answering my questions and through lack of sources you cite you are in direct violation of WP:OR. This is the second time I've reverted your edits. Kindly respond and refrain from edit warring until the issue has been resolved. サラは、私を、私の青覚えている。 Talk Contribs 00:01, 6 December 2008 (UTC)

Having had a look over the sources, they don't /quite/ say what you want them to (One of the sources seem to indicate a victory for both sides, one military, one diplomatically). From the same sources you could easily seperate to a military victory for the coalition but political victory for Nassar. I'm going to blank the info out totally until some kind of agreement can be found, I figure it is best to skip it than have you guys edit warring overit. --Narson ~ Talk • 00:24, 6 December 2008 (UTC)


To LOTRules.

You're changing the long term consensus text from the infobox for POV reasons. The correct means of changing the consensus would be to take the change to the talk page, discuss it and achieve a new consensus. But you don't seem to want to do that, you simply revert straight back to your version. I have already responded to you pointing out that the sources you're quoting doesn't support the edit that you're proposing. You have chosen not to respond to that. I also took it to WP:AN requesting comments on my action, no one has seen anything wrong with it so I've reverted. I also removed two templates that had been added, to which there had been no action and the originator had not pursued for months, I noted that one of them had been satisfied anyway. You've simply blindly added those back without any thought in a kneejerk reaction.

What I have reverted is not WP:OR, its not even my edit, it was the previous consensus. See WP:CON for more details. Furthermore, I have not edit-warred. I've reverted twice and have no intention of editing any further, on the other hand you have already reverted 3 times today so are skating close to WP:3RR. It is 3 reverts, as you're reverting text that you attempted to introduce some days ago without success, remember the time when I issued a WP:3RR warning. And 3 reverts is not a given, edit-warring is simply reverting repeatedly against consensus and an admin could choose to block you on much less than that. Especially noting the history of a few days ago.

You claim that I haven't explained why to you, well that does show a certain lack of good faith as I have done so in talk, on WP:AN, on your own talk page and in my edit summaries. Your questions have been answered, I have not attacked you, I merely indicated on WP:AN that your talk page indicates a history of POV edits, which it clearly does.

I also offered a compromise to you, suggesting you added Egyptian politicial victory to the infobox, which was there previously. You've chosen not to do that, simply reverting to your version. Continue as you are if you like, I expect that someone else will be along presently note that you have changed the consensus, note the contents of the talk page and revert. You can then choose to revert again, earn a 3RR block, or force the article into being protected from editing. None of which is a particularly productive behaviour. Or you can choose to self-revert, discuss the matter with your fellow editors and move toward some compromise. Your choice. Justin talk 00:32, 6 December 2008 (UTC)

I've a look at your "sources" LOTR, you've exaggerated them quite a bit. I'd also say that two plain books and a bit off the "University of Singapore" website, aren't the best sources just the author's opinion. Ryan4314 (talk) 00:39, 6 December 2008 (UTC)


Right now I'm satisfied about the compromise made. 4314, I have not "exaggerated" the sources. The two historians and the University of Singapore are reliable sources. I've tried to reach a compromise with Justin but again he reverted my edits without saying anything much about it.

Justin. For the last time. Please direct me to the consensus reached. Stop bantering and show me so I can read it. サラは、私を、私の青覚えている。 Talk Contribs 12:27, 6 December 2008 (UTC)

