Talk:BAC TSR-2/Archive 2

TSR2's nickname

Can anybody remember the TSR2 being referred to as "hedgehopper"?

I've asked many people if they recall this, including some who work at the RAF Cosford museum, but they shake their heads and look at me as though I've lost the plot. Surely I can't have dreamt it - after all, how else would I have known about the low-flying capability of this aircraft.

Please help me out someone before they lock me away!

86.177.162.217 (talk) 09:50, 17 April 2010 (UTC)

Knowing somebody who was involved with the programme and they never mentioned a nickname, sounds like it has been made up! Perhaps you read a reference about a hedge hopping capability with reference to the terrain following radar but I would say it was never a nickname. MilborneOne (talk) 11:32, 17 April 2010 (UTC)

I concur, there wasn't enough time in the programme even to assign a name or for folks to come up with a nickname. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 19:03, 17 April 2010 (UTC)

I concur, and asking someone who drives a bus about the design history of the bus is perhaps a suitable analogy. The Cosford Museum guys are well versed in RAF history, - but TSR2 never reached the RAF. They are no more likely to know if it had a nickname than we are. It was only ever in the builder's hands. Shame! 82.151.237.103 (talk) 17:00, 19 April 2010 (UTC)

Claims in lead

Apologies if this has already been discussed, but I can't find any record of it on this talk page. Bzuk has recently added a few claims in the lead that I think could do with some references. In particular, that the TSR-2 was a "victim" of the 1957 White Paper, which seems tenuous, given that it wasn't cancelled until some 8 years later; also, that the (partial) replacement by the Buccaneer was "inevitable". Shouldn't we be sticking to the bare facts (at least in the lead)? Regards, Letdorf (talk) 13:02, 23 November 2010 (UTC).

With the lede being expanded due to a request by the GA reviewer, a precis of the relevant issues was added. It is not, repeat not standard to have any references cited in a lede as it is intended only as a brief summary of the salient points of the article. Despite this stylistic device, the series of aircraft projects that were affected by the White Paper according to Wood (1986) include the TSR-2 as the most egregious cancellation. Contemporary media articles were still harping on the repercussions of the White Paper in 1965 including the publication of a dramatic cover in Air Pictorial that showed the results of the White Paper as a cartoon image of a field of destruction with the TSR-2 front and centre. As to the debate revolving around the TSR-2's replacement, it was the acceptance of a "buy American" policy that was also being questioned as it was assumed that an "off-the-shelf" product would invariably be less costly. Regardless of this verbiage, I have revised the lede to include Wood's description of an extraordinary meeting held in 1957 with all the principal parties involved in the TSR-2 development including industry, government and military representatives where the extent and implications of the White Paper were laid out and a clear understanding that the GOR.339 specification was specifically in jeopardy. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 15:19, 23 November 2010 (UTC).

Thanks for the revisions, however, regarding your point about citations in leads, WP:LEADCITE would appear to disagree (to quote: there is not, however, an exception to citation requirements specific to leads). As for the 1957 White Paper, could it be said that GOR.339 was specifically at risk of future cancellation because it was one of only two future programmes that weren't cancelled as an immediate result of the WP? By the way, by "Wood (1996)", do you mean Wood (1986), or another book? Regards, Letdorf (talk) 14:04, 24 November 2010 (UTC).

Regardless, I have gone through enough FA and GA reviews that have had reviewers specifically indicate that ledes should be free of cites that it was considered a convention, perhaps also a personal preference on their part. And, if you read further in the guide to style, "Leads are usually written at a greater level of generality than the body, and information in the lead section of non-controversial subjects is less likely to be challenged and less likely to require a source; there is not, however, an exception to citation requirements specific to leads. The necessity for citations in a lead should be determined on a case-by-case basis by editorial consensus." As to the Wood reference, my copy is actually the first edition, and I went with that but the mistake in dates is now corrected, as it is also the most recent date that is stated in a citation. The TSR-2's cancellation was linked by the editor of Air Pictorial specifically to the impact of the White Paper philosophy, that was still in effect in 1965, while the first implications of the document were felt immediately, some of its provisions had long-lasting effects. Note specifically, these statements that had a connection to the TSR-2's development:

1. That combat aircraft be treated as a complete weapon system and that responsibility for the co-ordination of all the components lie with the designer/manufacturer.
2. Future RAF/RN programmes adopt the developmental batch system (instead of two or three prototypes, around a dozen are ordered to avoid delays due to a lack of prototypes).
3. That future programmes proceed by a series of short steps leading to smaller but more frequent advances. This would ease technical problems and in the event of an emergency, a relatively up-to-date and advanced aircraft could be put into production quicker, and "the overall result would be economy of the nation's resources and an increase in its preparedness at any point." FWiW Bzuk (talk) 15:26, 24 November 2010 (UTC)

How can it state in the lead that "although only one prototype was completed, test flights confirmed that the aircraft would be able to meet its stringent design specifications" when it says further down that "the aircraft was also falling short of many of the requirements laid out in OR.343, such as takeoff distance and combat radius. As a cost-saving measure, a reduced specification was agreed upon, notably reductions in combat radius to 650 nmi, the top speed to Mach 1.75 and takeoff run up increased from 600 yards to 1,100 yards"? One test aircraft flew without its electronics suite and from my read of the article it never acheived any of its performance specifications, so saying that it "would be able to meet its stringent design specifications" is pure conjecture Mztourist (talk) 10:12, 20 January 2011 (UTC)

Note, the statement is cited and the test programme was not completed, so it is accurate to state that as the source indicated, all indications were present that as the aircraft was being sorted out, it WOULD meet the design requirements, which might have been adjusted from earlier specifications of OR.343. FWiW, whole books have been written around just this "conjecture." Bzuk (talk) 15:40, 20 January 2011 (UTC).

It's not cited in the lead and it is unclear how the later comment that the specifications were adjusted down ties in with the conjecture that the aircraft could meet those criteria. The assertion just isn't supported by the test results. It would be better to change the lead statement to "As only one prototype was flown without its full electronics suite and without completing the full flight-test programme, it is impossible to say whether TSR-2 would have met or exceeded its design criteria."Mztourist (talk) 01:00, 21 January 2011 (UTC)

It is cited. FWiW, your comments about your "reading" have to be taken at face value. Bzuk (talk) 01:23, 21 January 2011 (UTC).

