Talk:Operation Linda Nchi

Rename Article Too: Operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Country)

The above is the official name of the Kenyan Invasion of Somalia. Which is what this is. Incursion indicates a limited cross border raid or sovereignty violation. I would think thousands of troops and attack aircraft qualifies for the upgrade. Additionally, the Kenyans have the stated goal of seizing Al Shabab's operational capital. This is definitely a war, and could potentially be a major turning point in the Somali Civil War. I would say it qualifies for the name change and its own page. ArcherMan86 (talk) 21:52, 18 October 2011 (UTC)

The main problem with using operational titles for conflicts is that they are inherently non-neutral, for example im sure al-Shabab doesnt refer to the campaign as operation linda nchi and you can bet that most english speaking sources wont either.XavierGreen (talk) 23:10, 18 October 2011 (UTC)

Agreed. The official name of the incursion is apparently Linda Nchi. So, per List of military operations, that's what the page should be moved to if it survives the Afd. Middayexpress (talk) 20:58, 19 October 2011 (UTC)

It seems that Operation Linda Nchi is already a redirect to this article. So in the meantime, I've moved this page to the more accurate "Joint Kenyan-Somalian operation (2011)" since the incursion is actually a coordinated, signed agreement, not a unilateral invasion. Middayexpress (talk) 17:16, 23 October 2011 (UTC)

Have you put in a move request to Operation Linda Nchi? I agree that would be the best title for the page, especially now that Ethiopia is openly mulling adding its forces to the operation and there is talk of coordinating the efforts with those of AU peacekeepers. -Kudzu1 (talk) 17:51, 23 October 2011 (UTC)

Good idea. Middayexpress (talk) 18:32, 23 October 2011 (UTC)

Muhammad Abdi Yusuf

is he the same as the abdi yusuf quoted in the article? if so, we can fix that redlink.— alf.laylah.wa.laylah (talk) 23:28, 16 October 2011 (UTC)

Not sure. This Yusuf is an army officer, that Yusuf (as far as I know) is a politician and diplomat. -Kudzu1 (talk) 23:31, 16 October 2011 (UTC)

"English translation"

I'm dubious. Kenya's official name in Swahili is...Kenya. So "Linda Nchi" doesn't seem like it can possibly translate to "Protect Kenya". -Kudzu1 (talk) 18:16, 19 October 2011 (UTC)

Agreed. As I understand it, Kenya was actually named by the British after Mount Kenya. Middayexpress (talk) 20:38, 19 October 2011 (UTC)

As it turns out, some blogs are indicating that "Linda Nchi" translates as "Protect Kenya". However, most outlets that discuss the name indicate that it's "Protect the country", which seems more likely given the above. Middayexpress (talk) 21:16, 19 October 2011 (UTC)

Local news agencies are using "Protect the Country" or "Protect the Nation" Xelawafs (talk) 07:18, 23 October 2011 (UTC)

Fork

Per WP:POVFORK, I've redirected a fork of this article [1] to point to this page. Middayexpress (talk) 17:30, 26 October 2011 (UTC)

Signed cooperative agreement, Kenya-Shabaab proxy war, France's alleged involvement

The statements asserting that 1) an official agreement was reached between Somalia's and Kenya's respective Defence Ministers to cooperate against Al-Shabaab, and that 2) both countries signed an official pact to "co-operate in undertaking security and military operations", including "co-ordinated pre-emptive action" are sourced to ABC and Al-Jazeera, respectively, not to the reference labeled Krusasbeas. Also, the overview explains states that "Kenya had not "actively engaged" in the conflict in southern Somalia prior to this operation", but then several sentences later blurts out that "Kenya had previously been supporting at least two militias in southern Somalia" without providing any context. The actual article [2] that the information was taken from, however, does provide context for this militia support by the Kenyans when it explains that Kenya was involved in a proxy war against Al-Shabaab, but moved instead to a direct presence of Kenyan troops once that strategy had failed. Lastly, both the French embassy in Kenya and a spokesman for the French military have denied France's involvement in the operation. It's the French media and the Kenyan military that claim the French military is involved; the French embassy actually requested that it "would appreciate if the newspapers would kindly correct the false impression created on this matter". So the qualifier "alleged" is necessary if one is to neutrally cite France as a belligerent. Middayexpress (talk) 20:44, 26 October 2011 (UTC)

It wasn't just those statements which had issues when sourced to Kasabears, it was all of them. Besides, as noted, kasasbears should not be reinserted as we have the original it was copied from. The ABC source was made on 25 October saying the pact had happened the previous week, and the Al-Jazeera source indicates that discussion that created the pact were held after the initial Kenyan action, neither can be used to support an agreement pre-invasion. Active engagement implies with their own military troops, which wouldn't include supporting militia. However, I see no reason why proxy war information can't go into the article. France has officially noted that it is providing logistical support (BBC source), helping the Kenyan army. Chipmunkdavis (talk) 00:22, 27 October 2011 (UTC)

In the last version, exactly one statement was sourced to the Kasabears ref; namely, the assertion that "the incursion was reportedly coordinated with and at the behest of the Somalian Army". This seems to be the main bone of contention i.e. whether or not there was some sort of pre-understanding between the Somalian and Kenyan governments with regard to the deployment of Kenyan troops. As it turns out, the intervention was at the behest of the Somalian government ("intervention by Kenyan military forces was requested and welcomed by the US-backed Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu" [3]). The Kenyan government itself has also indicated this "Nairobi said the deployment into Somali was done with the approval of President Ahmed's government" [4]. The Kenyan troops then crossed the border into southern Somalia, and two days into the incursion, a formal agreement was signed between Somalia's and Kenya's defence ministers in Mogadishu outlining a joint strategy to "co-operate in undertaking security and military operations"; the pact also reportedly restricts Kenyan activities to the Lower Juba region. The reason why the President of Somalia Sharif Ahmed is upset about the Kenyan troops' assault on Al-Shabaab positions is because he believes it's a breach of the logistical nature of the pact with Kenya. Specifically, that the Kenyan forces would provide some training to Somalian soldiers and that's about it. But this is apparently not what the Mogadishu cooperative agreement actually stipulates, which is why the media is describing Sharif Ahmed's position as "contradicting" the pact: "'Somalia's government and its people will not allow forces entering its soil without prior agreement,' Sharif Sheikh Ahmed told reporters in Mogadishu on Monday. 'There is only one thing we know about the Kenyan forces, and that is their offer of training to the national army of Somalia.' Sharif's statement appeared to contradict an agreement signed last week by Kenya and Somalia's defence ministers to 'co-operate in undertaking security and military operations'" [5]. All of this should be made clear in the article. Middayexpress (talk) 17:26, 27 October 2011 (UTC)

The Kasasbears ref was used multiple times, and it shouldn't be used at all. It wasn't any single statement. As for preunderstanding, we have sources noting the surprise of the Somalian government. The ambassador to Kenya and the President both expressed displeasure, although Nairobi did claim it was prearranged. This is all in the current article. The formal agreement two days later should be fine to put in, assuming source. The defense ministers pact could easily have changed the nature of the agreement (and obviously would have), so I see no issues with that. Chipmunkdavis (talk) 02:35, 28 October 2011 (UTC)

The Krusasbeas ref was initially used multiple times, but was replaced by me with other refs. At any rate, I have no problem with omitting it altogether. That the defense ministers changed the nature of the initial informal agreement with Kenya is unlikely since Sharif Ahmed himself took part in the Mogadishu talks that ended in the formal pact (c.f. [6]). As such, he was already aware of the nature of the agreement. That's why the media is saying that his statements contradict the ministerial agreement. From the Kenya Defence Minister's comments in that link above, it would appear that the media early on may perhaps have also embellished the extent of Kenya's initial military engagement. Middayexpress (talk) 19:33, 28 October 2011 (UTC)

The formal pact again took place after this started. Are the terms of the agreement published anywhere? Which media suggest the contradictions? Chipmunkdavis (talk) 23:43, 30 October 2011 (UTC)

As explained and quoted previously, there were two agreements: one informal and one formal. Namely, a) the initial non-written agreement to deploy Kenyan troops into Somalia, as testified by both the media and the Kenyan military; and b) the pact in Mogadishu two days into the incursion, formally outlining a joint strategy. Both are notable.

Although Somalia's ambassador to Kenya, Mohamed Ali Nur, expressed reservations about the intervention, the initial deployment of Kenyan troops into Somalia was reportedly at the behest of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The Kenyan government also stated that it had received approval from the Somalian authorities to dispatch its troops into the country.

On 16 October, Abdi Yusuf, a leading Somali military commander, indicated that the Kenyan army was acting in concert with the Somalian military and that Somalia's "neighbour Kenya is fully supporting us militarily and our mission is to drive Al-Shabaab out of the region."

Several days later, on 18 October, President of Somalia Sharif Ahmed and other TFG officials hosted a Kenyan delegation in Mogadishu to formalize the pact and outline a joint strategy. Somalia's Defence Minister Hussein Arab Isse and Kenya's Minister of Defence Mohamed Yusuf Haji then signed an agreement to collaborate against Al-Shabaab. Both countries pledged to "co-operate in undertaking security and military operations", including "co-ordinated pre-emptive action". The agreement reportedly restricts Kenyan activities to the southern Lower Juba region.

Despite media reports indicating that the Somalian military had been assisted by Kenyan forces when it captured various towns in Lower Juba, Kenya Defence Minister Haji denied any direct involvement by the Kenyan military. He added that "Kenya trained more TFG troops in the past and they are battling now against al-Shabaab in southern Somalia regions and we are giving them both logistical and financial support." Somalia's Defence Minister Isse welcomed Kenya's participation, stating that Somalia "need[ed] the support of Kenya so that our forces will be able to end al-Shabaab or any other threats against both Kenya and Somalia".

On 25 October, President Sharif made several statements before the press that appeared to contradict the signed cooperative agreement between the Somalian and Kenyan governments. Sharif suggested that although Kenyan support in the form of logistics and training was welcome, his administration and people in Somalia opposed the presence of Kenyan troops since the Somalian federal government "had no agreement with Kenya beyond helping us with logistics". According to a BBC correspondent, Ahmed's remarks may stem from his opposition to the notion of Kenya's involvement in a local initiative that looks to establish a semi-autonomous Jubaland region in the south.

