Talk:Consciousness/Archive 5

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Let's talk, please

There has been quite a bit of editing on this article recently, and it seems to have turned into a back-and-forth that is verging on edit-warring. Most of the changes seem reasonable to me, although I wouldn't necessarily make them myself. Can we please discuss issues rather than simply reverting back and forth? Edit summaries are not a substitute for proper discussion. (For what it's worth, well over half of the current text is my work, but I don't want to behave as though I "own" the article.) Looie496 (talk) 13:31, 15 June 2014 (UTC)

Looie496, first, many thanks for all your work! Perhaps the one substantive change I'd consider making is splitting off Nagel's paper "What is it like to be a bat?" to its own section. Despite its suggestive title, Nagel isn't discussing just nonhuman animals and the methodological difficulties that the study of their consciousness poses. Rather, the paper is part of Nagel's attack on scientism and (as he puts it most recently) "Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False". --Davidcpearce (talk) 15:54, 15 June 2014 (UTC)

Hi David. I was aware that Nagel's aims were broader, but I was thinking about this from a different direction. If the goal is to write a section about the question of consciousness in animals, is there a better way to frame it? After all, even if Nagel's aims were broader, he did very specifically treat the problem of animal consciousness in that article. Regards, Looie496 (talk) 12:12, 16 June 2014 (UTC)

By the way, no serious treatment of the topic of animal consiousness can ignore the thesis expouned in John McDowell's magnum opus Mind and World (Lecture VI). John McDowell's views are among the most widely discussed in Analytic philosophy. --Omnipaedista (talk) 16:49, 16 June 2014 (UTC)

Sounds good. Can you add a summary? --Epipelagic (talk) 20:54, 16 June 2014 (UTC)

I also note that Cassandra3001 never gave an explanation for their actions [1][2]. Users who force their controversial edits without negotiating are commonly called POV pushers. --Omnipaedista (talk) 16:56, 16 June 2014 (UTC)

@Looie496: Since you appear to have endorsed Cassandra's edits, I'll give some background reasons for my reversion. Cassandra's main activity appears to be replacing references to "animals" with "nonhuman animals". She has been trying to edit war these changes into place on articles such as Emotion in animals, Pain in animals and Animal consciousness. Her talk page history shows her record of declining to discuss her edits. She usually deletes attempts to engage her. The issue has been discussed in some detail here. There are hundreds of articles on Wikipedia which are about nonhuman animals. Cassandra seems to want to override the generally accepted convention that "nonhuman animals" are referred to as "animals" when the context is clear. Davidcpearce has been supporting Cassandra in this endeavour. Because of the number of articles involved, this is not a matter that should be decided by individual editors on specific articles. It is a matter better decided at a more general level, perhaps by WikiProject Animals.

Another difficulty with Cassandra's edits is that she takes succinct statements and, citing no sources, turns them into something gratuitously prolix. Finally, there is her addition, "drug discrimination studies are used in biomedical research to determine if animals distinguish between novel psychoactive substances and known drugs of abuse", again uncited, and quite unclear as to what it might mean in the context of consciousness. --Epipelagic (talk) 20:51, 16 June 2014 (UTC)

I didn't actually mean to endorse anybody's edits. Looie496 (talk) 21:23, 16 June 2014 (UTC)

Well you made your intervention after Davidcpearce reinstated Cassandra's edits which, to me, suggested tacit approval. --Epipelagic (talk) 22:34, 16 June 2014 (UTC)

Epilegagic, please assume good faith. I delete ad hominem attacks, but I'm happy discuss any substantive points here. Drug discrimination studies are a staple of biomedical research. See any standard text, e.g.http://eu.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-0470433523.html

And yes, I believe scientific accuracy should be preferred - even at the price of "prolixity". — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cassandra3001 (talk • contribs) 06:29, 17 June 2014 (UTC)

A unilateral global search-and-replace ('animals' -> 'nonhuman animals') is against fundamental Wikipedia policies: enforcing a marginal terminology and making blind substitutions of words violates MOS:QUOTE, WP:INTEGRITY and, above all, WP:RS/AC. Presenting the issue as some kind of Wikipedia community bias or stylistic preference is deeply misleading.