Where is the citation? Please point me to it as you obviously think I'm incapable of reading. The lead is supposed to be a summary of the article. The statement that it "would be able to meet its stringent design specifications" is not borne out by the operational testing section, therefore the Lead statement is conjecture and misleading. Mztourist (talk) 05:03, 21 January 2011 (UTC)

No quote was given but Winchester 2005, p. 25, states: "Early test flying confirmed that the sleek, beautiful TSR-2 would be able to deliver what had been promised." Thornborough 2005, p. 4, states: "Apart from some minor criticisms, and despite the aircraft having known shortcomings in respect of engine vibration and undercarriage retraction... with almost all the technical problems ironed out, (after outlining the results of test flying ...it was a incredible achievement to accomplish all this in the space of a flight-test programme lasting a mere six months from just one available aircraft." Wood 1975, p. 179: "There was no doubt that the airframe would be capable of accomplishing the tasks set for it and that it represented a major advance on any other type." Bzuk (talk) 06:45, 21 January 2011 (UTC)

Thanks for finally acknowledging it was unreferenced. The quotes that you have provided are however pure conjecture based on assumptions that the aircraft would not encounter new problems at higher speeds and that the electronics package, particularly the terrain-following radar, could be successfully integrated to deliver the low-level performance. The lead statement is therefore misleading and should be replaced with the more ambivalent/weasally language I suggested above. Mztourist (talk) 07:14, 21 January 2011 (UTC)

No, it was cited from Winchester, and the studied opinion of experts is that the TSR-2 despite not having finished its development trials, WOULD have be capable of meeting its design objectives. Surely all of this is conjecture as the programme was prematurely ended, a fact that makes all of the surrounding controversy more damning. Seek out a consensus for a change if you must, but the statement is reflective of the prevailing opinion of verifiable, authoritative sources. As you know, lede statements are not necessarily more than a precis and are often not referenced but this section was cited as the editors working on the article were seeking an GA rating. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 14:50, 21 January 2011 (UTC)

I see that you have now added the various quotes you gave above into the lead. I don't see how conjecture by 2 authors (Winchester and Wood) amounts to "the studied opinion of experts". I don't have access to their books, but Winchester and Wood do not appear to be unbiased objective sources, Winchester's quote of "the sleek, beautiful TSR-2" and the title of Wood's book "Project Cancelled: The Disaster of Britain's Abandoned Aircraft Projects" both suggest editorial bias, which is endemic in discussions of TSR-2. I note that the Thornborough quote doesn't make any similar claim and query whether such statements are supported by other authors such as Burke. So your statement that the lead statement is "reflective of the prevailing opinion of verifiable, authoritative sources" seems to be based on a selective sourcing of references. The references and the underlying statements are pure conjecture by Winchester and Wood and conjecture, even if its published, does not become fact and Wikipedia is supposed to be about verifiable facts. Mztourist (talk) 02:14, 22 January 2011 (UTC)

...and conjecture that the TSR-2 couldn't meet its objectives is based on what? FWiW Bzuk (talk) 03:00, 22 January 2011 (UTC).

It never completed the test programme! So we will never know whether it would or wouldn't have exceeded its design criteria, which is precisely the point that I raised in my suggested language earlier. I am surprised that an experienced editor and published author such as yourself is prepared to put so much reliance on two quotes which share the same unstated, but huge assumption that the rest of the test programme (including electronics integration) would have proceeded perfectly or with only minor hitches. The quotes are unverifiable and therefore using them in the lead is misleading. Mztourist (talk) 03:19, 22 January 2011 (UTC)

And in relation to the lead statement, who says that the design specifications were "stringent"? Was this stringent before they were watered down to account for the actual results indicated by testing (per Burke)? If so it needs to be reworded.Mztourist (talk) 03:25, 22 January 2011 (UTC)

In the same token, there is no indication that given the usual development cycle, that the TSR-2 would not have met the design requirements which despite being lowered were still not present in any other contemporary aircraft design; since you are referencing Burke, what is that author's appraisal? FWiW, I have no preconceived notions as to whether the TSR-2 could have met its design requirements but other sources (BTW, you have quotes that are transcribed verbatim) felt that the aircraft was a "world beater."Bzuk (talk) 03:41, 22 January 2011 (UTC)

"Given the usual development cycle", i.e. you are making the same assumption as Winchester and Wood that the test programme would have proceeded perfectly or with minor hitches, which is not addressed in the lead statement. TSR-2's whole raison d'etre was low-level nap of the earth attack and as the terrain-following radar was never integrated, we have absolutely no way of knowing whether or not it would have been able to successfully perform that role. I don't have Burke's book, nor access to any of the others where I am. With regard to the TSR-2 having design requirements "not present in any other contemporary aircraft design" and being a "world beater" a look at the performance specifications for the F-111 (later F model admittedly) indicate that it was superior to the revised TSR-2 performance specs in almost every category. There is a lot of hype and speculation about the TSR-2 which we will never know if it was justified or not, but Wikipedia is supposed to have NPOV and the lead statement isn't neutral rather it is unverifiable conjecture with unstated underlying assumptions, therefore it should be revised. Mztourist (talk) 04:34, 22 January 2011 (UTC)

The claims seem to be adequately sourced, so what is required to balance this (perceived) NPOV is statements that it was not going to succeed and that the F-111 was superior to it. These can then be added to the appropriate section and the lede ammended to reflect this. GraemeLeggett (talk) 11:45, 22 January 2011 (UTC)

The statements may be adequately sourced, but they are completely speculative. No-one can say with certainty if TSR-2 would or wouldn't have performed to specification. Suggesting that I should produce arguments that it wouldn't succeed and that the F-111 was superior is the stuff for aviation chat rooms not Wikipedia. We are supposed to be dealing in verifiable facts. The quotes are statements of opinion by Winchester and Wood, which given their bias and unverifiability does not make them reliable sources Mztourist (talk) 12:39, 22 January 2011 (UTC)

The statements by Winchester, Wood et al are the verifiable material that we are building the article with. We are working from their position as writers on the history of aircraft. If there was a body of opinion that ran counter to their statements then we might get into the "according to" style of incorporating their statements. But for the moment there doesn't seem to that body of opinion. Bias in the case of Winchester and Wood is yet to be demonstrated. GraemeLeggett (talk) 14:36, 22 January 2011 (UTC)

Two writer give their opinions and as detailed above they are clearly not unbiased, meanwhile there are numerous other references which are not referred to as they presumably don't make such assumptions. You are an experienced editor, so I really would expect you to be a bit more objective on this issue, or are you also a TSR-2 fan? Mztourist (talk) 15:06, 22 January 2011 (UTC)

The two writers, and I haven't read them as I don't have access, may be making assumptions or they may be giving their considered opinion based upon the materials available, or reporting Ministry documents. Other books in the bibliography may not be making any statement as to TSR-2s suitability at all. Perhaps those who have access to the books can tell us. Aside from the dramatic titles of the books is there any proof of Wood or Winchester not being objective? GraemeLeggett (talk) 15:38, 22 January 2011 (UTC)

Of course the authors (and any underlying sources they relied on) are making assumptions! TSR-2 never completed its test programme and the full electronics suite was never integrated, so how can anyone say with any certainty that it would (or wouldn't) have met its design criteria? The performance specs had already been adjusted down once, who is to say that wouldn't happen again? The more I reread the article the more it becomes apparent that it doesn't deserve GA status due to the conflicting performance specs which state anything from a top speed of Mach 1.7 to Mach 3 and the subtle POV comments, it should therefore be reassessed.Mztourist (talk) 02:14, 23 January 2011 (UTC)

TSR-2' s "stringent" design specs; Note to Bzuk: I see you have reverted my deletion. Who says the design specs were stringent? What is the source for this? As noted in the article, the design specs were changed, the criteria may have been stringent when first issued, but were they still stringent when revised down? Mztourist (talk) 15:12, 22 January 2011 (UTC)

In a word, "yes." Tony Buttler states in Air Enthusiast, September/October 1995, p. 21, after examining the ramifications of GOR.339, the revised specifications and all the designs submitted by the aerospace industry in the UK. "[N]ever before had such an advanced aircraft been proposed for the RAF." Besides the BAC TSR.2 winning entry, these industry submissions included in the chronological order that the proposals were made: Blackburn B.103A, de Havilland "Modified" DH.110, Supermarine Type 565, Hawker P.1121, Avro 739, Blackburn B.108, Bristol 204, Christchurch (de Havilland) GOR.339, English Electric P.37, Fairey GOR.339, Gloster GOR.339, Handley Page Study GOR.339, Hawker P.1129 and Vickers-Armstrong Type 571; all of which were rejected as not meeting the design requirements. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 15:43, 22 January 2011 (UTC).

