Talk:Protocol I

The systematic bias is legitmate in this case

The complaint is that the American objection to the Protocl is provided but that there are no objections given for the other dissenting nations. This is true. However when the United States fails to ratify a major treaty it is much more important than if Israel or Pakistan does. Second, most other nations who objected to Protocol I have not published their official reasons so even if the will were there, they is not an easy way. Last, the burden is too great on the original author or authors to provide the rationale for all the opposing nations. The article would be delayed for months ir not years. The great strength of Wikipeida is that we all can add things like this. The criticism has been posted for 3 years now and no one has added the other nation's positions. That alone suggests ho0w difficult it might be to do so. However, if the information is public, sooner or later it will be added, and that is exactly the way I think Wikipedia should work. The bias is one of unintentional ommission, not of intentional commission. The former should be remedied or the article pulled--the latter should just wait until others add the missing information. I suggest that as a general principle. LDEBarnard (talk) 18:54, 13 June 2009 (UTC)

NPOV or not?

Need an opinion on this one. The article has criticism throughout rather than at the end and at least a little systematic bias - US and UK positions on areas of the protocol are stated repeatedly but Iraqi, Afgan objections are not. It's not outright conjecture and subjectivity, but it is definitely discursive rather than encyclopedic. I'm not up to the task of "balancing" it myself but would appreciate someone taking a look, so I've POV Check AND Technical tagged - the latter mostly because of the density of the prose (see irony *grin*). May also be mergable with main Geneva Convention article. Samwehli 13:38, 15 April 2006 (UTC)

• To address you points. please give some examples of "systematic bias" in the article and give an example of Iraqi, Afgan objections.
• This is an article not the source. For that you go to the Wikisource
• It should not be merged with the main Geneva Convention article any more than GCIII should.

--Philip Baird Shearer 07:55, 21 April 2006 (UTC)

As there has been no answer I am removing the POV template --Philip Baird Shearer 09:40, 10 May 2006 (UTC)

This article is NPOV and facetious.

Firstly it falsely claims that it was only Protocol I that gave insurgents or guerrillas (i.e. Francs-tireurs ) prisoner of war status (or equivalent legal protections) when it was the Third Geneva Convention itself in Article 4 that Franc-tireurs were given prisoner of war status provided they meet certain standards, namely wearing an identifiable symbol (i.e. an armband, not a full uniform) carried arms openly, and had responsible superiors. Thus insurgents and guerrillas were given a legal basis by the Third Geneva Convention provided they abided by these laws of war.

Thus the analogy to American Revolutionaries and other "freedom fighters" is facetious because as Franc-tireurs who followed the laws of war (i.e. the standards above) they would have been accorded prisoner of was status under the Third Geneva Convention, regardless of Protocol I. Protocol I is unique in this regard only in that it extends an equivalent prisoner of war status to those insurgents who do not follow the laws of war, i.e. unlawful combatants.

The article is NPOV is not only making this false analogy, but in unnecessarily describing the ratified signatories of Protocol I as "civilised" and hence the non-adherents as uncivilised and barbaric, despite the main target of the barb, the United States, being a ratified signatory to the Third Geneva Convention itself, which gives prisoner of war status to Franc-tireurs. It is a bigoted slur that has no place in an encyclopaedia.

The "Article 44.-Combatants and prisoners of war" section, especially its last paragraph, contains these falsehoods and the facetious analogy, I will rewrite and delete them where necessary in accordance with the fact that the Third Geneva Convention itself gives prisoner of war status to Franc-tireurs, guerrillas, insurgents etc. provided they follow the laws of war, Protocol I additionally gives them an equivalent status even if they don't. 58.173.51.94 (talk) 14:25, 15 June 2008 (UTC)

Needs to be re-written

I think this article is horrible as written now. Would it not be better if it were written in paragraph format?say1988 22:00, 19 May 2006 (UTC)

I thought the exact same thing. A terrible article, even an expert of the subject would be confused. All the explanation seem to be be trying to prove something and are clearly written from one POV. I recommend either starting over from scratch or deleting the article as reading it is a waste of time.Mantion 14:47, 15 August 2007 (UTC)

Agree has POV

I agree with Samwehli that the article is not neutral. The entry on Article 1 contains an unsourced criticism but not a defence. The special anniversary issue of the ICRC journal, linked at the foot, contains good qualified material on both sides and arguments from it could be cited, summarised or paraphrased. In articles on legal instruments, it would be generally helpful to have a potted history in the introduction. Eg. here, why were the 1949 texts thought to be inadequate? 83.44.146.24 13:05, 5 September 2006 (UTC) James Wimberley (unregistered user) 5 Sept 2006

Catch 22 for Article 44.3?