No, you reverted whilst I was working on the compromise suggested. The point you are missing, is that the sources quoted DID NOT SUPPORT YOUR EDIT (emphasis added for clarity. Justin talk 14:29, 6 December 2008 (UTC)
I don't mean to sound so forward -- but you are lying. You did not work on a compromise. You ignored me. Sources do suppport my argument as one editor has previously said. (Also try not to shout at me -- its rude, see WP:UNCIVIL use italics next time.). Citations don't support yours and I don't see you discussing any you've found which support your biased claims. サラは、私を、私の青覚えている。 Talk Contribs 15:16, 6 December 2008 (UTC)
I would suggest you remove that remark and apologise, see [6] when I pointed out the long standing consensus. Justin talk 15:27, 6 December 2008 (UTC)
I agree - though I would also suggest that if you both agree in principle about describing military and diplomatic victories separately, discussing how you reached that agreement is pretty irrelevant as these things go.
In the spirit of WP:BOLD, I have removed the peacock term "major" from "major victory". Infoboxes are blunt instruments and I think it best to go into detail in the article (as we do). Pfainuk talk 15:36, 6 December 2008 (UTC)
No. I refuse to apologise as you wrongly accused me of violating WP:3RR when I was editing the article. You come across that way. We are getting off topic. If you want to discuss the apology you want me to give go to my talkpage. サラは、私を、私の青覚えている。 Talk Contribs 15:43, 6 December 2008 (UTC)
(Where is that long consensus link you point out? If it is in WP:AN that's a weak argument. Show me the link for the Suez crisis archives. User:Narson had finished and resolved the issue -- he offered the solution, not you. According to the link you only made the consensus -- there was no "we" and "long standing consensus") サラは、私を、私の青覚えている。 Talk Contribs 15:55, 6 December 2008 (UTC)

An important reason is clearly understated here- the reason for Israel's attack on the Gaza strip

From 1948 and more and more frequently, groups of Fedayeen, suicide bombers, that have been attacking Israeli targets, were based in the Gaza strip, where the Arab National Movement had a lot of support among the populace. In order to stop the attacks, Moshe Dayan ordered a takeover of the Gaza strip. The invasion succeeded, and Gaza strip has fallen under Israeli control, and attacks indeed ceased. Ironically, in the peace treaty between Sadat and Begin, Sadat refused to recieve back the strip, despite Begin's requests. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 132.77.4.129 (talk) 13:40, 15 February 2009 (UTC)

Where to put reference to Kafr Qasim massacre?

There is a sentence briefly describing, and linking to, the Kafr Qasim massacre. The sentence is relevant to the article as a whole, but not the section it's in: Anglo-French Task Force, in a paragraph describing prewar preparations. As to where to put it, I'm torn between the earlier section describing the Israeli Operation Kadesh (given that it's a technical description of military operations, it doesn't quite fit) and Aftermath (putting in a sentence or two on the effects on Israeli politics). Any suggestions? Vonschlesien (talk) 13:51, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

The movie: I O U S A

I don' see any mention of "Some historians consider this the exact moment that the British Empire ceased to exist." in this article.

As per the movie: I O U S A [A 30 minute highlight which can be seen here at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yQTdZNXLecM (This section can be found at 20:25)].

America's top 5 trade deficits (2007)

Number 1 China, at 262 billion.

What does financial Warfare look like?

In the fall of 1956, the world was on the brink of a major international conflict. America's allies, Britian and France, were engaged in a battle against Egypt, over control over the Suez Canal. The Soviet Union was threatening to intervene on the side of Egypt. America wanted to avoid military action at any cost, and demanded that the British and French allies withdraw from the region. When their request was denied, the US turned to financial warfare. America, which at that time, owned much of England's debt, threatened to sell off or dump a signifigant part of its holdings in the British Pound.

Eisenhower: "So, as far as going into any kind of military action under present conditions, of course, we are not.

This would have effectively destroyed England's currency. The result, all British and French military forces withdrew from the Suez Canal within weeks. Some historians consider this the exact moment that the British Empire ceased to exist.

Ikip (talk) 22:15, 11 April 2009 (UTC)

Soem sources other then thismight be nice, who are thes historians.[[Slatersteven (talk) 19:43, 14 April 2009 (UTC)]]

Beligerents

I think there should be a third column for the UN force that was situated on the suez. Seeing how they were a crucial element to this entire event. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 174.0.32.195 (talk) 21:49, 30 August 2009 (UTC)

This article is far too long

This article is far too long and not concise enough for an encyclopedia. The article has 14 pages including 8 pages of introductory and background material before we even reach the section about the actual crisis.

An example from the article:

For example, on 31 October 1952, a cargo of meat was confiscated; on 2 September 1953, 500 tons of asphalt and a number of Israel-assembled cars were detained; on 4 November 1953, two boats destined for Italy were removed; on 28 September 1954 a shipment of 93 tons of meat, 42 tons of plywood and 30 tons of hides was confiscated, and the crew thrown in jail. On 8 July 1955, a Dutch ship was detained en route to Haifa. Part of its cargo was confiscated. On 25 May 1956, a Greek ship en route to Eilat was detained in the Suez Canal with a cargo of 520 tons of cement. The crew was not allowed ashore for three months despite a severe shortage of water and the spread of illness.

