Talk:Empiricism/Archive 1

Execllent article

Excellent article, folks! Clear and elegant. It seems Wikipedia is attracting, in combination, the most well-informed minds and the sharpest writers in the world. Well done! (I guess what you would expect from a bunch of people interested in pure, elegant fact.) PS Material on quantum theory is quite reminiscent of one aspect of the Buddhist view of interdependent origination, which notes that 1) No object can be observed or experienced except through a mind/senses 2) All objects are observed by different beings in different places at different times, therefore 3) There is no 'true' ultimate object to be found (ie. experienced) anywhere in the universe. Interesting huh? (Of course, pure consciousness is not an object per se, because it is void of form).

Shouldn't Thomas Hobbes be included in the list of empiricists? (left unsigned by Hephaestos, 18:12, 3 January 2004

Should this article also include some mention of recent challenges to the philosophical usefulness and historical accuracy of the term "empiricism"?(left unsigned by Hephaestos, 18:12, 3 January 2004

Empiricism?

If Empiricism is based on observation then would not one mans faith in God manifested be Empiricism? For example, ones prayers being answered. According to the rationalist, philosophy should be performed via introspection and a priori deductive reasoning. If one looks at the universe and sees all that is, deductive reason would show a Creator. Just an opinion.

Empiricism usually uses inductive reasoning based on observation to suggest theories to explain those observations. Rationalism is generally opposed to empiricism in that it starts with assumptions and then uses deductive reasoning to see what follows from them. Manifestation of God is generally not regarded as being DIRECTLY observable. You may see things that you think imply that God exists, but this is rationalist, not empirical reasoning.

The word observation usually implies that something sensed is measurable and confirmable by others (so personally hearing God talk to you would not count unless it could be confirmed by others). I am not aware of any empiricist arguments for God, although some empiricist philosophers did believe in God. WhiteC 07:00, 20 May 2005 (UTC)

The original empiricists (i.e. Berkely, Hume, Locke) were all in favour of a priori reasoning, and the original rationalists (i.e. Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz) didn't have any principled objection to inductive reasoning. Hume for example, although he wrote a lot about the properties of inductive reasoning, didn't actually base his philosophy on inductive reasoning, but on arguments from a priori truths and common sense notions. The big difference between the rationalists and the empiricists was simply that the rationalists believed in innate ideas and the empiricists didn't. These days "rationalism" and "empiricism" are often used with different senses, but we should be clear that the distinctions WhiteC is talking about don't apply to the original rationalist and empiricist philosophers. (When I say "original" I don't mean to suggest that Descartes was the first rationalist or that Locke was the first empiricist in terms of their philosophical thought, merely that these philosphers founded the philosophical schools of rationalism/empiricism). Cadr 3 July 2005 19:40 (UTC)

In some circles faith is empirical. Briefly, nebulous concepts such as the "self" are empirical in the sense that ones relation to ones hand, for example, is private: it's an experience that no one else can have (see James Gibson, 1979). In another sense, one's relation to God is a private experience (see Kierkegaard). In either case the empirical problem of "two minds knowing the same thing" (this is William James; see also "Varieties of Religous Experiance") can only by broached be embracing something akin to the "radical" empiricist doctrine (radical empiricism is covered on this site).

Empiricism vs. empirical

Shouldn't Empirical and Empiricism be different articles? KSchutte 3 July 2005 03:00 (UTC)

Modern Empiricism

This section gets the chronology wrong. Hume can't have attacked Kant's doctrines since it's unlikely he even knew of Kant. None of the Critiques were written until after Hume was dead. KSchutte 18:05, 24 January 2006 (UTC)

Don't worry, K. I think we have people who are, at least, knowledable enough to avoid THAT kind of whopper.--Lacatosias 09:59, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