I suspect that a Catch 22 situation may apply to Article 44.3 .

* If the combatant caries his arms (weapons) openly then he can be arrested and kept as a Prisoner of War (or illegal combatant equivalent). No trial is needed.

* If the combatant is in uniform then he can be arrested and kept as a Prisoner of War (or illegal combatant equivalent). No trial is needed.

* Once he has gained Combatant status he can be arrested and kept as a Prisoner of War (or illegal combatant equivalent), even if out of uniform at the time of the arrest. No trial is needed but a tribunal may need convincing of his status.

* If he is performing a reconnaissance out of uniform then he can be tried as a Spy.

* If he is out of uniform and hiding his arms then he can be given a civilian trial for murder and/or damaging property or attempting these crimes. Claiming Combatant Status may be a defense but should result in his arrest and being kept without bail as a Prisoner of War (or illegal combatant equivalent).

* Alternatively if he is hiding his arms and out of uniform during an attack then he can be given a military trial for the Grave Breach of the Geneva Convention know as Perfidy, see Article 37 of Protocol 1.

* Targeting civilians as an act of terror is a war crime and a Prisoner of War (or illegal combatant equivalent) can be tried for that.

I have no legal training or qualifications. Andrew Swallow 03:48, 20 October 2007 (UTC)

You state taht "Targeting civilians as an act of terror " is a war crime. This is a very confused concept. There are MANY execeptions recognixed by International Law where civillian targets can be targeted legitimately. For example if there is any use of the facility or area for military purposes, it may legally be destroyed even if many civillians are killed and/or terrorized. In WWII we destroyed an entire area of Hamburg and killed mostly civilians because the area of Hamburg was being used to manufacture war weapons. Likewise a home in Gaza where rockets were assembled, stored, or even was used as a meeting place by Hamas becomes a legitmate military target. In the American Civil War, the Southernors claimed that Sherman burned Atlanta illegally. He did not. Only the manufacuting section of the city was destroyed (albeit many homes were in the area) but the factories were used to make munitions and clothing and supplies for the Confederate troops. No war crime. In WWII the allies bombed the Monestary at Monte Casino killing many innocent Monks becasue a small German contingent was using the Monestary at the top of the mountain to gather intelligence on the movement of Allied troops down in the valley.

The criteria is not whether the civillians are terrorized. It is a war crime if and only if the military officer who gave the orders did if for the only purpose of terrorizing or punishing the civillians. If the officer thought that there was a miltiary use of a civillian facility of area that was (or had been) used for any military purpose, then it is NOT a war crime. The officer does not even have to be right to be exonerated from war crimes. When we bombed the Chinese press building in Belgrade in the Serbian War, we killed many civillians and terrorized the area. The building was NOT being used for any military purpose. But our maps were wrong and the officer who ordered the bombing BELIEVED that the building was a military building. An honest belief is all that is necessary. So if an enemy runs into a school with a weapon, and does not come out, the school becomes a legitimate military target.

The conventions that devine war crimes generally break down when one side or the other used civillian facilities and people as shields. The Germans in WWII, instead of locating all their munitions factories in separate areas, placed them within civillian areas. The area then becomes a military target even though it is mostly populated by civilians. The allies destroyed the entire manufacturing area of Hamburg and killed more civillians than the atomic bomb drops did but this was not a war crime. The same thing happened in Tokyo where the japanese had spread out their military manufacturing into small (many home based) factories. Tokyo was firbombed and most of the factories were destroyed. Unfortunately so were many homes and 100,000 civilians. But no war crime. In Lebanon, Hesbollah as a military policy forced civillian institutions to store rockets, munitions and food rations. All those hospitals, schools, and apartment buildings in the Hesbollah areas became legitimate military targets. A greater abuse was made by Hamas in Gaza. When a Hamas fighter enters a building, the building can be legitimately destroyes even if it is United Nations facility.