So you are assuring me that he specifically considered the spec reductions stated in Burke, i.e. combat radius reduced to 650 nmi, top speed to Mach 1.75 and takeoff run up increased from 600 yards to 1,100 yards? Mztourist (talk) 02:17, 23 January 2011 (UTC)

In a word, "yes."Bzuk (talk) 02:20, 23 January 2011 (UTC)

Quite by chance I came across this today, a 6-page (PDF) article by Roy Iredale of BAC Warton, who was intimately involved with the flight test programme of XR219 from early 1963 until the end. It gives interesting information about the lead up to flight testing and some of the challenges which arose. --TraceyR (talk) 22:24, 23 January 2011 (UTC)

Image Credit

Can I just note that credits are not given in image captions as the credit is on the individual page. Nothing on the image page or flikr page that indicates that this image should be treated differently. I would suggest we remove the credit. MilborneOne (talk) 17:09, 4 December 2010 (UTC)

Just noted that some of the other images apart from the lead are credited as well, really need to remove them. MilborneOne (talk) 17:12, 4 December 2010 (UTC)

1966 Defence Review

In project cancellation doesnt mention that the F-111 was not a done deal, although they had an option on the F-111 a number of aircraft were considered including the Dassault Spey Mirage IV and the Buccaneer two-star it was not until the 1966 defence review that it was decided to order a small number of F-111s (and to use v-bombers in a tactical role rather than strategic) while they await the AFVG. Might be worth a mention. MilborneOne (talk) 23:34, 11 December 2010 (UTC)

Yes, the F-111 was by no means a done deal at the time of cancellation, however Healey's memo about the F-111 (CAB/129/121: C(65)58) and the Cabinet minutes regarding the final cancellation (CAB/128/39: CC(65)21) show that this was very much the favoured option at the time, pending the outcome of the defence review. Letdorf (talk) 23:56, 11 December 2010 (UTC).

The F-111K was quite a substantial modification of the F-111C and two aircraft were already in the final stages of assembly when the contract was cancelled, so even though other aircraft may have been considered early on, General Dynamics had a contract. See Roger Franklin's The Defender: The Story of General Dynamics (1986), p. 212. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 04:21, 12 December 2010 (UTC)

I dont disagree with both your comments but the actually order for the F-111 as an interim solution was placed as a result of the 1966 defence review and up to that point it could have been different. Certainly the original announcements about the F-111 option that was placed did not mention at that time it was considered only an interim solution pending the AFVG. A lot of work was done on the BAC/Dassault Spey-Mirage particularly on howq to fit the TSR-2 electronics and the BAC workshare. MilborneOne (talk) 08:46, 12 December 2010 (UTC)

Now fit this into the article without jerrymandering too much of the text in place; also refs will be necessary as the article is in review for a GA assessment. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 20:24, 12 December 2010 (UTC)

I think it would be reasonable to say that the option on the F-111 was announced at the time of cancellation, but wasn't confirmed until the 1966 defence review? A quick google finds a source mentioning the Spey Mirage here.Letdorf (talk) 13:10, 13 December 2010 (UTC).

Just as well they cancelled it;

Performance

Maximum speed: Mach 1.75 at 40,000 ft/12,000 m (Mach 0.9 at sea level) ; final specification data

Roughly the same power as the SR-71 but smaller and lighter and only did Mach 1.75? - must have been crap to be that slow on that power. Considering one of the planned mission profiles called for a Mach 2.0 cruise at 50-58,000ft then surely a 'Maximum speed' of 'Mach 1.75 at 40,000ft' seems a bit of a failure. To have built an aircraft that small and aerodynamically clean, with that much power (c. 60,000lb), and to have it only do Mach 1.75 would seem to be ample reason for cancelling it. For anyone who hasn't seen one of the preserved aircraft from head-on, it's tiny.

Bear in mind that there are other factors beyond thrust and drag in terms of determining maximum speed. Compressor inlet temperature and airframe thermal limits will often be the key factors. The SR-71 was built out of titanium; the TSR-2 out of aluminium. Also, as noted in Burke's new book, the TSR-2 had major stability problems past Mach 1.7, hence the effective maximum speed. Sjbradshaw (talk) 00:36, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

Production aircraft would have actually had more power with 2 x Olympus R28 Mk.360 of 42,733 lbf (190,090 N) each.

The actual design maximum speed figures declassified a couple of years ago and available in TNA (PRO) are; Mach 3.2 at 36,000ft, and Mach 2.0 at sea level. The 'Mach 1.75' figure was the highest reached in flight tests by Beamont and Dell before cancellation of the TSR-2 project terminated the flight test programme. Presumably the Mach 3.2 figure would have been a 'dash' speed, limited to short periods because of airframe heatinng.

Um, no - the maximum speed actually obtained was Mach 1.2, on the flight up to Warton. Sjbradshaw (talk) 00:36, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

BTW, the mention of Air Pictorial magazine in the para above reminds me of a Christmas issue of around the time of the TSR-2 cancellation, in which the cover shows a cartoon of the then-Labour Government, including Healey, Benn, etc, dressed as elves, in suitable Santa's helpers attire, all busy with their axes, chopping away at various forlorn-looking caricatures of the British military aircraft projects that had been cancelled, including (IIRC), the TSR-2 and the AW.681. IIARC, the title of the cartoon was something like; We're chop-chop-chop-chopping, that's what we like to do, we're chop-chop ....

Oh, also BTW, Merry Christmas to everyone.—Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.112.48.14 (talk) 19:32, 25 December 2010 (UTC)

Getting back on topic, are there any other sources describing the Buccaneer Mk.2* being considered, or even proposed in 1965-66 as an alternative to the F-111? The citation in the article of Boot (1990) describes the B.108, which was actually a 1958 submission for OR.339. He briefly mentions the Mk.2* on p. 68, but in a 1962 timeframe, and makes no reference to it in relation to the F-111. Letdorf (talk) 18:02, 27 December 2010 (UTC).

• [1] - question in the house about Buccaneer Mark II Aircraft in 1966 as a Canberra replacement The Buccaneer Mark II is being considered along with a number of other alternative aircraft in the context of the Defence Review, with particular relation to the Canberra replacement. Also see [2] We had also to ensure that the aircraft we selected was not being produced in such small numbers that our purchase—like a purchase of the TSR 2—would be hopelessly uneconomic. There were three possible contenders; the Buccaneer 2, the Spey-Mirage and the F 111. MilborneOne (talk) 18:09, 27 December 2010 (UTC)

Thanks - I've also now found (and cited) an article in Flight about the House of Commons debate in December 1965 mentioning the Buccaneer option. Just to clarify matters, the Buccaneer proposal was referred to as the "Buccaneer 2-Double-Star" (2**), not to be confused with the 2*, which was a Martel upgrade proposal for the FAA. Curiously, I can't find any mention of the 2** in Boot (1990). Regards, Letdorf (talk) 18:47, 27 December 2010 (UTC).