Hume died in 1776. Kant's critical period began in 1770. Although Kant did not make the distinction between "analyic" and "synthetic" until the Intro to the Critique of Pure Reason (first edition, 1781), Kant made the distinctions between the a priori and a posteriori, which is not the same as the distinction between synthetic and analytic, much earlier. For instance, in the 1764 On the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals Kant argues for the possibility of proofs of the fundamental principles of natural theology and morals which would be as distinct as the proofs of geometry. Also the notion that existence is not a real predicate (One Possible Basis..., 1763) and Kant's notion of causality were from the pre-critical era and precursor's to the critical period. It is essentially the distinction he made between real and logical possibility (Dasein and Existenz). So:

You have misinterpreted what is essentially being implied and your reasons form no basis, but;

The paragraph should be rewritten to reflect that Hume and Kant's ideas of the synthetic and empirical are similar but in accordance to Hume's empiricism and the empiricist's conception of the a priori (as pretty much limited to the relations of ideas), he would have misunderstood Kant's notion of the a priori and causality as purporting "Innate ideas". Feel free to change the paragraph within these guidelines, or delete the sentence altogether. Amerindianarts 19:38, 24 January 2006 (UTC)

Pragmatism and Existentialism

Do these two count as being offshoots, or even siblings? Because they are both concerned with human experiance and often ignore anything beyond a person's imminant concerns (existentialism deals with relationships, pragmatism deals with order, and Empiracism seems to be the main premise for both). Can they count as being related? -- 69.248.43.27 04:07, 3 March 2006 (UTC)

Every wide scope position in philosophy is related to every other wide scope position in philosophy merely by the fact that they are wide scope. Thus, pragmatism, existentialism, rationalism, empiricism, phenomenology, and so forth are related. Each is trying to solve the big problem in philosophy: How are we to begin doing philosophy? Beyond that, there is no special connection between the three you mention. KSchutte 20:12, 10 March 2006 (UTC)

I should speak more carefully. There is, of course, a recognized connection between empiricism and pragmatism. Peirce, after all, is considered a concept empiricist. What I was trying to say above was just that these things aren't (and shouldn't be taken as being) the same. KSchutte 20:25, 10 March 2006 (UTC)

Chemistry

I removed the sentence

This terminology is particularly important in theoretical chemistry.

Since I can't work out what it is intended to convey (although I am no expert). It seems to me it is important in any theoretical field. Thoughts? --Hansnesse 02:55, 8 March 2006 (UTC)

Empiricism and Science - a suggestion

The establishment of the Royal Society marked an upsurge and organisation in empiricism, the substitution of experiment and observation for philosophical theoretising.

I may be depending on popular reinterpretation rather than formal history here, so I didn't just write it into the article, but it seems to me that the RS actually brought out empiricism, and it could then be refined into scientific method. Astronomy for instance had been dominated quite famously by dogma, over empiricism, the RS and other developments around then (that century or two) made sure that when it was observed to move, theoretical explanations in terms of epicycles could be dispensed with. Midgley 01:51, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

Epistemology, Psychology, Semantics

I think it would be useful to note, early on, that empiricism is really a family of (perhaps logically independent) views about epistemology, psychology, and semantics. The epistemological view holds that all (or most, or all synthetic, or all substantive) knowledge is based on experience. The psychological view (a.k.a., concept empiricism) holds that none (or few?) of our concepts are innate. The semantical view (e.g., logical empiricism, a.k.a. verificationism, etc.) holds that meaning is a function of potential experiences.

Locke, e.g., was a concept empiricist, hence his diatribe against innate ideas. Consequently, he was also a semantic empiricist, as were the other British empiricists. Unlike these, though, Locke wasn't really much of an empiricist in the epistemological sense. With the exception of 'sensitive knowledge', all knowledge for Locke was a priori, though, granted, most of it was trivial. His argument for the existence of God, however, and his scattered thoughts about morality as a demonstrative science indicate a strain of epistemological rationalism: here is substantive (non-trivial) a priori knowledge.