In your edit summary you claimed that the paragraphs above that I added "altered the tone and used sources to try and imply something which they do not". However, you have not explained what exactly you are referring to. Per WP:BRD, instead of reverting wholesale, please explain which exact sentences above you believe are misleading or inaccurate and why, citing the relevant parts of the sources in question. We can then begin to resolve the issue, if any. Don't throw the baby out with the bathwater. Middayexpress (talk) 19:33, 31 October 2011 (UTC)

I've seen no convincing evidence in the media that there was an informal agreement between the governments, although it does seem the Somalian military of the area may have known something. The only source that explicitly states any invitation or prior agreement is the WSWS source, published on 26 October, and which is hardly reliable. It's a political rant against western influence, and it's claiming that the TFG welcomed Kenya in order to assault the evil US imperialist empire. After that you say "the Kenyan government also stated it had received approval..." from BBC. The also is misleading, as no statement has been asserted before, and you've taken one sentence from an article which begins discussing Somali opposition to the governments opposition to Kenya and counters that statement immediately afterwards. You've then sourced that Abdi Yusuf stated the Kenyan army was acting in concert with the Somalian army, however the source only notes support (which they already had in border security agreements) and you've conveniently left out the fact he couldn't confirm where the jets were from. Nothing wrong with your paragraph about the agreement two days later, but it's ironic that you've used the Skynews article "Somali president opposes Kenyan assault" which explicitly notes "'There is only one thing we know about the Kenyan forces, and that is their offer of training to the national army of Somalia." In your last paragraph you say "President Sharif made several statements before the press that appeared to contradict the signed cooperative agreement between the Somalian and Kenyan governments", however the source used (the Skynews one again) doesn't mention the government, just the defence ministers. Chipmunkdavis (talk) 21:00, 31 October 2011 (UTC)

There's a lot of key information your wholesale revert again threw out. Although your point about the wswg ref is taken, it is hardly the only article that indicates that Kenya's troop deployment was done at the behest of the TFG (e.g. "Foreign Affairs minister Moses Wetang’ula said troops went across the border on the request of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG)" [7]). Your complaint about the statement from the Somalian commander Abdi Yusuf that "Kenyan army was acting in concert with the Somalian military" is likewise unfounded since the Reuters article itself states in its very first sentence that "Kenyan troops have crossed into Somalia and have driven out al Shabaab militants from two bases near the Kenyan border in a joint operation with Somali soldiers, a Somali military commander said on Sunday" [8]. As such, Yusuf's statement had nothing do with with any hypothetical prior border security agreement(s) between Somalia and Kenya. The article is specifically on Operation Linda Nchi against Al-Shabaab, and was published on October 16, during the mission's very first coordinated move. Furthermore, the jets info was omitted because the origin of the aircraft was unclear (media have suggested that the French military has also launched air-strikes, so it wasn't necessarily even Kenyan aircraft) and because it didn't fit into the section on agreements. It belongs further down the page in the events timeline. Lastly, Sharif Ahmed's statements contradict the actual arrangement with Kenya. This is stated outright in that SkyNews article you quote from ("Sharif's statement appeared to contradict an agreement signed last week by Kenya and Somalia's defence ministers to 'co-operate in undertaking security and military operations'" [9]). The Oct. 18th pact was signed by both Defence Ministers, so I have no issue with adjusting that. Note that representatives of the Somalian and Kenyan governments met today and ironed out their differences. They also released a joint communique, signed by both Prime Ministers, "pledging joint military, diplomatic and political support for Operation Linda Nchi, requesting African Union (AU) peacekeepers to police "liberated areas" and the International Criminal Court (ICC) to start investigations against key officials within the Al Qaida linked extremist militia" [10]. All of the foregoing needs to be explained. Middayexpress (talk) 23:39, 31 October 2011 (UTC)

The fact that the Kenyan government claims they were invited is already in the article. As for the Somali commanders claim, that is also already in the article. It however was not connected with Abdi Yusuf's statement. The sky article does state the president contradicted the agreement, however, he contradicted the 18 October arrangement rather than any prior agreement. Todays agreement can likewise be added into the article, with no problem. What information did I throw out that should be in? Chipmunkdavis (talk) 10:15, 1 November 2011 (UTC)

To answer your question, every paragraph above -- including the chronological discussion of the various cooperative arrangements (such as the key specification that the Kenyan military's operations are officially limited to the Lower Juba region per the signed October 18th agreement), and the section headings -- was removed wholesale. The fact that the Kenyan military was given permission to enter Somalia by the Somalian government is in the article. The fact that the Somalian TFG itself first requested that assistance (as the Kenyan Foreign Minister himself has indicated), however, is not. Abdi Yusuf is also the Somali military commander that is quoted and referenced in the Reuters article; no other commander is cited there. As such, it's him that indicates on the first day of the operation that it was a joint mission with the Kenyan military: "Kenyan troops have crossed into Somalia and have driven out al Shabaab militants from two bases near the Kenyan border in a joint operation with Somali soldiers". That implies that there was already some sort of pre-arrangement with regard to Operation Linda Nchi. Now that that's understood, there are now three separate cooperative agreements that have taken place between the Somalian and Kenyan governments vis-a-vis Operation Linda Nchi:

1) The initial "joint operation" arrangement alluded to by the senior Somali military commander Abdi Yusuf.

2) The signed October 18th pact in Mogadishu that formally outlined a joint strategy.

3) The October 31st joint communique of yesterday ironing out differences and reaffirming the coordinated nature of the operation.

As such, a separate Cooperative agreements section is clearly needed to properly discuss these various arrangements as they have evolved, and to discuss any similar future arrangements that may also come to pass. The revised text and/or sourcing of the explanatory paragraphs quoted above would thus now look as follows, with an additional paragraph(s) to be added discussing the new joint communique:

Although Somalia's ambassador to Kenya, Mohamed Ali Nur, expressed reservations about the intervention, the initial deployment of Kenyan troops into Somalia was at the request of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) according to Kenya's Foreign Affairs Minister, Moses Wetang’ula. The Kenyan government also stated that it had received approval from the Somalian authorities to dispatch its troops into the country.

On 16 October, Abdi Yusuf, a leading Somali military commander, indicated that the Kenyan army was acting in concert with the Somalian military and that Somalia's "neighbour Kenya is fully supporting us militarily and our mission is to drive Al-Shabaab out of the region."

Several days later, on 18 October, President of Somalia Sharif Ahmed and other TFG officials hosted a Kenyan delegation in Mogadishu to formalize the pact and outline a joint strategy. Somalia's Defence Minister Hussein Arab Isse and Kenya's Minister of Defence Mohamed Yusuf Haji then signed an agreement to collaborate against Al-Shabaab. Both countries pledged to "co-operate in undertaking security and military operations", including "co-ordinated pre-emptive action". The agreement reportedly restricts Kenyan activities to the southern Lower Juba region.

Despite media reports indicating that the Somalian military had been assisted by Kenyan forces when it captured various towns in Lower Juba, Kenya Defence Minister Haji on 18 October denied any direct involvement by the Kenyan military. He added that "Kenya trained more TFG troops in the past and they are battling now against al-Shabaab in southern Somalia regions and we are giving them both logistical and financial support." Somalia's Defence Minister Isse welcomed Kenya's participation, stating that Somalia "need[ed] the support of Kenya so that our forces will be able to end al-Shabaab or any other threats against both Kenya and Somalia".

On 25 October, President Sharif made several statements before the press that appeared to contradict the signed cooperative agreement between the Somalian and Kenyan Defence ministers. Sharif suggested that although Kenyan support in the form of logistics and training was welcome, his administration and people in Somalia opposed the presence of Kenyan troops since the Somalian federal government "had no agreement with Kenya beyond helping us with logistics". According to a BBC correspondent, Ahmed's remarks may have stemmed from his opposition to the notion of Kenya's involvement in a local initiative that looks to establish a semi-autonomous Jubaland region in the south.

Since there's already a separate International response section devoted to the reactions of the international community, npov also requires us to devote a similar section to the reactions of the other belligerent, Al-Shabaab. The Al-Shabaab reaction heading should therefore be restored. And finally, the phrase in the opening paragraph that states that "Operation Linda Nchi is the Kenyan name" for the mission is an understatement since the article was just moved to Operation Linda Nchi because that is the WP:COMMONNAME, not just the Kenyan one. That phrase should therefore be changed back to its original "Operation Linda Nchi is the codename for...". Middayexpress (talk) 16:56, 1 November 2011 (UTC)

Actually, the Lower Juba information is still in the article. That paragraph was left intact. We don't have any reliable sources which support the TFG asking for invasion besides those which note the Kenyan claims of invitation, and that is in the article. I don't see the connection between Abdi Yusuf and the other commander in the reuters article. Do we have any other sources about that? As for extrapolating a joint operation to mean a pre-arranged agreement between governments, that's synth. A cooperative agreements section isn't needed, and would seem to be a strange way to arrange the article. The paragraphs above duplicate current information elsewhere in the article. Your argument for a Al-Shabaab section is sound, I've placed it back in. As for Operation Linda Nchi, that is the Kenyan name, whether it is the common name or not. Chipmunkdavis (talk) 17:40, 1 November 2011 (UTC)

Actually, we do have a reliable source that Kenya's troop deployment was done at the request of the TFG -- the Kenyan Foreign Minister himself: "Foreign Affairs minister Moses Wetang’ula said troops went across the border on the request of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG)" [11]. This, like much of the material above, is not in the wiki article. All that is indicated in the wiki article on this point is that "The Kenyan government has claimed the invasion was done with Somalia's approval". Approval (which means permission in this case) is not the same thing as requesting. This is because approval doesn't rule out the possibility that the Kenyan government itself first could have approached the Somalian government about intervening and only then been granted permission to do so. However, this is not what the aforementioned Reuters article indicates. It clearly states that, per the Kenyan Foreign Minister, the Somalian TFG actually personally requested Kenya's troop deployment. So yes, we certainly do have a reliable source indicating that the deployment of Kenyan troops was at the request of the TFG. Moreover, if Abdi Yusuf is not the military commander who indicated to Reuters on the first day of the incursion that the mission was a "joint operation", then a simple tweak of the paragraph above mentioning Yusuf to now attribute the "joint operation" to the unnamed military commander should suffice. That's not synth; that's what Reuters actually indicates. Viz.:

Reuters: "Kenyan troops have crossed into Somalia and have driven out al Shabaab militants from two bases near the Kenyan border in a joint operation with Somali soldiers, a Somali military commander said on Sunday."

The now-tweaked paragraph: "On 16 October, an unnamed Somali military commander told Reuters that the Kenyan forces were acting in concert with the Somalian army. Abdi Yusuf, a senior Somali military commander, also specified that Somalia's "neighbour Kenya is fully supporting us militarily and our mission is to drive Al-Shabaab out of the region."

You have also not justified why a separate cooperative agreements section is not needed. Per the media, there have been three separate arrangements between the Somalian and Kenyan governments: 1) The initial "joint operation" between the Somalian and Kenyan militaries as per the Somali commander; 2) The official October 18th agreement formally outlining a joint strategy; and 3) The joint communique of October 31st ironing out differences. Instead of discussing these separate arrangements in their chronological order and allocating space for more such future agreements (which are likely), the wiki article:

a) Omits altogether mention of the initial "joint operation".

b) Leaves out important aspects of the October 18th agreement, such as the Kenya Defence Minister Haji's denial at that date of any direct involvement by the Kenyan military despite media reports to that effect, and his assertion that Kenya was instead providing mainly logistical support. Also, Somalia's Defence Minister's welcoming Kenya's participation and his indication that his military "need[ed] the support of Kenya so that our forces will be able to end al-Shabaab or any other threats against both Kenya and Somalia".

c) Fails to even mention the joint communique of October 31st between Somalia's and Kenya's Prime Ministers. Instead, it gives the impression that the Prime Minister opposes Kenya's involvement based on that dubious, factually inaccurate Kenyan article already discussed below.

