Talk:High Seas Fleet

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Good articleHigh Seas Fleet has been listed as one of the Warfare good articles under the good article criteria. If you can improve it further, please do so. If it no longer meets these criteria, you can reassess it.
Article milestones
DateProcessResult
April 21, 2011Good article nomineeListed
Did You Know
A fact from this article appeared on Wikipedia's Main Page in the "Did you know?" column on May 1, 2011.
The text of the entry was: Did you know ... that faced with what they thought to be a suicide mission, the crews of several battleships of the German High Seas Fleet (squadron pictured) mutinied in 1918?

Heligoland[edit]

Heligoland was a British victory

You present Heligoland as "inconclusive". Well, it certainly wasn't decisive for the outcome of the war, but it was a British victory according to the wikipedia article you link to. Incidentally, that article spells Heligoland with an "i".

Sensemaker

Surrender[edit]

Re: the numbers of German vessels surrendered - see | Beatty's orders which shows that the expected numbers were 9 battle ships, 5 battle cruisers, 7 light cruisers and 50 destroyers. Hearsay evidence - two destroyes failed to leave port.

Fenton Robb 10:52, 4 April 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Pre-war politics[edit]

Should be more on pre-War politics. Germany made a serious attempt at the beginning of the 20th century to build up a surface navy that would rival Britain's. However, for Germany its navy and overseas colonies were more of a symbolic show-the-flag international prestige type of thing, rather than having any great practical importance, while Britain was a maritime power which was not self-sufficient in food production, and so was basically dependent on shipments of food from overseas to avoid starvation -- and this meant that Britain would do whatever it took to match and exceed Germany in the naval arms race, regardless of the cost, as a life-and-death matter. In the end, when WW1 came, the German surface navy didn't seriously challenge British sea power outside the North Sea, and didn't really give Germany any great military advantage in the North Sea, but building up the navy had soured British-German relations in the years preceding WW1. If not building up the navy would have meant that Britain wouldn't intervene on the side of France, Germany would have done a lot better not to build up its surface navy. AnonMoos 17:34, 15 September 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Some additional info at Fleet Acts and scattered in various subsections of Causes of World War I. -- AnonMoos 21:14, 18 September 2007 (UTC)[reply]
Also Tirpitz_Plan... AnonMoos (talk) 13:43, 2 July 2009 (UTC)[reply]
See Kaiserliche Marine for more info about the history of the HSF before WWI. Sandpiper (talk) 23:41, 8 March 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Suicide attack[edit]

"In October 1918, with the army facing defeat and the civil population starving, Scheer decided to launch a do-or-die attack on the Grand Fleet."

Can this sentence be substantiated? In Germany it is generally accepted that rumours ran abound within the ranks of the sailors that such an attack was planned (hence their revolt), but that the German High Command never prepared this kind of operation and thus its actual application can be considered unlikely. The German revolution would have been underway with or without the sailor's revolution which was just the catalyst.

84.154.3.52 (talk) 19:40, 22 November 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Well, it says so in my history book "Wars of Europe". I seem to remember reading it in Encyclopedia Britannica too. -Sensemaker

Order of Battle?[edit]

What about creating a section that would allow a user to quickly acess pages devoted to the vessels that composed the High Seas Fleet? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.115.86.14 (talk) 12:53, 19 November 2007 (UTC)[reply]

There is a separate article about the order of battle at Jutland containing info for both sides. Sandpiper (talk) 23:41, 8 March 2009 (UTC)[reply]
Additionally, the order of battle varies with time... so it might be established for some specific (important?) moments. Maybe a "list" of these ships would be better for allowing "quick access" to a user (bsed on which sources?). Cheers, DPdH (talk) 04:24, 17 April 2009 (UTC)[reply]

What about the 1917 Baltic Operations?[edit]

Why no commentary on Operation Albion and the Intervention in Finland. To only where both these actions entirely successful, they also go some way to refuting the contention that the HSF was militarily and politically useless. 195.217.166.8 (talk) 13:07, 13 January 2011 (UTC)[reply]

