Talk:Hull note/Archive 1

Page contents not supported in other languages.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Sloppy Links[edit]

Why are the links in this article so sloppy? The link in footnote No. 5 is to Time magazine and requires a subscription. If you provide a link, it should be to sites which general readers can access. Otherwise, at very minimum you're promoting some outside commercial service. Likewise the Hamilton Fish reference is to the 19th century figure. --Gunnermanz (talk) 05:11, 13 April 2014 (UTC)[reply]

The article said:[edit]

"The United States had been pursuing an Open Door Policy in China - that is, they wanted to make sure the Chinese market was open to American products. The United States did not want China or portions of China to be controlled by other countries such as Japan, the United Kingdom or other European countries."

This statement is completely unsupported by the hall document itself. Seems like commentary designed to push a pragmatists agenda. While I find it plausibly that this is what motivated the US actions, I see no place for such a statement without pointing out a source. Also it may not be the right article for such a statement. No need to explain why the USA was motivated to make the demand - enough to describe the contents of the hall document.

Cederal (talk) 22:51, 27 July 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Tamogami[edit]

Tamogami argues that "According to those files(Venona Files), there were three hundred Comintern spies working in the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, who took office in 1933. Among them, one who rose to the top was the number two official at the Treasury, Assistant Secretary Harry White. Harry White is said to have been the perpetrator who wrote the Hull note, America’s final notice to Japan before the war began." and goes on to argue that [1] I know he is not a historian, but his point of view has been published, in book and essay form. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Timtak (talk • contribs) 06:41, 30 March 2009 (UTC)[reply]

I am going to add a reference to Tamogami's views. Sorry I did not sign my last comment. --Timtak (talk) 12:32, 1 April 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Harry Dexter White[edit]

If you think other scholars disagree with Steil by all means include them. But please don't try to cover up statements from those you disagree with!

Steil's book has been called “the gold standard on its topic” by the New York Times, “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history” by the Financial Times, and “a superb history” by the Wall Street Journal.Jimjilin (talk) 14:20, 4 June 2014 (UTC)[reply]

You say "one book with a radically different thesis cannot be considered the final authority". So it seems you have a different opinion regarding the scholarly consensus from Steil. Please don't silence Steil, just include other opinions regarding the scholarly consensus.Jimjilin (talk) 14:28, 4 June 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Steil's book contains points that are widely agreed upon, and also points that go against the mainstream literature. Praise for the book cannot be used as a shoehorn to insert unaccepted or disputed 'facts'. Binksternet (talk) 14:43, 4 June 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Further investigation of this issue makes me think that the Steil book passage was not presented neutrally in this addition by Jimjilin:

Benn Steil, director of international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote "That [Harry Dexter] White was the author of the key ultimatum demands is beyond dispute. That the Japanese government made the decision to move forward with the Pearl Harbor strike after receiving the ultimatum is also beyond dispute." Steil also quotes Soviet spymaster Vladimir Karpov:

The war in the Pacific could have been avoided. Stalin was the real initiator of the ultimatum to Japan.

Karpov also stated "Harry Dexter White was acting in accordance with a design initiated by [Soviet spies] Akhmerov and Pavlov."

The emphatic statements quoted here are not in keeping with the book's central thesis. Steil writes on page 54, "The Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor was the culmination of a series of critical political developments and, clearly, no single event, no single action, and no single individual can be said to have triggered it." Binksternet (talk) 15:47, 4 June 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Binksternet you have not been elected spokesman for mainstream scholarship. Please stop saying that, it's kind of ridiculous.

If you'd like to add: "The Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor was the culmination of a series of critical political developments and, clearly, no single event, no single action, and no single individual can be said to have triggered it." I think that's fine if placed together with "That White was the author of the key ultimatum demands is beyond dispute. That the Japanese government made the decision to move forward with the Pearl Harbor strike after receiving the ultimatum is also beyond dispute."Jimjilin (talk) 18:21, 4 June 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Your proposed solution is still problematic; it is still over-reliant on one book. The issue should be treated by summarizing several books for the reader. Binksternet (talk) 18:50, 4 June 2014 (UTC)[reply]

That's absurd. Single books are used as sources throughout Wikipedia! Anyway other authors agree with Steil: Haynes & Klehr have written about White's influence and his Soviet espionage activities, John Koster wrote a book called Operation Snow: How a Soviet Mole in FDR's White House Triggered Pearl Harbor.

Koster's book offers no footnotes at all to support his thesis. He even quotes one person and offers no bibliography reference on that person. DEddy (talk) 21:23, 26 July 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Here's Koster: NKVD agent Vitalii Pavlov managed to reactivate White with an urgent mission—to provoke a war between the United States and Japan so that Russia would not have to fight on two fronts.

From his perch in the Treasury Department, White had become closely acquainted with the key figures in FDR’s administration. He knew, for instance, that Stanley Hornbeck, the State Department’s expert on Asia, hated the Japanese and believed that Asians were naturally timid and easily bluffed. And White wielded enormous influence with his boss, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthal Jr., whose personal friendship with the president made him the most powerful member of the cabinet.

