Talk:Free will/Archive 19

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Compatibilism

The introduction says:

Those who define free will otherwise, without reference to determinism, are called compatibilists, because they hold determinism to be compatible with free will.

Now, this statement appears to be self-contradictory as it says compatibilists do not refer to determinism, but at the same time do refer to it by saying determinism is compatible with free will.

Some who define free will without mention of determinism, do not think determinism has anything to do with it, but refer instead to the 'laws of nature' and define free will to accommodate these laws.

For example, Stanislas Dehaene thinks the intuition of 'free will' is a temporary frame of mind and as our "intuition becomes educated" it will "evaporate". He says:

"When we discuss "free will" we mean a much more interesting form of freedom."(p. 264) [Different from the intuition "that the mind chooses its actions 'at will' ", and different from the usual ideas of freedom from 'determinism' or random events] "Our belief in free will expresses the idea that, under the right circumstances, we have the ability to guide our decisions by our higher order thoughts, beliefs, values, and past experiences, and to exert control over our undesired lower level impulses. Most of the time our willful acts ....consist in a careful review of our options, followed by the deliberate selection of the one we favor....This conception of free will requires no appeal to quantum physics, and can be implemented in a standard computer. Our global neuronal workspace allows us to collect all the necessary information, both from our current senses and from our memories, synthesize it, evaluate its consequences, ponder them for as long as we want, and eventually use this internal reflection to guide our actions. ...Our brain states are clearly not uncaused and do not escape the laws of physics - nothing does. But our decisions are genuinely free whenever they are based upon conscious deliberation that proceeds autonomously, without any impediment, carefully weighing the pros and cons before committing to a course of action..." (All from p. 264 as read in Amazon's look inside feature)

I'm under the impression that Dehaene is only one of several philosophers who use the idea of a central clearing house where decisions are weighed, but in a manner consistent with the laws of nature. The criteria that are in place in the control center during the weighing process are programmed by a variety of external mechanisms that include genetics, upbringing, and culture, which are very large external influences also governed by the laws of nature including evolution and social mechanisms (vis à vis Ratner).

I believe this exposition (you can read it in more detail here is one example of a thinker who simultaneously (i) believes in free will and (ii) believes all events obey the laws of nature. He is (I guess) a compatibilist but it is hard to fit him into the framework of those that deny the ubiquity of natural law. Brews ohare (talk) 15:52, 18 March 2014 (UTC)