Regarding Cassandra3001 actions, her latest response to attempts by other editors to engage her in discussion was "Please get this junk off my page ..." and "misc junk deleted". --Omnipaedista (talk) 12:38, 17 June 2014 (UTC)

, Omnipaedista, by omitting the remaining words of my sentence, i.e. "...and at least consider discussing the substantive issues on Talk instead." you have inverted my meaning. --Cassandra3001 (talk) 14:11, 17 June 2014 (UTC)

Cassandra appears to have deleted the messages on her talk page in an attempt to hide them. This is because an editor who recently reverted her pointed out to her in his edit summary that "User:Cassandra Talk page is currently on notice for edit warring WP:EW and for violating WP:BRD by 2 other editors. You are required to make consensus by BRD on Talk prior to further edits."

By the way, where is the "junk" you refer to Cassandra? --Epipelagic (talk) 15:33, 17 June 2014 (UTC)

Epipelagic, if an editor had deliberately omitted half the worlds of your sentence so as to reverse its meaning, I think you might feel aggrieved too. Regardless, can we now focus on the substantive issues for the article. What do you believe is the original research? If you don't see why drug discrimination studies are relevant to consciousness in nonhuman animals (and consciousness in humans lacking verbal competence), I'm happy to explain. But the research certainly isn't original to me. --Cassandra3001 (talk) 16:21, 17 June 2014 (UTC)

Cassandra3001, I have added an ellipsis, provided a link to the whole sentence, and provided an edit summary of yours in which you repeat the "junk" accusation. Before any constructive discussion can take place, it would be advisable to elaborate on what you mean by "junk" . --Omnipaedista (talk) 16:27, 17 June 2014 (UTC)

That's not at all likely to lead to a constructive discussion. Let's just treat it as a poor choice of wording and move on. Looie496 (talk) 12:36, 19 June 2014 (UTC)

Back to improving the article...does anyone else worry that citing drug discrimination studies involves original research? I hope the link I provided sets Epipelagic's mind at rest, but I can provide others if neded. --Cassandra3001 (talk) 18:51, 18 June 2014 (UTC)

I'd also add a mention of the mirror self-recognition test - which undermines all but radical scepticism about the existence of self-consciousness - let alone simple consciousness - in some nonhuman animals. Also, Wikipedia's own hot-linked entry "What Is It like to be a bat" gives a lucid account of what Nagel is arguing. But I haven't got the energy for an edit war if anyone wants the existing paragraph text to stand. :-) --Davidcpearce (talk) 11:56, 19 June 2014 (UTC)

It's just not that simple David. There are robots that can recognise themselves in mirrors. I think you should discriminate between real world scepticism and logical scepticism. In this area I am a logical skeptic but not a real world skeptic. In the real world I take it for granted that children and animals are conscious. At a personal level I do not doubt that the many children and animals I have had close relationships with are conscious. And I do not doubt that I, personally, am sometimes conscious. But I am highly skeptical about flawed and sloppy arguments being presented as "proof" that animals (including humans and including myself) are conscious. Perhaps the issue is not resolvable by logic or science. Perhaps as some analytical philosophers suggest, the issue is that there isn't really an issue at all, but we're just caught up in language games. Anyway I'm out of here as well. Cassandra and Looie can decide together what they want for the article. --Epipelagic (talk) 19:04, 19 June 2014 (UTC)

Epipelagic, I agree with you: it's not possible to prove that anyone else is sentient. That was what I meant by "...undermines all but radical scepticism". But sometimes specific skeptical worries are raised about subjects who don't use language. Passing the mirror test is widely regarded in the scientific community as evidence of self-consciousness. Unfortunately, some authors use "conscious" when they mean self-conscious - which muddies the issue further. --Davidcpearce (talk) 20:15, 19 June 2014 (UTC)

The mirror test is meant to be a test of self-awareness, not self-consciousness. I doubt many animals are self-conscious, though the common usage of all these related terms is muddy. --Epipelagic (talk) 20:28, 19 June 2014 (UTC)