I have made some adjustments to the article to correct some of these omissions, but they're not enough. A separate Cooperative agreements header is still required per the above. Middayexpress (talk) 18:17, 2 November 2011 (UTC)

Note that the joint operation alluded to by the Somali military commander on the first day of Linda Nchi is almost certainly the same prior agreement reached between the TFG and the Kenyan government that Somalia's Defence Minister Hussein Arab Isse read out to the Kenyan delegation during the Mogadishu talks that led up to the signed October 18th pact: "Somalia’s Defence minister –cum-Deputy Prime Minister Hussein Arab Issa, read out an agreement reached with Kenya, when Nairobi ministers visited Mogadishu recently. Mr Issa stated: “The Somali Government and the Kenyan ministers only agreed to tackle the fighting against Al-Shabaab jointly by Kenya supporting the Somali forces" [12]. So that's actually two formal agreements and one joint communique, all pertaining to Operation Linda Nchi. And all are notable. Middayexpress (talk) 18:17, 2 November 2011 (UTC)

I don't see much of a difference between approval and requesting, but that would be an acceptable change. But despite this, we have sources going on about how the Somalian President opposed the action almost a week later. The agreements made are simply events that have occurred, I see no special reason to separate them. And no, the media still has not noted the first agreement anywhere, just the Kenyan ministers statement. So yes, a) the Kenyan claims are mentioned b) again, I'm fine for that info to go in, c) again fine. As for your Issa statement, that seems to be about the 18th agreement, not any supposed prior one. Chipmunkdavis (talk) 00:54, 3 November 2011 (UTC)

After reviewing Isse's quote, I agree that he is referring to the October 18th signed agreement. Sharif Ahmed did oppose the October 18 agreement, but that was only after having initially supported it. That is why he is described as contradicting his previous position on the issue. Like many TFG officials, the Somalian Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali initially opposed Ahmed's position, but later "disowned any agreement with Kenya to enter Somalia" [13]. I'm willing to let the issue of a separate header for the cooperative arrangements go. But if another pact is signed (which is possible), then it'll have to be reconsidered. Middayexpress (talk) 18:09, 3 November 2011 (UTC)

Something was up with Ahmed, although I doubt we'll find out exactly what for awhile. I'd be interested in a section on the expansion of the mission if that happens. We've already got France, Kenya, and Somalia, allegedly the USA, and possibly Ethiopia. Chipmunkdavis (talk) 20:13, 3 November 2011 (UTC)

A separate Belligerents section does seem warranted, as Kenya has now raised concerns that Eritrea is arming Al-Shabaab [14]. I've moved the relevant material to a new header titled as such. Middayexpress (talk) 18:36, 4 November 2011 (UTC)

Oh yay, Eritrea. No-one saw that coming. Anyway, I've placed back the information of the twitter claim and the background of Ahmeds tensions with Kenya. RS have reported on it, so we can simply follow them. Now that we have a belligerent section I think we should reduce overview to just the pre-16 October events and place everything else in the Events section. Overview could then be called background. Chipmunkdavis (talk) 20:07, 4 November 2011 (UTC)

The Belligerents section is only for the discussion of the actual belligerents that are involved (like the infobox, but more detailed), not a chronological discussion of the operation's background. The Overview section already covers that general background. The Belligerents section now basically repeats a lot of the info already mentioned in the Overview section, such as Sharif's objections and the 18 October agreement. That repetition needs to be removed. The Belligerents section also does not mention the fact that the operation is now officially Somalia-led. That is, along with the decision to hand over liberated areas to local administrative authorities, Somalia as operation leader is one of the actual stipulations of the jointly-issued Prime Ministerial communique of October 31st: "the operation would be led by TFG supported by Kenyan forces and that the liberated areas will be handed over to local administration and humanitarian services and other infrastructure provided"[15].

I notice you've also re-added the irrelevant claim from the StarKe ref that Ahmed previously protested the deployment of 2500 Somalian troops to southern Somalia back in 2010. As explained below, that deployment of Transitional Federal Government troops had nothing to do with Jubaland fears, much less the brand new Operation Linda Nchi of 2011. Sharif's contradicting statements were also already mentioned:

"President Sharif subsequently made several statements before the press that appeared to contradict the signed 18 October cooperative agreement between the Somalian and Kenyan Defence ministers.[28] Sharif suggested that although Kenyan support in the form of logistics and training was welcome, his administration and people in Somalia opposed the presence of Kenyan troops since the Somalian federal government "had no agreement with Kenya beyond helping us with logistics".[26] According to a BBC correspondent, Sharif's remarks may have stemmed from his opposition to the notion of Kenya's involvement in a local initiative that looks to establish a semi-autonomous Jubaland region in the south.[19]"

If you would like to implement major layout changes please discuss them here first for consensus per WP:BRD (as with the idea of a Belligerents header that you brought up & I agreed with). Middayexpress (talk) 21:11, 4 November 2011 (UTC)

So what information is supposed to be in the belligerent section? A summary of each belligerent I would assume; it's what you did for your summary of France and the USA. Otherwise what is it other than a list?

Somali leadership is mentioned, the last sentence says "After another meeting on 31 October Abdiweli Mohamed Ali noted the operation "would be led by Somali forces with support of Kenyan forces" ". The note of liberated areas should be added somewhere, to the current explanation in what is now overview?

Ah, below, missed that. Will reply here for now. The connection was made in a source and is an example of previous Kenyan indirect involvement, seems quite relevant. I just summarised shortly the detail for the Belligerent section.

I did suggest a change just above, to split overview, leaving before information there and shifting post-16 Oct information to events. That would give a nice clear background section. Thoughts? Chipmunkdavis (talk) 22:18, 4 November 2011 (UTC)

The fact that Sharif wanted Somalian federal troops deployed to Mogadishu instead of southern Somalia back in 2010 is not relevant to this article on the brand new Operation Linda Nchi. The author of that Kenyan article attempts to tie that unrelated deployment of TFG troops to the current coordinated operation by suggesting that Sharif wanted troops in Mogadishu instead of southern Somalia because he feared that Jubaland would otherwise secede ("President Shariff was worried that the youth, if deployed in the Juba region, would help former Somali Defence minister Mohamed Ghandi whom Mogadishu suspects is attempting to create a separate state for himself between Kenya and the Juba River" [16]). This is an inaccurate, fringe claim, as explained below. The reason why Sharif wanted more troops in Mogadishu was because his government, which was much weaker then in terms of territory controlled and troop strength, was fighting for its very survival. Al-Shabaab at the time were within mortar-launching distance of the presidential palace, so the TFG & its AMISOM allies declared a State of Emergency and were preparing for the start of a long-promised major offensive against the rebels. Sharif summoned the TFG troops to Mogadishu for this offensive, not because he supposedly feared Jubaland would break away ("Somalia's president wants thousands of troops trained in Kenya to be deployed to Mogadishu for an upcoming offensive against Islamist militants" [17]). Whatever the case, it is completely irrelevant to Operation Linda Nchi and attempting to tie-in the two is synth. Moving on, the Belligerents section is only supposed to identify the Belligerents (like in the Belligerents section of the infobox) and briefly explain their role. It is not meant as a dumping ground for things already mentioned elsewhere in the article. The French & U.S. material that I put in the Belligerents section is not mentioned anywhere else in the article because I moved them there since they a) identified France & the United States as potential belligerents; b) explained who has identified them as such (namely, Kenya); and c) indicated France's and the United States' respective responses to their supposedly being belligerents. The same goes for Eritrea. That's the kind of info that goes in the Belligerents section, not repetition of stuff that's already in the Overview section such as Sharif's previous objections and the October 18th pact. Changing the assertion in the Somalia area of the Belligerents section from its original "According to a joint communique issued by the Prime Ministers of Somalia and Kenya on 31 October, the operation, though coordinated, is being led by the Somalian military" to that quote by the Somalian Premier Ali is a major understatement. This is because it is the actual joint communique itself, issued by both Prime Ministers on behalf of their respective delegations, that asserts that the operation is now officially Somalia-led; it's not just Prime Minister Ali claiming this (from the communique, republished on the Kenya Foreign Ministry website: "the current operations are being led by the TFG of Somalia Forces with the support of the Kenyan Defence Forces in pursuit of legitimate Al Shabaab targets" [18]). Lastly, I would support a split of the Overview section, but only in its most logical form i.e. as a main Background section discussing the initial troop deployment, what allegedly motivated it according to the Kenyans, and the initial mixed Somalian response, and a separate Cooperative agreements area reserved for the October 18th pact and joint communique of October 31st. Per WP:BRD, I would also like to first see a draft proposal(s) of the new split up section to get an idea of what it will look like. Middayexpress (talk) 17:24, 5 November 2011 (UTC)

Previous Kenyan involvement and conflict with Ahmed is very relevant. You've given on evidence it is WP:FRINGE at all (a fringe claim is a claim which is placed in opposition to widespread and overbearing mainstream claims), and none of your sources dispute fears over Jubaland. It isn't WP:SYNTH either (synth is combining sources to make them say things they don't say, it is impossible to synth of one source).

After I edited the Somalia section it a) identified it as a belligerent b) explained who identified them as belligerents and who didn't c) indicated Somali response to the events. If the French entry was simplified as much as you have the Somalia entry it would just read "On 25 October, Col Thierry Burkhard of the French military specified that French planes were transporting military equipment to Kenyan troops at an airport near the Somalian border."

When I made the "understatement" it was based on the source at hand. You've provided a new one, so that's brilliant. What's the issue?

I still don't fully understand the "Cooperative agreements" title. Do you mean a section on coordinated efforts or something similar? Either way it wouldn't contain all the information that isn't background. Also, that's not what WP:BRD is (BRD is for when someone makes an edit and it is reverted, and is then discussed on talk, it has nothing to do with proposals). Chipmunkdavis (talk) 18:44, 5 November 2011 (UTC)

The fact that, according to a BBC correspondent (an attribution that was deleted in your edit), President of Somalia Sharif Ahmed's "remarks may have stemmed from his opposition to the notion of Kenya's involvement in a local initiative that looks to establish a semi-autonomous Jubaland region in the south" was already included in the article: "According to a BBC correspondent, Sharif's remarks may have stemmed from his opposition to the notion of Kenya's involvement in a local initiative that looks to establish a semi-autonomous Jubaland region in the south.[20]". I never suggested that that was fringe. I suggested something altogether different in reference to Sharif Ahmed's much earlier, unrelated request from 2010 to have Somalian federal troops redeployed to Mogadishu instead of southern Somalia where they were stationed. The StarKe ref that you keep adding makes the inaccurate claim that that deployment request by Sharif was over fears of Jubaland, and tries to tie in those alleged fears with Sharif's current apprehensions vis-a-vis the presence of Kenyan forces in southern Somalia. However, as quoted above, actual media from the period clearly indicates that Ahmed requested the Somalian federal troops to be redeployed from southern Somalia to Mogadishu in preparation for a major offensive; it had nothing to do with alleged worries that Jubaland might otherwise break away. The latter is a fringe view posited by that StarKe ref's author. And per WP:REDFLAG, "Any exceptional claim requires high-quality sources.[7] Red flags that should prompt extra caution include[...] surprising or apparently important claims not covered by mainstream sources[...] challenged claims that are supported purely by primary or self-published sources[...] reports of a statement by someone that seems out of character, or against an interest they had previously defended[...] claims that are contradicted by the prevailing view within the relevant community, or that would significantly alter mainstream assumptions, especially in science, medicine, history, politics, and biographies of living people."