There is no contradiction because that sentence is talking about people with opinions like Dehaene's. Dehaene would be called a compatibilist because he doesn't say "in order to have free will, determinism must be false". He gives a conception of free will that is not defined by its relation to determinism, and as such, he does not find determinism a detriment to that conception of free will -- in other words, free will as he defines it is perfectly compatible with determinism, because free will as he defines it does not hinge on determinism either way. You don't have to say "I define free will as something compatible with determinism" to be a compatibilist; you just have to not say "I define free will as requiring the absence of determinism".
I'm unclear what you mean by "the framework of those that deny the ubiquity of natural law" but it makes me think you are still confused as to what these different positions name. Let me try to explain again.
Say you compiled a list of all the different answers anybody gives to the question "What is free will?" You'd have things like:
  • "Free will is the ability to guide our decisions by our higher order thoughts"
  • "Free will is the ability to act as we choose without fear of punishment"
  • "Free will is the ability to move our bodies in accordance with our desires"
  • "Free will is the ability to act in ways that defy prediction from prior events"
And so on. If you then asked everyone who agrees with one of those answers "Do we have free will or not?", and you'd get 'yes' or 'no' answers of course, two groups for each answer.
But as it turns out, an answer like that last one to the "What is free will?" question has been so popular over time that the people answering any of the other answers, combined, were of comparable notability to the people on either side of the "Do we have free will?" question within that last group alone. So people would ask questions like "Do you believe in free will, or do you believe in determinism?" and one notable group would answer "free will", another notable group would answer "determinism", and a third notable group would answer "that's a false dilemma, your definition of free will is wrong."
That last group, the "false dilemma" group, are the compatibilists. Everyone who doesn't play the free-will-or-determinism dilemma game is a compatibilist.
So compatibilism the category of positions is defined in reference to the position which defines free will in reference to determinism ("incompatibilism"), but compatibilist positions explicitly do not define free will in reference to determinism. That's what makes them compatibilist. The category "compatibilism" is defined as "those positions that don't define free will in reference to determinism". There are different orders of abstraction at play here: positions about free will on one order, and categories of such positions on a higher order. The common categorization is determinism-centric, because a determinism-centric position has historically been so damn popular, but not all the positions thus categorized are themselves determinism-centric: compatibilism is the category of all positions that are not.
Believe me, as a compatibilist myself (of a variety very similar to Dehaene in fact), I think this kind of terminology is itself biased, but it's the kind of terminology used in the literature so it's what we have to go with. It's like how in certain countries is makes sense for historical reason to speak of "whites" and "colored" (or "people or color" or "non-whites" or whatever the locally acceptable term is in the country in question), even though caucasians are just one of many races and an ahistorical categorization of race would list caucasians equally amidst many different races. In some places, caucasians have so dominated every other race there that the terminology reflects that history, as there is something common to all of the other races despite all their significant differences: they are not a part of the historically dominant group, namely white people. Likewise, the incompatibilist definition of free will is just one of many possible definitions which on an ahistorical listing would just be listed alongside the others, but it has been so dominant for so much of history that it makes sense to group all of the others together, despite their significant differences, as the group of all those not agreeing with that dominant definition. But although the category "nonwhite" is defined in terms of whiteness, the nonwhites people in that category are by definition not white; and so too although the category "compatibilism" is defined in terms of determinism, compatibilist positions in that category are by definition not concerned with determinism. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:13, 19 March 2014 (UTC)
Two points:
First, the statement:
Those who define free will otherwise, without reference to determinism, are called compatibilists, because they hold determinism to be compatible with free will.
is self-contradictory on the face of it, saying two opposite things (compatibilism both does and doesn't refer to determinism), no matter how complicated a wiggle is used to make sense of it. It should be rewritten. Here's a possibility:
Those who define 'free will' and 'determinism' in ways that are not logically exclusive and contradictory of each other are called compatibilists, because they hold views of free will and determinism that are compatible.
Brews ohare (talk) 15:02, 19 March 2014 (UTC)
It's not a complicated wiggle, Brews, you're just failing to distinguish orders of abstraction again. Compatibilist definitions of free will do not refer to determinism. The definition of the category "compatibilism" does. They are two separate things that only sound contradictory because you can't seem to separate first- and second-order discourses from each other.
Here's a really simple illustration. What does x equal? Survey says:
  • x=3
  • x=5
  • x=7
  • x=9
Now let's make a category of all answers that don't say x=3, and call them x≠3ers.
The category of x≠3ers is defined in reference to 3. Obviously, it's right in the name.
None of the answers in the x≠3ers category define x in reference to 3 though. Look at them:
  • x=5
  • x=7
  • x=9
I don't see any of them talking about 3. But they're all in a category defined in reference to 3... because they'd all say x≠3! Oh noes! Contradiction!
See how silly that is? --Pfhorrest (talk) 20:18, 19 March 2014 (UTC)
Second, you say that you hold a position like that of Dehaene, but that the introduction cannot be phrased to include (never mind espouse) such a position because a poll would show that view to be a small minority view. I'd summarize this approach by saying something like: this article is taken by some to be about a defensible position, but superstition prevails and so the article must be phrased to make the introduction incompatible with any other position. That is a far less defensible position than one that designates a group in an inoffensive manner. Brews ohare (talk) 15:02, 19 March 2014 (UTC)
If you think the present introduction excludes views like Dehaene's, then you don't understand what the present introduction says, which is what I've been trying to say all along. I agree pretty much completely with Dehaene and the present introduction does not sound biased against my position to me. The present introduction does not assert incompatibilism in any way. "Constraints" is not about determinism, and in fact that language was chosen before you came along explicitly to make the lede not define free will in terms of determinism, to be inclusive of compatibilist positions. "Unconstrained" just an elaboration of the word "free".
Would you agree with a lede that said "Free will is the ability to will freely?" It's kind of inane but it's uncontroversially true, isn't it?
How about if we substitute something for "to will", like "to make choices"? Or some other synonymous phrase, your pick. Is there something we could stick in there to make it sound less inane?
Now how about we do the same for "freely". Can you think of some short phrase that explains what "freely" in general means? Bearing in mind that different definitions of free will are concerned about the will being free from different things, so you need to say what "freely" means without specifying what it's free from; just that it's free from something or other.
Then how about we list a couple things different definitions think it's important to be free from? (For a modern compatibilist like Dehaene, for example, it would be freedom from anything bypassing or overriding our deliberative processes; freedom from overwhelming irrational thought processes like compulsions of phobias. For incompatibilists, it would be freedom from causation or predictability. And so on).
Can you fill in the blanks there in some way that sounds alright to you? Because if you can, you'll have come up with a sentence or two that are equivalent to what the current introduction says, just phrased differently. --Pfhorrest (talk) 20:18, 19 March 2014 (UTC)
It appears to me that Dehaene is among those that achieve a compatibilist position by defining either 'free will' or 'determinism' in ways that are not logically distinct and contradictory of each other. So 'free will' becomes supervisory regulation by a governing software system and 'determinism' becomes 'laws of nature' (which could include evolution and genetic programming). Definitional inventions are a fun activity, I guess, so there is no reason that the intro can't say that this is one of the games associated with the free will debate. Brews ohare (talk) 15:02, 19 March 2014 (UTC)
That's how anyone achieves a compatibilist position. That's what compatibilism is. --Pfhorrest (talk) 20:18, 19 March 2014 (UTC)
What is incontrovertible is that all humans have an instinctive belief in free will, that this instinct is so basic that we have no problem identifying that we have it, and that feeling is prior to and independent of any attempt to verbalize it, and the life in this topic is derived entirely from this instinct and trying to make some sense out of it. Dehaene accepts this situation, but says it is a temporary cultural phenomenon that will evaporate as our intuitions become educated by greater scientific understanding of the thought processes. In different words, Dehaene is an evangelist. Brews ohare (talk) 15:17, 19 March 2014 (UTC)
Pfhorrest: If every compatabilist achieves their stance "by defining either 'free will' or 'determinism' in ways that are not logically distinct and contradictory of each other", why not say so? You might notice that this makes the position different from say a verifiable, or experimental, or intuitive, or religious position. That is, compatibilism is about words and usage, and is not a way to look at a controversy over facts or beliefs. Brews ohare (talk) 06:06, 20 March 2014 (UTC)
If someone defines free will in a way that it is not contradictory with determinism (such as by not mentioning determinism at all), that makes them a compatibilist. The article at present says "Those who define free will otherwise, without reference to determinism, are called compatibilists". How is that not clear already? --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:17, 20 March 2014 (UTC)
Another point:You go to lengths to suggest that 'determinism' is used in several ways in the sentence
"Those who define free will otherwise, without reference to determinism1, are called compatibilists, because they hold determinism2 to be compatible with free will.
I'd say that is no way to write a clear statement for a general audience. Brews ohare (talk) 06:06, 20 March 2014 (UTC)
I'm not saying that "determinism is used in several different ways", like it means two different things; two different things are being said about two different orders of abstraction, both in reference to the same sense of "determinism". If you had read those "lengths" you would understand that. Look up at the numerical analogy again. Is "3" being used in different ways? Or is the same number "3" being spoken of with regards to two different kinds of things: the several answers to "what does x equal"? which do not mention the number 3, and the category "answers to that question which do not mention the number 3", which does mention the number 3, only to say that the things in that set do not.
I'll say it again: Compatibilists positions do not define free will in reference to determinism. But that sentence I just wrote does, in defining the category "compatibilists positions". --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:17, 20 March 2014 (UTC)
Finally, in this edit you reintroduce the sentence:
"Though it is a commonly-held intuition that we have free will, it has been widely debated throughout history not only whether that is true, but even how to define the concept of free will."
Now, in my mind, my emphasized it that is debated might be whether the intuition has a basis or whether some or another definition of free will (and that is pretty hard to pin down at this stage) is 'true'. Now, while I think many people would feel that at least certain of their intuitions have a basis, I don't think anybody thinks that a definition is 'true' (it's only a convention about what words will be taken to mean) although it might be consistent with some or another metaphysical system, or (as is highly improbable in this instance) it might be consistent with some observable evidence. This it needs fixing. Brews ohare (talk) 06:06, 20 March 2014 (UTC)
Ugh. I'm sorry I'm losing my patience here, but can you read? "It" is a dummy pronoun used to rearrange a sentence that would otherwise say "whether that [the intuition that we have free will] is true, and even how to define the concept of free will, has been widely debated throughout history". What has been widely debated through out history? Whether the intuition that we have free will is true; and also, how to define the concept of free will. That is what has been widely debated throughout history. It -- that is to say, whether the intuition that we have free will is true, and how to define the concept of free will -- has been widely debated throughout history. You know that set of questions that I keep repeating in this paragraph? It has been widely debated throughout history. Those questions have. The questions of whether the intuition that we have free will is true, and of how to define the concept of free will.
This is elementary school level grammar here, Brews.
Nothing in there is talking about a definition being true. It's talking about whether the proposition commonly intuited, "we have free will", is true. It is also talking about how to define the concept of free will employed in that proposition.
I'm starting to lose my good faith here. This is almost troll-level willful inability to understand here. --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:17, 20 March 2014 (UTC)
Pfhorrest: You seem to think my confusion is feigned, or that I am simply the only person who finds these things less than clear. The first is incorrect, and the second might be (although I don't think so). However, rephrasing these things would be easier than explaining why they are already wonderful expressions of your thought. Brews ohare (talk) 14:44, 20 March 2014 (UTC)
Here is a rephrasing of the definition of compatitibilism:
"Although some varieties of compatibilism define 'free will' and 'determinism' in ways that are not logically contradictory and so are compatible, others deny determinism in any form, making compatibility with determinism a non-issue that can be ignored in their definitions of 'free will'." Brews ohare (talk) 15:19, 20 March 2014 (UTC)
The second category of compatibilists is really a subset of the first with more radical definitions of determinism that are more or less obviously absurd. Brews ohare (talk) 15:24, 20 March 2014 (UTC)
The "deny determinism in any form" subcategory you mention belies a persistent apparent misunderstanding of what the different major positions on free will claim.
Forget for the moment what exactly "determinism" means. Let's just say there is some thesis, some claim, about how the world works. Doesn't matter how ridiculous it is, there is some claim that's made by someone and for some reason a lot of people are concerned about it.
  • One major group all agree that having free will depends on that thesis being false.
    • Within that group, one subgroup claims that that thesis is true, and that consequently nobody can have free will.
    • Another subgroup among them claims that that thesis is false, and that consequently free will is possible.
  • Another bunch of other people disagree in various ways about free will depending in any way on that thesis at all. They subsequently don't care whether that thesis is true or false. They don't have to "deny it in any form". Some of them may deny it anyway, but they would say that that was irrelevant to their stance on free will, because their stance on free will has nothing to do with whether that thesis is true or false.
That last group are the compatibilists. The first major group are incompatibilists, and the subgroups within them are hard determinists and metaphysical libertarians.
I think maybe the place you're getting confused is that you think some compatibilists get to "free will and determinism can coexist" by redefining that they mean by "determinism". They don't, and that would be a cheap cop-out because everyone involved in this discourse (besides you) generally understands what is meant by "determinism". Compatibilists differ from incompatibilists only in how they define free will. Incompatibilists define free will in reference to determinism, by saying "free will requires non-determinism". Compatibilists, all of them, just define free will in any other way, that doesn't make reference to determinism; and then, if someone asks them "but but but what if determinism?" they say "so what? not a problem". No compatibilist sets out to say "I define free will as compatible with determinism". They just say "I define free will as [whatever]", where "[whatever]" has nothing to do with determinism, and so does not require free will as they define it to be incompatible with determinism. Because they don't require it to be incompatible, because they don't define it that way, then on their view they could be compatible. And that's a big deal to the big group who think they have to be incompatible, so they label all of those rebels who disagree "compatibilists".
Compatibilism, the category, is defined in contrast to incompatibilism, the category. The place where they contrast is this: incompatibilists define free will, the ability, in a way that requires non-determinism; and compatibilists don't define free will that way. They don't define it as being compatible with determinism; they just don't define it as not being compatible with determinism, because they don't mention determinism at all in their definitions. Beyond that one thing they all don't do, their definitions may differ in any way. The only thing they have in common, the only reason any of them would care to mention determinism at all, is to say "my kind of free will doesn't care about determinism". And the only reason they need to say that is because so many damn people think otherwise, that they need to say "nah I'm not with them". Compatibilists don't care about determinism enough to say anything about it aside from "I don't care about determinism". There's not some kind of... even-more-not-caring kind who doesn't just not care about determinism, they... don't care about... not caring about determinism? Whatever distinction you're trying to draw there isn't even coherent enough to paraphrase. --Pfhorrest (talk)
Pfhorrest: Your remark " Compatibilists don't care about determinism enough to say anything about it aside from ′I don't care about determinism′ " is far from true. Most compatibilists spend a lot of prose on the subject of 'determinism', and they don't all share a common understanding of what it is. Dehaene employs determinism as the 'laws of physics', presumably in their modern form, and not those laws as seen by Laplace; some use the 'laws of nature' presumably including evolution among other 'laws' (which might be reducible to 'laws of physics', but as yet defy that effort). The Stanford Encyclopedia points out the lack of a clear understanding of determinism:
"There is a long tradition of compatibilists arguing that freedom is fully compatible with physical determinism. Hume went so far as to argue that determinism is a necessary condition for freedom—or at least, he argued that some causality principle along the lines of “same cause, same effect” is required. There have been equally numerous and vigorous responses by those who are not convinced. Can a clear understanding of what determinism is, and how it tends to succeed or fail in real physical theories, shed any light on the controversy?"
Pfhorrest, I think you might admit to a bit of rhetorical excess here. You seem more interested in bringing me into the fold than in recognizing any need to revise the language to be more clear. Probably we pretty much agree about the discussions in the literature, but disagree about how to present them. Brews ohare (talk) 13:08, 21 March 2014 (UTC)
A primary point to be made clear is the role of the arguments over which definitions are compatible with which. That is an activity very different from an argument over beliefs or facts. The article right now is muddy about this distinction. The truth is, there is no conceivable evidentiary procedure that can address the 'best' choice of definitions, so the debate is really about (i) logical consistency and (ii) taste (or one's intuitions).
In the realm of consistency, one can choose the domain over which consistency is demanded, and most discussion concerns the assumption that consistency should include the 'laws of nature'. At the extreme, these laws are taken to be, not as they actually are or claim to be, but in an idealized extrapolation that is in itself unverifiable in principle. For example, that they are universally applicable (in some supposed form of the yet-to-be-discovered theory of everything) to every conceivable (nevermind observable) event, mental or otherwise.
In the realm of intuition, one could posit along with Dehaene that psychology will show that 'intuitions' are cultural artifacts, and that as people become more aware and better educated they will ultimately come round to Dehaene's view and 'free will' as ordinarily experienced ("our mind chooses its actions ′at will′ ", p. 263) will 'evaporate'. Or not. Even today, most of us already believe whatever is the realm where 'free will' has sway, it has its limitations. That view in some form is already in our statutes, for example, about 'crimes of passion'. Brews ohare (talk) 09:40, 22 March 2014 (UTC)