The logical empiricists, of course, held the semantical view while prescinding from any Humean-style psychologizing. Their view was explicitly not based on concept empiricism, hence the 'logical' in 'logical positivism'.

Snakefarmer 06:58, 28 March 2006 (UTC)

Discussion of lead section

I have removed the following paragraph and placed it here for further consideration related to the historical develpment of today's empirical methodology within science as a whole. It's content is true and well source, but so incomplete that it presents a distorted view without further perspective. Among the many important figures are Hume, Kant, C.S. Peirce, Popper, etc. before one can properly understand what Kuhn was talking about...Kenosis 23:24, 28 March 2006 (UTC)

Empiricism was a precursor of logical positivism, also known as logical empiricism. Empirical methods have dominated science until the present day. It laid the groundwork for the scientific method, which is the traditional view of theory and progress in science. However, in the past couple of decades quantum mechanics, constructivism, and Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions have created some challenges to empiricism as the exclusive way in which science works and should work. On the other hand, some argue that theories such as quantum mechanics provide a perfect example of the solidity of empiricism: the ability to discover even counter-intuitive scientific laws, and the ability to rework our theories to accept these laws.23:24, 28 March 2006 (UTC)

I think you're doing a great job. Especially the removal of the sentence, which is very bad, from the intro paragraph-

"Empiricism as a doctrine is opposed to rationalism, the idea that all or a large part of our knowledge comes to us by way of innate ideas and the application of the faculty of reason to these ideas" Amerindianarts 16:27, 1 April 2006 (UTC)

Comment of the recent edits by user Lacatosias. The sentence you edited needed editing. The a priori is not the same as the innate (maybe from the empirical point of view it is, but not when asserting NPOV). But your changes follow this same line of reasoning. I think the principle of identity and difference, which is inherent to empiricism or realism, is a sufficient example. It may also be considered as an innate faculty of the mind. Amerindianarts 17:38, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

Amerindianarts, if you are referring to synthetic a priori knowledge such as mathematical principles, you are absolutely correct — today such principles are continually honed and developed, and work side by side with empirical investigation of the natural world. Best it should be avoided in the introductory paragraph then. Pls see my remarks below...Kenosis 18:48, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

The distinction between empirical knowledge and a priori knowledge is quite basic and can be found in any of a large number of standard philosophy textbooks. Nonetheless, if it is to be controversial in this article it whould be avoided in the introductory paragraph of the article, at least until the article is cleaned up and contains reasonable explanations of these various "empirical" slants sampled further down in the article. Since this article requires cleanup anyway, I may as well start in bit by bit with some info and references to several such standard textbooks. To begin, the historical background, if it is to be included at all, is needed going all the way back to the "debate" between Plato and Aristotle (yes, innate vs empirical knowledge derived from sense perception. It is a debate that continues even today, except that in the context of accepted scientific investigation, "self evident" (a priori) principles are no longer regarded as acceptable (for at least the past hundred to two hundred years, with the notable exception of what are known as synthetic a priori statements, generally mathematical in nature). Please be patient with the process, and I will do my best to provide sourcing, at least on this page, and where needed in the article itself as well...Kenosis 18:48, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

No problem. I did make a change to the intro however. Rather than any reference to "innate" or "faculties of the mind" it would be better to use the word "reason" if there must be a reference here. But, To oppose the two is still an ambiguity in any sense and it would be better served, as you stated, in a history of the concept. Empiricists are labeled as such all the time, but they are rarely empiricists in the strict sense of the opposition between the senses and any notion of innateness, the a priori, reason, faculties of the mind, etc. Amerindianarts 18:57, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

I think you are referring to the debate in the 17th and 18th Century between the [primarily] Continental "rationalists" and the [primarily] British "empiricists". It's an extremely interesting and important debate. But that's where the confusion comes from about "empiricism" vs. "rationalism" or "reason", and much of it is no longer current. Perhaps the editors should hold off on something like that in the intro, at minimum until the rest of the article makes more sense....Kenosis 19:09, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

I agree for the most part. I don't think there should be any reference at all in the intro paragraph to a dichtomy between the senses and the mind, at any time. To do so may cast a preconception when reading the rest of the article. Amerindianarts 19:15, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

I will start in, then, bit by bit, farther down in the article — perhaps later today. The intro is currently adequate, in my estimation, to hold steady for awhile. Look forward to further discussion about it here, and hopefully at some point soon the article will begin to make some more "sense" ;-) Kenosis 19:22, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

Discussion of radical, moderate, "Naive" empricism, etc..