TSR-1?

Was there a TSR-1? If so, does it deserve a mention? Just curious. --TraceyR (talk) 20:26, 22 January 2011 (UTC)

In brief, "no" at least not in connection to the development of a strike aircraft, although sometimes "tagged" to the Canberra. The only other instance of this designation in British use that I am aware of, was that TSR1 was the original designation for the Fairey S.9/30 which was the progenitor of the Fairey Swordfish. The term TSR1 standing for= Torpedo, Spotter, Reconnaissance. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 20:35, 22 January 2011 (UTC)

Fairey S.9/30 refers to TSR.1 (or I ) GraemeLeggett (talk) 20:50, 22 January 2011 (UTC)

As the article Graeme mentioned says, the TSR.I was followed by another Swordfish prototype, which was called the TSR.II. There was also another torpedo-bomber of the same era, the Gloster TSR.38. It appears the "2" in TSR.2 actually referred to its Mach 2.0 performance,[3] rather than implying the existence of a "TSR.1" predecessor. Regards, Letdorf (talk) 22:30, 22 January 2011 (UTC).

Went looking for the TSR term in Flights archive but found it's used generously eg this list of aircraft. GraemeLeggett (talk) 22:47, 22 January 2011 (UTC)

G, What other aircraft had been designated TSR1? FWiW Bzuk (talk) 23:37, 22 January 2011 (UTC)

I haven't found any as yet. The search function is not ideal "TSR.38" returns many results which are about the TSR-2 without mentioning the TSR.38. The search also tunrs up pages without TSR in them. (grumble) GraemeLeggett (talk) 09:36, 23 January 2011 (UTC)

Mosquito

The brief reference to the Mosquito IMV is misleading. Defensive armament was unnecessary on that aircraft because - unlike the Canberra but like the TSR2 - it was faster and more agile than all the fighter aircraft of its day. Whilst in some parallel universe where ground to air missiles were in use in 1942 this was not the case and thus the 4 forward firing cannon on many marks of the Mosquito were quite enough.

This issue is interesting because the MoA thinking at the time of the Mosquito was as follows: Two engines equals bomber. Bomber equals slow. Slow means rear firing popguns like the Fairey Battle. The aircraft was faster and better in all departments than the Spitfire and that was unthinkable. What's more most of it was not fabricated from strategic materials and it was cheap to build in furniture factories. The operational range was enormous compared to the feeble Spitfire and it carried bombs! Oh woe! Bombers come under Harris and Harris wants big beasts for strategic effort. If de Havilland and his team had not persisted the MoA would have abandoned the fastest propeller driven aircraft of the war - the best ground attack fighter - the aircraft of choice for a bomber leader and the best ground support aircraft.

Unfortunately the TSR2 had no such champion.

It's good to see that 70 years after the event contributors to Wikipedia are still - in secret little corners - repeating the same canards based on ancient office politics.

Drg40 (talk) 12:29, 21 May 2011 (UTC)

In the early 1970's in Manchester (UK of course) I met over a period of months someone who had worked as an engineer on TSR2. The point of interest is that he was seconded to the USA as part of a team of engineers to work on TSR2 after the 1966 cancellation. He said that many of the UK engineers, all jigs, all drawings and one of the prototypes were sent to some facility which he wouldn't commenton.

At the time I was aware of TSR2 be not in the detail that I now know. It was of some interest the he had been 'thrown out' of the us by FBI/CIA on trumped up charges because he wanted to leave the project and start up his own home decorating business. I it my imagination of is the rear tail assembly of the F111 similar to that of TSR2 Frank Bently 20 th June 2011 Frank bentley (talk) 06:43, 20 June 2011 (UTC)

The TSR2 was designed to more-or-less the same design philosophy as the Mosquito and indeed it was intended as a successor to the Canberra which itself was the direct successor to the Mosquito, however the Canberra had been designed to emulate the high-flying Mosquito bomber such as had been used by the Light Night Striking Force whereas the TSR2 was intended from the start to emulate the low-flying Mosquito operations such as used on attacks at Amiens, Oslo, etc. So with the TSR2 they just switched roles from high to low-level, the Mosquito being excellent at both.

BTW, the Canberra could fly higher than both the MiG 15 and the later MiG 17 - by then its most likely opponents - so overall speed was not so necessary. It was still more-or-less immune from interception. That was the whole point of the TSR2 in that it flew so low and so fast that it was practically immune from interception, and with a nuclear weapon it could almost be guaranteed to reach and bomb its target. ... and in all weathers. And if you can almost guarantee to do that then you suffer fewer losses and can get by with buying fewer aircraft. TSR2 was expensive but it could do the job that other aircraft couldn't, and you didn't need so many of them. That philosophy also applied to the V Bombers - too fast and too high to intercept. And it was because of the cancellation of TSR2 that the V Force had to be transferred to the low-level role in the late 1960s, at which they were comparatively ill-suited. The TSR2 of course had been designed for this role from the start. And at Mach 2 too. That's why TSR2 was much mourned by the RAF. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.7.147.13 (talk) 11:29, 27 December 2012 (UTC)

Design

The information in Roy Iredale's piece (see above) e.g. about the skin material ("20/20") being very brittle, could be mentioned in the design section. --TraceyR (talk) 10:33, 24 January 2011 (UTC)

Change of name for this page?

It is surely better called the "Vickers TSR2". The contract was awarded to Vickers Armstrongs, and all the work was done at Weybridge. John Wheater (talk) 09:52, 26 July 2012 (UTC)

But by that point Vickers, Bristol and EE were being wrapped together into BAC. And by the time it flew, BAC was the name of the company it was being built by. GraemeLeggett (talk) 11:29, 26 July 2012 (UTC)

BAC TSR-2 is the logical and "common" name. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 16:08, 26 July 2012 (UTC).

I concur with Graeme and Bzuk. BAC was formed more or less as a result of Vickers and EE being jointly awarded the OR.339 contract. I've never heard of the TSR.2 being referred to as the "Vickers TSR2". Regards, Letdorf (talk) 21:41, 26 July 2012 (UTC).