I see that I have digressed so far from the subject of defining 'compatibilism' that Pfhorrest doesn't know where to start with a reply. To go back to basics here, we need a better definition than:

Those who define free will otherwise, without reference to determinism, are called compatibilists, because they hold determinism to be compatible with free will.

which is to be understood as saying in different words:

A definition of 'free will' adopted by compatibilism need not involve any mention of 'determinism'. Compatibilists adopt the view that, whichever definition of 'determinism' is adopted, it must be logically compatible with their chosen definition of 'free will', which is the more basic concept.

I am uncertain that in fact compatibilists first adopt a view of free will, and then adopt a compatible version of 'determinism', and think that some work it the other way around. For example, Dehaene is a compatibilist who defines 'determinism' first and then defines 'free will' so it fits with his determinism. In any event, a clearer definition is in order. Brews ohare (talk) 16:41, 23 March 2014 (UTC)

A more encompassing alternative might go like this:

Definitions of 'free will' and 'determinism' adopted by compatibilism must be logically compatible with each other. Different compatibilists differ as to which concept is the more basic.

Brews ohare (talk) 16:49, 23 March 2014 (UTC)

You've got what I was saying backwards. I never meant to suggest "compatibilists first adopt a view of free will, and then adopt a compatible version of 'determinism'", but exactly the opposite. Nuances aside, everyone in the free will debate understands at least roughly what kind of thing is meant by "determinism". There might be different ways of articulating it precisely but compatibilists don't need to take a position on that matter. Free will as compatibilists define it is not threatened by anything in that ballpark, because what they mean by "free will" doesn't have anything to do with that kind of stuff at all. Classical compatibilists were concerned with things that we'd now call freedom or action and political freedom, which have nothing to do with "determinism" of any sort. Most modern compatibilists are, like Dehaene, concerned with us having a particular kind of psychological functionality, which again has nothing to do with "determinism" of any sort. The definition of "determinism" is not of any importance to a compatibilist, because compatibilist concepts of free will aren't remotely concerned with determinism in any way shape or form. The only reason they write anything about it is because so many other people are worried that determinism is a threat to free will, and the compatibilists are explaining why that is not something they need to worry about, because free will properly understood (i.e. as they explain it) isn't the kind of thing that's threatened by determinism in any way.
Also, whatever sentence we put in there has to fit in with the flow of the surrounding sentences, which your suggestion does not, aside from any other problems with it. --Pfhorrest (talk)
It doesn't matter if I got your meaning; the point is that your meaning is not obvious to all, myself being an example of one. Your statement that "compatibilist concepts of free will are not remotely concerned with determinism in any way shape or form" is wrong. Dehaene is one counterexample. Perhaps you do not consider him a compatibilist? He does espouse his definition of 'free will' and does claim compatibility with his definition of 'determinism'. That compatibilism is central for him: it reconciles 'free will' with his idea of what is natural law (perhaps a form of determinism according to Carl Hoefer, but not by you). IMO we should look at sources, and not state our own conceptions. Possibly the framing of the issues according to sources is less of a log jam than trying to fit our own views together? You write that compatibilists are concerned with determinism only because there are so many misguided souls. Inasmuch as those who deny free will are legion (Harris being one), I'd agree with you that for compatibilists to face them is not really a choice they can duck. Again, sources are needed here, not our opinions. It is an oddity that the name 'compatibilism' should identify this group by something you say they need never consider. How about a return to (1) attempted clarity in wording and (2) the presentation of sources, not opinion? Brews ohare (talk) 08:50, 25 March 2014 (UTC)

Paragraphing the new lede

I just want to weigh in on this before it becomes an edit war and then the small progress we've just made gets rolled back.

I don't think a paragraph break where Brews inserted one is necessary, as the bulk of the text prior to it serves as an introduction to the text after it and the paragraph after that.

However, as it serves as an introduction to both of those paragraphs, I also think it's fine to have that introductory text as a small paragraph of it's own preceding them both.

It would also be acceptable, but not necessary, to merge it into the end of the preceding paragraph, in case anyone thinks that might help.

I'm happy my little bold move has resulted in some productive back-and-forth between Brews and Snowded, I'm pretty happy with the compromise you've reached now, and I hope we can see more collaboration like this in the future. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:18, 19 March 2014 (UTC)

If the paragraph really matters to Brews I am happy to concede it, inserting mass quotes and arguments in references however is not and never has been acceptable. ----Snowded TALK 07:24, 19 March 2014 (UTC)
It is hardly a 'mass quote' to indicate the reason for referring to Dehaene (reference 4) was his quotation from Lucretius that supports the claim that this discussion has been with us for a long time. Your reduction of this footnote to a link to Dehaene with no guidance to the reader makes the purpose of the footnote obscure. Brews ohare (talk) 15:11, 19 March 2014 (UTC)
You have had your edits reverted by three different editors, I suggest you consider a different conclusion ----Snowded TALK 09:49, 25 March 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: I put in that reference to support the longevity of the debate. Now maybe you can suggest what other point in this sentence this reference supports, instead of silly invention that the purpose of this footnote has come up three times already. Brews ohare (talk) 10:45, 25 March 2014 (UTC)
You tried to sneak content into a reference which is a foolish tactic you have adopted recently. If pointing this out together with your recalcitrant behaviour and inability to abide by WP:Civil is silly then I embrace the term. ----Snowded TALK 12:48, 25 March 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: It may come as a surprise to you, but what the reverted footnote to reference 4 says is:

"An early approach to the matter is found in Lucretius writing in the first century BC. Quoted by Stanislas Dehaene (2014). Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts. Penguin. p. 263. ISBN 0698151402."

That doesn't fit your description of trying "to sneak content into a reference". What this remark about Lucretius does is point out the relevance of the reference to the sentence it supports, namely, the remark of the WP text that free will has been debated for centuries. I'll accept your apologies in advance. Brews ohare (talk) 16:00, 25 March 2014 (UTC)

You are adding commentary Brews, I'm sorry for you, but not sorry ----Snowded TALK 17:14, 25 March 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: You simply don't understand what a footnote is - you think it must consist of a citation only. What journals and books do you read, anyway? Some works separate citations from notes, and that could be done here too. Would that suit you? Brews ohare (talk) 17:37, 25 March 2014 (UTC)
I fully understand footnotes Brews and I am on the editorial board of several journals that I also read. You are using footnotes and references to add commentary (which includes your explanations) and that a is variously original research and synthesis. You are wasting everyone's time and can't keep a civil tongue in your head so don't expect any significant response until you fix both problems. ----Snowded TALK 17:41, 25 March 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: Your comments are disconnected completely from the case at hand, quoted above. Please wake up. Brews ohare (talk) 18:44, 25 March 2014 (UTC)
Apparently you don't follow the statement that Lucretius discussed 'free will' several centuries BC indicates the debate is long-lived. You characterize this statement as WP:OR and WP:SYN; ludicrous!!! Brews ohare (talk) 19:01, 25 March 2014 (UTC)
See previous comments ----Snowded TALK 20:53, 25 March 2014 (UTC)
I assume you are writing for some imagined audience not contributing here. If it exists, I hope they follow your advice and read your responses. Brews ohare (talk) 22:03, 25 March 2014 (UTC)

Discussion of sources

This section is a continuation of preceding thread.