Insofar as we distinguish self-consciousness from self-awareness, I agree. --Davidcpearce (talk) 20:53, 19 June 2014 (UTC)

I am not sure if it is helpful to argue on and on from "first principles"; we should look at what reliable sources say about these matters. One can find plenty of them in the article about mirror test. Regarding the whole "human animal" debate, please see Tryptofish's comment in Talk:Pain in animals#Edit war regarding Wikipedia:RGW#Righting Great Wrongs. --Omnipaedista (talk) 07:41, 27 June 2014 (UTC)

Omnipaedista, if an article says "he" when "he or she" is intended, then the reader can often infer the writer's intention. Yet it's still good editorial practice to use an accurate, gender-inclusive term over the traditional (ab)usage. This does not mean that we are each obliged to comb Wikipedia for sexist language. Likewise, correcting "animals" to "nonhuman animals" may strike some folk as pedantic. But a useful rule-of-thumb for encyclopedia editors is "If in doubt, prefer accuracy." --Davidcpearce (talk) 10:17, 27 June 2014 (UTC)

Drawing analogies between sexism and speciesism is historically inaccurate, highly misleading and misses the point. --Omnipaedista (talk) 19:24, 29 June 2014 (UTC)

Omnipaedista, you said above that John McDowell's views on animal consciousness were among "the most widely discussed in Analytic philosophy", and that "no serious treatment of the topic of animal consciousness can ignore [this]". Would you mind summarizing this influence, or at least pointing to key sources supporting your statement. --Epipelagic (talk) 15:16, 27 June 2014 (UTC)

See, e.g., John McDowell: Experience, Norm, and Nature by Jakob Lindgaard (2009), p. xviii. --Omnipaedista (talk) 19:24, 29 June 2014 (UTC)

Misleading addition

I reverted this edit by Davidcpearce (talk · contribs). The fifth scenario he added, involving the "first animals with nervous systems in the late pre-Cambrian", is not mentioned at all in the cited article. Indeed, the word "Cambrian" appears nowhere in the article. I am noting the matter here, because when I noted it on his talk page he removed the entry with the edit summary troll deleted. --Epipelagic (talk) 20:54, 20 August 2014 (UTC)

Anognosia

I believe that the section on anognosia incorrectly refers to the right side of the affected person's body, since it is the right hemisphere manages the entero- and exteroception of the left side. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.39.5.60 (talk) 19:35, 1 October 2014 (UTC)

Additional final paragraph under Biological function and evolution - refers to a new theory of the nature and function of consciousness

Brian Earl (Brian Earl (2014). "The biological function of consciousness". Frontiers in Psychology. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00697.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: unflagged free DOI (link)) proposed that consciousness—one’s ongoing experience—functions as the data input to the neural mechanism(s) that generate nonautomatic, “intentional”, relatively flexible responses (the ‘‘flexible response mechanism’’, FRM). He supported this proposal with evidence that: (1) The properties of consciousness are such that it can only contribute to biological fitness as input to processes that determine behavior. (2) Various properties of consciousness correspond to the expected data input requirements of the FRM. And, (3) other properties of consciousness are explicable in terms of consciousness being input data to the FRM. However, the question remains why the input to the FRM is conscious. Consciousness is a very complex biological property with many interrelated components, and together with other evidence, this tells us that consciousness is almost certainly adaptive. Therefore, even though we do not know how consciousness could have functions which cannot be performed by nonconscious neural structures, it is good science provisionally to assume that consciousness is adaptive, and try to determine why its biological function might require that it be conscious. In the past that approach has been a successful strategy in biology[108]. Consciousness carries information, and information always has to be in an appropriate form to be usable, so it may be that the FRM input is conscious because qualia are a functional form for these data.