Vickers were awarded the contract as prime contractor but the design was based on the English Electric/Shorts P.17/P.17D concept. EE designed the P.17, and Shorts the P.17D that was intended to be a flat-rising lifting platform to provide the VTOL/STOL aspect for the P.17. The P.17D was a VTOL platform that used Shorts' VTOL lift technology developed on the Short SC.1 and was intended to carry the P.17 during take-off and landing - sounds ludicrous but there were a lot of those sort of ideas around at the time - see Gerry Anderson's various TV series such as Thunderbirds, or Dan Dare. Of the two concepts only the EE P.17 itself went on to become the TSR2. The P.17D, BTW, was to be powered by 70 (seventy) engines. At the time EE had had ten years of supersonic aircraft experience (with the P.1/Lightning) behind them, whereas Vickers had none. The P.17D was dropped when the operational requirement was redefined as O.R.343. By this time EE and Vickers had combined and the P.17 design (more or less) was the one submitted for TSR2, or rather, the design submitted by the BAC was based on the P.17 — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.7.147.13 (talk) 19:00, 1 January 2013 (UTC)

Oh, God, not again

This whole article reads like one of those "if only we've built/used XY, then the world would turn into an utopia of awesomeness" fantasy rants of aircraft fanboys/otaku. People forget that this plane would have been obsolete by the late 1960s either way, since nuclear bombers quickly lost their importance as ICBMs improved over time. And in case of escalation, it would drop nukes. Maybe a graceful bird, but not one worth the apologetic whining. --ZemplinTemplar (talk) 07:17, 18 August 2012 (UTC)

Utterly and completely wrong. And that's because you fail to grasp that TSR2 was not a supersonic strategic bomber competing for business with ICBMs. TSR2 was intended for a completely different purpose; the name gives it away; T for Tactical, S for Strike, R for Reconnaissance. In short a tactical aircraft to deal with targets on the battlefield or just beyond. ICBMs cannot do that, and if they could they would signal to the Warsaw Pact an escalation to a strategic level. TSR2 was designed and intended to deliver tactical "nukes" (as you put it) and there are NATO protocols that limit the size and yield of weapons deployed in Central Europe to a mere 200 kilotons, and for that very reason; - to avoid nuclear strikes on the battlefield being misinterpreted as strategic, with all that implies for all-out global war.

As for your ungentlemanly language that refers to "apologetic whining", - perhaps a better grasp of Western aviation history should be a pre-requisite for contributors from the former Eastern Bloc.

And, because you overlooked it, the American competitor to TSR2, - the F-111 (allegedly not as good), - it was in widespread service with the USAF until 1998, and not retired from the Royal Australian Air Force until 2010. That alone rather makes a case that TSR2 was both needed, and a wise economic investment.

Other contributors have said that there were profound political and economic reasons for cancellation that do not need repeating here by me, except to say that until the forced company mergers of that time, the UK aircraft industry of the time was amongst the largest UK industries, employing vast numbers of people. Any aircraft design as complex and advanced as TSR2 requires vast economic resources; and that in turn inevitably turns on political will to provide the funding to see the project through. Sadly in this instance the political will didn't measure up. That's why the consequences were so dire, and why historians of the UK aviation scene will never lose interest.

And fewer insults from ZemplinTemplar would be a good start. George.Hutchinson (talk) 16:15, 3 January 2013 (UTC)

I think you'll find that if it hadn't been cancelled then the TSR2 would still have been doing its job (and doing it very well) when the Berlin Wall came down in 1989. By all informed accounts it really was that good. In fact the few pilots who flew it regarded it as a superb aeroplane. Not good, not average, but superb. The 'mourning' that people display is not just that the cancellation deprived the RAF of a tool that would have done the job better than any other, but that, having been forced to 'put all its eggs in one basket', so to speak, the cancellation effectively killed the UK military aviation industry as a world class player. So the repercussions of the cancellation were profound. It did more than kill one aeroplane, it killed British military aviation. The only new aircraft that came after the cancellation were the Tornado, Jaguar, and the Eurofighter, all collaborative projects with Europe or France. The UK has designed and built no new military aeroplanes since TSR2's cancellation. Lightning, Harrier (well, the P.1127), Nimrod, P.1154, Vulcan, Victor, etc, were all around or being designed when TSR2 was still extant. Try and buy a modern, state-of-the-art British military aeroplane these days. You can't, they don't make them any more. Just a few bits and pieces.

I suspect that's why some British aviation 'fanboys' get so uptight about TSR2. Because if you're not careful, that's how you destroy an industry. And that's what the cancellation of TSR2 did. Before TSR2 the British military aviation scene comprised a number of reasonably successful companies that had worldwide sales. In order to get the TSR2 contract the then-current government forced a number of them to merge to become BAC. Once merged, the succeeding government then deprived them of their single most important work in-which they had invested almost everything - TSR2. All due to politicians and civil servants who don't know their arses from their elbows, and who know the price of everything, and the value of nothing. Then there was the farce that was the F-111K order. And the poor Canadians carried on that tradition on their side of 'the pond' with the Arrow.

So the TSR2 was rather more important to British aviation than many people might surmise. And if you like or are interested in British aviation then the TSR2 is a fairly important (if little known) milestone in British aviation history. Things were never the same afterwards. With the cancellation Britain probably lost around 50,000 jobs over a ten year period, due to the ripple-down effect to the numerous and varied suppliers that lost the income. That was when unemployment rates for the country as a whole was only around half a million.

... and as an aside, it also shows what happens when you allow idiots to run things like governments. They can seriously mess things up for people, whether they intend to, or not. You have to spend money to make money, see. Otherwise you eventually end up bankrupt. And it's far better to spend money in your own country rather than buy stuff made elsewhere, as otherwise you are paying to keep the other country's workforce employed, rather than your own. Buy everything from abroad and eventually your own people become poor due to lack of work, and they stop spending money, which then reduces the incomes of everyone else, and your formerly industrialised country then enters the ranks of the third world, with people begging on the streets, and sleeping rough. All right for the rich of course, but eventually the masses get pissed-off with this and resort to crime and violence, whereupon the government then spends increasing amounts on the police and on information-gathering - they never seem too short of money to do this. How to become a Banana Republic - only without the sun and the bananas. I think we, as the Chinese say, live in 'interesting times'.

... and now for something completely different .... — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.7.147.13 (talk) 14:04, 27 December 2012 (UTC)

Nicely put. Has someone had you blocked for this yet? 8-) Andy Dingley (talk) 14:21, 27 December 2012 (UTC)

For more of the same, see Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow, Northrop YB-49 where governments did their best to destroy an industry or company. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 16:15, 27 December 2012 (UTC)

"It's an extraordinary good moment when you turn onto the runway, you call for clearance to go, you get clearance from the tower. Five, Four, Three, Two, One, Brakes off, you light the reheat and go, and from then on you know exactly what it's supposed to do and your task is just to be totally alert to see if it doesn't do what it's supposed to do. It's a fascinating moment, it's professionally enormously satisfying, and then when you become airborne and you find this new device actually performs as well as predicted, or even in the case of TSR2, better ... half way through that (the first flight) at the end of the first circuit round Boscombe I had formed the opinion that this was far more than a questionable aeroplane, this was a brilliant first attempt at getting this complex aeroplane right, it was so good and so right on Flight One after ten minutes, that I was enjoying the sensation of just relaxing and feeling that this was a marvellous aeroplane. I felt I'd been there before ...

... This new aeroplane was, despite it's difficulties, despite its management problems, despite the rather unpleasant and hazardous faults that had occurred in some of the first few flights, it was now showing itself to be a tremendous thoroughbred, it was going to be a wonderful aeroplane, it was already extraordinary satisfying to fly as a professional, and I had been looking forward enormously to 'shaking the dust' of Boscombe off my feet, figuratively, and flying this aeroplane back to my own base where, even the voice of the air traffic controllers were my friends" - Roland Beamont - from 'TSR2 - the Untold Story' — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.7.147.13 (talk) 15:47, 1 January 2013 (UTC)

BTW, initial orders for TSR2 were 150 aircraft for the RAF with a further 30 for the RAAF. The RAAF later cancelled their order after political interference from Lord Mountbatten who tried to get them to order the Buccaneer instead. The Australians eventually decided on the F-111. I should also point out that although the TSR2 was cancelled on grounds of cost, if the project had been continued the RAF/MoD would not have needed to have spent the considerable sums it later did on the Jaguar and Tornado. TSR2 would have outperformed them both by a wide margin, and would probably have been all that was needed until the Berlin Wall came down in 1989. Cancelling TSR2 was probably the worst military procurement blunder - due to its long-term repercussions - made by a British government in the 1960s although the decision to opt for Chevaline over the US offer for Poseidon and early Trident in the 1970s probably ranks close. But that's another story.