Further you do not differentiate in your catch 22 where the "fighter" claims that he is a soldier adn is at war; and the organziation claims to be a miltiary organziation fighting a military war. Then if they are held to the same standards as any otehr army by their enemy, they claim that thier civilians are being terrorized. LDEBarnard (talk) 18:38, 13 June 2009 (UTC) LDEBarnard (talk) 18:38, 13 June 2009 (UTC)

Grossly incomplete & lacking NPOV again

The problems with this article are not just that it needs "cleanup" as "too technical," but rather that it ignores many of the most important features of Protocol I. For instance, in 2002 on the 25th anniversary of Protocols I & II, Jakob Kellenberger, the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross, which administers the Geneva Conventions, said this about Protocol I:

"Twenty-five years ago, the major achievement of the First Additional Protocol were the rules it established on the conduct of hostilities. Among them is the crucial principle of distinction between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives. The Protocol also clearly stated another important rule that "the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited". The list does not end here."

In 2007 on the 30th anniversary, a spokesperson for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a statement on the S-G's behalf that said in part:

"Additional Protocol I is significant for strengthening the protection of civilians during international armed conflict. Balancing both military and humanitarian needs, Additional Protocol I brings together two formerly separate areas of law concerning armed conflict: the law concerning the conduct of hostilities and the law protecting civilians and those who no longer take an active part in hostilities. It sets forth essential rules reminding parties that the methods and means of warfare are not unlimited, and prohibits the use of weapons that are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. It also sets forth the principle of distinction, according to which parties to a conflict must distinguish between the civilian population and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives, and may only direct operations against military objectives."

It also noted that 167 countries were party to Protocol I and said "The Secretary-General calls on all States currently not party to the 1977 Additional Protocols to become party to these instruments."

The current article does not link to intimately related Wikipedia articles such as those on distinction, proportionality and military necessity that deal with some of the key features of Protocol I unmentioned in the current text.

The aspects of Protocol I regarding and extending the applicability of Geneva Conventions protections to irregular combatants addressed in this rump article had taken on additional importance in U.S. domestic and international politics, as a result of U.S. responses to the September 2001 terrorist attacks, at the time the article was originally composed, though the source link to President Reagan's 1987 message to Congress shows they had deeper roots. Those controversies appear to form the background for most of what is written in the article.

(The Reagan reasons for referring Protocol II but not Protocol I for ratification are interesting, inasmuch as it is true as stated that Protocol I provides more protections for some irregular combatants that the U.S. has faced before and since, but also true, but not stated, that Protocol I restricts and makes war crimes actions by irregular combatants that the Reagan administration backed, notably the Nicaraguan Contras and the guerrilla forces of Jonas Savimbi in Angola. The article fails to note that Protocol I among other things makes clear that irregular combatant forces and organizations are bound by the laws of war too and punishable for violating them.)

IMO what is here has to be seen as POV inasmuch as it explains why those aspects "were seen as problematic" by mostly unnamed parties (except the U.K. government at ratification), and tends to read as justification for U.S. non-ratification and less explicitly perhaps for Bush administration "War on Terror" practices. Notably it does not say why those aspects evidently were seen as necessary by some and acceptable by many ratifying governments, nor what parties that ratified with reservations saw as important enough to lead to ratification despite the reservations. Why the U.S. is so isolated in non-ratification is not addressed -- could it be partly that past U.S. strategies such as "free fire zones" in Vietnam would be considered war crimes under Protocol I? The commentary on the British "Declarations" raises the question of why the U.S. has not pursued a similar course of action.

The way I have just written would not be appropriate NPOV either. However, I am going to try to figure out how to put a POV flag on the article again & will try to come back to begin some substantive editing reflecting these comments in an appropriate manner -- I cannot do so now.