Since you raise Dehaene as a counterexample, can you show me where his definition of free will hinges on determinism of some sort? --Pfhorrest (talk) 09:29, 25 March 2014 (UTC)

→ Hi Pfhorrest: My memory is that I've provided some quotes already. It is clear from those quotes that Dehaene defines 'free will' as the unimpeded operation of a supervisory clearing house programming of the brain (a " global neuronal workspace") that is in every way compatible with the 'laws of physics' . He doesn't think compatibility with the laws of physics constitutes the everyday meaning of determinism, but that is another matter, because it is certainly what some consider to be determinism ("Part of understanding determinism—and especially, whether and why it is metaphysically important—is getting clear about the status of the presumed laws of nature." Hoefer). This compatibility is the point of his definition of 'free will'. He says further that our intuition of 'free will' will adapt to his definition in time as our understanding of the operation of the brain improves, because intuition is malleable in this way. If you need more, or cannot find these quotes on this talk page (15:52, 18 March) let me know. If they don't answer your questions, please elaborate. Brews ohare (talk) 09:45, 25 March 2014 (UTC)

The quotes all are from p. 264 as read in Amazon's look inside feature. Brews ohare (talk) 16:18, 25 March 2014 (UTC)

Here's a few more quotes:

"Once our intuition is educated by cognitive neuroscience and computer simulations, Chalmers's hard problem will evaporate. The hypothetical concept of qualia, pure mental experience detatched from any information-processing role, will be viewed as a peculiar idea of the prescientific era, much like vitalism" (p. 262)
"The science of consciousness already explains significant chunks of our subjective experience, and I see no obvious limits to this approach." (p. 262)
"In my opinion, a machine with free will is therefore not a contradiction in terms, just a shorthand description of who we are." (p. 265)
"Whenever a neuronal architecture exhibits autonomy and deliberation, we are right in calling it "a free mind" - and once we reverse engineer it, we will learn to mimic it in artificial machines." (p. 265)
"In brief, neither qualia nor free will seems to pose a serious philosophical problem for the concept of a conscious machine." (p. 265)

I'd guess that Dennett and Eric Kandel would have no problem with any of this. On the other hand, Chalmers, and Schrödinger, and Bohr1, and Popper, and Georg Northoff would think this argument to be naive and a very uninformed view of science and how it works. I'm unsure where Pinker fits into this; he might be with Wittgenstein or with Carnap or with Stephen Hawking in thinking it is all about what domain your language is supposed to fit with, and how meanings bleed from one domain into another.

1. See p. 76 "whether the straightforward solution of the unexpected paradoxes met with in the application of our simplest concepts to atomic phenomena might not help us to clarify conceptual difficulties in other domains of experience." - a reference to the complementarity of subject and object.

Brews ohare (talk) 16:45, 25 March 2014 (UTC)

I still don't see in any of this (or in your earlier quote) anything stating a definition in terms of determinism. He's certainly mentioning what relationship free will as he conceives it has to determinism -- mentioning that the former does not require the absence of the other. But when he defines the former, he just describes some psychological processes -- where is he stating a definition in terms of determinism?
Look for example at this quote from the passage you quoted at the start of the previous section. "This conception of free will requires no appeal to quantum physics, and can be implemented in a standard computer." That is a comment by him about how free will as he conceives it doesn't need indeterminism. When he states how he defined free will, he says "Our belief in free will expresses the idea that, under the right circumstances, we have the ability to guide our decisions by our higher order thoughts, beliefs, values, and past experiences, and to exert control over our undesired lower level impulses". Where in there does he mention determinism, or anything like it, at all? Later he says "Our brain states are clearly not uncaused and do not escape the laws of physics - nothing does. But our decisions are genuinely free whenever they are based upon conscious deliberation" That is again not a statement of definition of free will, it is an acceptance that something at least determinism-like applies to our brains, but that that's not a problem because free will isn't about being undetermined, it's about conscious deliberation.
In all of these passages Dehaene is doing exactly what I've claimed compatibilists in general do, so you'll need to point to something more specific and show how it constitutes a compatibilist defining free will in terms of determinism (rather than just commenting on how his concept of free will is not defined in terms of determinism) if you want to claim a counterexample to that. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:23, 26 March 2014 (UTC)
Pfhorrest: If you read pages 262-265 carefully you will see that Dehaene subscribes to the same reductionist view as Eric Kandle and many other (but not all) neuroscientists, and in addition he holds that the 'intuition' of free will is an artifact of a brain in a certain cultural milieu, and when the milieu changes, it will transform, evaporate in fact. As for the formal definition of free will, he feels free to define it separate from the intuition (which he feels he has disposed of), and he does so by identifying free will as the unimpeded exercise of a 'global neuronal workspace' (mentioned on pp. 13, 14, 161, 163, 164, 168, 170, 175, 179, 181...) analogous in every particular to the operation of a supervisory program over its subroutines in pursuit of various optimization criteria, the origin of which criteria in our case, according to Dehaene, I haven't pursued, but anticipate will be found in some Darwinian mechanism See this.
Now it is my impression that you don't see it that way, and that any attempt on my part to persuade you of this view is going to boil down to my quoting 'X' and you saying "Yeah, but he also says 'Y'." So it is going to boil down to finding a secondary source (hurrah for Snowded) that says "Dehaene thinks free will is such and such." So our little dispute will be resolved by saying "Author A says Dehaene said 'this' and author B says Dehaene said 'that'", and nobody gives a *** what Brews and Pfhorrest say Dehaene said.
That's how I see this playing out. I'm really not interested in arguing this way, but see section below for an attempt. If you think Dehaene is not understandable in the manner I have outlined, I'd rather go on to other sources. If you prefer, at the end, we can summarize Dehaene as possibly falling into several different camps, although I don't really think so. Brews ohare (talk) 13:57, 26 March 2014 (UTC)
Your first paragraph here sounds like an accurate gloss of Dehaene to me, but again doesn't seem to say in any way that he's defining free will in terms of determinism. I've replied about that more in your new section below.
And I don't see why we would want to say he falls into several camps. It's very clear that he is a compatibilist. We seem to agree on that. We also seem to agree more or less on the claims he adheres to, but you seem to be reading some kind of connection between those claims that seems clearly nonexistent to me, namely that by talking about determinism and free will in the same text, he he somehow defining free will in terms of determinism; and you seem to think we need to redefine "compatibilism" to accommodate that, while I'll need to see first that Dehaene (or anyone) thinks like that (whatever 'that' is, I'm still not clear) first, and then that any reputable source considers that within the bounds of compatibilism. --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:30, 27 March 2014 (UTC)
In the meantime, it is hypothetically possible to imagine the situation I have described as being Dehaene's, and this possibility doesn't fit with the prescription for compatibilism given above, but requires a more general stance. That is to say, there are clearly those that believe our decision processes will be explained as the result of certain brain circuit activities (in fact, a huge number of sources), and they also will say that 'free will' in the sense of 'mental causation' or whatever the standard intuition suggests, is not possible. That may mean they aren't compatibilists. But then they can pop up with a new definition of free will, that it is an epiphenomenon, or that it is some 'supervisory' (but law-abiding) function, or it is a new-found 'cooperative' aspect of complex feedback systems, and suddenly they are compatibilists of a different ilk. Brews ohare (talk) 14:38, 26 March 2014 (UTC)
Yes, that is what makes them compatibilists. If someone accepts all the of the first things you say there about brains and so on and that making 'mental causation' nonexistent, they are (more or less) a determinist. If they do that any also accept the definition of "free will" that requires that that kind of 'mental causation', then in denying that that exists, they become hard determinists: incompatibilist determinists. If they instead reject that definition of free will and pose another, any other, that has no problem with determinism, then they become compatibilists instead. That's how those categories are defined. --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:30, 27 March 2014 (UTC)
We also have another category in the Bohr, Shrödinger, Pinker, Wittgenstein, Northoff tradition, that 'free will' is in a different domain of description than neuroscience, and there is no need to conflate the two, and that is how the question of 'moral responsibility' is to be resolved. Are they 'compatibilists'? Brews ohare (talk) 14:46, 26 March 2014 (UTC)
And yet further, and not exactly distinct from the linguistic approach, we can view 'free will' as a cultural phenomenon, for example, as expressed in laws and religions, and not part of the 'brain' at all, but an aspect of cultural psychology, à la Ratner. "Social forms of thinking are necessary to understand the social nature of behavior/psychology." Brews ohare (talk) 15:12, 26 March 2014 (UTC)
Either 'compatibilism' is defined to accommodate various modern versions, or it is admitted that the concept is a remnant of an exhausted and archaic version of the free will debates, a not-very-interesting version of the issues involved. Brews ohare (talk) 15:01, 26 March 2014 (UTC)
All of the above fit within compatibilism as it is already defined in the article. I still don't see what the problem is. --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:30, 27 March 2014 (UTC)

Does Dehaene refer to 'determinism' with regard to free will?