... oh, and the RAAF finally retired its F-111C's in December 2010. And they didn't receive them until 1973. They could probably have had TSR2 by around 1968-69 if it hadn't been cancelled. The US retired its F-111's in 1998.

... and in answer to Andy's earlier question, no, apparently not - LOL!— Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.7.147.13 (talk) 10:37, 3 January 2013 (UTC)

'highest-performing aircraft in the world in its projected missions'

The lead says of it 'Some of the most advanced aviation technology of the period was incorporated in order to make it the highest-performing aircraft in the world in its projected missions'. Do we have a source for that? - Crosbie 10:26, 16 November 2013 (UTC)

I had a similar discussion/debate on these claims in 2011, see Talk:BAC TSR-2/Archive 2#Claims in lead. I still don't see how such claims can be accepted when it never even completed its development program, however it seems that secondary sources written by fans of TSR-2 are sufficient justification... Mztourist (talk) 09:42, 18 November 2013 (UTC)

Well, it had considerably more power than this; F-111, or this; MiG-25 Foxbat, in a smaller airframe with a higher fineness ratio, and with as much power as this; Lockheed SR-71, so unless the designers were unusually incompetent one presumes this would have given TSR.2 suitable performance. The same designers, along with their French colleagues, went on to produce this; Concorde, so presumably they knew something about designing high-performance aeroplanes. Production TSR.2 aircraft BTW, would have had more power, ~40,000lb per-engine with reheat, slightly more than Concorde's civilian-rated 38,000lb Olympus 593's.

If that's not sufficient here's a quote for you from a 1963 issue of Flight; " ...as it is, the TSR.2 can fairly be described as the most advanced and versatile military aircraft in the world." [4] — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.7.147.13 (talk) 10:29, 22 December 2013 (UTC)

A Pilot Press cutaway drawing of TSR.2 with comprehensive specification figures as-of November 1962, here: [5]

Figures at variance with ones on article page include rate of climb, an initial RoC given in linked specs as 'over 50,000 ft/min (254m/sec)', and a ferry range of 'up to 4,250 mls (6,850 km)'. Radius of action with drop tanks is also higher being '1,725 mls (2,774 km)'.

Radius of action figures with one 2,000lb bomb internally are: '1,105 mls (1,850 km) with 10 per cent at Mach = 1.7 above 40,000 ft (12,200 m) and 20 per cent Mach = 0.9 at 200 ft (61 m), or 575 mls (925 km) at Mach = 2.0 at medium altitude or 800 mls (1,286 km) at Mach = 0.9 at 200 ft (61 m).'

Speeds are; 'Max cruising speeds, Mach = 0.9 to 1.1 at 200 ft (61 m), Mach = 2.05 above 36,000 ft (10,980 m)'. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.7.147.13 (talk) 18:02, 29 December 2013 (UTC)

Cancellation

It was openly said by many at the time that the Labour Government had decided to cancel TSR2 (if the party was elected to power) prior to the General Election of October 1964 but as usual it was denied.

It was also rumoured that the project was going to be renamed and the aircraft would have been called "Mosquito" because like that wonderful aeroplane it could fly fast without armaments and be "back at base" before the enemy knew what had happened.

The production was due to be carried out at Warton near Preston, Lancashire. Ronald Beaumont brought XR219 up to Lancashire and was photographed with his hands on his bone-dome - flying helmet, flying the aircraft along the runway at 50 feet "Dambuster height." Make no mistake about it the aircraft could have flown to Moscow in the USSR and Back almost 100% guaranteed unseen by radar. That is why it was cancelled because the Soviets feared it and Wilson (Prime Minister in 1964-1969) was sympathetic to the Soviets view.

Also when it was cancelled the airframes were broken up at Samlesbury outside Preston, Lancashire. See this link http://www.stevebroadbent.net/tsr2memories.html which clearly shows the airframes being smashed up. Indeed I know of people who went to work at Samlesbury who refused to do the deed but were told "Do it or be sacked!"

The fact that until the MRCA project resulted in the Tornado and several types were withdrawn from service many of which were living on borrowed time, but TSR2 was one of the very few that Tornado would not have replaced.

Oh my credentials - I was a teenage boy in 1964, have served in the RAF as aircrew AeO - 40,000 rivets in close formation with 8 screws and twin fins and am now in my second career - geology.The Geologist (talk) 14:47, 10 January 2013 (UTC)

I have never heard of the 'Mosquito' name being rumoured, I suspect that as it was already so widely known by its designation that it might have remained 'TSR2' in RAF service, rather like the VC10 remained so-called. I also suspect that using the normal Air Ministry/RAF/MoD naming conventions such as city names - e.g., Canberra - might have been regarded post-1945 as inappropriate for nuclear armed bombers, hence the Valiant, Vulcan, Victor, and it's possible that if TSR2 had been named the name would have begun with a 'V' and been appropriately warlike, so something like 'Vengeful', 'Vanquisher' etc., But that's just a guess.

The TSR2 was never intended for attacking Moscow or anywhere like that, it was designed for attacking tactical targets such as roads, bridges, railway lines, tank and troop concentrations, close to or behind the front lines of any invading Eastern Bloc force, so slowing or stopping their advance into Western Europe, specifically into Germany. To do this it would have been flown out to rough airstrips or even the autobahns in Germany where it would have only a short distance to fly to its targets. For this purpose a complete air portable ground support system was designed for TSR2, for refuelling - rubber bladder tanks for fuel transportation that could be airlifted by helicopter and just dropped at a location - re-arming, maintenance, etc., that could all be airlifted up close to the front line. In addition TSR2 would have have been used for low-level reconnaissance to find and photograph targets prior to other aircraft being sent out to attack them. TSR2 was really optimised for handling and survivability at low-level and in all weathers, day or night, because if the Soviets did invade it would be necessary to stop them quickly no matter what the weather or time of day. To fly at these altitudes at high speeds - as low as 50ft and 900mph - in poor visibility it was necessary to develop an autopilot with built-in ground avoidance and navigation, as the pilot's reactions would not have been quick enough in these circumstances, and he would have quickly tired. This and the low-level navigation system was the only really technically challenging and risky area of the design still needing to be done at the time of cancellation. Terrain warning had been proposed before, IIRC, but TSR2 was to have had terrain avoidance, which would have automatically flown the aircraft over or around any obstacles. IIARC, a less sophisticated development of this system was later used for the Tornado. The small highly-loaded wing was to give rock-steady (good damping about all axes) flight and precise manoeuvrability at low-levels and high speed, rather in the manner of the Buccaneer.