BrianEarlcs (talk) 08:07, 7 January 2015 (UTC)

Interesting paper, but in my view it has not yet received enough attention to require coverage in this article. When it hits the 100 citation mark, it will be time to reconsider. Looie496 (talk) 17:38, 7 January 2015 (UTC)

Picture of Monk is Misleading

The picture of a monk and it's description appears to suggest that meditation is a "state of conciousness" however, according to this article, this is disputed. Here I quote: "It has been disputed, however, whether there is enough evidence to count these as physiologically distinct states of consciousness". In my own opinion, I think meditation itself is more religion than science, and best be kept out of the scientific section of this article. Smk65536 (talk) 00:39, 10 January 2015 (UTC)

Meditation is a practice which can result in various states of consciousness. It may or may not be practised in connection with some religion. But meditation is a practice (like distance running) and is not itself a religion (which is a belief structure). What is disputed in the source cited in the article is merely whether meditative states of consciousness are physiologically different from the states of consciousness that can occur when people relax. The source does not imply that states of conciousness do not occur during meditation (or relaxation for that matter). There is, in fact, a large scholarly literature which discusses states of conciousness in connection with meditation. You could have simply checked this yourself. --Epipelagic (talk) 02:28, 10 January 2015 (UTC)

Is this quote appropriate?

An IP editor added to the lead this line: Dr. Ver Hoef of University of Alabama at Birmingham has described consciousness as "living on the razor's edge between coma and seizure.", without giving a source or edit summary. I reverted, with an edit summary saying "not a useful quote, particularly at this point in the article". The line was then reinserted, again without edit summary. I am convinced the quote does not belong, as (a) the author is not especially notable, and (b) the quote doesn't bear on the content of the paragraph it was added to. My policy is not to carry on one-on-one edit wars, so I am raising the issue here in the hope that somebody else will step in. Looie496 (talk) 15:31, 12 August 2015 (UTC)

AI and conciousness

In the article it says that AI is working with consciousness but I have to disagree on that point. So far I know AI is trying to reproduce the human way to think. But is that really the same as creating a consciousness and even if it was how would you know if you had succeed?/81.170.158.36 (talk) 20:29, 26 October 2015 (UTC)

Why not mention that consciousness may be stored in microtubules?

Orch-OR. Socialistguy (talk) 17:25, 25 February 2016 (UTC)

That's mentioned in the Mind-body problem section -- briefly, but I'm not sure anything more extensive is justified. Feel free to make suggestions, though. Looie496 (talk) 21:30, 25 February 2016 (UTC)

Why not mention that consciousness may be stored in microtubules?

Orch-OR. Socialistguy (talk) 17:25, 25 February 2016 (UTC)

That's mentioned in the Mind-body problem section -- briefly, but I'm not sure anything more extensive is justified. Feel free to make suggestions, though. Looie496 (talk) 21:30, 25 February 2016 (UTC)

Reflection

Everything is space is united because space can't have holes, so how can things move if everything is united, is just consciousness what connect with the totality of smaller parts that form space so is life, our loved god who move things in the universe, and nothing can move and leave the nothing where it was, so only can be consciousness that have a injectivity with every part of space what move things. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 190.36.232.4 (talk) 22:31, 11 June 2016 (UTC)

Consciousness vs. awareness

The definition of consciousness is inaccurate and should be improved by taking into account the cited work of Giulio Tononi. My suggestion is to add the text "Consciousness is the readiness for receiving information." and cite the quoted text. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2804:14C:8780:A082:8D38:5779:CC:6168 (talk) 03:06, 1 July 2016 (UTC)

But the source you refer to doesn't support that. It does say: "According to the theory, consciousness corresponds to the capacity of a system to integrate information". That is not the same as "Consciousness is the readiness for receiving information". When my computer is connected to the internet it is in a constant state of "readiness for receiving information". But that doesn't make it "conscious". You have inserted your own original research, and cited it with a source that doesn't support your position at all. --Epipelagic (talk) 03:23, 1 July 2016 (UTC)

When you say 'But that doesn't make it "conscious"', that is an idea of consciousness in conflict with Tononi's theory, which actually implies that "even a simple system such a single photo diode will be conscious to some degree if it not contained within a larger complex" (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/#InfAcc). — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2804:14C:8780:A082:8D38:5779:CC:6168 (talk) 04:16, 1 July 2016 (UTC)