Chris Lowe (talk) 22:45, 8 January 2009 (UTC)

Yes, there is obvious massive bias here against Protocol I - it is presented as a sort of miscellaneous addendum that you can take or leave, when there is a very serious case that the Protocol I provisions pertaining to insurgents/guerillas/franc-tieurs are in fact customary, and binding on all parties whether they ratify it or not. Protocol I would seem to indicate that combatants who do not actively use "human shields," yet are not readily identifiable as combatants when not actively fighting, are lawful combatants. This would presumably include the great majority of America's "unlawful combatants," so the relevance is obvious, but Wikipedia obfuscates it. 76.68.60.30 (talk) 00:08, 1 August 2009 (UTC)

Rewritten

I have completely rewritten the article to address the above issues. It should be much more accessible now to the uninitiated. Long discussions about why the United States did not adopt it, or detailed enumerations of each paragraph of the treaty, should be published in an International Law journal, not here. It could possibly use expanded treatment of the key paragraphs, or a History section. Lets try to keep this article concise, factual, and in the style of an encyclopedic entry. Morrillonline (talk) 11:50, 15 September 2009 (UTC)

I am not sure that this was a good idea. I think you have removed a lot of text that was useful and which is not contained in any other Wikiepdia article. PBS (talk) 23:40, 4 March 2010 (UTC)

I agree with the above poster. This rewrite is not helpful. Statements in the opening paragraph such as "a number of the articles contained in both protocols are recognized as rules of customary international law valid for all states, whether or not they have ratified them" make absolutely no sense when the reigning superpower and hegemony is not a party to the treaty, does not recognize it as customary or peremptory, and strikes me as incredibly POV against that entity. Such a statement delegitimizes the concept of international law as a whole. If any State with a veto on the Security Council disagrees with a concept or treaty, and has the economic or physical power to defend such disagreement, I have no idea how it can be considered jus cogens. Your statement is quite simply, not factual and encyclopedic, but expresses an ideal of what international law should be rather than what it is. (68.174.97.40 (talk) 10:19, 30 December 2014 (UTC))

Only obeying orders

See Law on the battlefield by A. P. V. Rogers p. 145 for how this issue was not dealt with in this additional protocol. At some point it would be useful to include this information in this article. -- PBS (talk) 23:40, 4 March 2010 (UTC)

Can we get a map displaying who actually assents to Protocol I?

This protocol map is entirely unclear and gives me absolutely no information about who is a party to Protocol I and who is not. It has all sorts of irrelevant data about Geneva Conventions in general, and the other Protocols. Why can't we have a clear map of who assents and who does not? How else can we get an understanding of whether or not this treaty should be considered a peremptory norm? It is being cited more and more, but the US clearly is not a participant. How can something be a peremptory norm when the reigning superpower and hegemony is not a party to it? This last comment is a bit of my own POV, but I came here looking for information so that I could determine how universal participation was in this treaty, and how abnormal the US' lack of assent was, and I can't figure it out. This needs to be addressed across all articles on the Geneva Conventions. This method of charting is absolutely horrible (68.174.97.40 (talk) 10:13, 30 December 2014 (UTC))

Russian "revocation" of Protocol I

To be clear, I'm not a lawyer of any kind, much less an expert in international humanitarian law - but I think this article, and many of its sources, have the facts wrong with regards to Russia's 2019 revocation of Protocol I. As best as I can tell, Putin did not revoke Russia's ratification itself, but rather the optional declaration recognizing the IHFFC provided for in article 90.

The actual text of the declaration, as reported and translated by the International Committee of the Red Cross, was as follows:

The Russian Federation decided to withdraw the declaration made by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the time of the ratification of the Additional Protocol I in accordance with Article 90, paragraph 2, recognizing ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other High Contracting Party accepting the same obligation, the competence of the International Fact-Finding Commission.

Reuters reported this wrongly, saying that Putin had "revoked an additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions related to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts" when in fact he revoked the declaration recognizing that the IHFFC was competent to investigate violations **of** the protocol. The Globe and Mail source linked here is straight off the Reuters wire. The Moscow Times source correctly reports that "Putin issued a decree Wednesday revoking the Soviet Union’s statement accompanying its 1989 adoption of the additional protocol to the conventions" but again phrases this as meaning that "Putin is seeking to withdraw Russia’s recognition of a Geneva Conventions provision on protecting victims of war," which, again, does not appear to have been correct. Reading Putin's letter also makes it clear it's entirely about his problems with the IHFFC (it "has effectively failed to carry out its functions since 1991," the risk of the committee being abused has increased, Russia isn't represented on the committee, etc) rather than about any problems with Protocol I itself. The Bloomberg source is paywalled so I can't comment on the quality of that one, but all in all, looks like it was sloppy reporting all around.