Your edits to the Belligerents section also did not improve it. In the Somalia sub-section, the statement you added that "On 18 October, President of Somalia Sharif Ahmed and other TFG officials hosted a Kenyan delegation in Mogadishu where Somalia's Defence Minister Hussein Arab Isse and Kenya's Minister of Defence Mohamed Yusuf Haji agreed to collaborate against Al-Shabaab" is just a repetition of the October 18th agreement that is already described in greater detail in the Overview section (and which should actually be discussed in a separate Cooperative agreements sub-section). It also involves both Kenya and Somalia, and Somalia's official involvement in the operation actually dates back to the very first day of the incursion per the unnamed Somalian military commander. The French analogy is likewise an inaccurate one because a) the sentence that "On 25 October, Col Thierry Burkhard of the French military specified that French planes were transporting military equipment to Kenyan troops at an airport near the Somalian border" does not fully identify France's role (Kenya has claimed France is also providing air support), whereas my attribution of Somalia leading the entire operation does; b) the French information was not mentioned anywhere else in the article whereas the non-Belligerent info that you added to the Somalia area was. Fact is, the Belligerents section was never meant to discuss general responses to the operation. This is something I never agreed with in my comments above, and which, in any case, you never mentioned in your initial proposal to create such a new section (proposals are a common procedure in the consensus process, by the way). The Belligerents section was meant to identify potential belligerents & their role, name who has identified them as such, and indicate their respective responses to their supposedly being belligerents. The Somalia and Kenya sections are short because there is no debate that they are belligerents, and their respective roles are clearly outlined in the joint communique of October 31st (not the contentious October 18th agreement). For some reason, you also removed the assertion from the Kenya sub-section that its official role in the operation is to provide support to the Somalian forces, as well as the obviously important specification in the lede that the operation is officially Somalia-led. Middayexpress (talk) 20:14, 6 November 2011 (UTC)

MiddayExpress, if you keep making massive changes to the article that create walls of yellow and green then obviously I'm going to miss a couple of improvements such as source switching. The star article notes Kenyan claimed troops were sent to Jubaland, which is a claim none of your sources refute. People can have multiple reasons for wanting something. In fact, those troops are probably the troops who Yusuf Haji was talking about in "Kenya trained more TFG troops in the past and they are battling now against al-Shabaab in southern Somalia regions", which would be another reason to keep the info. Also, your argument doesn't demonstrate fringe, as theres no indication it runs against any sort of mainstream. It doesn't fit any of those red flags.

Yes, I've included information about Somalias involvement in a section about its involvement. Why that's a bad thing I have no idea. It's a summary of the information of the 18th meeting, just as you've summarised the information of the 31st. Adding a quick note of previous involvement doesn't sound like a bad idea if you wish. Your attribution of Somalia's leading the entire operation is wrong and misleading, this is an encyclopaedia page not a news report. What is described here should show the whole event, not just the most recent agreement or action. My initial proposal was a rough idea which I threw out to gauge a reaction, you were the one who simply took it and set it up as you would like. Discussion is common procedure in consensus (probably more so than simple proposals). I've added back the 31 communique note to Kenya. As I said before, if you give me a wall of green and yellow including bad prose and things not in line with sources, some things will get lost. Thank you for bringing this bad removal I made to my attention. As for the lead note of leadership, that would be WP:RECENTISM. The surety of Somali leadership only occurred a week ago, whereas the operation as a whole has lasted almost a month. Chipmunkdavis (talk) 22:07, 6 November 2011 (UTC)

Arbitrary break

Well, you have pretty much reverted and/or completely altered most of my contributions for the past week and a half or so, contributions which I've consistently justified in detail here. And when I've tried to improve upon those edits to actually address your various concerns above, you've still removed/altered them wholesale and then later complained about my making massive changes (!). Most of the edits in question consist of material I added to the article to begin with. Case in point, I just sourced a tagged phrase in the lede about the operation representing the final stages of the Islamist insurgency per the Ethiopian Foreign Minister; yet that too was reverted and the "by whom" tag was reinserted for good measure. This is not particularly helpful.

I've already gone over the StarKe ref, literally quoting the parts that are fringe and unrelated to Linda Nchi, and contrasting them with actual material from the period that indicates the real reason for the troop deployment to Mogadishu (viz. to prepare for an offensive). You've claimed that the StarKe link's claims don't breach WP:REDFLAG, which is your prerogative. However, you have not substantiated this by, per that policy, producing high quality mainstream sources that also attempt to tie the deployment of Somalian troops to Mogadishu in 2010 to the current coordinated Operation Linda Nchi. The latter historic deployment of Somalian soldiers is not an association that the cited Economist and BBC articles make with the current Operation Linda Nchi; only the StarKe link's author does. Those other refs just argue that Sharif's resistance to the presence of Kenyan troops in southern Somalia (not Somalian federal troops back in 2010) may have stemmed from his opposition to the notion of Kenya's involvement in a local initiative that looks to establish a semi-autonomous Jubaland region in the south -- something that was already included in the wiki article.

The charge that my "attribution of Somalia's leading the entire operation is wrong and misleading" makes no sense. As plainly indicated on the Kenya Foreign Ministry website [19], "the current operations are being led by the TFG of Somalia Forces with the support of the Kenyan Defence Forces in pursuit of legitimate Al Shabaab targets". The "current operations" phrase is a reference to Linda Nchi itself, like the rest of the joint communique's enumerated stipulations. Together with the October 18th agreement, the communique is part of a Joint Mechanism on how the two main belligerents will actually operate: "The meeting was a follow up to the deliberations agreed upon between the two countries in Mogadishu on 18th October 2011 on the operationalization of a Joint Mechanism to manage the joint security operations in Southern Somalia." That's not recentism, which is an issue that applies to matters with no longstanding effects (per WP:RECENT, "Recentism is writing or editing without a long-term, historical view, thereby inflating the importance of a topic that has received recent public attention"). The Joint Mechanism cannot be dismissed as a matter that has merely received recent public attention, as it actually dictates the very course of the operation. Middayexpress (talk) 20:03, 7 November 2011 (UTC)

I've tried to make sure that everything you justified here and I agreed to stayed in, the article has changed during that time. My comment on the massive changes was simply a note that I can not be expected to keep every one of the good edits in the bunch, because I simply can't see them. I didn't add the whom tag, and once again I somehow missed that change (although that was a weird one to miss). Your edit redoing that was good.

Whether or not there was a planned offensive, no source you've given has shown any rejection of Ahmed's discomfort with Kenyan-trained troops in Juba. Which part of REDFLAG do you think the claim breaks? Many references don't mention a lot of things, the absence of the mention in the BBC or Economist isn't a strong argument for removal.

Yes, the communique notes Somalia is currently leading. However, that was not always the case. The joint operation, somehow agreed to but disputed on the 18th and finally and apparently undisputedly agreed to on the 31st did not dictate the previous running of the operation. Chipmunkdavis (talk) 01:16, 8 November 2011 (UTC)

Here is the sentence on Jubaland in the wiki article that is irrelevant:

"Ahmed previously protested the deployment 2500 Somalis trained in Kenya to southern Somalia, arguing that the forces be sent to Mogadishu to support the TFG there."

That phrase, which is a separate reference to a deployment of Somalian soldiers from southern Somalia to Mogadishu in 2010, is sourced to the StarKe ref [20]. And in itself, the wiki phrase has nothing whatsoever to do with the new Operation Linda Nchi and the deployment of Kenyan soldiers into southern Somalia. The only reason why that phrase has been included in the wiki article is because the author of the StarKe ref that it is cited to attempts to tie that old deployment to the current Operation Linda Nchi:

"Somali President Shariff Sheikh Ahmed is opposed to the deployment of Kenyan troops in his country because he believes it is an attempt by Kenya to create an autonomous Jubaland. Communication from as far back as March 2011 between President Shariff and President Kibaki shows that the Somali leader asked Kenya not to deploy to Juba region an estimated 2,500 young Somali soldiers who had been trained and equipped in Kenya. President Shariff was worried that the youth, if deployed in the Juba region, would help former Somali Defence minister Mohamed Ghandi whom Mogadishu suspects is attempting to create a separate state for himself between Kenya and the Juba River."

However, he is the only author that attempts to make this connection. The cited Economist and BBC correspondents both do not, and neither do any other mainstream sources. For example, here's what the BBC article indicates on the issue; no mention of the 2010 deployment of TFG troops:

"The BBC's East Africa correspondent, Will Ross, says Mr Ahmed's comments put the Kenyan government in a very difficult position. It is possible that the Somali authorities have spoken out because they are opposed to the idea of Kenya helping to establish a semi-autonomous region in Somalia known as Jubaland, he says." [21]

To make matters worse, actual sources from the period (2010) that do actually mention the deployment of TFG forces from southern Somalia to Mogadishu indicate that Ahmed summoned the troops as reinforcements for a planned offensive against Al-Shabaab; they do not link the deployment to any Jubaland fears as the StarKe ref author does:

"Somalia's president wants thousands of troops trained in Kenya to be deployed to Mogadishu for an upcoming offensive against Islamist militants" [22]

That's what makes the quoted wiki phrase above claim fail WP:REDFLAG since the policy stipulates that "any exceptional claim requires high-quality sources.[7] Red flags that should prompt extra caution include[...] surprising or apparently important claims not covered by mainstream sources[...] challenged claims that are supported purely by primary or self-published sources[...] reports of a statement by someone that seems out of character, or against an interest they had previously defended[...] claims that are contradicted by the prevailing view within the relevant community, or that would significantly alter mainstream assumptions, especially in science, medicine, history, politics, and biographies of living people."

I am giving you the opportunity to substantiate that the wiki phrase doesn't breach WP:REDFLAG by producing high quality mainstream sources that make the same connection between the deployment of TFG troops to Mogadishu back in 2010 to the current Operation Linda Nchi. This should not be difficult to do if the association is not red-flag. Middayexpress (talk) 19:54, 8 November 2011 (UTC)

The source is about the opposition of Ahmed to the Kenyan action, an opposition which went against other government officials and apparently against an agreement that had already been signed. More detail doesn't make it worse than other sources, and using a couple of other sources that don't mention it is not an argument against inclusion. A newspaper is a mainstream source. They are not primary or self-published. The claim hasn't been contradicted by any view, and is in line with the many mainstream assumptions of the Jubaland situation. In fact, many sources say the Ogaden soldiers were deployed to support Jubaland (recent eg). The statement thus hasn't failed any of the red flag criteria. In addition, the source you give (which is a republishing of which the original is in english and should be found), again using the argument of it not being there as an argument against (still not a good argument, very similar to the Black swan fallacy), notes Kenyan power over the somalian military even before this event, useful information on previous Kenyan involvement. Would an attribution of author in prose, similar to some others in the article, be useful? Chipmunkdavis (talk) 01:48, 9 November 2011 (UTC)

As it turns out, Ahmed had expressed reservations with regard to the deployment of Somalian troops to Lower Juba in 2010. However, it wasn't because he feared that this might facilitate Jubaland breaking away as the StarKe ref claims. Per a Wikileaked U.S. government cable originally released in 2010, it was because of the following:

"As he has in other, recent meetings, Sharif appeared self-possessed and confident. His qualified willingness to support the long-incubated Kenyan Lower Juba initiative at this meeting was at variance with the skepticism he had expressed to Somalia Unit in Nairobi about two weeks ago (septel). At that time, he suggested that the troops in training at Isiolo did not have broad-based clan representation and speculated that it might be better to bring them to Mogadishu and integrate them into existing TFG security forces. He also in that meeting seemed more skeptical of the GOK's ability to manage a cross-border offensive."