Removing this section for now and placing it here on the talk page, because it misrepresents William James' form of pragmatism propounded around the turn of 20th Century. Will deal with it a bit later...Kenosis 21:23, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

Radical empiricism:

William James was a proponent of one form of radical empiricism. Radical empiricists believe that all human knowledge is purely empirical. More specifically, the radical empiricists are much like ordinary empiricists (rejection of the metaphysical, etc.), but unlike the ordinary empiricists, radical empiricists like William James include subjective knowledge as being a source of empirical information also, due to the mere fact that it is experience, and thus should be included. Like Henri Bergson, radical empiricists tend to reject distinctions between the "inner" (subjective) and "outer" (the so-called objective)--which is a move made by other philosophers as well (e.g. Chomsky).21:23, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

Removing this section for now and placing it on the talk page. The sentence is basically correct as to "empirical method," "methodological naturalism" or scientific method, but was stranded and substantially mislabeled as "Moderate empiricism"...Kenosis 21:30, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

Moderate empiricism:

According to moderate empiricism, apart from empirical also analytical and only analytical sentences have the right to a place in science. It holds that the only claims or propositions that can be justified a priori are those which are analytic.21:30, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

This section removed and placed here on the talk page in the event it can serve as further grist for the mill. It is not an established term, and is probably a conflation of what appears to be an obscure term with obsolete meaning from the 19th century, with the concept of naive falsification (the null hypothesis), the latter of which is in fact part of the empirical method...Kenosis 23:04, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

Naïve empiricism:

Naïve empirism holds that scientists should approach a problem with no preconceived expectations or assumptions which have not been previously studied and justified using the scientific method. It stresses the importance of relying on empirical observations about the world and not our interpretations of those observations.Kenosis 23:11, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

Removed from the Locke, Berkeley, Hume section for reconsideration:...Kenosis 23:11, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

From the late eighteenth century onwards, empiricists were critical of Immanuel Kant's doctrine of the a priori as positing innate ideas, while proponents of innate ideas rejected Kant's doctrine of intuition and deduction as not innatist, but part of a rationalist doctrine. Modern empiricism contends that all knowledge must be attained through internal and external sensations.Kenosis 23:11, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

Naive empiricism is unfamiliar to me also. Is this a form of naive realism attributed to some Aristotelians? Also, what is problematic about the Locke, Berkeley, Hume section? Different time frame? Amerindianarts 23:22, 2 April 2006 (UTC)

If the term naive empiricism is unfamiliar, it is probably for good reason. The term appears to be limited to an obscure 19th Century debate, but difficult to confirm for you immediately. There are no currently accepted uses of this term in either philosophy or in scientific method or philosophy of science. The article on naive empiricism was unfortunately made up out of thin air--a number of other uses on the web appear to have quite possibly been picked off that mistaken Wikipedia article within the last two years. The "Naive empiricism" article will now most likely either be deleted, or limited to its obscure, archaic usage with a caution not to confuse it with naive falsification or empiricism. What a mess...Kenosis 00:25, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