So as far as I can tell, if Russia were to - hypothetically, of course - indiscriminately kill civilians, dress soldiers in enemy colors, or damage the Chernobyl sarcophagus, all of would still be war crimes under Russian law, but Russian law would not recognize any external authority to investigate those war crimes. That seems like an important clarification, but given that it's possible I've misunderstood something, I thought I should put it here rather than being bold, given the importance of the information in question. 2601:14D:4180:F5A0:0:0:0:53AD (talk) 16:44, 25 February 2022 (UTC)

I agree, and I think given this has been here nearly two months without comment, I will be BOLD. SamBC(talk) 10:11, 19 April 2022 (UTC)

Done, with citations to the ICRC and UN lists of states parties. SamBC(talk) 12:15, 19 April 2022 (UTC)

All mention of controversies has now been eliminated from the article

There's no mention of the reasons why the U.S. government thought this document overall pro-terrorist (just a bare mention that the U.S. has not ratified). There's also no mention of that some interpreted the notorious sentence below as excluding Israelis (among others) from being covered by any protections: AnonMoos (talk) 18:29, 21 March 2022 (UTC)

The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination

As far as I'm concerned, if someone wants to add that and they can do so in a balanced way (commentary from different sides of the debate), NPOV, and not give undue weight to the reasons for failing to sign/ratify of some nations over others, that's fine. We can report on it without endorsing the criticisms. SamBC(talk) 12:19, 19 April 2022 (UTC)

Weasel words on the Article I controversies

The article currently describes Article I as particularly controversial, saying Article I states that the convention applies in "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination", which has been interpreted as favoring terrorism, and denying protections to Israel.

This seems WP:UNDUE and like weasel words to me. Interpreted by who? By the authors of the sources we link? We should name them if so, because if it's just a handful of law review articles from individual experts, the credibility of those experts is important for evaluating the claims.

But if it's a larger movement who says this, we're going to need sources saying that specifically, and not just a handful of individual criticisms.

(The original text also included a clear WP:SYNTHy link to a resolution that does not appear to be mentioned in the sources as far as I've been able to tell. I've removed it and I hope that removal will be uncontroversial.) Loki (talk) 01:11, 14 November 2023 (UTC)

I find your objections to be almost incomprehensible. The pro-terrorism clause added to Article 1 of the Protocol is a very large part of why the U.S. didn't ratify it, and explanations as to why the U.S. didn't ratify Protocol I are 100% on topic for this article. Douglas J. Feith was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense when he wrote the linked article. Furthermore, the idea that the pro-terrorism clause added to Article 1 was aimed at Israel is contained directly in the cited source "A Response to Douglas J. Feith's Law in the Service of Terror -- The Strange Case of the Additional Protocol" by Waldemar A. Solf (1986), Akron Law Review vol. 20, issue 2, p. 285. And people in International organizations in 1977 were exceedingly well aware of UNGA 3379 of 1975, a very live and acrimonious topic which had invaded a number of seemingly unrelated venues, such as the International Women's Year. (It also ended up being the only act of the United Nations which was formally repealed during the entire history of the United Nations, though that happened later.) Those who added the pro-terrorism clause to Article I of the Protocol knew exactly what they were doing, so I don't know why Wikipedia readers can't benefit from the same knowledge. In any case, the assertion in "A Response to Douglas J. Feith's Law in the Service of Terror -- The Strange Case of the Additional Protocol" by Waldemar A. Solf (1986), Akron Law Review vol. 20, issue 2, p. 285 is very hard to understand without background knowledge of UNGA 3379 of 1975...

I am not a footnote guy -- if technicalities of footnoting are in less than optimal form due to my weak footnoting skills, then fixing the format technicalities without deleting sourced and relevant information should be the answer. AnonMoos (talk) 10:55, 14 November 2023 (UTC)