Talk:Attack on Pearl Harbor/Archive 10

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Why do we say "surprise"?

Writing "surprise attack" isn't wikipedia assuming a position on the Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate? Isn't this a violation of WP:NPOV?--Pokipsy76 (talk) 16:38, 15 March 2008 (UTC)

Since Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate is a page for conspiracy loons, no. The consensus among historiographers (& naval officers, btw) is, Japan achieved massive strategic surprise. To deny that is POV, too. What did you have in mind? Trekphiler (talk) 20:41, 15 March 2008 (UTC)
I have in mind just to not use the word "surprise" if there is room to doubt that it was a surprise.--Pokipsy76 (talk) 16:03, 24 March 2008 (UTC)
How much "room to doubt" is required before we stop using the word "surprise"? An insignificant number of historians and military observers doubt that overwhelming surprise was achieved. Binksternet (talk) 17:45, 24 March 2008 (UTC)
How much insignificant is this number and how much significant does it have to be in order to avoid the word "surprise" according to you? Do you have statistics about the opinions of historians?--Pokipsy76 (talk) 20:02, 10 April 2008 (UTC)
Why harp on the word "surprise"? The Japanese intended their coordinated December 8 attacks to surprise the world. If a few individuals were able to guess ahead of time that the attacks were coming, such information belongs in this article with proper citation. No need to get rid of the word "surprise" in order to make room for such statistical outlyers. Binksternet (talk) 16:43, 13 April 2008 (UTC)
You make a good point however I'm still not convinced. The intention of the attackers cannot be relevant: suppose that the US army had advance-knowledge and organized their defence, would you say that it was a "surprise attack"? I don't think so. This means that what the japanese intended to do is not a relevant issue.--Pokipsy76 (talk) 16:55, 13 April 2008 (UTC)
Conjecture about what we might call it if something different happened doesn't seem useful to me in making this particular article clear for the reader. The great mass of US military was completely surprised in the event. Furthermore, it's been called a surprise attack for decades. That's enough for me to be fully satisfied with the word "surprise" remaining in the lead. Whatever further clarification is felt necessary can go in the body. Binksternet (talk) 00:16, 14 April 2008 (UTC)
We must also understand the definition of "surprise" isn't (necessarily) the dictionary one. In a military context, even advance knowledge doesn't obviate surprise being achieved. For instance, it was widely accepted in Germany the Allies would land in northern Europe; "surprise" centered on exactly when & where, & there's no question it was achieved. So, too, Pearl Harbor: Japan attacked, catching defenders (who should have had warning, from Ward & Opana Point, if noplace else) off-guard. Trekphiler (talk) 16:08, 14 April 2008 (UTC)
Can you explain on what grounds can you say that "Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate is a page for conspiracy loons", please?--Pokipsy76 (talk) 20:10, 10 April 2008 (UTC)
"Can you explain on what grounds can you say that "Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate is a page for conspiracy loons", please?" Yes. Read the talk page there. In short, anything that contradicts the theory it's a conspiracy is dismissed, & whatever FDR (& everybody else concerned) was doing to actually aid Britian (which demanded peace in the Pacific) is ignored. To do this in the face of the facts, either you're stupid or a loon; I can't see any other explanation. You be the judge. Trekphiler (talk) 12:10, 12 April 2008 (UTC)
This is wikipedia, not POVpedia, we don't mind who editors think to be "loons" or "stupids", we just report fairly everything that is reported by sources without taking positions.--Pokipsy76 (talk) 13:10, 12 April 2008 (UTC)
Notice this is a talk page, where any POV is expressed.... "report fairly everything" applies to the article pages. Trekphiler (talk) 07:54, 13 April 2008 (UTC)
This is not sa forum, we are here for discussing the article and your POV should be completely irrelevant for the development and the discussion of the article.--Pokipsy76 (talk) 10:43, 13 April 2008 (UTC)

<--Make a note. I didn't introduce my POV to the article. If it's said here, I'm entitled to a POV, regardless whether you like it. I have yet to go out of my way to express it, except in response to criticisms of what is or is not in the article. You raised PHAND as a defense, not me. You failed to consider the low (or nonexistent) caliber of scholarship in the PHAND wrangle, not me. And you were the one trying to turn back the historographical consensus, not me. Whose POV should get left at the door? Trekphiler (talk) 11:06, 13 April 2008 (UTC)

There have been many viewpoints on the attack starting from the moment it began. We're not here to solve any disputes between viewpoints. As a matter of convenience and order we've split the topic into manageable chunks. Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate is devoted to the debate over whether the attack was a surprise. This article is devoted to the attack itself, and as little background and follow up as possible. There are many additional articles that cover other aspects of the attacks, including articles on the leading participants as well the ships, planes, forces, and locations that were involved not to mention the preceding and subsequent events plus the military intelligence, etc, etc. Let's try to keep this article focused, as much as possible, on the actual event. ·:· Will Beback ·:· 11:21, 13 April 2008 (UTC)
Ditto. With that in mind, I'd suggest breaking out the "salvage" section into its own article. It's not uninteresting, it just isn't on point here, IMO. Trekphiler (talk) 12:11, 13 April 2008 (UTC)
I think that it's worthwhile leaving in the fate of the ships. If we do want to remove the "salvage" subsection it shouldn't go in its own article but rather in Results of the attack on Pearl Harbor. ·:· Will Beback ·:· 17:00, 13 April 2008 (UTC)
No beef with that. I just think this page should narrow the focus as much as reasonable. I incline to moving anything that's outside the strictly military effect. Trekphiler (talk) 15:13, 14 April 2008 (UTC)
Yes and talking about *this* article about the event I'm wandering why we say it was a "surprise" if there is a "debate" about whether it is a surprise or not.--Pokipsy76 (talk) 12:13, 13 April 2008 (UTC)
There is a debate about it only become some people insist on debating it, not because their contentions necessarily have merit. It may take two to tango, but it only takes one side to create the appearance of a debate. The consensus of historians is that there is nothing to debate, and this article represents that situation, as an encyclopedia should, so in the meantime, please take the "debate" to the proper place, which is not here. Ed Fitzgerald (unfutz) (talk / cont) 20:02, 13 April 2008 (UTC)
Ditto. It was. There isn't. Any questions? Trekphiler (talk) 15:13 & 16:19, 14 April 2008 (UTC)