I'll eventually get around to expanding this article, and when I do, those two will be covered. Parsecboy (talk) 13:12, 13 January 2011 (UTC)[reply]
The contention was not that it was "militarily and politically useless" as such -- but rather that if not building the fleet would have meant that Britain would have stayed out of the war, then the decision to build the fleet ended up having far more negative than positive consequences for Germany. Also, if the fleet was built mainly to satisfy Wilhelm II's semi-childlike glee in possessing shiny new military hardware, gold braid on his shoulders, and multiple medals on his chest (rather than on the basis of sober strategic well-informed military-political deliberations), then it was an extremely expensive personal toy... AnonMoos (talk) 15:48, 13 January 2011 (UTC)[reply]
I don't know if I'd agree with that analysis - the naval rivalry was more the symptom of growing Anglo-German tension rather than the cause. Germany was growing increasingly powerful after unification in 1871, militarily and economically, to the point where it supplanted Britain's traditional rival - France - as the dominant power on the continent. Britain considered treaties with France against Germany as far back as 1881, when the Imperial Navy consisted of a handful of assorted ironclads.
You are correct, however, that it was essentially a plaything for Wilhelm II. Parsecboy (talk) 16:31, 13 January 2011 (UTC)[reply]
There would have been tensions regardless, but if Germany hadn't directly challenged Britain in its special sphere of military predominance (and even seemed to be aiming at Britain's food supplies -- see previous comments above), then the tensions might not have been so great, and might not have resulted in driving Britain into the arms of France to the same degree that actually happened in 1904. If the German surface fleet was built largely to cater for Wilhelm II's personal vanity, resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of German soldiers by greatly solidifying a British-French alliance, and ended up at the bottom of Scapa Flow without ever having struck any very major or decisive blow on behalf of Germany, then it was really a luxury that Germany couldn't afford... AnonMoos (talk) 17:10, 13 January 2011 (UTC)[reply]
One might argue that the High Seas Fleet enforced half of the blockade of Russia that eventually led to its collapse (the other half enforced largely by Goeben in the Bosporus/Dardanelles), and therefore the fleet did place a decisive role.
I don't know; the US Navy began a program of major naval expansion at the same time, which didn't arouse any significant anti-American feelings in the UK. France's return to a Mahanian fleet (from the Jeune Ecole of the late 19th century) didn't cause problems either. Yes, part of the difference was that Tirpitz stated he intended to build "a dagger at Britain's throat," but certainly the return to battleship construction by France's navy, Britain's traditional maritime rival, should have provoked at least as great a backlash in England. Parsecboy (talk) 17:30, 13 January 2011 (UTC)[reply]
With the rise of a number of countries to a relatively advanced level of industrial and economic development in the last part of the nineteenth century, Britain's naval predominance would almost certainly be lessened -- however, Germany chose to prominently and conspicuously place itself on the sharp edge of the wedge (rather than merely being one of a number of nations increasing its naval strength as part of an overall long-term general trend), and it paid a diplomatic price for doing so. If there was no one with a significant voice in Germany's decision-making who was doing a coldly calculated cost-benefit analysis of whether or not the benefits to Germany would be worth the price, then that's kind of an indictment of the German system...
Also, the Baltic is not the High Seas, and Germany probably could have blocked off the Baltic with a fleet which was aimed much more towards Germany's immediate local strategic needs (as opposed to making an apparent attempt at challenging global domination). AnonMoos (talk) 16:08, 16 January 2011 (UTC)[reply]

Some comments[edit]

Per the request here, I've read through the article. While it's nicely written and fairly comprehensive, it does miss some topics which seem relevant. These include:

  • The strategic and intellectual bankruptcy of the High Seas Fleet concept isn't really covered. While the problems with the concept up to 1906 are covered nicely, this analysis isn't taken forward. This strategy was a key factor in Britain becoming involved in World War I (and contributed to the tensions which caused the war), yet due to geography and Britain's shipbuilding capabilities never had a realistic hope of success.
  • Coverage of the fleet's logistics would be interesting - for instance, did it have the range to operate outside of the North Sea as a coherent unit? Where were its bases, and how sophisticated were they? (etc)
  • Likewise coverage of topics such as communications and intelligence would be good
  • It would be good if the article could cover how the Germans manned the fleet and trained the large number of sailors (and officers) it required. Given that the various German states had historically not been naval powers, building such a huge fleet was a major change and would have generated massive training requirements.
  • To reach FA status I'd suggest that the article should cover the legacy of the fleet (ie, what influence did it have on the war, how is it remembered and did it influence later developments? (such as Plan Z?)
  • "Once the ships were interned, their guns were disabled through the removal of their breech blocks, and their crews were reduced to 200 officers and enlisted men" - was this 200 men per ship, or across all the interned ships? Nick-D (talk) 00:20, 26 April 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks a lot, Nick, this is really helpful. I don't usually do these bigger picture topics and it's easy for me to get trapped in the tactical/operational stuff. I know off the top of my head that Herwig has a nice chapter on personnel/training/etc. as well as an explanation of the logistics (especially with regards to the overseas units) which should be integrated. And of course there's plenty of info on the arms race going off the rails for Germany in the run-up to WWI as well as the failure of the fleet as an instrument of war. I'll see what I can dig up on intel and communications. As for the last one, that's per ship - I can see how that is unclear though. Thanks again. Parsecboy (talk) 02:04, 26 April 2011 (UTC)[reply]
No worries. It's always great to see articles on 'big' topics like this being brought up to the highest standards. Nick-D (talk) 02:08, 26 April 2011 (UTC)[reply]

The creation of the German navy is described in isolation to world events. To understand the ideas and opinions of Tirpitz it is necessary to make reference to the events that shape his views. His remarks in 1897 relating to the first naval law are made about the activities of the Royal Navy "Flying Squadron" created by the Royal Navy to menace German trade in retaliation for the Kruger telegram of 1896. The second navy law passed in 1902 is a specific response to the interference by the RN with German ships off the coast of South Africa during the Boer war. The Germans saw the Boers as kindred people and viewed the British colonial aspirations as unacceptable when they encroached into the Boer republics. Revisionist99 (talk) 15:54, 12 December 2012 (UTC)[reply]

To be able to directly protect the Boers, the Germans would have needed to build a fleet large and powerful enough to directly challenge British naval domination -- which meant a fleet powerful enough to threaten to starve Britain, since the island of Britain was not self-sufficient in food. German naval construction plans along those lines played a large role in driving Britain into the "Entente cordiale" with France in 1905, and ensuring that Britain would step in on the side of France in 1914. If German policymakers had coldly and clear-sightedly prioritized the importance of protecting Boers vs. British neutrality in a continental European conflict, then they might have given British neutrality more importance than an intangible delight in shiny new naval hardware, or grandiose but extremely vague daydreaming colonial aspirations. AnonMoos (talk) 16:23, 12 December 2012 (UTC)[reply]

Sortie of 18–19 October 1916[edit]

You have removed the paragraph concerning this operation: why? It is fallaciously claimed by many authors the HSF never sortied after Jutland. The three occasions when it did were 18-19 August 1916, 18-19 October 1916 and 23-25 April 1918; the first and the third have paragraph descriptions in this article, why not the second?Dfvj (talk) 06:40, 1 October 2014 (UTC)[reply]