Pfhorrest's view is that compatibilists can define 'free will' themselves without referring to 'determinism', although it is clear (apparently) that compatibilism is defined as 'the belief that determinism doesn't matter'.

Thus, oddly, a group who need never think about determinism are defined not by what they do think, but by a concept that they need never use.

The question has arisen as to whether some compatibilists actually do define free will using the concept of determinism. And in particular, is Dehaene such a one? The possibility of such a group of compatibilists probably is more important than whether Dehaene is one of them, but here is an attempt to classify Dehaene's work:

Pfhorrest has characterized Dehaene as follows:

″When he states how he defined free will, he says ′Our belief in free will expresses the idea that, under the right circumstances, we have the ability to guide our decisions by our higher order thoughts, beliefs, values, and past experiences, and to exert control over our undesired lower level impulses'. Where in there does he mention determinism, or anything like it, at all? Later he says 'Our brain states are clearly not uncaused and do not escape the laws of physics - nothing does. But our decisions are genuinely free whenever they are based upon conscious deliberation' That is again not a statement of definition of free will, it is an acceptance that something at least determinism-like applies to our brains, but that that's not a problem because free will isn't about being undetermined, it's about conscious deliberation.″

Let's see; where does Dehaene mention determinism? In the paragraphs preceding Pfhorrest's quote he says:

"To some people, a machine with free will is a contradiction in terms, because machines are deterministic; their behavior is determined by their internal organization and their initial state...They cannot deviate from the causal chain that is dictated by their physical organization. This determinism seems to leave no room for personal freedom."

He then quote Lucretius: "if atoms never swerve so as to originate some new movement that will snap the bonds of fate, the everlasting sequence of cause and effect - what is the source of the free will possessed by living things..."

Thus is 'determinism' defined. He proceeds to the modern day and discusses Penrose's, "fanciful view of the brain as a quantum computer" and other "baroque proposals" to escape this dilemma proposed by Lucretius.

He then says: "When we discuss 'free will', we mean a much more interesting form of freedom [than those just discussed]." He goes on to describe 'higher functions' in the quote that Pfhorrest has mentioned. He then says:

"This conception of free will [guiding our decisions by our higher-level thoughts] ...can be implemented in a standard computer. Our global neuronal workspace allows us to collect all the necessary information...and eventually use this internal reflection to guide our actions. This is what we call a willed decision."
"In thinking about free will, we therefore need to sharply distinguish two intuitions about our decisions: their fundamental indeterminacy (a dubious idea) and their autonomy (a respectable notion). Our brain states are clearly not uncaused and do not escape the laws of physics - nothing does. But our decisions are genuinely free when they are based on a conscious deliberation that proceeds autonomously, without any impediment...When this occurs, we are correctly speaking of a voluntary decision - even if it is, of course, ultimately caused by our genes, our life history, and the value functions they have inscribed in our neuronal circuits. ...What counts is the autonomous decision making."
"In my opinion, a machine with free will is therefore not a contradiction in terms, just a shorthand description of what we are. ..Even if our brain architecture were fully deterministic, as a computer might be, it would still be legitimate to say that it exercises a form of free will. Whenever a neuronal architecture exhibits autonomy and deliberation, we are right in calling it "a free mind" - and once we reverse-engineer it, we will learn to mimic it in artificial machines."
"In brief, neither qualia nor free will seems to pose a serious philosophical problem for the conscious machine. Reaching the end of our journey into consciousness and the brain, we realize how carefully we should treat our intuitions of what a complex neuronal machinery can achieve.[...]
"The neuronal code that results from this crossing of genetic rules, past experiences,...is unique to each person. Its immense number of states creates a rich world of inner experiences, linked to the environment but not imposed by it. Subjective feelings...correspond to stable neuronal attractors in this dynamic landscape. They are inherently subjective, because the dynamics of the brain [...add..] a layer of personal experience to raw sensory inputs... a conscious inner world....As you close this book to ponder your own existence, ignited assemblies of neurons literally make up your mind"

So what is Dehaene's position? Does he use 'determinism' to define his concept of 'free will'. Let's say at the outset that Dehaene's definition of determinism seems to be that of Lucretius, while Dehaene discusses a somewhat different version he calls 'obeying the laws of physics'. I regard this distinction as a mere technicality , and lump both into the term 'determinism'. I'd also say at the outset that Dehaene is not very clear.

Dehaene imagines a complicated computer that works according to the 'laws of physics', but can have 'free will' (in Dehaene's sense of exercising supervisory decisions) because it can run its own programs by itself, even though the objectives of those programs have been coded into it and it doesn't originate these goals, but must pursue them. All it can do is choose an optimal path toward their achievement, but in doing that it might develop its own algorithms for optimization. Dehaene defines 'free will' as the unimpeded supervision of the running of the programs, that is, I'd guess, there are no power failures and no outside techie hitting the escape key or loading new instructions. Dehaene says the machine can have "experiences" that are not imposed by its environment. He doesn't say these experiences count for anything, they are just "experiences", perhaps just an epiphenomenon. He also doesn't say that these "experiences" are part of free will, because that is defined in the third-person as unimpeded supervisory operation.

So, when Dehaene says 'free will' is the unimpeded exercise of supervisory decisions in a deterministic system, is the addition "in a deterministic system" an essential part of this definition? I'd say so, because he goes into this aspect at length, and because without this caveat (IMO) Dehaene has nothing to say. Pfhorrest would not, and would suggest that any elaboration about the deterministic nature of the system is there not because of its necessity, but because one has to deal with the nuisance of incompatibilists. Brews ohare (talk) 17:34, 26 March 2014 (UTC)