As to Kant's relationship to the British empiricists, the content I removed and put here on the talk page is significantly misrepresentative of Kant's placement in the debate, at least as it was written. (I may as well begin to outline this here, and then we can perhaps consider including Kant if it seems important enough. But I caution you Kant is oblique and complicated — editors opted to leave him out of the scientific method article for this reason too, and skipped right to C.S. Peirce in that article. He gets only cursory mention in the History of scientific method article and not mentioned in the Philosophy of science article for the same reason.) Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, sometimes translated as Critique of Speculative Reason, is a watershed piece in philosophy. In direct response to Hume's almost incredible skepticism and well framed arguments against induction, one of the bases of scientific method and of life generally (which hogtied the whole discussion for awhile), Kant posited what is called the transcendental aesthetic as a schema to describe how empirical observation and reason fit together. Kant coined the term sythetic a priori as a basis for legitimacy of mathematical proposition. It would not be until C.S. Peirce in the late 19th Century that inductive and deductive reasoning were placed in a complimentary mode (along with abductive reasoning) such that a firmer, more usable foundation was laid for the empirical method. Peirce followed Kant's analysis by about 60 years or so, during which time empricism had gotten stuck on foundational alternatives, which basically means "you're on your own; may the best theory win in the end." That's a very quick explanation.

The previous content in the article misstated the "innate ideas" advocates' position overall, and was merely an observation of how Kant, in a way not unlike William James, got criticized from both sides after presenting an integrative schema. Thus it was inadequate and also somewhat irrelevant without better explanation, which is why I removed it from Locke, Berkeley, Hume...Kenosis 00:54, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

• The section on naive empiricism should be deleted, but the main articlenaive empiricism retained. Even in its current form, the info is better than misinfo or no info.
• The section on James should be rewritten, and the section on "radical empiricism" retained. I was assigned James for a bibliographical essay mandatory for my grad degree, but that was a long time ago and I haven't touched him since. Kant was my concentration. Even with my limited familiarity, I know the paragraph was bad. James was a character and I don't know what to think of his investigations into the extra sensory or where he was coming from sometimes.
• Kant can be omitted but the info on the controversy is worth salvaging. While the dichotomy is not necessary for a definition of "empiricism", the controversy is very relevant. I do not agree with you that "the article misstated the "innate ideas" advocates' position". Amerindianarts 01:28, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

• The Naive empiricism article, if it is to be expanded, needs to be researched and documented. Agreed that it has no place in this article on Empiricism.

• Agreed about William James. I thoroughly support his inclusion, and we can make clear that his "radical empiricism" is a very specific slant, an offshoot of his form of pragmatism. It needs to be made very clear that James' "radical empiricism" is self-titled and maintains in essence that the empirically observed universe "requires no trans-empirical connective support", by which he meant to rule out supernatural explanations for natural phenomena.

• Kant is a minefield, but I think with some attention to the language a brief mention of his contributions leading up to Peirce's and James's important contributions, there's a chance we can include it and have it said in a way that will not attract too many arbitrary edits "out of the blue"-- hopefully at least...Kenosis 03:18, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

That's all good thinking. The reference to Kant in the article was alluding to the synthetic a priori. The paragraph could be written much better. The empiricist would try to explain what that represents in terms of knowledge derived from the senses. The innatist, I think, accepts the a priori, but denies that it is synthetic in Kant's sense. Kant's conceptualism with its tenets of empiricism and realism definitely defies categorization. I think it is mistaken to label him as an idealist, which many do. Good luck.Amerindianarts 05:21, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

The innatist here would be oversimplifying and misrepresenting Kant, who presumes an "underlying" noumenal "structure" which has phenomenal attributes that are empirically observable. It is this "structure" or "coherence" which requires the exercise of a transcendental aesthetic to make useful sense of the relationships among phenomena, without which there would be little or nothing to make coherent sense of-- at least according to Kant. He also noted [elsewhere] that Hume needed to use inductive reasoning to arrive at the problem of induction. That's it for me for today. Take care for now, Amerindianarts...Kenosis 06:23, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