The decision to scrap the jigs and production tools was a political one as at the time of the cancellation the RAF was in the middle of a defence review and it was quite possible that the result of the review might conclude that TSR2 was needed in order to fulfil NATO commitments in defending Europe. Reading between the lines of documents at TNA the jigs and production tools were therefore destroyed so that it would be impossible to go back on the scrapping decision and re-instate the design. Labour had made a point of emphasising that they would scrap TSR2 in their campaign in the run-up to their successful election such that the aeroplane became pretty much a political football and was a front page story in several national newspapers on a number of occasions. In other words, the incoming Labour government had made point of publicly stating that they would scrap TSR2 and wanted to make sure that once scrapped it remained scrapped. That was why the jigs and tooling was destroyed in such great haste, as the defence review was soon to publish its report and Labour didn't want to have to put up with political pressure in parliament to 'un-scrap' it. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.7.147.13 (talk) 11:36, 11 January 2013 (UTC)

The destruction of the rigs and tools for cancelled UK defence projects is standard practice and the same thing was done with the P1154 Mach 2 stol production line and the Nimrod surveillance planes under construction,just a couple of years ago. It would be accurate that the Labour Cabinet never intended to go on with TRS2, but kept it going for 9 months to preserve aerospace jobs and to avoid premature political fallout from scrapping the RAF premier' white heat high tech project;'. A very good source on Labour TRS2 view is the Crossman diaries. The other major aircraft project cancelled at the time, the Cam P1154 Mach 2 jump jet was a more sensible and viable project which was easy to cancel because neither the RAF or RN liked it much. The real point about TRS2 is that it was the capability that really gave real credibility to the RAF view that Island hopping and Australian bases could replace the carriers of the RN east of Suez. A fleet of 150 TRS2 with 1000 mile radius made that idea tenable, were the F-111 really didn't. The reality having closely studied UK defence policy in that period, is that the Buccaneer was always Healy's favoured option for RAF strike and the F-111 contract is written to ensure ideal cancellation terms. Healy insisted that PM Wilson stand on the cliffs when the Buccaneers hit the Torey Cannon. Why I can't be certain.

Why did Denis Healey make Wislon watch the bombing of the Torrey Canyon from close quarters? Possibly he was hoping they'd miss the ship. Mr Larrington (talk) 19:39, 2 September 2015 (UTC)

Thanks for the info. I am aware that scrapping jigs and other tools is normal practice of cancelled projects, but that is usually carried out at the manufacturer's leisure. In TSR.2's case, the government sent officials down to make sure that destruction of the jigs was carried out immediately, i.e, scrapping started within a day or so of the decision being announced. This is unheard of.

... and the scrapping of tools and jigs also effectively meant that BAC would be unable to continue development using private funds for possible other customers. At the time BAC's only other major aircraft project was Concorde, so the cancellation of TSR.2 had a pretty dire effect on BAC's viability. A later government tried to get Concorde cancelled too, so that would have put BAC effectively out of business - a company that was formed by the forced merger of a number of aviation companies that were told that was the only way they could get the order for what was to be the TSR.2 - in effect, get them to merge and then kill their business.

BTW, the scrapping of the P.1154 was why the decision was taking to buy re-engined Phantoms fitted with the Rolls-Royce Spey, as a 'sop' to the British aero engine industry, unfortunately someone must have missed the point that it was Bristol Siddeley that was losing the jobs, not RR, with the loss of the BS.100 with the P.1154.

.. one could be forgiven for reaching the conclusion on examining the muddles and contradictory British defence policies of the 1960s that it was a result of Machiavellian strategies attempted by politicians and civil servants without much in the way of competence. The ultimate cause was lack of money, but you don't solve this problem by 'throwing out the baby with the bathwater'.

... and the cancellation of TSR.2 didn't actually save any money - it actually cost MORE in the long run. That sort of behaviour in an individual would lead them to be classed as an 'imbecile'. You see, the TSR.2 project was built on a system whereby the production line and jigs, tooling, etc., were set up for mass production from the start, i.e., most of the costs had already been paid for, the production line, tooling etc., was all ready to go, in fact the three prototypes had all been built on the production tooling. In other words, they cancelled it just when it was almost ready to start generating revenue. The cancellation was the aviation industry equivalent of running the marathon and then giving up within sight of the finishing line. THAT's why the cancellation was so stupid. And all due to 'politics'.

A 1964 Flight article "TSR.2 - Producing a Major Weapon System for the RAF" here: [6]

... and a 1963 Flight article "TSR2 - Britain's New Weapon; an Assessment by the Technical Editor" (Bill Gunston) here: [7] and continued here: [8] — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.7.147.13 (talk) 15:07, 20 February 2013 (UTC)

Development and Production Costs being discussed just before cancellation

Just before cancellation the figure being talked about by the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and BAC/BSE was £650M which included 110 aircraft at £3M each.(page 104) In those days the defence budget was around 6% of GDP ( today just under 2%) and totalled around £2500M (RAF share £500M) per year with most of that spent on personnel as now. Projects then fitted much smaller time scales than today and comparison of plane costs for the UK at the time were Hercules £0.75M and Phantom £0.9M ( with RR engines and UK radar £1.6M) TSR2 Project manager Prof BO Heath All from RAF Historical Society "TSR in Hindsight" seminar with leading participants of the time in 1998.

http://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/documents/Research/RAF-Historical-Society-Journals/Journal-17B-TSR2-with-Hindsight.pdf — Preceding unsigned comment added by 122.61.144.71 (talk) 04:48, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

Rising Costs?

The article claims rising costs killed the project, but quotes no figures. I've read a total of £78M was spent, which was not extravagant. BAC had a reputation for delivering on-time and on-budget. Perhaps that's why the Labour Party got rid of them with the second amalgamation. ICBMs would do job a lot better and more cheaply.220.240.254.239 (talk) 00:01, 15 July 2015 (UTC)

The TSR.2 was the first UK aircraft project built as an integrated "weapon system" which included development of associated ground equipment that could be airlifted to the front-line fields the aircraft was intended to be used from. Normally this type of equipment was accounted for in separate budgeting, and not included in the cost of any particular aircraft. In addition, the aircraft required specialised avionics, such as the terrain-following radar and autopilot, which again, would normally be ordered and paid for under separate MoS/MoD budgets. This inflated the apparent cost of the aircraft. Some of this equipment could also have been used with other RAF aircraft, so it's not as if the money was being wasted on their development. Most of the 'rising costs' were actually the fault of the preceding Conservative government, that had mis-organised how the project was set up in the first place. Possibly Labour saw the aircraft as a stick-to-beat-the-Tories-with.

TSR.2 was a tactical aircraft and not intended for any strategic role later performed by ICBMs, nor indeed as was currently performed by the V-Force at that time. It was a replacement for the Canberra, and would have performed the same roles, both low and high level, that aircraft was then carrying out. The TSR.2 was effectively intended to do a similar role to that of the later SEPECAT Jaguar and Panavia Tornado - the latter initially called the "MRCA" - humorously referred-to within the RAF as standing for "Must Replace Canberra, Again". The Canberra BTW, finally left RAF service as late as 2006, so there is no reason to assume the TSR.2 would not have enjoyed similar longevity.

