Talk:Quasi-realism

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Quasi-realism vs. constructivism[edit]

I would like others' opinions on this question; it seems important enough to me to deserve clarification in an encyclopedia article on quasi-realism. What is the relationship between quasi-realist and constructivist theories in metaethics?

According to Russ Shafer-Landau (Moral Realism, 2003, Oxford University Press, p. 14):

"Constructivists endorse the reality of a domain, but explain this by invoking a constructive function out of which the reality is created. This function has moral reality as its output."

Subjectivists, relativists, Kantians, and contractarians all get classified as constructivists by Shafer-Landau. So should ideal observer theories and rational preference theories, I think. The main point of such theories seems to be that normativity is irreducibly subjective, and so if there are normative facts they must be constructed by a subjective (or intersubjective) constructive function (such as, "X is good" = "An ideally rational agent would choose/prefer X").

According to Blackburn (Essays in Quasi Realism, p. 5)

"'Humean Projection' [is] the mechanism whereby what starts like as a non-descriptive psychological state ends up expressed, thought about, and considered in propositional form."

The point of quasi-realist projection is, I think, supposed to be that moral or normative judgments start as subjective attitudes and get projected so that we treat them as facts or propositions. Is projection itself a kind of constructive function?

I know that Blackburn rejects various forms of constructivism, and I don't think he claims to be a constructivist, but I have read at least one philosopher (Thomas L. Carson, in Value and the Good Life, Notre Dame University Press, 2000) who I take to be a constructivist (he's a rational preference theorist) who does identify himself as quasi-realist.SCPhilosopher 22:43, 9 November 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Does Blackburn self-identify as non-cognitivist?[edit]

I remember reading somewhere that Blackburn does non think the non-cognitivist label is appropriate for quasi-realism. Thoughts? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 94.195.129.111 (talk) 16:36, 16 April 2010 (UTC)[reply]

According to a 2002 interview, Blackburn holds a nuanced position on this : he is an expressivist, which is a form of non-cognitivism, but at the same time holds that one can be an expressivist and keep using the term of knowledge, in a renewed sense :

"Q : What does moral knowledge mean to a quasi-realist ? A :The position has been classified as non-cognitivism. That applies to the absence of knowledge and it’s one of the confusing things I mentioned. If one tries to hold a concept of knowledge, having said that this is all about expressing attitudes, then it looks as though it’s not of the nature of knowledge at all. Knowledge, in many people ́s minds, I think, implies receptivity, implies receiving the kind of information formed outside. Knowledge implies getting representations of how things are. That’s missing from an expressivist position. It is a type of non-cognitivism. I want to say: I’m not sure that the image associated with the concept of knowledge is right. (...) So I think, if you give a practical account of knowledge, or an expressivist account of knowledge, you can allow for moral knowledge. I think, there’s lots of moral knowledge: talk that pleasure is better than pain; talk about being rewarded for things that you deserve, as being better than being rewarded for things you don’t deserve, and so on. Many little bits of moral knowledge. So, in that sense, I don’t find the word “knowledge” a problem" (source : http://www.cfh.ufsc.br/ethic@/ETICA1~1.PRN.pdf Alternate source : http://www.scribd.com/doc/28739959/Simon-Blackburn-Interview-Quasi-realism-in-moral-philosophy ) --88.162.121.155 (talk) 07:43, 3 May 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Quasi-realism & Emotivism[edit]

Both Emotivism and Quasi-realism state that these two meta-ethical positions are in opposition, but they do not give an explanation. Can someone help? Lboukoko (talk) 05:20, 15 February 2020 (UTC)[reply]

I agree, quasi-realism and emotivism, as described in these pages, are literally identical, so I don't understand why there's a statement devoted to them being opposed. If nobody replies in a few days I'll just change it since it's clearly nonsensical. Voyaging^talk 03:39, 18 October 2020 (UTC)[reply]