The key point here Brews is that he never says "'free will' is the unimpeded exercise of supervisory decisions in a deterministic system". He says free will is the unimpeded exercise of supervisory decisions. Then he says that that kind of program can be implemented in a deterministic system; that it doesn't need the kind of quantum indeterminacy that others claim is needed. The modal operators there ("can", "need") are very important. He is replying to claims that indeterminacy is needed, and saying that the conception of free will employed by the people who make those claims is wrong. He then gives his own conception of it, and points out how free will thus conceived has no problem with determinism. That is very different from him defining free will in reference to (i.e. in terms of) determinism himself. This is the usual pattern of all compatibilists. Of course he goes into the non-necessity of determinism at length: the reason he has something to say is to clear up a widespread misunderstanding, namely that of the incompatibilists he is arguing against.
Your argument is like saying that Dawkins defines evolution in terms of intelligent design because he talks about intelligent design at length in The Blind Watchmaker. The point of that book is to argue against intelligent design, so of course he's going to talk at length about it -- to say why it's an unnecessary and unjustified theory. Dehaene (and compatibilists in general) discuss determinism at length for similar reasons. --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:15, 27 March 2014 (UTC)
That is how I felt you would see this matter Pfhorrest. I think the suggestion made by Dehaene that a brain or a computer, one that is fully deterministic in the sense that dismayed Lucretius, can readily exercise free will, even though its goals and its every internal event are determined that way, does make sense if you define "free will" as Dehaene means it: namely that a central program has 'free will' when it 'decides' which subroutine is to be used. In simple terms, an "if" statement in a program like if x > x0, then use subroutine 1; else, use subroutine 2 embodies that governing statement with free will. It can 'decide' either way. Another 'higher level' program with greater 'free will' might set the threshold x0 based upon some sensor input.
Now of course, in the context of whether such a view defines 'free will' without mentioning determinism, you are completely on target in saying it does accomplish that. On the other hand, one can ask how anybody can think that this definition of 'free will' connects to the subject of free will as normally understood: Is Dehaene actually talking about free will? For example, acts partly free from causal antecedents prior to deciding to do them?1 Is 'free will' something we can handle like Humpty Dumpty, who can make his words mean whatever he likes? Or does Dehaene have to put it in the context of determinism just to be on subject? Is the definition of compatibilism actually right on if it defines compatibilism as the 'disbelief in the relevance of 'determinism' to 'free will'? If so, a compatibilist must argue the case for irrelevance, why 'free will' as construed with reference to determinism is not the interesting subject, and we should move on. Do we agree about that? Brews ohare (talk) 16:38, 27 March 2014 (UTC)
See also Entscheidungsproblem and Church–Turing thesis#History.—Machine Elf 1735 21:10, 27 March 2014 (UTC)
I'm not even sure what you think we're disagreeing about now.
I have no disagreement with Dehaene's own position (not that it would matter if I did). As I've said before my own view on free will is extremely similar to his. So I'm not sure where you're going with that first paragraph. Are you just arguing that Dehaene's view is plausible? I don't need convincing of that, and even if I did, it wouldn't matter; whether I think a view is plausible isn't important here. All that's important is whether we're accurately reporting what the view is.
You agree that Dehaene succeeds in defining "free will" without mentioning determinism, which is the only reason we were having this conversation, so I guess we're done here? You previously objected to the way the article currently says that compatibilists define free will without reference to determinism, and raised Dehaene as a counterexample. Now you agree that Dehaene does define free will without reference to determinism, so... hurray? We're good?
And just for clarity on my position: I don't think a compatibilist has to present actual arguments against the relevancy of determinism "just to be on subject". A compatibilist has to be of such an opinion that were it brought up, he would say it was irrelevant. And much of the reason compatibilists bother talking about it is to counter all the many other people who say it is relevant. But someone could, say, just be doing neurological or psychological research into whether we have the kind of mental or brain function that Dehaene says would count as free will, and only mention that that is what they mean by "free will", that's what they're looking for, and then just go on to say what they found, and never mention determinism. --Pfhorrest (talk) 02:09, 28 March 2014 (UTC)
Pfhorrest: Your last paragraph addresses my point, which is that a compatitibilist can define 'free will' anyway they wish; it is only a word, as Humpty Dumpty says. But an arbitrary definition does not engage with others discussing 'free will' unless a connection can be pointed out. Hence the interest of the compatibilist in explaining why 'determinism' is not relevant to 'free will': he wants to play with the team, not practice behind the garage. Brews ohare (talk) 02:45, 28 March 2014 (UTC)
The definitions proposed by compatibilists are not arbitrary, but rather all aim (as the incompatibilist definition does) to capture more formally our intuitive conception that our will is, in some important way or another, free, at least some of the time. If incompatibilists were no so historically significant, there would be no need for a term "compatibilism" under which to group everyone who disagrees with them, and there might instead be a bunch of cross arguments between different positions on what "free will" means. E.g. there might be an argument between Hobbes and Frankfurt (if they were contemporaries) about who is less free of will: the sane, rational man who is barred into a room and cannot leave it even if he chooses to, or the agoraphobic who could walk out the door if he chose to but is unable to bring himself to make that choice no matter how much he thinks he should. (Note that neither of them is arguing about determinism, which is the point).
It's only because of historical circumstances that compatibilists need a name to describe them collectively and need so often to engage in debates about why they are not incompatibilists (i.e. why they don't think determinism is a threat to free will). They don't need to do that to be what they are, and they don't need to do that to state their definitions of free will. They do need to do that to engage in the ongoing discourse about whether incompatibilism is correct or not, but someone might be a compatibilist and be uninterested in arguing about it, and just dismiss incompatibilists and not bother talking to them; the same way one could be an atheist, not only by arguing against the existence of God all the time, but just by ignoring theists and their claims and carrying on not worrying about God.
Anyway, I'm not sure where this leaves us with regards to the article. Are you now OK with the way the intro to the lede summary of compatibilism is phrased? --Pfhorrest (talk)
Yes, but I have made a proposal for the main article's introduction above. Although further discussion may be pointless, I'll outline my views below.
Although there is a long history behind the term compatibilism, IMO there is a very basic issue here that is still alive and needs to be addressed. It is addressed by Dehaene and most others. That issue is how the concept of 'free will' can be accommodated to the notion of 'laws of nature'. The issue is that the 'laws of nature' suggest that the way events operate in the Universe at large includes humans, so they aren't special. So the root of the matter is one of reductionism,(see Vargas) and if reductionism is overblown, as I'd say many think is the case, then there is no need to think that the 'laws of nature' apply to humans. (For example, the 'laws of nature' are a human construction made for certain purposes that explicitly exclude the subjectivity involved in their invention, but that are unfortunately a creature of that subjectivity themselves. See Kuhn.) The resistance to reductionism is the real origin of compatibilism, and the Dehaene approach of defining 'free will' in a manner compatible with reductionism is a cop out because it doesn't recognize the role of subjectivity in theory creation and adoption, thereby begging the question. Brews ohare (talk) 13:40, 28 March 2014 (UTC)
From these comments, I'm still unclear on whether you understand the difference between compatibilists and metaphysical libertarians.
Both of them say that we have free will, and that determinism does not limit our free will.
  • Libertarians say that that's because determinism is false, as in, not universally true; at the very least that it doesn't apply to us, if it applies to anything.
  • Compatibilists say instead that it's because free will isn't the kind of thing that determinism is a threat to. Determinism could be true, or not, and we could have free will either way.
To put it in the language of reductionism as you use there:
  • Libertarians are the ones who would be likely to say that we have free will because we are somehow especially exempt from the same kinds of laws that govern the rest of the universe.
  • Compatibilists instead would have no problem with us being the same kind of ordinary things as anything else in the universe, differing only in that the kind of 'machines' we are do something really cool in our brains, but something still based on the same physical rules as everything else.
"Hard determinists" (that's different from just "determinists") agree with the libertarians that we'd need some special exception from a mechanistic, strict-laws-of-nature type of universe... but argue that there is no special exception, and the universe is mechanistic like that, and so we don't have free will. They, together with libertarians, make up "incompatibilists", but not every incompatibilist is a hard determinist. In other words, compatibilists aren't just anyone who thinks we have free will. They're specifically the ones who think we could have free will even if all the scary reductionist deterministic stuff were true. Like Dehaene saying we don't need any quantum weirdness; an ordinary mechanical Turing Machine will do, with the right programming. --Pfhorrest (talk) 08:04, 29 March 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: I have no problems with your definitions. Your description of the libertarian stance, that 'determinism is not universally true' can label the above position, but suffers from the restriction to determinism, while the issue is broader (deeper) than that. Your description of compatibilism also accepts the conflict as one with determinism, determinism is OK, and free will has to give. That describes Dehaene, but his approach is different from many compatibilists in that he simply defines 'free will' to suit himself (and explicitly denies our intuition needs accommodation), while most compatibilists search for some way to accommodate our intuitive idea of 'freedom to choose' by close examination of what these words might be construed to mean and still stay within the fold of determinism. So a libertarian label comes closest, but isn't a great fit. Opposition to reductionism lies outside the traditional formulation that accepts being boxed into narrow conflict with 'determinism' on its own turf, whether that be framed in the manner of Lucretius or as an accord with 'laws of nature'. Libertarianism could be expanded to include this view if the emphasis upon 'determinism' were replaced with the deeper context of the subject-object problem. Brews ohare (talk) 15:02, 29 March 2014 (UTC)

"Conjectured" and "intuition"

Regarding today's edits, I want to weigh in that I am OK with some kind of qualifying word like "conjectured" being put where it was put, though I don't think that one is really the best word. "Supposed" or "purported" sounds much better to my ear. If Snowded or someone thinks that's weasley I'm not dead set on it, but I think something like it is OK.