It's too much detail, and more importantly, you added it without any sources (and by adding it, you broke citations that were in the article). This article should cover the operations of the fleet as a high level summary - only significant operations should be covered in any detail (which is why Jutland gets its own section, Albion gets an entire paragraph, etc.). The 18-19 October sortie deserves the same level of detail as the sorties Pohl conducted in 1915 (which is a single sentence) since they never had a chance of encountering significant British forces. Operations that had a reasonable chance of producing the Germans' desired result (the bombardment of 15-16 December 1914, the 18-19 August 1916 operation, and the 23-25 April 1918 sortie, being the chief examples) should have a bit more coverage, since the fleets might well have come to grips on those occasions. Parsecboy (talk) 12:12, 1 October 2014 (UTC)[reply]
All of the information in that paragraph came from Beesley, which WAS cited (admittedly at the end of the first sentence rather than the end of the paragraph, which was a style error). I don't recall breaking any citations: to what, precisely? I think you are wrong to dismiss the significance of the October 1916 sortie: British authors make much of the post-Jutland inactivity of the HSF (in order to argue Jutland was a moral victory for the RN); yet on this occasion, the British were fore-warned, yet declined to counter other than diverting mercantile traffic -- yes the weather had a lot to do with that, but it gives the lie to the Germans cowering before British might, doesn't it? I've uploaded a parsed version of this paragraph to which I hope you have no objection. Dfvj (talk) 00:48, 2 October 2014 (UTC)[reply]
What you're arguing for is original research, and while I might agree with it–indeed one of my Masters' papers touched on that very issue—it cannot be included in the article. Again, this should be a high-level summary of the activities of the fleet, and while your argument is an important one, I don't know of any historians who have yet explicitly made it. Without making that argument, the operation loses its significance—it's just one more in a series of sorties by the fleet that resulted in no contact with British surface forces. Parsecboy (talk) 01:39, 2 October 2014 (UTC)[reply]

ENGVAR[edit]

This early version of the article seems to use Commonwealth English. Was there a reason it got changed to American? --Wubslin (talk) 00:45, 25 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]

There's also an "equalization" in there, which is the American spelling. If I'm going to be the person who actually does the work and there are no WP:STRONGNAT concerns, I'm going to standardize on the variant I use. And it's been stable this way for well over a decade, there's no point to change it now. Parsecboy (talk) 09:53, 25 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]
"Equalization" is a UK spelling too though. So you reckon your Little Red Hen idea outweighs policy? Interesting. Perhaps you could give it a little more thought. --Wubslin (talk) 11:30, 25 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]
Tell that to Cambridge (note "UK usually equalisation").
You're awfully familiar with obscure policies for someone whose account is a week old. Tell me, what was your previous username? Parsecboy (talk) 12:13, 25 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]
It's well worth being familiar with the rules. It helps us to edit harmoniously here. I think you're maybe unaware of Oxford spelling; might be interesting to read about it. --Wubslin (talk) 18:08, 25 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]
Sure, uh huh. I'll buy that. Run along, sock. Parsecboy (talk) 19:37, 25 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]
It's well worth being familiar with the rules. So far I think I am completely in compliance with the rules. You, not so much. I'll leave this here for now. I take it you've nothing substantive to say about the ENGVAR issue? --Wubslin (talk) 20:10, 25 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]
No, because you don’t have anything substantive to say either. Wikilawyering about what version of English an article used nearly 15 years ago is a waste of time (and coincidentally, something I only see Brits do – why is that?). Do me a favor: go somewhere else and actually write an article yourself. There’s plenty of real work to be done, no need to waste your effort on pointless debates (which, ironically, the entire point in creating ENGVAR in the first place was to prevent stupid arguments like this one). Time to WP:DROPTHESTICK. Parsecboy (talk) 20:49, 25 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]
Many thanks for the advice, I may well do that. As you're well aware, ENGVAR is indeed designed to stop silly arguments about spelling variants by "freezing" the spelling variant at the first non-stub version. I'm sorry you think it's a waste of time: I think it's a great saving of time, but we can agree to differ, as seemingly we have on the other issue below. So, just to be clear, you think that because you substantially developed the article it gives you licence to ignore ENGVAR? Maybe if you feel that way, you could lobby to have the guidance changed accordingly. In the meantime, I think this article should probably be in Commonwealth English, the version the first non-stub was written in. --Wubslin (talk) 21:08, 25 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]
As entertaining as this has all been, ENGVAR specifically states "An article should not be edited or renamed simply to switch from one variety of English to another". You are wrong, here and below. Move along. Parsecboy (talk) 21:37, 25 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]
I don't believe I am, I think you are wrong, but I can see you aren't going to change your mind. It isn't actually that big of a deal in a way, but it strikes me that if you've encountered this before, and especially if it annoys you as much as it seems to do, you should maybe be more careful in future to respect the strong recommendation not to change the dialect an article is written in as you develop it. That might be the best way out of this. For the meantime, I'll wait and see if anyone else is bothered. I'm not, particularly. --Wubslin (talk) 01:06, 26 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]
What part of "don't edit an article simply to change the spelling" do you think means "edit the article simply to change the spelling"?
Sure, the fact that this article is written in American English bothers you so little that you didn't take the time to dig through its history, then spend a day arguing about it.
If you want to understand why it's frustrating, I alluded to it earlier. I've lost track of the number of times arrogant Brits have demanded that an article that has little to do with the UK be changed to UK spellings over the years (usually regardless of how the article started). What is it with you guys? I have literally never seen an Australian, Kiwi, or Canadian demand an article be changed from one variant to another. Please, answer me this question: what drove you to look at the article history in the first place? Was it the standard "this isn't an American topic, so British should be the default" assumption? (If you are wondering, I have encountered that ludicrous opinion on many occasions, like this one, for instance).
If you still believe you are correct, do me a favor and go change Humour to the American spelling, since the article started that way. Once you get that accomplished, come back here and we'll talk. Parsecboy (talk) 11:43, 26 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]