It's not necessary to list the details of the cargoes of those ships.

The above paragraph lists details of things which are not even part of the crisis, which is what this article is about.

I will delete excessively detailed or superfluous material. Twerges (talk) 09:44, 17 October 2009 (UTC)

"End Date" for the Suez Crisis

There was some batting back and forth on the end date. Short-duration edit war between the two dates 'November 5, 1956' and 'March 1957'. Some discussion here might be appropriate. It is clear from the content of the article, that the "Suez Crisis" article speaks to the military conflict of November 1956. Background, Events Leading To, and on to the Invasion force, End of Hostilities, then Aftermath. A general survey of "Suez Crisis" in literature will, likewise, focus on the period of military conflict; the events leading up to the conflict are stage-setters, and the conflict is consistently noted as "ending" effective with the ceasefire of November 6. It is, of course, true that the Israeli forces remained in the Sinai until March 1957, but that can be well addressed in "aftermath". - Thaimoss (talk) 02:33, 16 December 2009 (UTC)

There was one edit and a revert then your own step in. Not an edit war in the least. Now, lets be very clear, the Suez Crisis covers more than just a military crisis. It was a diplomatic event and (this bit is important) not a declared war with convenient beginning and end point. It is not understood entirely as a military event, but also along the lines of the diplomacy and impact of the crisis upon the middle east and on imperialism. It is also worth mentioning that there are various end dates (and we have appeared to pick the most incorrect one. The UN resolution was the day before, the British cease fire the day after. Some historians date the crisis through into various points of 1957 depending on their view point. For many uninvolved nations it ends on Nov 4th, due to UN. For the British it is often continued through into January 1957 to the resignation of Eden. For the Israelis through to March. I firmly believe we should be using the most inclusive dates, so earliest start date and latest end date within reason.
That being said, I'd suggest that if we want to have in the info box the end date of hostilities we have two end dates. Both of the active hostilities and the withdrawal of invading forces (Back to the status quo ante bellum). --Narson ~ Talk • 13:12, 16 December 2009 (UTC)
Narson, I agree completely with your thread on the history, and the various "end dates" (and with everything else you've mentioned here). Good suggestion for a way to focus on the 'meat' of the crisis, while being most inclusive. I'd suggest some tweaking of the sections, as well. "Aftermath" no longer would have the "aftermath of the suez crisis" meaning, but would instead be "aftermath of the military action". - Thaimoss (talk) 01:24, 19 December 2009 (UTC)
Narson, layout of dates okay? - Thaimoss (talk) 00:26, 20 December 2009 (UTC)
Much better. Yes. The article in general still needs some work, I might have to make some time over christmas to expand on the aftermath. --Narson ~ Talk • 00:32, 20 December 2009 (UTC)

Egyptian POW

In this newreel they said 30,000 Egyptian POW has taken please fix it! here is the link 0:30-0:40 0:30-0:40 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.65.214.155 (talk) 14:39, 8 October 2010 (UTC)

lacks infos

lacks infos on

  • landing training in algeria,
  • Operation Amilcar and
  • objectives change and hesitation between french and british about just getting back the suez canal or overthrowing Nasser hence Operation Musketeer Revised (opération mousquetaire révisée).
  • also the French paras were dropped over the south of Port Said not only Port Fouad. the article only mentions the british.
  • the beaches where the french landed were mined but the egyptian had left when they saw the invaders so the remote controlled claymore did not made casualties.

Shame On You 02:13, 9 April 2007 (UTC)

There is also much lacking on the actual operations. The French air force actually based F-84 jets in Israel, from where they operated against Egypt, as well as the French jets in Cyprus. It has never been explained why the first British air raid completely missed its target, dropping all bombs on nearby waste ground; it doesn't take a lot to understand why probably. When the British were stationed in Egypt, the pilots of the RAF and REAF had a very cordial relationship, unlike the other Egyptian and British forces. The most terrible close fighting took place in Port Said between British paratroopers and the Egyptian police; that reflects generations of dislike between off-duty british troops and Egyptian policemen. The naval combat between the Egyptian Navy and the three attacking navies is also not covered.IAC-62 (talk) 18:29, 30 March 2010 (UTC)