I am also OK with something like the clarification of "whether that is true", though I'm not sure that "that" -> "that intuition" is quite accurate, as it's not so much the intuition that we're talking about being true, but the proposition "we have free will", which is the content of that intuition. On the whole we're saying, of the proposition that we have free will, that is is commonly intuited, but has been widely debated. "That intuition" is ok... ish... but if there's a better way to word it, that'd be preferable. --Pfhorrest (talk) 05:33, 23 March 2014 (UTC)

I really don't see the need for any qualification. The title of the article is "Free Will" so we describe what that means, We then go on to say that it is a controversial issue. Even on pseudo-science articles we don't qualify the initial description of the subject. ----Snowded TALK 06:28, 23 March 2014 (UTC)
I think the proposed change to the first sentence is both unnecessary and too weasely.—Machine Elf 1735 15:51, 23 March 2014 (UTC)
1. The sentence:
"Though it is a commonly-held intuition that we have free will,[3] it has been widely debated throughout history not only whether that intuition is true, but even how to define the concept of free will.[4]"
has a clear meaning, but Pfhorrest thinks it should mean something else entirely, namely:
"Though it is a commonly-held intuition that we have free will,[3] how to define the concept of free will has been debated throughout history.[4]"
which also is clear, but says something quite different. I'd vote for this last version.
2. Although Pfhorrest is in agreement with a qualifier, Snowded is not. The first sentence says:
"Free will is the ability of agents to make choices unconstrained by certain factors."
Snowded and MachineElf say there is no need to insert some qualifier as in:
"Free will is the xxx ability of agents to make choices unconstrained by certain factors."
where xxx could be 'supposed', 'putative', 'conjectured', 'often-assumed', 'purported', or some other adjective indicating that this 'ability' may or may not exist. In my opinion, clearly not that of Snowded or MachineElf, is that it is a belief in this "ability of agents" that is widespread, and the object of this belief, the ability itself, is conjectural, with many authors clearly expressing doubt that it is a real ability at all, and others that it is available only under restricting circumstances. The first sentence should not be interpretable as saying that this ability is something real and available.
So far, only Snowded's and MachineElf's personal preference is offered, without supporting reasoning, to explain why it is good form to have a beginning sentence that is easily misread as asserting the existence of a (most probably) mythical 'ability'. The rest of the article is properly introduced by adding an adjective that suggests discussion should take place. What is wrong with an adjective identifying the obvious uncertainty about this 'ability'?
Therefore, I agree with Pfhorrest on this one, and disagree with Snowded and MachineElf entirely: some xxx is necessary. Brews ohare (talk) 16:11, 23 March 2014 (UTC)
The article is about Free Will, so we defined it as such. We then go on to say that some people don't thing we have it/ Per my comment on pseudo-science articles above this is not a personal preference, it is the way wikipedia works. I am not at home to check my reference books but I doubt they qualify the term. ----Snowded TALK 18:15, 23 March 2014 (UTC)
There is no policy about this: so an argument is necessary to support a choice. The subject is better served with the adjective, as already explained. Brews ohare (talk) 20:21, 23 March 2014 (UTC)
I'm pretty sure its in one of these style guides but lets see if you get any support before we waste anymore time on this ----Snowded TALK 23:44, 23 March 2014 (UTC)
Pfhorrest is in support, I am in support; we have a simple argument in support. You and MachineElf have a preference based upon your personal aesthetic, and no reason for opposition. Please get around to reasons. Brews ohare (talk) 00:38, 24 March 2014 (UTC)
You have weak support from Pfhorrest and two editors opposed. Reasons have been given you just don't like them. if other editors come in support of you then it may be worth the effort to repeat and elaborate arguments already provided. ----Snowded TALK 05:43, 24 March 2014 (UTC)
"Repeat and elaborate 'arguments'?" All you have so far is your single argument based upon your undocumented report that in "pseudo-science articles we don't qualify the initial description of the subject". Now the topic of 'free will' might be seen as pseudo-science by some, but apparently not by philosophers. And if 'free will' is not pseudo-science, your example fails. And, of course, there is no WP policy suggesting an easily misinterpreted lead sentence is good practice. Your opposition to adding one or another of a half-dozen possible adjectives indicating every preferred shade of uncertainty is simply obstruction for the sake of being obstructive. Brews ohare (talk) 15:25, 24 March 2014 (UTC)
Brews (i) cool it, you are subject to WP:Civil like anyone else (ii) I said that even on pseudo-science articles we don't qualify and (iii) it is not misleading, you are simply over elaborating and over complicating (iv) STOP edit warring, you know you don't have agreement, wait until you do (v) note that (i) means that (iv) gets less and less likely ----Snowded TALK 16:44, 24 March 2014 (UTC)
Sorry about that: "Even on pseudo-science articles we don't qualify the initial description of the subject". An even wider claim even harder to document and unsupported by policy. Brews ohare (talk) 18:23, 24 March 2014 (UTC)
Brews, you haven't succeeded in making this a pseudoscience article yet.—Machine Elf 1735 18:36, 24 March 2014 (UTC)
LOL ----Snowded TALK 18:40, 24 March 2014 (UTC)
We may have to bring in new eyes on this behavior. Really poor form boys. Brews ohare (talk) 23:59, 24 March 2014 (UTC)
Please do it would be interesting ----Snowded TALK 04:26, 25 March 2014 (UTC)
I want to add that I agree with Snowded and Machine Elf's arguments about why a qualifier is not necessary. I do think that qualifiers like that should be permissible, in this and other articles, precisely because it would assuage people like Brews here on topics like this, but I'm not going to argue that it needs to be included, I just think it wouldn't hurt anything and if it ends an argument without causing any problems why not. (This is, again, a general principle of mine, not a special exception I'm making for this article).
On a different note, Brews wrote that he thinks I think the second paragraph should begin "Though it is a commonly-held intuition that we have free will,[3] how to define the concept of free will has been debated throughout history.[4]" That's not what I'm saying (and I've reverted the recent change to say that). I think that sentence is saying three thing:
  • Of the proposition that we have free will:
    • It is commonly intuited, and
    • It has been debated throughout history.
  • Also, what "free will" even means has been debated throughout history too.
If we let "F(we)" mean "we have free will", the sentence as it stands now means "Though it is a commonly-held intuition that F(we), not only [the question of whether F(we) is true], but even [how to define the function F()] has been debated throughout history." I still can't believe I need to parse a simple English sentence out piece by piece like this. --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:33, 25 March 2014 (UTC)
Thanks for your clarification, that you do not find reference to a seemingly extant 'ability of agents' suggests that there is in fact such an ability. I'll accept that this is the majority opinion, though it is, in my view, a prejudicial beginning sentence favoring one position.
As for the second point, I believe my wording:
"Though it is a commonly-held intuition that we have free will,[3] how to define the concept of free will has been debated throughout history.[4]"
says the same thing without the mare's nest of introducing what 'true' means. (Is it verifiable? Actually, definitively not, at least for parties in the secular domain.) After all, if the definition is unresolvable, how can one get on with the truth of it all, eh? Because we both find the other's formulation unclear, I guess we're both mistaken, eh? Brews ohare (talk) 16:23, 25 March 2014 (UTC)
As I've clarified several times already, nothing I've written anywhere is talking at all about a definition being true. It's talking about the proposition "we have free will" being true (or not), just like one clause earlier it's talking about that proposition being commonly intuited. And then we're also talking about what "free will" means. If we wanted to sound like third graders who don't know how to write compound sentences, we could write:
  • "It is commonly intuited that we have free will. It has been debated throughout history whether we have free will. It has been debated throughout history what 'free will' means."
But because we're grownups writing for grownups and this isn't Simple English Wikipedia, we can connect those together into clauses of one sentence:
  • "It is commonly intuited that we have free will, but it{i.e. something about to be named} has been debated throughout history not only {i.e. in addition to something else to be named right after that} whether that is true [that we have free will]{this is the 'it'}, but{here comes the something else} [it has] even [been debated throughout history] what 'free will' means."
I think the problem is that you can't parse compound sentences or paragraphs very well, and halfway through a complicated bit of writing you lose track of what was going on. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:43, 26 March 2014 (UTC)
Pfhorrest: It should be evident that however wonderful you think your sentence is, it isn't wonderful. Simple changes in wording would make a transparent statement with your meaning, and there is no reason other than an inordinate fondness for your own words to resist rewriting it. As for saying you are not saying a 'definition' is 'true', but are saying instead that a 'proposition' is 'true', that is not the case. A proposition is 'true' when it is shown to state a tautology, as in "the sum of the angles in a triangle is 180°", which follows from the definitions of 'triangle' and 'degree' and the posited axioms of geometry. As you know, this is not an empirical statement. The statement "we have free will" is not of the 'true' or 'false' kind. It is in fact neither a logical nor an empirical statement, but complete nonsense. The words 'we have' suggest an empirical claim, which cannot be 'true' or 'false' in the sense of tautology, and 'free will' cannot be defined in a way that makes the statement "We have free will" empirically testable. Brews ohare (talk) 14:17, 26 March 2014 (UTC)
My resistance is that your suggested changes change the meaning, they don't clarify it. Most recently, you removed the part about it being debated whether or not we have free will. That debate is even older than the definitional debate. It is the more important part of the sentence, and you removed it completely.
Everything else in this paragraph... I don't know where to begin. A proposition is not only a mathematical or logical statement. "The sun will rise at 6AM tomorrow" is a proposition, and an empirically testable one. (I have no idea if it's true or not, and it's very context-dependent for meaning anyway). So is "2+2=7" (a logical proposition, and a false one). You apparently don't understand what that word "proposition" means.
And your claim The statement "we have free will" is not of the 'true' or 'false' kind. It is in fact neither a logical nor an empirical statement, but complete nonsense is, to put it politely, a highly biased point of view, that is absolutely inappropriate for the article's own voice. (Though find someone notable who has such a view and it can be included, attributed to them, in the appropriate section, of course. In fact I think there already a few in there). --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:40, 27 March 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: You are a bit excited. I agree that the statement "The sun will rise at 6AM tomorrow" is empirically testable. I agree that "2+2=7" is a proposition of the true/false sort, true if it is tautologically true. I have no idea why you propose I am confused about this. The statement "we have free will" is not testable until we have an agreed meaning for 'free will' that can be connected to an experiment. That might be possible for Dehaene's meaning of 'free will' in that programs can be verified to exist that have control (of some kind, say an autopilot) over other programs. But I'd say that for the most part, free will definitions do not have real world attachments that can be tested. You can't prove they apply and you can't prove they don't. Most arguments about 'free will' are either disputes over logical connections between terms (e.g. whether some definition of 'free will' is logically consistent with some hypothetical view of 'natural law'), or disputes about what best fits our intuitions about free will, which 'fit' certainly is not about evidence that holds up in a lab. I don't think that is a highly biased view. And the statement "we have free will" is definitely not a statement that can be assessed as tautologically true or false. The words "we have" in my mind suggest a real-world validity, not anything assessable from a logical standpoint. I see you are angry with me, but do we really disagree about any of this? Brews ohare (talk) 16:15, 27 March 2014 (UTC)