UK English with mostly "-ize" instead of "-ise" is what is known as Oxford spelling... 20:18, 25 June 2022 (UTC)

Oops, I didn't see that it was already mentioned above. Anyway, it's definitely a valid thing, and preferred by some (though of course not by UK newspapers etc). AnonMoos (talk) 20:21, 25 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]

Risk theory and fleet in being[edit]

I had always believed that these two concepts in naval strategy were intimately connected. This article seems to back my view up. Am I wrong? --Wubslin (talk) 18:10, 25 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]

Indeed you are. That hobbyist article has a poor description of what a fleet in being actually is (and does), and am inaccurate description of Tirpitz's risk theory (not to mention Till, which the amateur historian cites, either has a blatantly incorrect explanation for why Jellicoe and then Beatty employed a distant blockade, or said amateur misrepresents Till; I can't say, I haven't read the book).
The basic point of a fleet in being is to pose a threat and force one's opponent to employ ships to contain the fleet, rather than use them elsewhere. Tirpitz in Norway is a good example of this. So long as the ship was still operational, Britain (and at times the US) had to employ capital ships to cover the convoys to the Soviet Union, rather than send those capital ships to the Mediterranean or Pacific. That is not what Tirpitz was attempting to do with the HSF. His goal was more akin to mutually assured destruction. He hoped to deter Britain from going to war against Germany because, in his view, to do so would effectively forfeit Britain's preeminent naval position. Parsecboy (talk) 20:00, 25 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for taking the time to explain that to me, that's a lot better way to work. I understand what you are saying, but I wonder if it's as clear-cut as you suggest. Here, for example is David T. Zabecki using the term in discussing the High Seas Fleet of WW1. I think he is saying that while it was not designed to be a fleet in being, that was what it was in practice once it became obvious there would be no major naval battles. (I like Churchill's view too, that it was a "Luxury Fleet".) The language the article uses should reflect the language that the sources use, I think. --Wubslin (talk) 20:24, 25 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]
You're moving the goalposts; the issue isn't whether the Germans adopted a fleet in being strategy during the war, but whether "risk theory" should be piped to fleet in being. That is all. And you are wrong. Parsecboy (talk) 21:38, 25 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]
Oh yeah, absolutely wrong on that. I don't think they mean the same, and I agree the piped link isn't right, but the more I think about it, the more I think the fleet in being deserves a mention and a link on this article. Don't you? --Wubslin (talk) 01:01, 26 June 2022 (UTC)[reply]