Overcoverage of British perspective

This conflict is presented far too much from the British - and to a lesser extent Western - POV, especially in the "Events precipitating the crisis" section. I have therefore added a tag to that effect. Gatoclass (talk) 06:13, 2 August 2008 (UTC)

As the instigator, Britain is perhaps as relevant to the conflict's roots as Egypt. Reading through, I don't see a particular over-coverage of British reactions to Nasser, so hopefully it improved since 2008. I removed the template. If you feel otherwise, you can re-add it and we can form new consensus.  dmyersturnbull  ⇒ talk 03:24, 2 May 2010 (UTC)


A Success is an over statement to imply. After all it was the British and French political bodies that declared the operation a complete and utter failure. The Main goal was to occupy the entire canal, to insure Anglo-French control. British Prime Minister Eden's hate for Nasser was also a reason that the objective of Nasser's removal was an objective. As for the statement that the British armada did not shell the shores of Port Said is false. They were forbidden to use their 9 inch main batteries to bombard the beach and surrounding areas, however, The British naval commander refused to let his marines land without fire support and this led to him ordering the use of all smaller sized munitions that caused a huge amount of damage as well as lives. The ease to which the Anglo-French forces had was due in most part to the earlier attack and destruction caused by the Israeli's preemptive strike and the following Anglo-French-Israeli bombing campaigns —Preceding unsigned comment added by 173.32.71.31 (talk) 23:25, 22 November 2008 (UTC)

Q for "Anglo-French Task Force" section

"On 30 October, in the morning, Britain and France sent ultimatums to Egypt and Israel."

Could this be clarified a bit? It doesn't say at all what ultimatums were sent. (and why to Israel, if they were working in concert with them?)

--Agamemnus (talk) 20:09, 19 July 2010 (UTC)

Citation needed tags in final section

I added some citation needed tags to the final section. The material is probably fine, but the addition of sources is needed to change it from an essay to an encyclopedic article—or, a "collection of sources". The final section needs expansion anyway. There sould be subsections added for the aftermath regarding the various countries involved. If the article is getting too big, it could be split out. However, Suez had far-reaching consequences for the major powers of the world, and this is not well-captured in the article. --Airborne84 (talk) 16:06, 21 August 2010 (UTC)

Aftermath: Kissinger

I have recently been reading "Reflections on a Partnership" by Henry Kissinger he is of the view that the US made a major mistake in betraying[1] Great Britain over Suez, ramifications of which he feels is felt all over the world today, I think the opinion of someone like Kissinger whose gravitas and reputation needs no introduction deserves mentioning. In fact it is rather odd he hasn't been mentioned in this context. 'Eisenhower himself later stated privately that he regretted his opposition to the combined British, French and Israeli response to the Crisis.[59] After retiring from office Eisenhower came to see the Suez Crisis as perhaps his biggest foreign policy mistake. Not only did he feel that the United States weakened two crucial European Cold War allies, but he created in Nasser a man capable of dominating the Arab world'. While this paragraph mentions Eisenhowers 'regret' I feel that a much stronger emphasis should be put on US views regarding the issue/ Also: Aftermath: Britain: greatly accelerated decolonisation and sought to recapture the benevolence of the United States. Where did that come from? There is no mention in the BBC article of Great Britain seeking 'benevolence' of any sort from any country...needs a proper citation.Twobells (talk) 15:55, 23 January 2011 (UTC)

Start of crisis

Surely the Suez Crisis began on 26th July 1956 and the actual military operation in late October/November was the Allied response? (92.7.8.72 (talk) 13:11, 1 February 2011 (UTC))

just an ordinary conscript

This article makes no mention about the UK fuel shortage and the lengths people would go to simply to obtain petrol.