And readiness for receiving information is the *minimal* capacity of a system to integrate information. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2804:14C:8780:A082:8D38:5779:CC:6168 (talk) 04:35, 1 July 2016 (UTC)

This seems more about artificial consciousness than the wider issues of biological consciousness and the hard problem of consciousness. Tononi reduces the issue until consciousness is purely to do with the integration of information and can be described mathematically as an information-theoretic property of systems. He seems to endorse the idea that consciousness is not confined to biological organisms, but functions in artefacts to the point where even a single photo diode can operate consciously. That is hardly a mainstream position, though perhaps some autistics might find it natural. It would be lacking balance to add his definition so prominently at the beginning of the general article on consciousness, as you have done, implying that his view is currently the dominant global view. However, his views seem to get some traction, particularly in the area of artificial intelligence, and you could perhaps add something appropriate about them in the section on artifact consciousness. Please sign at the end of your posts by typing 4 tildes, ~~~~. Thanks. --Epipelagic (talk) 07:20, 1 July 2016 (UTC)

Misrepresenting Tononi's idea, published in a neuroscience journal, as *artificial*, *unbalanced* and *autistic* is in disagreement with Wikipedia's rules of neutrality and fairness. The definition in the article is inaccurate (and obsolete, actually), and that the issue. 2804:14C:8780:A082:5C8E:6766:D669:2B30 (talk) 13:59, 1 July 2016 (UTC)

If you disagree then please try and respond to specific points with some measure and reason, and leave the party political style to more appropriate platforms. It is your own determined and continuing misrepresentation of what I say, such as you did here, that is the larger problem. --Epipelagic (talk) 19:08, 1 July 2016 (UTC) --Epipelagic (talk) 19:08, 1 July 2016 (UTC)

Philosophy vs. Science

The intro to this article, and perhaps the article as a whole, seems to emphasize philosophy of mind over the hard sciences. For example, the second paragraph calls out various issues of concern in the study of consciousness as questions, but some of those questions have largely been answered by the sciences. I'm not too familiar with philosophy of mind, but in other areas of philosophy I've noticed that it seems to take a long time for philosophers to integrate scientific discovery into the development of their investigations. I don't have the domain expertise to tackle it myself, but perhaps the article could be better served by approaching the subject from the perspective of the hard sciences, with the philosophical aspects covering the history of the study of consciousness along with the areas that have not yet been answered by science. Just my two cents, for what it's worth. Sparkie82 (t•c) 19:42, 14 August 2016 (UTC)

Hard sciences involve information gathered through the five senses followed by thinking. For example, subject areas such as physics and chemistry involve visual observations followed by thinking (often involving complicated analyses) – all this happens within the observers’ consciousness. In other words, the study of consciousness goes beyond the ‘hard sciences,’ and therefore, ‘philosophy of mind’ is very important for this page.

  Nandinik (talk) 16:10, 15 August 2016 (UTC)

---

Stuart Sutherland part...

...Is completely worthless obscurantism that says nothing and I'd prefer it removed. It adds 0 to the understanding of the term. There's enough vagueness and confusion in philosophy without adding to it.Vree (talk) 22:17, 18 August 2016 (UTC)

Philosophy is mostly crap

Lots of words are thrown around a very simple idea without ever quite pinning it down. Consciousness is the mind's ability to reason about itself. Certainly someone else must have realized that by now? I would have thought the dictionary definition gave it away.

This mechanistic description clearly allows for non-human consciousness, as long as whatever type of entity we're considering is able to rationalize itself. The mirror test is a great way to determine that an animal at least knows about its own body, implying a sense of self. If animals can "hold beliefs about things they cannot directly perceive" then they have the ability to reason abstractly. All that's needed is to bring the two together.

I would imagine this is possible at various levels, introspection being one of them. I've never heard of a whale wanting to redefine himself, for instance. Except in cartoons. But I have heard of orcas saving people, and of tangled humpbacks seeking assistance from divers. When we eventually develop a test for consciousness, I'm fairly optimistic these animals will pass.