As can be seen above, those reservations notwithstanding, Sharif actually officially supported Kenya's involvement in the Jubaland Initiative (GOK=Government of Kenya):

"Sharif offered a qualified "yes" when asked if he supported the GOK's Lower Juba initiative. He had told the GOK that the TFG did not want to see Somalia further divided. That would create more problems than it would solve, he added. The GOK had reassured the TFG that it also did not want to see Somalia divided and that it intended to use the troops now being trained in Kenya for a national not a regional mission[...]

Sharif believed that the ethnic Somali troops currently in Isiolo, Kenya, were receiving good training but did not have all of the equipment they needed. Sharif thought that perhaps the USG could assist the Kenyan effort. He concluded by noting that the enemy the TFG faced was global and that defeating it should not be on the shoulders of the TFG alone[...]

A/S Carson hoped that the planned TFG offensive would be successful. He said that he would confer with the Ugandans about providing additional material resources."

The whole operation was part of an overall TFG plan to simultaneously attack Al-Shabaab from different fronts, with the assistance of other parties, including neighboring countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya (the offensive I mentioned earlier):

"Sharif predicted that efforts to reform TFG security forces in Mogadishu, TFG outreach to ASWJ, and troops trained by Kenya and Ethiopia would coalesce into a comprehensive effort to push al-Shabaab out of south central Somalia[...] Sharif said that USG support was needed for the TFG's planned military campaign. An AMISOM-backed TFG offensive in Mogadishu would be complemented by ASWJ-led efforts in Hiraan and Galgaduud regions, as well as the entry into battle of troops currently being trained by Kenya."

So the StarKe journalist's claims are not even accurate. Sharif never worried that the Somalian troops that were being trained in Kenya might be used instead to help Jubaland break away since a) he indicated that he actually supported the Jubaland Iniative; b) the only reservations with regard to the deployment of the Kenya-trained Somalian troops that Sharif expressed were over the limited clan composition of those TFG troops and the Kenyan military's ability to carry out such a mission (presumably due to its inexperience); and c) the troops were being prepared in the first place for a TFG-planned offensive against Al-Shabaab. Middayexpress (talk) 20:01, 9 November 2011 (UTC)

I'm sure you know that one primary source doesn't defeat the plethora of secondary sources noting the opposition to Jubaland. There's a reason we have WP:PRIMARY as a guideline for diting and assessing sources. Before you held in high regard the statements of the BBC and the Economist. Both note Sharif is opposed to Jubaland, Many Somalis, not just Islamist ones, suspect that the Kenyan authorities want a semi-autonomous state in the south—a “Jubaland initiative”. The Somalis’ fear that Somalia will break into more bits has already caused the president of its transitional government, Sharif Ahmed, to denounce the presence of Kenyan troops inside Somalia, It is possible that the Somali authorities have spoken out because they are opposed to the idea of Kenya helping to establish a semi-autonomous region in Somalia known as Jubaland, he says.

I actually did not mention the Economist and BBC articles in my post above, so I'm not sure what you're talking about. I only addressed the StarKe ref, which mentions the earlier deployment of Somalian troops; the Economist and BBC articles don't. At any rate, I don't have an issue with retaining the Jubaland material (the BBC claim to that effect was already in my earlier wiki edits, by the way). However, some mention also needs to be made that, per the U.S. government cable, Sharif Ahmed actually told U.S. officials that he was not in principle opposed to the Jubaland Initiative; he just wants it handled with care. The Economist and BBC statements' are speculations by correspondents on what is making Sharif tick. They're not actually based on Sharif's own statements (e.g. the BBC one goes "The BBC's East Africa correspondent, Will Ross, says[...] It is possible that the Somali authorities have spoken out because they are opposed to the idea of Kenya helping to establish a semi-autonomous region in Somalia known as Jubaland"). The fact that the training of the Somalian troops in Kenya was in the first place part of a TFG-led military campaign likewise needs to be made clear ("An AMISOM-backed TFG offensive in Mogadishu would be complemented by ASWJ-led efforts in Hiraan and Galgaduud regions, as well as the entry into battle of troops currently being trained by Kenya" [23]). Also, WP:PRIMARY does allow primary material but it "may only be used on Wikipedia to make straightforward, descriptive statements that any educated person, with access to the source but without specialist knowledge, will be able to verify are supported by the source. For example, an article about a novel may cite passages to describe the plot, but any interpretation needs a secondary source." So the Wikileaks cable can also be quoted to illustrate Sharif's actual position on Jubaland according to what he himself has stated. That's the WP:NPOV thing to do. Middayexpress (talk) 18:51, 10 November 2011 (UTC)

You've referred to the reliability of the economist and BBC multiple times, claiming their absence of a particular bit of information was enough to remove another (secondary) source. Now, although they both clearly oppose a (primary) source you've found, you think that source deserves to be placed into the article. That's highly inconsistent, and a strange thing to justify with NPOV. Chipmunkdavis (talk) 18:57, 10 November 2011 (UTC)

Posts don't exist in a vacuum; they are written in a chronological fashion. The Economist and BBC correspondents' claims (which I have not suggested we remove) that Sharif Ahmed opposes the Jubaland Initiative were okay by themselves... until of course I came across that U.S. government cable indicating that Sharif Ahmed himself told U.S. officials that he has no major objections to said Initiative. So actually, it's Sharif Ahmed's own words on his position that contradict the correspondents' speculations on his position. Those are the opposed viewpoints. And red-flag considerations notwithstanding, WP:NPOV instructs that we must represent "fairly, proportionately, and as far as possible without bias, all significant views that have been published by reliable sources". Middayexpress (talk) 20:02, 11 November 2011 (UTC)

That doesn't explain the inconsistency of your arguments at all. Shouldn't the viewpoint mentioned in StarKe also be mentioned then? Chipmunkdavis (talk) 01:47, 12 November 2011 (UTC)

The StarKe ref is already mentioned in the article. Since you've refused to remove it, I'm trying to be practical and work with you by actually providing context for its assertion that Sharif Ahmed allegedly opposed the deployment of Kenya-trained Somalian troops to southern Somalia in the past. And I'm trying to do that by, per the NPOV policy cited above, quoting a U.S. government cable indicating that Sharif told U.S. officials that he actually had no major objections to Kenya's involvement in the Jubaland Initiative.

Also, a couple of posts ago, you produced a link from the Guardian that indicates that, according to "several sources", Operation Linda Nchi had actually been discussed and planned as far back as 2010 [24]:

"Several sources agree, however, that the Kenyan intervention plan was discussed and decided in 2010, then finalised with input from western partners, including the US and to a lesser extent France. Nairobi seems to have seized on kidnappings of foreign nationals by Somali groups on Kenyan territory as an excuse to launch an operation ready and waiting."

This contradicts the assertion in the wiki article that Kenya's intervention was prompted by Al-Shabaab's alleged kidnappings. I would like to hear your thoughts on this. Middayexpress (talk) 19:48, 12 November 2011 (UTC)

Yes it is, and am I to take it you're agreeing to keep it if we mention the US government cable? If so, that sounds like a plan. If you have any secondary sources about the cable, that would be better than just the cable, but just the cable can be added.

That guardian information was interesting, and I remember seeing similar statements in a couple of other articles. They suggest a plan was in motion beforehand and that the kidnappings were the excuse Kenya used. Interestingly I haven't found any explicit mentions of these several sources, although it may be because they are anonymous. I suppose that information can go in, but I think it would definitely have to be attributed to the Guardian (and other sources if found). Chipmunkdavis (talk) 00:31, 13 November 2011 (UTC)

Great then; we are in agreement. I also concur that the assertions that, according to several sources, the operation had actually been discussed and planned as far back as 2010, should be attributed to the Guardian. There is an interesting recent Kenyan op-ed piece that suggests something similar [25]. Middayexpress (talk) 18:53, 13 November 2011 (UTC)

I'm uncomfortable having such a large amount of text from a primary source on the page, I'm fairly sure it violates some editing guidelines. If you can find a way to make the points more concise, that would be appreciated. That is an interesting op-ed, I don't see how it explain flipflopping, but it does suggest something similar. Chipmunkdavis (talk) 01:22, 14 November 2011 (UTC)

The deleted assertion that Sharif Ahmed believed the Somalian military exercise in Kenya was "good training" and that he noted that "the enemy the TFG faced was global and that defeating it should not be on the shoulders of the TFG alone" seemed like key points. By itself, the assertion that Sharif "thought that perhaps the USG could assist the Kenyan effort [to train Somali troops]" reads now a bit like a non-sequitur, so I've removed that too. The Kenyan link above is an op-ed, so it's not usable for our wiki purposes. But it does state something interesting and germane to the Guardian article's suggestion that the operation had been in the works for a while, which I thought I'd share:

"The reasons given to justify the war are weak. The governments says the operation follows the recent abduction of four Europeans-two at the Coast and two aid workers in refugee camps in North Eastern. Al Shabab has denied its involvement and there is no indication that the Kenyan soldiers are in hot pursuit of the abductors. This has now changed and the stated mission is to overthrow Al Shabaab-not to bring back the abductees. No explanation has been given why the Government failed to act in similar fashion when hundreds of Kenyans were butchered by Ethiopian militia. The immediate Government response indicates the operation has been in the planning for several weeks if not months before the operation was mounted. That explains the TFG flip flopping on the operation."

Middayexpress (talk) 19:56, 14 November 2011 (UTC)

I thought the important part of the quote was the assertion that Somalia asked the USA to help train their forces in Kenya, rather than any particular comments on their quality. There's nothing wrong with suitably attributed op-eds if they're published in a newspaper and not some random blog. I still don't make the connection being made there for why the TFG flipflopped, but anyway. The note of the change in mission aim/expansion of mission aim could be useful. Chipmunkdavis (talk) 22:34, 14 November 2011 (UTC)

The important part of the quote and the point of it are Sharif Ahmed's statements on his own position vis-a-vis the Jubaland Initiative and the Somalian troop training exercise. At any rate, while op-eds are sometimes usable as sources, WP:RSOPINION makes an exception with regard to material about living persons. I still think though that the Kenyan op-ed author may be onto something, as a GOK spokesman told reporters on October 26th that the operation had been planned months in advance (c.f. [26]). This was after the Kenyan government's initial story that it was pursuing Al-Shabaab for the kidnappings. Analysts also suggested previously that the planning of the operation could not have happened as quickly as the GOK earlier seemed to claim [27]. We should probably incorporate this material. Middayexpress (talk) 20:04, 15 November 2011 (UTC)

If that was the important point why was everything else added? We've got a paragraph mostly covering speculation on advanced planning, we could always add more there. Chipmunkdavis (talk) 13:01, 18 November 2011 (UTC)

References

Jubaland troops ca. 2010

Several inaccurate statements have been added from a Kenyan article claiming that a) President of Somalia Sharif Ahmed may have come out against the presence of Kenyan troops because of fears that the Kenyan government was attempting to support the creation of an independent Jubaland; b) Sharif had previously protested the training and arming of a militia of 2500 Ogaden tribesmen from the region. For starters, the article states that Sharif Ahmed feared an autonomous Jubaland buffer zone with strong ties to Kenya, not an independent country. Sharif also requested the transfer to Mogadishu of Somalian federal troops (not Ogaden tribesmen; Ogaden is also a clan, not a tribe) that were being trained in Kenya during a declared State of Emergency in 2010, obviously well before the TFG managed to assume control of the capital this year [28]. That official training program is separate from Kenya's unsuccessful covert support of local militias/proxy war against Al-Shabaab militants that is already mentioned in the wiki article. Middayexpress (talk) 19:33, 28 October 2011 (UTC)

Your absolutely right. I've changed the wording to reflect the source, which says Ahmed wanted the 2,500 mostly Ogaden soldiers (although the Ogaden part didn't seem relevant to Operation Linda Nchi so I removed it) deployed to Mogadishu instead of Juba, not that he objected to their training. Chipmunkdavis (talk) 23:50, 30 October 2011 (UTC)

None of it is relevant to Operation Linda Nchi because the redeployment of TFG troops to Mogadishu from the Somalian-Kenyan border back in 2010 was for reinforcements during a declared State of Emergency in the capital ("Somalia's president wants thousands of troops trained in Kenya to be deployed to Mogadishu for an upcoming offensive against Islamist militants"). It had nothing to do with any Jubaland fears much less the brand new Operation Linda Nchi; that's an inaccurate fringe claim. Middayexpress (talk) 19:33, 31 October 2011 (UTC)

Requested move

The following discussion is an archived discussion of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. No further edits should be made to this section.