Waiting by the troopship at Southampton to embark for Cyprus, each man going on board was given his own "Manual of Military Law", a shaving brush and saddle soap. No sign of arms, ammunition, food, fuel etc

As was well known at the time, thanks to the Russians, the Egyptians had plenty of weapons and ammunitionAT Kunene (talk) 08:19, 19 March 2011 (UTC)

Nasser's forces stood no chance at all against the three allies though. (92.7.27.191 (talk) 13:23, 25 March 2011 (UTC))

Quick fix to intro

I removed some unsourced or poorly sourced and POV content from the intro - currently just replaced it with a very brief statement to maintain continuity but will return in a day or two to add a more appropriate summary. Gatoclass (talk) 13:54, 2 April 2011 (UTC)

I'm afraid the information you removed is vital to explain why Israel was involved (the fear of an attack by Egypt in 1957). Britain and France were also determined to remove Nasser before he could seize the Sudan. (92.7.15.220 (talk) 18:01, 2 April 2011 (UTC))

You can't just add material that you think is appropriate. Everything in Wikipedia has to be cited to reliable sources. Please read WP:V. Thanks, Gatoclass (talk) 19:06, 2 April 2011 (UTC)

It is already cited. (92.7.17.121 (talk) 10:06, 3 April 2011 (UTC))

Agreed, you can't just remove information that has been in the article for years, and as the IP said it explains why Israel was allied with the British and French against Nasser. (HantersSpade (talk) 10:26, 3 April 2011 (UTC))

Part of it is cited, but to an unreliable source. Most of it is uncited, and I've been unable to verify any of it in other sources. That's why I deleted it. Gatoclass (talk) 10:54, 3 April 2011 (UTC)

I think an official website about Eisenhower, the man who ended the Crisis, is reliable enough. There is far more information on Israel's involvement in the new biography of Macmillan. (HantersSpade (talk) 10:58, 3 April 2011 (UTC))

It's not remotely reliable enough. The article doesn't even have a byline. There is a wealth of quality sources for an article like this, we don't need to be relying on anonymous articles peddling dubious information from a political website. Gatoclass (talk) 11:14, 3 April 2011 (UTC)
HantersSpade and the 92 prefixed IPs are sockpuppeta of HarveyCarter (talk · contribs · deleted contribs · nuke contribs · logs · filter log · block user · block log), HantersSpade has now been blocked. O Fenian (talk) 11:18, 3 April 2011 (UTC)

Israel

Many people nowadays often ask me why Israel was involved in the Suez Crisis. It is vital that the article mentions the primary reason - the fear that Nasser was preparing to launch an attack in March or April 1957, using weapons supplied by the Soviet Union. (HantersSpade (talk) 10:33, 3 April 2011 (UTC))

That is an oversimplification. By the time the invasion was actually launched, military parity had been restored courtesy of arms shipments to Israel from France, which had restored the balance of power. I'm a bit rusty on this topic though, I am going to have to brush up on the topic a little before adding more to the article. Gatoclass (talk) 11:01, 3 April 2011 (UTC)
HantersSpade and the 92 prefixed IPs are sockpuppeta of HarveyCarter (talk · contribs · deleted contribs · nuke contribs · logs · filter log · block user · block log), HantersSpade has now been blocked. O Fenian (talk) 11:18, 3 April 2011 (UTC)

Major mistake in article

The Suez Crisis began on 26 July 1956 when Nasser nationalised the canal, it was the Tripartite Aggression/Sinai War which began on 29 October 1956. Eisenhower knew that Britain and France were almost certain to use military force in response, which is why there were frantic attempts to find a diplomatic solution throughout the summer. Nasser himself admitted in late July 1956 he did not know whether Britain would attack first, or Israel. (RodneyVanderhorst (talk) 18:51, 6 April 2011 (UTC))

New citation

Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, cargo shipments to and from Israel had been intercepted, removed, or destroyed by the Egyptians while attempting to pass through the Suez Canal.[citation needed]

For the citation, I've found a document coming from the United Nations Treaty Collection:

http://untreaty.un.org/cod/repertory/art51/english/rep_orig_vol2-art51_e.pdf

Starts with the heading "1. Decision of 1 September 1951 in connexion with the Palestine question" on page 6 and continues through all of page 7. I need someone else to approve & apply the edit as I am not authorized to do so.