I know other people are conscious because it's evident that they reason about themselves when we talk, especially the more self-centered jerks who mostly talk about themselves. You know I'm conscious when I tell you that list includes me. We can't talk to elephants or dolphins yet, but they obviously communicate with each other. So I don't really see consciousness or language as being so high on the list of superior human traits in contrast to, say, empathy, not to mention all the typically cited skills like toolmaking and the ability to record knowledge.

Consciousness is a probable evolutionary advantage because it allows for communication between individuals to concern itself with a subject very pertinent to their survival, namely themselves. There's likely a rationale regarding individual decisions as well. In terms of computational theory, reasoning about one's self elevates the level of complexity. It's cases along these lines which make the halting problem impossible to solve, and these kinds of statements which drive Godel's incompleteness theorem.

In order to reason about itself, a conscious entity must first realize what its own self is. It must have agency to act and sentience to observe the results of its actions, plus the awareness to link these two together. You could input into a computer its own technical specifications, but how would a program running those calculations understand what it was reasoning about?

There's your blueprint for a zombie. Take something that has a developed consciousness and strip away the ability to further reason about itself, leaving all the other machinery intact. The result would appear to be conscious, given that it mimics systems known to be conscious by making decisions that affect its own state. However, without the ability to alter its decisions via observations of its own actions, in a new environment for instance, it would not truly be reasoning about itself. DAVilla (talk) 00:39, 19 September 2016 (UTC)

Well there you go. Philosophy departments around the world need notifying about your arrival here on earth, and may need a period mourning before they can adjust to being so thoroughly cast aside. Exciting as this may be, this is perhaps not the best place for these revelations. Wikipedia is not a forum. Personal opinions not supported by reliable sources are regarded as original research and tend to be ignored. --Epipelagic (talk) 06:05, 19 September 2016 (UTC)

Yeah, I knew I couldn't put even the one line definition on the page without sources. I'm just surprised that there's nothing as definitive already there. I came here after replying several times to clueless posts on Facebook linking to the most ridiculous articles on this topic, wondering what was in the literature to back me up. This can't really be that original, can it? I mean, nearly half of what I wrote just seems so obvious, and the rest is speculation around some of the questions raised on the page, really just to expand on the thought so as to make it clearer.

I called philosophy mostly crap, but in truth my only introduction to the subject was a proof I'm sure you've heard of, which assumes that before every instance in time there is a previous instance, and goes on to conclude that there must be a God, followed by another proof making exactly the same assumption and concluding that there is no God. I don't know about you, but when I see A implies B and A implies not B, I think not A. From what I could tell, the arguments that continued didn't deviate much but still centered around B. So I stopped reading. DAVilla (talk) 10:11, 19 September 2016 (UTC)

What you are describing is religion, not philosophy. If you want to further study reductionist philosophy (where you could consider emergent properties of complex systems, without a strong need for a primal cause) you might want to consider reading Dennet's Consciousness Explained. Arnoutf (talk) 13:49, 19 September 2016 (UTC)

The introduction and the whole tenor of the page

64.134.147.82 (talk) 22:25, 20 October 2016 (UTC)In an attempt to broaden the discussion beyond the narrow 'philosophy of mind' adherents, I added the following from a recent excellent chapter:

Paul James and Manfred B. Steger identify four kinds of consciousness: 1. sensory experience, "the phenomenal sense that something exists in relation to, or has an impact on, a person. The concept of ‘affect’ attests to this kind of consciousness, as does ‘sense data'’"; 2. practical consciousness, or "knowing how to do things, knowing how to ‘go on’. As writers as different as Wittgenstein and Marx have elaborated, it is basic to human engagement"; 3. reflective consciousness, "the modality in which people reflect upon the first two forms. It is the stuff of ordinary philosophy and day-to-day thinking about what has been done and what is to be done; and 4. reflexive consciousness, or "reflecting on the basis of reflection, and interrogating the nature of knowing in the context of the constitutive conditions of being".75.82.19.242 (talk) 22:14, 7 July 2021 (UTC)

References