Discussing major changes or being BOLD

I think we are going in different directions here, monsieur. You have completely ignored phenomanlism (surely the major form of emoricism in the last two hundred years), logical empircism and so on. You have added Kant. I don't think Kant is relevenat to a hitsiry of empircism AT ALL. William Jame's notion of radical empiricism is perhaps marginally relevant. The criticism section should obviouly begin with TWO DOGMAS and not Khun which is nuch later. What say??--Lacatosias 17:29, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

Please discuss major changes on this page prior to implementing. The just added lengthy section is excessive and unsourced, and was not discussed here...Kenosis 17:46, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

Ummm...since when has this been a requirement on Wikipedia? I thought the idea was be BOLD and edit. Have you dicussed all of your changes prior to making them? The sources are not a problem. The length is tiny compared to the a single paragpraph of an average SEP entry. --Lacatosias 17:59, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

True, and when multiple editors are in disagreement or conflict, discussion and consensus become the rule. I trust the process, because it requires that multiple editors become familiar with the topic-- the lay of the land, so to speak. Your observation about James' marginal relationship is duly noted. I put it in because it is called "radical empiricism" and readily subject to immediate misunderstanding, as it was before in this article...Kenosis 18:26, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

Kant and contemporary empiricism

Rmvd and put here for discussion...Kenosis 17:44, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

==Comtemporary empiricm==

Contemporary empiricism thus begins with the rejection of the assummption that what we directly experience are always are own sensations. Physical things actually constite the objects of perception17:44, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

This is obviously not done. The point is that there will need to be a section which explains the rejection of sense-data and phenomenalism by most empiricists after the end of phenonenalism and logical empiricism. So-called "Constructive empiricism" is not even close to synonymous to contemporary empiricism. The article as it stands would leave this impression, however.--Lacatosias 17:52, 3 April 2006 (UTC) (edit conflicts again!! I'm going nuts!!!)

Rmvd and put here for discussion...Kenosis 17:44, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

===Immanuel Kant===

In the early 19th Century, Immanuel Kant formulated a response to Hume's almost incredible skepticism and well framed arguments against the logical validity of inductive reasoning, which had already been taken granted as one of the bases of scientific method. Hume's arguments stymied the discussion for a time and caused the debate among intellectuals to focus mainly on whether inductive reasoning was sufficiently valid for scientific method. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, sometimes translated as Critique of Speculative Reason, is a watershed piece in philosophy, in which Kant posited what is called the transcendental aesthetic as a schema to describe how empirical observation and reason fit together. Kant coined the term sythetic a priori as a basis for legitimacy of mathematical propositions. It would, however, take most of the 19th Century before Kant's concepts were more fully integrated into the ongoing discussion about empiricism in leading edge philosophy.17:44, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

Empiricism is a difficult topic. It is not accidental that the article still is very much in limbo at this stage of Wikipedia's development in 2006. With appropriate discussion I believe it can be done, and done effectively in the end....Kenosis 17:59, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

The same was true of philosophy of mind until I brought it single-handedly to FA status: see philosophy of mind FA. The same true of just about every other philosophy article I have laid m hands on. Period. But I see you are new here and think that you might change the rules around a bit to suit your purposes. --Lacatosias 18:07, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

Congratulations, then we will work at it until it's satisfactory, well organized and useful...Kenosis 18:16, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

Lacatosias, your earlier observation about James' marginal relationship is duly noted. I put it in because it is called "radical...Kenosis 18:29, 3 April 2006 (UTC) empiricism" and readily subject to immediate misunderstanding, as it was before in this article

I am in the process of putting together a paragraph on Peirce, who actually is more important than James leading up to today's scientific usage. I will put it here first so it can be gone over as desired. The philosophic discussion, I should add, is thoroughly historic, and basically stops after Kant, Hegel, Peirce and James-- this too can be sourced with due effort and discussion. For this reason caution is due in transitioning to phenomenalism in the article--you can see the verious inevitable POV's coming a mile away already. (The philosophic debate takes a fork in the road in the 19th with DeSaussure and those who follow in that direction through Derrida, and Husserl's phenomenology and its descendants are involved there too, but that is irrelevant to this article)...Kenosis 18:16, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