SomethingWycked (talk) 02:39, 31 May 2011 (UTC)

Relevant parts of the UN document quoted here (internal references omitted):


1. Decision of 1 September 1951 in connexion with the Palestine question

9. During the consideration of the item "Restrictions imposed by Egypt on the passage of ships through the Suez Canal" submitted by Israel on 11 July 1951, the representative of Egypt invoked Article 51 in justification of its restrictions imposed on the passage through the Suez Canal of goods destined for Israel. Other representatives maintained that, under the terms of Article 51, application of the right of self-defence was restricted to cases of armed attack and was limited in time until the Security Council had taken action under the Charter. It was also urged that under the existing circumstances, the action of Egypt did not correspond to the conditions set forth in Article 51.

10. At the 552nd meeting on l6 August 1951, the representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States submitted a joint draft resolution which provided that the Security Council "further finds that the practice that of "interfering with the passage" through the Suez Canal of goods destined for Israel cannot in the prevailing circumstances be justified on the ground that it is necessary for selfdefence".

Decision

At the 558th meeting of the Council on 1 September 1951, the joint draft resolution was adopted by 8 votes to none, with 3 abstentions. The relevant paragraphs of the resolution read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"1. Recalling that in its resolution of 11 August 1949 relating to the conclusion of Armistice Agreements between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States it drew attention to the pledges in these Agreements 'against any further acts of hostility between the Parties',

"5. Considering that since the armistice régime, which lias been in existence for nearly two and a half years, is of a permanent character, neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent or requires to exercise the right of visit, search, and seizure for any legitimate purpose of self-defence,

"7. Finds . . . that such practice that of "interfering with the passage" through the Suez Canal of goods destined for Israel is an abuse of the exercise of the right of visit, search and seizure;

"8. Further finds that that practice cannot in the prevailing circumstances be justified on the ground that it is necessary for self-defence;

"10. Calls upon Egypt to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal wherever bound and to cease all interference with such shipping beyond that essential to the safety of shipping in the Canal itself and to the observance of the international conventions in force."

Edit: Re-checking in on my section here. Still requesting someone who can to add this citation to the main article. SomethingWycked (talk) 02:18, 10 June 2011 (UTC)

Archiving

User:Oneiros seems to think this article should follow WP:A-A as far as archiving goes. Given that this is simply one editor's view, not even an essay, and carries absolutely no weight, can Oneiros explain why anyone should even pay attention to it, much less be bound by it? Of what value, for example, are the threads started by the sockpuppet of a banned editor? Also, can Oneiros explain why he removed the helpful search box I added beside the Table of Contents? Jayjg (talk) 00:18, 8 June 2011 (UTC)

Yes, I could. But can you explain why you want different parameters? Are these magical or set in stone? I removed the search box because it's redundant: Talk header already provides a search box - I said so in my comment.--Oneiros (talk) 07:03, 10 June 2011 (UTC)
The parameters are designed to ensure that editors and Wikipedia users don't waste time responding to dead discussions. That's why the added box is there too, because it's more visible and easier to find for Wikipedia users. The whole point is to make the page as useful as possible for the user, not to waste their time. So, do you now have any answers for my questions? Jayjg (talk) 21:43, 10 June 2011 (UTC)
The archive box clutters the page, it's unneeded and redundant. Your parameter set archives frequently and leaves very few threads on the page. The goal of archiving should not be to get the talk page as empty as possible as fast as possible, but to keep a reasonable number of threads on the talk page to allow occasional visitors to the talk page the opportunity to respond. That's why my proposet set archives more seldom but in larger chunks.--Oneiros (talk) 10:33, 11 June 2011 (UTC)
It doesn't "clutter the page", because it occupies otherwise empty space across from the Table of Contents. There is no value to having threads on the page if the discussions in them are dead; the value of threads is for editors to use them for active communication. They're not just there to "fill" something or make it look pretty. When an occasional editor comes along and responds to a discussion that has been dead for 10 months, it isn't an "opportunity", it's a waste of his/her time, because the issue has long been resolved, and the participants are likely gone. Again, the purpose of a Talk: page is to promote active discussion; if there is lots of active discussion, there will be lots of threads. Keep in mind, we're not talking about archiving after a few days or even weeks, but only after a discussion has been dead for several months. Jayjg (talk) 02:50, 12 June 2011 (UTC)
I'm still not convinced, but I don't care anymore. Go ahead, do as you want.--Oneiros (talk) 09:49, 12 June 2011 (UTC)
  1. ^ http://www.jstor.org/pss/2618470
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