The result of the move request was: page moved. Vegaswikian (talk) 23:13, 30 October 2011 (UTC)

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Joint Kenyan-Somalian operation (2011) → Operation Linda Nchi – The official name of the operation is apparently Operation Linda Nchi. Also, other countries besides Kenya and Somalia in the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) now seem interested in getting involved, particularly Ethiopia (please see above). Middayexpress (talk) 18:41, 23 October 2011 (UTC)

Strong support - Clearly the best name for this page and the least controversial. I don't think WP:COMMON can be said to apply here, as there seems to be no established preference for calling it an "invasion", "incursion", "intervention", "raid", "presence", "operation", or whatever, so we should go with the official name (which is least subject to change). -Kudzu1 (talk) 02:03, 24 October 2011 (UTC)

Support Much better than a vague countryname+operational word/phrase+date formulation. If another name becomes common later, it can be moved again. Chipmunkdavis (talk) 15:41, 24 October 2011 (UTC)

Support Use the most simple and shortest name where it's applied. I also want to rename "2008 Turkish incursion into northern Iraq" to "Operation Sun". Waorca (talk) 19:16, 24 October 2011 (UTC)

support—this is the obvious search term.— alf.laylah.wa.laylah (talk) 17:37, 26 October 2011 (UTC)

support There is nothing to add that has not already been said. This should be done.Beefcake6412 (talk) 17:53, 26 October 2011 (UTC)~

support Same as above. DITWIN GRIM (talk) 06:30, 27 October 2011 (UTC)

The above discussion is preserved as an archive of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on this talk page. No further edits should be made to this section.

Shabab v. Shabaab

I wonder what's the best thing to do with these varying transliterations? My feeling is that we ought to stick to one of them in the actual text of the article; I would say "Shabaab" since that seems to predominate, but have no strong feeling. Also, in actual quotes from sources where "Shabab" is used and in the titles of sources where "Shabab" is used, I think we ought to respect the spelling used by the source. Maybe no one but me cares? I don't mind continuing to do the changes, but I thought I'd better ask for some other opinions now that "Shabab" is used with quotes around it.— alf.laylah.wa.laylah (talk) 21:27, 7 November 2011 (UTC)

Our Al-Shabaab article uses the double a form. We should stick with that in prose (although obviously quotes and article titles use exactly what those articles use). Chipmunkdavis (talk) 01:23, 8 November 2011 (UTC)

That's my feeling too, so I'll just keep doing that as long as no one objects here.— alf.laylah.wa.laylah (talk) 02:25, 8 November 2011 (UTC)

Infobox

The operation is officially Somalia-led per the signed Joint Communique of October 31st; Kenya's role is to provide support: "the current operations are being led by the TFG of Somalia Forces with the support of the Kenyan Defence Forces in pursuit of legitimate Al Shabaab targets". Also, the operation is being led by the respective countries' Defense Ministries, with both Ministers signing the earlier October 18th agreement on behalf of their governments. Middayexpress (talk) 21:13, 15 November 2011 (UTC)

Look, this is a political statement, they are saying this so that it doesn't seem like they are foreign invaders, but that this is an operation by the TFG, which they are supporting. But in the infobox, the combatants are those who are fighting, now some may join a conflict to support an ally, it still makes them a combatant. The "supported by" section is for forces with limited involvement, like France which uses some helicopters and planes to provide assistance to the TFG and the Kenyans, but they do not actualy have forces on the ground fighting. If they did, they would be a combatant too.Kermanshahi (talk) 22:03, 15 November 2011 (UTC)

Kermanshahi is right, the combatants section is for active participants in the war, with the support section we've made is in regard to logistics. Chipmunkdavis (talk) 02:47, 16 November 2011 (UTC)

Casualties

If one is going to post casualties as the operation is ongoing. Credible sources should be used and the numbers must be there. Some here may very well have affiliations with Al Qaeda who use the internet to run propaganda so, I hope the proper people sources are monitoring those who edit these sites. Sources from the Kenyan gov. are credible as opposed to sources from Al Shabab commanders.

Delivernews (talk) 19:03, 20 November 2011 (UTC)

Some casualty edits referer to a site (http://www.presstv.ir) run by an iranian news agency that is of very questionable integrity and has been known to publish fictitious news stories/articles. http://www.presstv.ir http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Press_TV#Allegations_of_bias http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Press_TV_controversies

Kindly abide by wikipedia's call for neutral,unbiased and reliable sources. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Verifiability#Sources_that_are_usually_not_reliable

MrFusebox (talk) 22:50, 20 November 2011 (EAT)

none of those are really good sources in line with Wikipedia standards.

Delivernews (talk) 20:17, 20 November 2011 (UTC)

You claim that everything the Kenyan regime says is credible and anything al-Shabaab says is uncredible. You know that that is POV, which is banned on wikipedia. You must represent both sides and be as neutral as possible. We cannot have you turn this article into a propaganda page for the regimes of Kibaki, Musenvi and Zenawi. Ofcourse what these African (which are not in the least even slightly credible) say, must be reported in the article. But also the other side must be represented. As for Press TV, there is nothing in the link which is in any way questionable, they are quoting commanders from both sides and none of that article is anything to do with the opinion of the Iranian government. Now if you want to do a blanket removal of Iranian sources, than not only is it POV, it is racist and you will not be allowed to do it. Also I would like to note that if you think the Iranian regime is unreliable, than you should definetly not hold the words of dictators in Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Somalia in high regard, but then your comments in the history section: "I hope the FBI is tracing all of you editing this as you are shoing signs of supporting a terrorist organization" show that there is clearly a lack of goodwill from your side, in this case.Kermanshahi (talk) 21:35, 20 November 2011 (UTC)

Also note that the casualties do not merely include Kenyans, also TFG forces.Kermanshahi (talk) 21:46, 20 November 2011 (UTC)

BEGIN RESPONCE

Your allegations are interesting. I will attempt to address them one by one.

"You claim that everything the Kenyan regime says is credible and anything al-Shabaab says is uncredible."

If the above claim was true then I would have changed the entire article to be pro Ugandan/Kenyan/Ethiopian.

"You must represent both sides and be as neutral as possible."

I am trying to enforce the same thing by highlighting the credibility of presstv.ir.

"We cannot have you turn this article into a propaganda page for the regimes of Kibaki, Musenvi and Zenawi."

Show me what propaganda I posted

"As for Press TV, there is nothing in the link which is in any way questionable,"

There are numerous sources that highlight their lack of credibility. Referencing their articles violates wikipedias's rules on credibility and reliability.

"Now if you want to do a blanket removal of Iranian sources"

Hold it now! I am only against referencing articles from UNCREDIBLE sources, doesn't matter whether they are Iranian, Israeli, American, Kenyan, Ugandan, American, Japanese, Chinese, Indian, Somalian....complete the list.

Just an observation, your last statement tells alot about your neutrality. To be honest, the FBI statement wasn't mine but why would it bother you so?

And lastly you seem like an intelligent fellow. Try your best to investigate your sock puppet claim then let me know how you feel when you discover you wasted your time sir. Consider that it is very possible for two very different account holders to share the same opinion.

Thank you for airing your concerns.

MrFusebox (talk) 01:35, 21 November 2011 (EAT)

I see you have undone my changes to the article. In order to avoid a delete/undelete tag of war between me and you, is there a more civilized/democratic way of settling this credibility dispute? Perhaps we should seek the opinion of a more competent/qualified/Neutral individual. Your thoughts sir?

MrFusebox (talk) 02:00, 21 November 2011 (EAT)

(edit conflict)Just for the record, it was my sockpuppet investigation request, not Kermanshahi's. Can you think about using some indentation so that others can actually follow this discussion?— alf.laylah.wa.laylah (talk) 23:02, 20 November 2011 (UTC)

Also, MrFusebox, please don't be in such a hurry to get this settled. I know you're quite new here, and maybe haven't taken the time to read the 5 pillars. If you do, you'll see that we like to take these kind of discussions nice and slow to give all interested parties a chance to weigh in. So far, this section has been here on the talk page for very little time. Let us wait and see what others have to say about the issue, shall we?— alf.laylah.wa.laylah (talk) 23:05, 20 November 2011 (UTC)

And also again, MrFusebox, it's clear that Kermanshahi's comment was in response to Delivernews, not to you. Maybe you could let Delivernews responds for him or herself?— alf.laylah.wa.laylah (talk) 23:07, 20 November 2011 (UTC)

Yes I am new here. For a while I thought I was addressing the right accuser. Anyway it's fair for all parties should have a say in the matter. I'll wait for that.

Finally I am the one who highlighted presstv's credibility issue. Kermanshahi had an issue with my point of view and I was responding to to him on the matter but I am also keen to know your thoughts on the matter

MrFusebox (talk) 23:27, 20 November 2011 (UTC)

MrFusebox, my post was mainly in a reference to mr. deliverynews who has shown a clear bias in his editing. As for PressTV, I know there are Americans and Israelis which consider it unreliable because it reports things against their governments, which they do not like, but thier is not law. Now I know very well that not everything the Iranian government says, and infact they say many things which are not true and some are reported through Press TV but the same really goes for any other government and in reality, Press TV is no less biased than most American and Israeli sources are. Wikipedia is NPOV, so we represent both sides' claims, both sides' sources and if there are sources in the West which claim PressTV is unreliable than that may be posted on the Press TV article because censoring that information would be POV in favour of Iranian government. But a blanket ban against Iranian sources due to these allegations by pro-American sources is simply unacceptable and represents purely anti-Iranian POV. Now when it comes to Press TV's credibility it really comes down to the fact that if something happens that would put the Iranian government in negative light, they will likely spin the story in a pro-Iranian way or not report it. But when they quote (for instance, in this case) an al-Shabaab spokesman saying something, than he actualy said that and Press TV's credibility has nothing to do with it. I would also like to note that we can easily find the same thing reported by another source, but this is a matter of principle for me and I am not just going to let people with a pro-American bias ban any Iranian media outlet from wikipedia, to completely silence Iran and give all voice to anti-Islamic sites like Fox News and JPost.Kermanshahi (talk) 00:01, 21 November 2011 (UTC)

The issue however, is not Press TV. The issue is wheather we will represent both sides claims in the infobox: the claims from Kenya and the TFG and the claims from al-Shabaab, as is the neutral thing to do, or are we going in POV and turn this article into an advertisment for the Kibaki and Zenawi regimes and the warlord Ahmad Madobe, and silence all other voices? I say we represent both sides, as is the neutral thing to do and dude, I am a Shi'a, why would I be biased in favour of a Salafi group? I just want to make sure this article is proper. Dictators often hide casualties, do we endorse that?Kermanshahi (talk) 00:09, 21 November 2011 (UTC)

Mr Kermanshahi, the more you comment the more I'm convinced that your views are biased (and possibly anti-semitic).