Oh, I profundly disagree with this approach. Empriricms is not merely an historical phenomenon on philosophy no more than it is in science. You need not be conconcerend about POV dipsutes just becasue some of the concpet are still very much alive and discussed today. I have written an article on functionalism (philosophy of mind) in which I charaterize abput six or seven different version of functionalism. Empiricims is much more than just "Britich Empiricism", as you would seem to suggest of you were to eliminate discussion of "logical empricims", "phenomenalism", "constructive emnpricms, etc.. from the article. Phenomenology and the continental stuff simply has nothing to do empiricism. Philosophy in ganeral takes a fork in the road at the end of the 19t century, but empiricims has a clear and undeniable lineage startin from Lock through Hume then toward Millian phenomenalism and Machian empiriocsiticms right into logical empiricim and then the turn away from sense-data into the contemporay empiricism and its sub-specied (construcive empiricism, etc.)... This is completely non-controversial.

Secondly, Empiricism is primarily a philoshical doctrine. The scientific use of empirical methods are subordinate to this. You are writing this article as if werean essay dealing with the origin of empirical methids in science, as far as I can tell.--Lacatosias 10:34, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

Lengthy section intro on Phenomenalism placed here for sourcing, discussion and consensus

Rmvd and placed here for discussion, sourcing and consensus:

Recent empiricists have not agreed with Hume's conclusion that belief in an external world is rationally unjustifiable. Until about the 1950's, most of Hume's followers thought that his own principles implicitly contained the rational justification for such a belief: this argument for belief in the external world is known as phenomenalism. According to this extreme empiricist theory, anticipated by both Hume and George Berkeley, a physical object is a kind of construction out of our experiences. Macbeth knew that the dagger he saw was hallucinatory and not real not because he knew that there was no external cause for his visual experience, but because he knew that if he reached for the dagger he would see and feel his hand breeze right through the space where the dagger seemed to be. So, according to the phenomenalist, to have a visual experience of a real physical thing is to have an experience which belongs to a certain kind of group of experiences. This type of set of experiences possesses a constancy and coherence that is lacking in the set of experiences of which hallucinations are a part. As J.S. Mill put it, matter is a "permanent possibility of sensation".

One's instinctive belief that there is an external world of other selves is explained and justified in a similar manner. The phenomenalist beleieves that Hume's principles show that each one of us is nothing more than a bundle of experiences having a certain constancy and coherence. This gives rise to the illusion of a simple abiding thing which is over and above the experiences and has them.

It is important to note that the phenomenalist does not only claim that all we can possible know about daggers, other beings, and ourselves is confined to facts about our experiences: he also affirms that that all we can possibly mean when we speak of these things is confined to our experiences. To say that there is a jacknife in your drawer at home means that were you or someone else to go home and open the drawer, that person would have such and such experiences were he to do such and such things (were he to reach for it, he would have sensations of resistance, weight, smoothness; were he to drop it, he would hear a thump, and so on).

By the 20th century, when empiricists had come to take statements or propositions rather than terms or ideas as the basic units of meaning (logical empiricism), the phenomenalist thesis that a physical object is a construction out of sensations was interpreted as the thesis that any statement about a physical object is translatable into a statement about sensations (so-called translational phenomenalism). Thus, to make a categorical statement that there is along the banks of the Tiber a particular drainage pipe is really to make a hypothetical statement about sense data. Such a hypothetical statement woule be something like: if a normal observer under normal conditions were located in such a way as to view the banks of the Tiber, and were he to attentively make such-and-such observations, he would then have such-and-such experiential data. The phenomenalists believed that in these ways they could use Hume's own principles to analyse and justify the belief in an external world.