Skillfully manipulating Morgenthau and Hornbeck, White was able to turn U.S. policy toward Japan in an increasingly belligerent direction. When FDR almost agreed to relax a U.S. oil embargo in return for Japan’s gradual evacuation of China, White drafted a hysterical letter for Morgenthau’s signature:

To sell China to her enemies for the thirty blood-stained coins of gold, will not only weaken our national policy in Europe as well as the Far East, but will dim the bright luster of America’s world leadership in the great democratic fight against Fascism.

Instead of compromising, the United States demanded that Japan withdraw from China immediately, neutralize Manchuria, and sell three-quarters of its military and naval production to the U.S.

Perceiving the demand as an insult and a threat, the skittish Japanese government concluded that war was inevitable. They moved ahead with a contingency plan for an attack on the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, and Stalin, thanks to Harry Dexter White, were spared a war on his eastern flank.

link: http://nation.time.com/2012/12/07/pearl-harbor-2-0/

Soviets like Vitalii Pavlov and Vladimir Karpov also agree with Steil.Jimjilin (talk) 00:49, 5 June 2014 (UTC)[reply]

1) The key part of the Hull Note demanded Japan's withdrawal from China. That had been the US policy for years at the highest level--FDR, Hull, Stimson, Morgenthau all agreed on that. The idea that Moscow invented that policy in spring 1941 and tricked every top American official into believing it is a wild fringe notion and is not accepted by any scholar. 2) it has been known for decades that White had no knowledge of or control over the Hull Note. Steil says the Japanese moved toward war AFTER receiving the Hull Note, suggesting it caused their attack. Actually they sent their battle fleet toward Hawaii the day BEFORE Hull delivered the Note. 3) The key idea seems to be Here's Koster: NKVD agent Vitalii Pavlov managed to reactivate White with an urgent mission—to provoke a war between the United States and Japan so that Russia would not have to fight on two fronts. What war on two fronts???? The supposed restaurant meeting took place at a time when Stalin considered Hitler to be a good friend, and Stalin totally rejected the idea there would be any war with Hitler. Stalin furthermore knew from his own spies and Tokyo that Japan had no plans whatsoever to attack Siberia. 4) turn to the August-October 1941 timeframe. After Germany did invade Russia in late June 1941, the United States and Britain immediately offered large-scale assistance. Stalin eagerly accepted that assistance. If the United States went to war with Japan, it would diverge that assistance into the American war effort leaving Russia stranded. Moscow had to stop White from starting a war that would diminish American aid to Russia . 5) no scholar has accepted Steil's speculation about policy toward China, and Steil (and his lone source popular Russian writer Vladimir Karpov, who died in 2010; Vitalii Pavlov died in 2005) shows no knowledge whatsoever of the large scholarly literature on the subject of US and Japan. Indeed why should any Soviet spy be trusted to be telling the truth? That is not their line of business. That makes Steil a bad fringe source, and definitely not a reliable secondary source on this topic. Rjensen (talk) 09:13, 6 June 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Really interesting reading about your personal opinion regarding White's role in provoking the attack Rjensen, but how is this relevant? Again I am fascinated to learn that your opinion regarding the scholarly consensus differs from Steil's, but how is this relevant?Jimjilin (talk) 05:50, 8 June 2014 (UTC)[reply]

1) Wouldn't you say the Hull note was particularly extreme in its demands? 2) Why do you believe the task force could not have been recalled after Nov. 26? 3) Can you understand that Stalin would be overjoyed to see Japan and the U.S. fighting each other? You acknowledge of course that Stalin feared Japan and Germany and a two front war, right? 4) What is your evidence that Steil's only source was Vladimir Karpov?Jimjilin (talk) 05:50, 8 June 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Please do no remove the very carefully measured Oxford analysis of the historiography of the U.S. war with Japan. Page 831 of The Oxford Companion to American Military History says that your interpretation is held by very few, "a mere handful". This is quite a dismissive treatment. Binksternet (talk) 17:25, 11 June 2014 (UTC)[reply]

I'm afraid Binksternet you misread that passage. The "mere handful" refers to writers who think the Roosevelt administration knew about the attack and permitted U.S. casualties. That's a completely different topic.Jimjilin (talk) 14:07, 12 June 2014 (UTC)[reply]

External links modified[edit]

Hello fellow Wikipedians,

I have just modified one external link on Hull note. Please take a moment to review my edit. If you have any questions, or need the bot to ignore the links, or the page altogether, please visit this simple FaQ for additional information. I made the following changes:

When you have finished reviewing my changes, you may follow the instructions on the template below to fix any issues with the URLs.

checkY An editor has reviewed this edit and fixed any errors that were found.

  • If you have discovered URLs which were erroneously considered dead by the bot, you can report them with this tool.
  • If you found an error with any archives or the URLs themselves, you can fix them with this tool.

Cheers.—InternetArchiveBot (Report bug) 11:16, 8 November 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Hull_note/Archive_1&oldid=839359819"