I am scratching my head over why you think Iran is under attack here. Fox news is equally as biased as Presstv. If I found a questionable reference by the former here I would speak out against it just as I have done against presstv.

I have no interest in Israeli, American or Iranian politics as they are useless to most this side of the Sahara.

I do have an interest, however, in the integrity of wikipedia's articles because I have always relied on it for the truth. I have always been a passive user until now when I spotted this questionable reference.

I am also supprised to find editors who defend this as a credible source despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary as highlighted in the 2 NPOV wikipedia articles I quoted (remember they not US & Israeli media articles).

You sir are compromising wikipedia's integrity under the pretext of patriotism. (And possibly using this talk page to propagate pro-iranian views )

Anyway, I have just found out that one can apply for Arbitration.

Once our sockpuppet matter has been clarified to alf.laylah.wa.laylah, I shall seek Arbitrary intervention on this matter. Until then, feel free to check if the following news headlines coincide with other "NPOV/neutral sources":-

http://www.presstv.ir/detail/206653.html <- Only presstv reports this, search google and trace all references back to presstv

http://www.presstv.ir/detail/210130.html <- I see you already addressed this one below

http://www.presstv.ir/detail/208701.html <- Again trace all other reports and you will find the "all knowing presstv" as the only source

http://www.presstv.ir/detail/206829.html <- Same with this! No other agency west,east,neutral or even iranian reports any of the above.

enjoy. - MrFusebox (talk) 02:25, 21 November 2011 (UTC)

I am confused as I am not a Wikipedia expert but, I think this has been resolved well... Kudos

Delivernews (talk) 13:26, 21 November 2011 (UTC)

Mr.Fusebox, there is no wikipedia ban against Press TV and so you have no right to call Iranian sources as uncredible while anything else, from dictatorships like Kenya as credible. The more I talk to you the more I am convinced you have an anti-Iranian bias here, but I'll tell you this, keep that bias for yourself because you are compromising wikipedia's integrity by labelling sources from independent countries like Iran as not credible but all sources from corporatist and pro-Zionist medias as credible. As long as there is no wikipedia ban against Press TV, than you have no right to make such unreasonable demands.Kermanshahi (talk) 22:18, 21 November 2011 (UTC)

I believe the disputed section has now been edited in the fairest manner MrFusebox (talk) 19:30, 25 November 2011 (UTC)

Israel in combatants infobox

Israel is not a combatant. A joint announcement by the Israeli Prime Minister and Presiden tof Kenya about military cooperation does not mean that Israeli military forces are actively involved.Bunser (talk) 19:08, 20 November 2011 (UTC)

I just saw the "supported by" header, but I still think prominently featuring Israel there is an exaggeration of their role. Kenya asked for intelligence help and a few military vehicles, not air support or weapons.Bunser (talk) 19:12, 20 November 2011 (UTC)

I completely agree, Israel is not directly involved in this conflict, infact the source says they will be helping Kenya upgrade internal security measures rather than that they are helping them to fight in Somalia. Israel should be removed unless we want to add a giant list of all the weapons suppliers of all the combatants in every single infobox of wikipedia.Kermanshahi (talk) 21:45, 20 November 2011 (UTC)

you are all right. It is a strange thing used on maaany such articles--93.137.155.69 (talk) 11:14, 21 November 2011 (UTC)

Get rid of USA as well? OKelly (talk) 20:48, 5 January 2012 (UTC)

Adding a Map?

Perhaps a map of Somalia could be added to the top of this page, showing what areas are commanded by Kenya, TFG and Al-Shabad? -- 78.70.52.31 (talk) 22:28, 20 November 2011 (UTC)

Yea a picture is needed Badly. OKelly (talk) 20:50, 5 January 2012 (UTC)

Reverting confusion

A wikipedia vandal without a username deleted al-shabaab casualty figures and replaced them with his own random number. After I corrected the page again, I made some more edits. Later this unknown user came back and reverted my edit to a version were the sourced figure is replaced by an unsourced figure, and where sources are removed from Ahmed Madobe's name (and in which the word present is not italic). Since then a number of people reverted each other's edits as confusion was created over what was the good/credible version. To avoid confusion, the good version is the one which exists as of 12:54, 1 December 2011‎.Kermanshahi (talk) 13:04, 1 December 2011 (UTC) Try and find out who he is so you can block him. OKelly (talk) 20:51, 5 January 2012 (UTC)

OLN approaching end

The coordinated Operation Linda Nchi is approaching its end, as the Kenyan government has just approved the re-hatting of its troops under the AMISOM command [29]. The mission is now tapering into the general War in Somalia (2009–). Middayexpress (talk) 17:00, 12 December 2011 (UTC)

Indeed. We should wait for an official end of the mission before saying anything definite here though. Chipmunkdavis (talk) 17:44, 12 December 2011 (UTC)

Name changing request

Operation Linda Nchi is the name only for the Kenyan mission, the Ethiopians do not act under that name. A more neutral name is needed.--Reader1987 (talk) 15:06, 22 February 2012 (UTC)

This article started with a coverage of the Kenyan mission, which the others joined. Is there another name that has been used in sources? CMD (talk) 15:20, 22 February 2012 (UTC)

The mission is officially referred to as Operation Linda Nchi and the Ethiopians joined it as allies. It ends when Kenya re-hats under the general AMISOM command. Middayexpress (talk) 17:08, 11 May 2012 (UTC)

Source? CMD (talk) 00:58, 12 May 2012 (UTC)

Operation Linda Nchi ends as African Union takes over. Middayexpress (talk) 06:50, 12 May 2012 (UTC)

Infobox 2

The allied column in the list of belligerents should start with Somalia because per the official Joint Communique between the Somalian and Kenyan federal governments "the current operations are being led by the TFG of Somalia Forces with the support of the Kenyan Defence Forces". Middayexpress (talk) 06:50, 12 May 2012 (UTC)

That statement would only apply to operations at that point, half a month after it started, and also contradicts with the next point, "the Somali Government supports the activities of the Kenyan forces, which are being fully coordinated with the TFG of Somalia", which suggests coordination and support.

At any rate, I haven't seen a guideline that notes that leading countries go first. Chronological order makes more sense, especially as the operation seems to be ending and becoming a historical event as all forces are recombined under AMISOM. CMD (talk) 12:05, 12 May 2012 (UTC)

The assertion quoted and linked to above that the Somalian military is leading the actual mission does not contradict the assertion that it supports the activities of the Kenyan Forces since they are allies, and support each other is what allies do. The actual leader of the mission per the Kenyan government itself, however, is the Somalian government.

Also, the operation was coordinated from the start, as it was planned by both parties before it even began. So chronology actually does not place Kenya in a primordial role here either: "A team comprising Kenya Army and Rapid Deployment Unit [police] officers left our border last evening and went to Dhobley. They held a meeting with top officers of the TFG [Somali] forces for about two hours before they came back[...] The meeting was to prepare a joint operation between the two forces which is meant to launch an offensive against Al-Shabaab rebels who are scattered in different parts of southern Somalia". [30]

Even if this weren't the case, per the Template:Infobox military conflict in question, chronology is not one of the criteria determining how to arrange the order of combatants. The actual determinative criteria are as follows: "Combatants should be listed in order of importance to the conflict, be it in terms of military contribution, political clout, or a recognized chain of command." The Somalian military has devoted more troops to the fight against Al-Shabaab, and more importantly, the recognized chain of command has it officially leading the operation. So that's clearly who should be cited first. Middayexpress (talk) 18:40, 12 May 2012 (UTC)

It may have been coordinated with local forces, but the fact the Somalian President later spoke out against Kenyan forces being present shows that there was definitely not agreement in the high orders of government, which is what a countries name generally implies (the government embodying the state and all that). Furthermore this article isn't about the fight against Al-Shabaab, it's about the specific operation and what it eventually spawned in to. Do we have sources which give a number to the amount of Somali forces participating in the operation? Are there any actual instances showing the chain of command, rather than a communique which was later contradicted by the President of Somalia? CMD (talk) 19:51, 12 May 2012 (UTC)

The Joint Communique was not later contradicted by the President of Somalia. The October 31st document actually settled once and for all the nature of the operation after the earlier confusion. This evolution is documented in this very article too. The Joint Communique was the result of talks in Nairobi between Somalian and Kenyan governmental delegations to iron out differences. It was signed by the head of both countries' respective governments (their Premiers), and clearly stipulates as one of its conditions that the Somalian government is officially leading the operation [31]: "the current operations are being led by the TFG of Somalia Forces with the support of the Kenyan Defence Forces". Why is this a problem? Middayexpress (talk) 20:24, 12 May 2012 (UTC)

Sorry, I got the communique and the earlier meetings confused. The President's statements contradicted your assertion that the operation was coordinated by Somalia and Kenya from the start. The communique is where they finally agreed, but that one statement made in a nice diplomatic fashion seems to rub against all the other media reports we have which note an increase in joint diplomatic cooperation, but always talk about Kenyan forces in cooperation with local militias, rather than anything remotely TFG led. CMD (talk) 23:51, 12 May 2012 (UTC)

I didn't make any claims. The material I quoted above indicating that the Somalian and Kenyan authorities were working together on a mission against Al-Shabaab alludes to the weekend right before ONL even began and comes from a Reuters security source. At any rate, irrespective of media assertions, the Joint Communique signed by both the Somalian and Kenyan governments (the actual parties involved) clearly indicates that the operation is officially TFG-led. So for the sake of neutrality, that's the affirmed chain of command we too should be following per the relevant infobox template guidelines. Middayexpress (talk) 16:14, 13 May 2012 (UTC)

This claim: "it was planned by both parties before it even began". Clearly Somalia wasn't fully into it, at least if the President is anything to go by. And since when was following the views of governments neutral? What makes the government assertions at all more reliable than media assertions? CMD (talk) 21:36, 13 May 2012 (UTC)

Per the aforecited criteria, chronology is irrelevant here. Back on topic: Media assertions have not challenged the fact that, per the October 31st Joint Communique signed by both the Somalian and Kenyan governments (the actual involved parties), the operation is TFG-led. Only you have, so that's a non-existent either/or dichotomy. The real question therefore is, what is your evidence that the mission is not now officially TFG-led? Was there another official comunique that later changed the chain of command that one should be aware of? Middayexpress (talk) 12:31, 14 May 2012 (UTC)

Hey, you said it, not me! Why would media assertions challenge that a diplomatic statement doesn't say something it does say? That's just... a strange thing to consider. There is just very little evidence that TFG forces are actually leading any of the operations. Just see any BBC article for example, where the only place government forces are shown on the Somalian map is in Mogadishu, and even that is slashed with ASIMOM. CMD (talk) 23:14, 14 May 2012 (UTC)

The recognized chain of command -- the actual template criteria -- is not determined by who captures more towns (which, in any case, isn't Kenya [32]), but by the line of authority and responsibility along which orders are passed within a military unit and between different units. Per the official Joint Communique, that chain of command is led by the TFG. Again, do you know of any other official document indicating a different chain of command? If not, then Somalia should be cited first in the list of combatants. Middayexpress (talk) 14:31, 15 May 2012 (UTC)