The phenomenalist phase of post-Humean empiricism ended by the 1940s, for by that time it had become obvious that statements about physical things could not be translated into statements about actual and possible sense data. If a physical object statement is to be translatable into a sense-data statement, the former must be at least deducible from the latter. But it came to be realized that there is no finite set of statements about actual and possible sense-data from which we can deduce even a single physical-object statement. Remember that the translating or paraprashing statement must be couched in terms of normal observers in normal conditions of observation. There is, however, no finite set of statements that are couched in purely sensory terms and which can express the satisfaction of the condition of the presence of a normal observer. According to phenomenalism, to say that a normal observer is present is to make the hypothetical statement that were a doctor to inspect the observer, the observer woul appear to the doctor to be normal. But, of course, the doctor himself must be a normal observer. If we are to speficy this doctor's normaility in sensory term, we must make refercne to a second doctor who, when inspecting the sense organs of the first doctor, would himself have to have the sense data a normal observer has when inspecting the sense organs of a subject who is a normal observer. And if we are to specify in sensory terms that the second doctor is a normal observer, we must refer to a third doctor, and so on ad infinutum.17:52, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

On second thought, I'll leave it to you to take care of. This is VOLUNTARY work after all. Good night from the old world. Maybe I'll take a look at it myself when you've finished. --Lacatosias 18:12, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

I seriously need to take some time off though. It's been BAAAAAAAAAAAD day.--Lacatosias 18:57, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

I understand that the dabate continued for another 50 years or so before it finally burned out among anyone who wanted credibility in philosophic circles. This material above, if it is to be useful to readers, appears to belong in the article on Phenomenalism and in my estimation needs sourcing and better concision, in addition to much NPOV work. If it can be summarized in a paragraph or two in the Empricism article, with a link to the Phenomenalism article, perhaps it would make sense. I had a feeling the old substance v. attribute conundrum (noumena and phenomena here) would be a potentially very deep well to fall into. Links, I think, are the appropriate solution...Kenosis 00:23, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

That is false. Phenomalism was clearly profounly implicit in the work of Berkeley and Hume.

(1)Enciclopedia Garzantine della filofia, 1993 (2)Challenges to Empiricism ed. Harold Morick. Hacket Publishing Company. 1980. among other sources.

I could go on and on and on about this. Phenomalism is an extrenmely significant part of the history of empiricims. MUCHHH more so, that Piierce, William James,. or Kant. J.S. Mill, the most reknowned empricist of them all, formulate the phenomalist credo: "Physical objects are nothing more than permanent possibility of sensation". Ernst Mach was another sort of phenomalist (empiriocriticism, something else which shuld be address on ANY artilce on empiricism). Mach's phenomalism led to Einsteonìt rejection of the conepts of absolute space and time. Even if, as you say, it was a 50-year movement, you still prove my point that it was hgihgly significant. Logical positivism lasted much less and surely IT cannout be ignored in an article on empiricims. What would you have leftas the timlime of empiricms? British empricism (Lock to Hume), silnece for three hundred years until Constructive Empricism cam along???!!! To put it midly, I think that's wacky!! I will cut back on the length surely (the argument againt phenomalism is not needed fot example and the mention of logical positivism shuld be redundant since their shpuld be a separate section on it). I will reinsert a modified versio with sources. Incidently, there are NO SOURCES for ANYTING ELSE is the article. What's your problen with phenomalism? Perhaps you don't understand it?

Furhtermore, NPOV??? Give me a break!! What I wrote was plainly and simply a descritpion of phenomenalism and its derivation, the reason it was ultimately rejected (perahos this it the part you think is POV?? I certanly hope so, sicne that it tha part I plan on cutting). If you revert it, we will have an edit war on our hands. Period. There is no justifcation whatsoever for ignoring the important radical empircist movement of phenomenalism in an article ABOUT empircism.--Lacatosias 07:52, 4 April 2006 (UTC) Yes, I can source that claim

Your more recent proposal to replace the link I left with a much more compact discussion makes better sense to me...Kenosis 14:40, 4 April 2006 (UTC)