If TSR.2 had not been cancelled and instead had been allowed to enter service, then there would have been no need for the additional UK money that was later spent on both Jaguar and Tornado, which were ordered for the RAF to fill the gap left by the lack of TSR.2. So the money saved got spent later anyway. Long after all the UK job losses caused by the cancellation. Instead the UK money and jobs went to France, Germany and Italy. Then there was the UK money spent and wasted on the order - also later cancelled - for the US F-111K as a replacement. This aircraft was also encountering development difficulties at the time, although unlike the TSR.2's, which were relatively minor and could be easily fixed, the F-111's were not, leading to delays in that aircraft entering service. The RAAF didn't get theirs - ordered when they found out TSR.2 was likely to be cancelled - until around 1972 IIRC. They could probably have had TSR.2 (which was smaller and had a third more power) by 1968-69.

The TSR.2 project was an example of what happens when you let the people who actually know what they are doing be hampered and interfered-with by people - mostly politicians and civil servants, but the media had its part to play too - who don't. A similar thing had also occurred earlier with the Avro Tudor.

Using an ICBM to destroy a bridge in Germany would be an expensive and rather extreme measure to take when all you wanted to do was destroy a bridge to delay a Soviet advance - just ask the Germans what they thought of the idea. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.150.100.144 (talk) 10:03, 11 December 2016 (UTC)

RAF Historical Society TSR2 in HIndsight Seminar in 1998

Just looking back over talk archives I notice that this important gathering which included talks by many of the leading people involved at the time and covering a large number of relevant topics hasn't been referenced.

There was the belief by one participant that the TSR2 would still have been cancelled if the Conservatives had won the election instead of Labour as that was the recommendation of Air Staff Chief Sir Charles Elsworthy to the labour government.

It makes very interesting reading ( 200 pages) and will certainly change the opinions ( hopefully) of many contributors and covers more than just the cost and political aspects and covers engine, avionics etc and even a project overview by Sir Frederick Page

Anyway heres the full paper

http://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/documents/Research/RAF-Historical-Society-Journals/Journal-17B-TSR2-with-Hindsight.pdf — Preceding unsigned comment added by 122.61.144.71 (talk) 05:23, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

Yes... So, according to the seminar papers by those involved with the project: the OR was over-egged; in particular the grass-field-to-supersonic-cruise requirement ('Mach 2 from a cabbage patch') made no sense, and it led to the airframe's Achilles heel -- the dysfunctional undercarriage -- and the TSR 2 could never have been serviced at a rough grass strip anyway; the bump-up from English Electric's proposed Mach 1.7 to a demand for Mach 2.2, and Mach 2.2 in tropical climates at that, trebled the engine development costs to no great purpose; the warload was small and the predicted 200-400 yard error for blind bombing rendered TSR 2 useless for anything but nuclear attack, since enemy defences were certain to make visual bombing unaffordable; the inertial navigation system required constant drift correction by radar fixes, but the accurate reliably detailed maps of enemy territory to enable those fixes did not exist; the moving-map display was as hokey as the one in James Bond's Aston Martin, another groovy but comical bit of 1964 chic ('That interesting car of yours!' as Goldfinger chuckles); the side-looking radar display depended on continuous instantaneous development of optical film, requiring bottles of developer within the console (good luck getting that Heath-Robinson kit to work in a combat aircraft in bumpy low-level air); the aircraft was so electronically noisy that the enemy would have had little trouble detecting and targeting it; the Verdan digital computers were not powerful enough for all the proposed mission profiles and had to 'talk' to the analogue avionics, requiring awkward 'translation' and electronic bottlenecks; the planned mean time between failures, though ambitiously several times that of a Phantom, still gave only a 1 in 3 chance of successfully completing a 5-hour sortie, and the actual MTBF was measured in mere minutes; a mash-up of two competing designs by two competing companies is not how you do that; nobody was in charge, nobody could say no to anything and costs were escalating faster than the changes could be notified through the bureaucratic channels; the budget-milking was so blatant that EMI was proposing a real-time air-to-ground datalink on the reconnaissance pack, when the necessary communications satellites would not be in place for some 20 years; only about a quarter of planned development cost had been met by 1965; Chief of Defence Staff Lord Mountbatten was correct in saying that the Buccaneer could carry out most of the TSR 2's missions; and Chief of Air Staff Sam Elsworthy recommended cancellation and believed it was inevitable whichever party won the '64 election (so, nothing to do with Wilson or Healey having pro-Soviet sympathies, which they didn't).

Still, that's the trouble with being ahead of your time. The US B-58 Hustler was at least as ridiculous, it cost $5bn when $5bn was a lot of money and the navigator always had to carry a rubber band to connect two control knobs as an inflight fix when the astro-navigation thing broke down as it always did. And the B-58 went nowhere, but the TSR 2's Olympus 22R engine became the Olympus 593 for Concorde, and the lessons in engineering and project management were important for MRCA (Tornado), Jaguar and Typhoon. And going ahead with TSR 2 would have killed funding for better things. As Bill Gunston put it (in 'TSR 2: What Went Wrong?', Aeroplane Monthly, September 1973, p.220), 'a full TSR 2 programme would not have helped MRCA, which in my view is a much better thing for Western Europe to have developed.' Khamba Tendal (talk) 20:04, 17 January 2017 (UTC)

No. Built

just listing the no. flown is wrong, what if 1,000 of a type were built, but only one flew, how many would you say were made. - (ZLEA 01:23, 18 January 2017 (UTC)) — Preceding unsigned comment added by ZLEA (talk • contribs)

We normally only list the aircraft that have flown in the infobox, any others are explained in the article text. MilborneOne (talk) 15:06, 18 January 2017 (UTC)

Who's "We"? - ZLEA (talk) 01:25, 13 February 2017 (UTC)

Change Operational History to Development History?

As it never entered service/operation. Thoughts please Mztourist (talk) 06:26, 6 August 2017 (UTC)

High-value targets

This term is used in the lede and I know what it is intended to mean (geographical targets essential to the enemy). But the wiki article about HVT’s, which is linked, mentions only essential *people*. Boscaswell talk 03:54, 26 September 2018 (UTC)

Its theoretical maximum speed was Mach 3 in level flight at 45,000 ft (14,000 m)

A theoretical capability doesn't amount to anything in the real world. Does anyone have a copy of the source McLelland? Perhaps he has more on it.Pieter1963 (talk) 21:07, 26 February 2017 (UTC)

The Mach 3 figure was the theoretical aerodynamic limit that the airframe and engines were designed-to however the materials used limited (due to aerodynamic heating) the actual maximum speed to just over Mach 2. The projected Mach 3 Interceptor version would have used different, higher temperature, materials (e.g., titanium) in strategic places, and be armed with IIRC, four Red Top. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.132 (talk) 08:54, 3 November 2017 (UTC)

In Stanley Hookers autobiography "Not much of an engineer" page 147 he states that "One of the demands made for TSR.2 was that the aircraft should be able to fly at its maximum Mach number of 2.2 for a full 45 minutes. This meant a total redesign of the Olympus in high-temperature materials able to soak at the Mach 2,2 ambient conditions." KreyszigB (talk) 21:39, 4 November 2017 (UTC)

A comprehensive 1964 Flight article on the TSR.2 here: [9]

IIRC, the air entering Concorde's Olympus 593's at Mach 2 was at over 100c, hence the use of Titanium compressor initial stages. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.186 (talk) 10:09, 13 December 2018 (UTC)