I never said Kenya is capturing towns. What I've said was that there is a lack reports noting the TFG leading an operation, passing orders from its military units to Kenyas military units, despite what one document produced half a month after the beginning states. Even if there was, there are many more participants than just those two. There is no chain of command among the belligerents, it's a mishmash of separate military operations. CMD (talk) 16:27, 15 May 2012 (UTC)

I'm afraid you are again mistaken. Operation Linda Nchi is not a mish-mash of separate operations. It is a coordinated mission involving different IGAD members (read the article). No journalists have any say on the mission's chain of command. Only the actual involved parties do. The aforecited Joint Communique is the official document finalizing the nature of the cooperation between the first two belligerent parties, the Somalian and Kenyan forces. It clearly states that the mission is TFG-led, and it was signed by both the Somalian and Kenyan governments. I see that you are unable to produce a document indicating a change in this official chain of command, so I shall now query elsewhere on how best to resolve the issue. Middayexpress (talk) 16:52, 16 May 2012 (UTC)

If you cast your mind back, you'll remember I helped to write much of this article. The operations could indeed be coordinated - whatever that really means - but they're all functioning separately, so far as the evidence shows. Journalists don't have a say in what any chain of command is, but they do independently (in theory) report on what actually happens. Your placing a lot of emphasis on one primary source, a source that in any case doesn't even involve IGAD members, despite your telling me to read the article to note that IGAD had talks about the issue. CMD (talk) 17:04, 16 May 2012 (UTC)

The Joint Communique is not a mere primary source. It's the very agreement finalizing the nature of the coordinated activities between the Somalian and Kenyan forces. There's also no journalist reporting that the Joint Communique or any other actual document/agreement has Kenya officially leading the mission. Quite the opposite, as linked to above. If you'll recall, the debate here was between which of the two original parties should be cited first in the list of combatants: Somalia or Kenya? You said Kenya, but have been unable to provide any documents actually naming it as leading the mission, whereas I have already produced an official document (the Joint Communique) -- signed by the Kenyan government itself, no less -- that clearly indicates that it's the Somalian authorities who are officially leading the offensive. Whatever the case, this discussion is evidently going nowhere, so I shall query elsewhere on how best to proceed. Middayexpress (talk) 19:15, 16 May 2012 (UTC)

Mere or not, it's a primary source. The mere is irrelevant. I've never said Kenya was leading the mission, so I have no idea why you'd want to raise that as a point. Also, you never mentioned we're only discussing 2 of the 6 parties involved. You opened this with "the list of belligerents" as a whole. I can't recall we're only looking at two entities, because we never have been. There's dispute resolution processes, which you already know about. I don't see why you need to query. CMD (talk) 19:39, 16 May 2012 (UTC)

Troop strength figures

I've tagged the troop strength figures for Somali and Kenyan forces as not supported by the citations. The Kenyan figure has seemingly been calculated from the statement that: "Earlier this year the UN agreed to boost the AU force from 12,000 troops to nearly 18,000 to incorporate Kenyan troops which entered Somalia last October in pursuit of al-Shabab militants". I don't think that's an idea way to get the figure. The Somali forces figure doesn't seem to have any basis in the source cited at all. Can we look for reliable sources for these? So far, I've found Anderson and McKnight stating: "At the peak, more than 6,000 security personnel were deployed, including the Kenya Police and its General Service Unit, the Administration Police (another paramilitary unit), and units from the Kenya Air Force". Any suggestions for the Somali forces figure? Cordless Larry (talk) 16:00, 10 June 2015 (UTC)

I've now added some estimates of the Kenyan troop strength to the body of the article, and put the Anderson and McKnight figure for Kenyan forces in the infobox. I've been unable to find a source supporting the Somali forces figure that was in the infobox, so have removed it until such time that a source can be found. Cordless Larry (talk) 22:22, 10 June 2015 (UTC)

Actual numbers of personnel deployed for Linda Nchi have always been hard to get, and there'll be no clear Somali figure, because the total involved was the total number of TFG-supporting militias that happened to be on the Kenyan advance route from the border to Kismayo. That I've never seen discussed in any source. My standard starting source for the operation is S/2012/544, App 5.2, but that just says 'one battalion' for the Kenyans. It is clear that since the operation started that a number of different battalions have been involved (see casualty reports at Kenya Army Infantry) but that doesn't really help with your question. Best estimate would be derived from the number the Kenyans declared when they joined AMISOM. Buckshot06 (talk) 00:57, 11 June 2015 (UTC)

User:Cordless Larry, do you believe the entire 'Support consolidation' section about the Arab League is required? It does not appear to add anything at all. Buckshot06 (talk) 01:05, 11 June 2015 (UTC)

I'm not sure, to be honest. It reads a bit like recentism at the time the material was added, but I've only really become familiar with the subject recently, so I'm no expert. Something else what strikes me is that the mention in the joint communique that Kenyan and Somali forces are co-operating keeps being repeated through the article. Surely it only needs to be said once? Cordless Larry (talk) 06:26, 11 June 2015 (UTC)

On the troop numbers, Anderson and McKnight reference S/2013/413 for the statement that "By [April 2011] Kenya had trained a force of 3,000 Somali 'counter-insurgents', supplied with Chinese-manufactured weapons – though Ghandi had command of (at best) only 500 men", in relation to Azania. They also mention 600 soldiers under the command of Sheikh Ahmed Madobe. The ICG source includes the line "In Northern Sector, the KDF deals mostly with the remnants of the 2,500-strong Ogaden force it trained at the beginning of the Jubaland project in 2009". Should we include those figures? Cordless Larry (talk) 06:36, 11 June 2015 (UTC)

It's not recentism. The Arab league was a main benefactor of the TFG and continues to support the Federal government.12 The position of the Arab league is important given the possibility of Somali government refusal to back the intervention against Al-Shabaab. 26oo (talk) 07:15, 11 June 2015 (UTC)

The Somali-ethnic troops trained in Kenya were under the control of the Kenyan government, not the TFG, but yes, they are a military factor and should be included somewhere. Madobe's Raskamboni Movement fighters are a separate factor, and were also not under the command of the TFG. Buckshot06 (talk) 22:34, 11 June 2015 (UTC)

External links modified

Hello fellow Wikipedians,

I have just added archive links to 4 external links on Operation Linda Nchi. Please take a moment to review my edit. If necessary, add {{cbignore}} after the link to keep me from modifying it. Alternatively, you can add {{nobots|deny=InternetArchiveBot}} to keep me off the page altogether. I made the following changes:

• Added archive https://web.archive.org/20130927165623/http://shabelle.net/article.php/?id=14004 to http://www.shabelle.net/article.php?id=14004
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ICG reports on reasons for the operation

Paul D Williams paraphrases the ICG report of 2012 in these words: "desire to be seen as a reliable partner in the US-led ‘global war on terrorism’, institutional interests within the KDF, and key political elites within the Kenyan government, notably Minister for Internal Security George Saitoti, the Defence Minister Yusuf Haji and several senior security chiefs, who advocated for intervention to advance their own economic and political interests." Very little about security threats from al-Shabaab. Buckshot06 (talk) 21:08, 24 September 2018 (UTC)

TEmporary placement of removed Ethiopia text - doesn't really belong in this article

Ethiopia

On 19 November, local residents reported witnessing 28 Ethiopian military trucks and APCs loaded with troops establish a forward base in Guri'el, Somalia. Ethiopian government spokesman Shimeles Kemal would not confirm or deny the report. However, Ethiopian Foreign Ministry spokesman Dina Mufti dismissed the reports of the Ethiopian military's deployment as "absolutely not true, there are absolutely no troops in Somalia[...] People are simply speculating". Mufti added that "there is an intention on the part of IGAD members to bolster peacekeeping forces, because as you know the regional countries are working on increasing the numbers of AMISOM". Somali government spokesman Abdirahman Omar Osman also denied that Ethiopian troops had entered the country, stating that the Ethiopian military would first "need a mandate" or a bilateral agreement since the TFG "don't want anyone that could give propaganda for al-Shabab[...] We don't want any backlash."

On 21 November, Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki met in Abu Dhabi with the President of the United Arab Emirates Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan as part of a state visit. Both leaders affirmed their commitment to stabilising the security situation in southern Somalia and supporting post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts in the territory.

Following a multinational IGAD conference held in Addis Ababa on 25 November, IGAD Executive Secretary Mahboub Maalim announced that the Ethiopian government had agreed to support Somalia's TFG, the Kenyan authorities and the African Union's campaign to quash the Al-Shabaab insurgency. Maalim did not elaborate on what exactly Ethiopia's role would be, stating that "We leave that to the national security forces to decide." On 25 November, an Ethiopian government official acknowledged for the first time that Ethiopian troops had entered Somali territory for reconnoitring duties. After the IGAD meeting held the same day in Ethiopia's capital, the government official, who requested anonymity, indicated that the Ethiopian government would deploy troops inside Somalia to assist the Somali and Kenyan forces' efforts. He added that the Ethiopian military's activities were for the moment limited to liaison work and reconnaissance, but that "We are looking at a brief period of time, weeks. We don't want our deployment to be used for propaganda by the extremists". — Preceding unsigned comment added by Buckshot06 (talk • contribs) 05:02, 26 September 2018 (UTC)

References

WikiLeaks source

WP:RSP#WikiLeaks says It may be appropriate to cite a document from WikiLeaks as a primary source, but only if it is discussed by a reliable source. Restoring long quotes based only on primary documents isnt appropriate. The edit summmary that restored the text said it was a WP:RSP#WikiLeaks says It may be appropriate to cite a document from WikiLeaks as a primary source, but only if it is discussed by a reliable source. There is no reliable source discussing it. Restoring long quotes from primary sources isnt right

The edit summmary that added it back [33] said it was a reliable source, but WP:RSP#WikiLeaks says No consensus exists on its reliability. Some editors questioned the applicability of reliability ratings to Wikileaks. Some editors believe that documents from WikiLeaks fail the verifiability policy, because WikiLeaks does not adequately authenticate them, and there are concerns regarding whether the documents are genuine or tampered.

WP:RSP and WP:PRIMARY disagree with restoring Softlem (talk) 11:50, 16 November 2023 (UTC)

There are zero claims saying that the U.S. cables leak is falsified. They're genuinely the views of the State Department at the time. Should you wish, you can amend the wording to reflect the fact that they're the views of the State Department, however. Buckshot06 (talk) 20:16, 16 November 2023 (UTC)

There are zero claims saying that the U.S. cables leak is falsified. WP:RSP#Wikileaks applies to all WikiLeaks publications Softlem (talk) 20:31, 16 November 2023 (UTC)

Sorry I ruined my first message when I wrote it and text doubled, I did the self strike to make reading easier

Can you explain why you think but only if it is discussed by a reliable source doesnt apply to the United States diplomatic cables leak or I understand WP:RSP#WikiLeaks wrong? Softlem (talk) 07:31, 18 November 2023 (UTC)

It has been a week and you have been active and not explained why WP:RSP#WikiLeaks does not apply or how There are zero claims saying that the U.S. cables leak is falsified meets WP:BURDEN so I will remove it Softlem (talk) 13:04, 25 November 2023 (UTC)