My exasperation at your last response was the claim that "we have free will" is not a proposition just because it's not a logical, mathematical kind of proposition that can be shown a priori as either tautological or inconsistent. There are all kinds of propositions, some of them that kind, many of them (like most empirically testable ones) not. It doesn't matter for this point what kind "we have free will" is; it's still a proposition. A claim. An assertion. Or more precisely it's what is claimed or asserted, and likewise what we say is intuited in the first part of the sentence in question. You seem to be reading way more into the word "proposition" than is ever meant.
All of the rest of this is a meaningless digression. People do argue about whether we have free will or not. I can't believe that's even in question. Yes, a lot of those arguments include arguments about whether it is logically consistent with some other proposition (like the one we refer to as "determinism"), but then they proceed to take stances on whether that in turn is true or not, and consequently whether we have free will or not. Yes, there are other arguments about what the term "free will" means, which factor in to the arguments about logical consistency with other propositions, to show those other arguments to be valid or invalid, and even if they show those other arguments to be invalid, many of the positions about what "free will" mean still leave open a question about whether we have the thing meant by that term. All of the arguments center primarily about whether "we have free will" is true or not; the arguments about what "free will" means are ancillary to those. You cannot honestly claim that there have been no arguments about whether we have free will. But your latest change removed that claim, and left only the claim that we commonly intuit that we have it, and the claim that there have been arguments about what it means, leaving out the claim that there've been arguments about whether we have it. That's not OK. That is important. That's what a huge chunk of the article is about. It can't be omitted. I assumed that was a mistake on your part, not realizing what you had unintentionally done, but now it sounds like you meant it and I'm rather incredulous about that. --Pfhorrest (talk) 01:48, 28 March 2014 (UTC)
Well, perhaps we are farther apart than I thought, which is probably why we should stick to reporting published works and not trying to agree between us. You remark that "All of the arguments center primarily about whether 'we have free will' is true or not" strikes me as peculiar in the light of your subsequent remark that "the arguments about what 'free will' means are ancillary to those". Given that it is hard to debate whether we live on a planet until we have agreed on what a planet is, that sounds confusing. It sounds like we are regressing to argument about the content of the intuited free will, which is like debating one's taste in olives: Chacun à son goût; a very different matter than establishing facts or logical consistency. Probably the difficulty here is that we don't know how to phrase the situation so we both understand it. So it is better to stick to what Vargas says, or Dehaene says, or what Pinker says and not get involved in pontification. Provided we stick close to the authors' words, we should be able to agree that Vargas says this, James says that, and so forth. Brews ohare (talk) 02:29, 28 March 2014 (UTC)
I suppose there are two ways one could frame which debate is "ancillary" and which is "central", by logical priority or chronological priority. You're right that defining terms is logically prior to answering questions phrased in those terms. But chronologically, the debate about free will begins with people arguing over whether we have it or not, a question phrased initially in ambiguous terms, but as the terms get defined more precisely in the process of conducting that argument, a subsequent argument breaks out about how best to define those terms. That has to be answered before we can answer the question phrased in those terms, but we were having the argument about that question before the question of definition arose, and we care about getting the definition straight so that we can move on to answering the more substantial question. ("We" here meaning the interlocutors of the global, historical discourse, not you and I in particular).
Anyway the point is that there is an argument over facts, not only over definitions, and we need to mention that, no matter which is "ancillary" to the other. (And yes, there are some who say "there is no fact of this matter, either way", but that doesn't negate that there is still an argument over facts taking place, it's just seen as a misguided one by those people).
And of course we stick to saying what the different sources say, when we're discussing at length all the details of the different positions. But we can't help but summarize in the lede, so we need to agree on an accurate summary. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:35, 28 March 2014 (UTC)
The main question of fact is whether the first sentence of the introduction identifying an ability refers to an extant entity or an imagined one. On that basis, and with Dehaene's machines with 'free will' in mind, I'd suggest a follow-on like:
"Free will is the ability of agents to make choices unconstrained by certain factors. Controversy prevails over whether this 'ability' actually exists or is a mistaken intuition, and whether this 'ability' is found only among humans, or is also an 'ability' of other life forms and even machines. If free will is in fact a real ability, there is also question about the circumstances under which it functions, in particular, whether it is limited by certain factors."
From there we go on to the second sentence of the leading paragraph. Brews ohare (talk) 13:22, 28 March 2014 (UTC)
I'm ok with most of your additions here as far as accuracy goes, but the last sentence confuses what the current second sentence is on about, and from that same confusion, the placement of these new additions where you've put them breaks up a train of thought that would be one sentence if it weren't so long.
The stuff about constraints is about the different kinds of definitions proposed. It's a short overview of different kinds of positions on what "free will" means. It's not about the question "Assuming free will exists, do any of these things limit it?" It's about the question "When we say 'free' will, what do we mean 'free' from?" As you just said a few responses above, that definitional question logically precedes the question of fact, so it cannot presume an answer to it, because it (the question of fact) cannot even be asked properly without an answer to it (the definitional question).
With that objection stated, the rest of that seems OK for inclusion somewhere in the article, after the first two sentences. (Think of them as one sentence. They used to be, until addition after addition made it too long, and it got broken up for readability). It seems fit to be merged with the current first sentence of the second paragraph what we've been discussing here, which is largely about the same thing. I'm not sure that the digression about whether only humans have it is due weight at that point in the lede though, as we haven't by that point limited the discussion to humans only, so we're not ruling that position out, but by far the bulk of the literature is about the free will of humans, so I think explicitly bringing up nonhumans in the lede would be undue weight.
So we're basically back to arguing about whether the current first sentence of the second paragraph is OK or not, I guess. --Pfhorrest (talk) 07:45, 29 March 2014 (UTC)
I agree with your distinction between "the question 'Assuming free will exists, do any of these things limit it?' " and the question "When we say 'free' will, what do we mean 'free' from?". The first is framed as an empirical issue, and could involve (as an example) whether drugs inhibit one's capacity to exercise the ability of 'free will' supposing that to be a real ability. It is answered on the empirical basis (for instance) that subjects who profess a decision to break addiction cannot do it. The second is an academic issue about what words mean, and has nothing to do with whether the subject has any factual content.
Which aspect, the empirical questions or the linguistic questions, are of more interest? Or, should both be accommodated in the lede?
At the moment, the lede suggests several kinds of constraints, of which religious, ethical, legal, scientific, compulsions, phobias and so on all seem to be empirically verifiable constraints upon one's abilities to exercise decisions. The 'metaphysical constraints' I'd suggest, have no empirical content.
Right now the preponderance of the lede leans to the empirical, not the metaphysical. Possibly the metaphysical issue raised is not the linguistic issues found in the article, but the question of whether a subjective report of a professed desire to do something and the subsequent observation of the attempt to execute that decision in a prescribed environment is a suitable formulation of what we mean by 'free will' and constraints upon it. Brews ohare (talk) 15:57, 29 March 2014 (UTC)
That lab formulation seems to work for some cases, like the execution of a professed desire to walk across the room is observed to be constrained by being tied to a chair. Tax laws constrain which investments are made following a decision to invest. Religion constrains which church one attends. Maybe it works for addiction as well, where brain scans show dopamine production affects ability to exercise professed decisions. Maybe there are hypothetical cases where this approach can't work that philosophers can argue about for millennia? For example, Libet's experiments have been interpreted as showing the professed desire to lift a finger is initiated following some of the steps in the brain's activity causing the finger to lift. That might be a metaphysical issue, or it might be an issue of experimental design. Brews ohare (talk) 16:22, 29 March 2014 (UTC)
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