I'm impressed by Pokipsy76's arguments questioning the use of the word surprise. I think it goes to the heart, in my mind, of the difficulty and/or impossibility of being truly objective, even in the face of an enormous amount of research and background, even with something that seems so obvious and certain. I have little doubt, SOME in the military knew or strongly suspected, such an attack would take place (similar to the argument regarding Normandy). The challenging questions become WHO knew, WHEN did they KNOW, HOW much did they know, and what did they DO or FAIL to do upon such knowing, and were individual who knew CONVINCE others there was a problem (consider the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the person(s) who said he knew about the hijackers and was ignored), and most important: how much power did any person who knew (or should have known) have to take action in the face of such knowledge.

And more problematic, how do we know who knew? Some people very high up may have known but, because they refused to take action, or worse--because they wanted an excuse to enter into WWII--they would never admit to such knowing. Perhaps they used the Oliver North strategy to shred all the evidence of their knowing. That reasonable possibility, like the sinking of the Battleship Maine, gives me sufficient reason to doubt that it is unquestionably certain that the attack was a surprise to the MILITARY AS A WHOLE.

On the other hand, I do think it fair to argue that those on the island who were attacked were surprised. I believe the evidence strongly supports that. Even if a small number of high level officers on the island had sufficient fore-knowledge of the attack, either they would have prepared for it (to save themselves or the troops they felt a connection to), or one of them would have been so outraged that the others were not preparing for it, that s/he would have told the story about it later. This would not necessarily apply to those at the highest ranks of the military, who are far less likely to feel a deep connection to those at the bottom, those who were thousands of miles away and were of a different monetary class (for evidence of this there is a famous French movie regarding WWI and how troops were indifferently sent to slaughter by indifferent generals (the movie Galipoli also portrays it)). Those at the very top could have known and were willing to take the sacrifice to enter WWII because they either felt it was the excuse they needed to enter the war (for either moral reasons or perhaps to benefit other in their class). They may have acted surprised or convinced themselves they were surprised. The same has been argued regarding the sinking of the Maine.

Apparently, Howard Zinn, a noted historian, makes the following argument: "According to Zinn, suggests[sic] that America, not Japan, was to blame for Pearl Harbor, provoking the Empire of the Sun and forcing it to attack us."--written by someone who clearly takes issue with Zinn Article by Daniel J. Flynn. I discussed with someone who says he will provide sources that the American military has frequently deliberately made itself vulnerable. (He said a number of ships were out looking for the Japanese fleet). Zinn, like me, question the possibility of pure objectivity:

“Objectivity is impossible,” Zinn once remarked, “and it is also undesirable. That is, if it were possible it would be undesirable, because if you have any kind of a social aim, if you think history should serve society in some way; should serve the progress of the human race; should serve justice in some way, then it requires that you make your selection on the basis of what you think will advance causes of humanity.”

Ibid.

I think that's why I'm both impressed and simultaneously skeptical of the Wikipedia challenge to obtain "objectivity." People want to believe it is possible, but I'm still not entirely convinced, and I sought out this site in particular, because I knew it would be contentious. I do believe, however, in the importance of sharing multiple opinions and letting people decide for themselves based on the evidence provided, what to believe and what not to believe. Not that there going to make the "right" choice!

--David Tornheim (talk) 20:31, 18 July 2008 (UTC)

So much conjecture belongs at Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate. Thank you, please drive through. Binksternet (talk) 21:12, 18 July 2008 (UTC)
I think your basic argument is sound in the abstract. It's difficult to know positively when secrecy, let alone the passage of time, is involved. However, we can't ignore the personalities of the people in charge. Decisions are never made in a vacuum; they're driven by beliefs & values as much as aims.
That being true, it impugns the reputation of George Marshall, at least, if not FDR himself, by suggesting Marshall would knowingly go along with this. Marshall's integrity was unimpeachable & uncompromising. He would never stand for a conspiracy. And that means FDR would have had to be astonishingly careless, cavalier, or stupid to risk it (given you accept he did, & I don't). Marshall was supremely well placed to discover the putative conspiracy, & there can be no question he'd have exposed it if he had discovered one. Neither was FDR so stupid as he'd have had to be; whatever else he was, his grasp of political calculus was masterful. He cannot have failed to understand it would have ruined him to be caught in a fiddle like that, even presuming he wasn't impeached (& the anti-FDR climate in '40-41 wasn't unlike that around Clinton & Whitewater/Lewinsky, AFAIK).
Furthermore, the actions FDR did take belie the conspiracy theory. He tried everything he could to move Congress & public opinion to active support of Britain. He took measures to provoke Germany into declaring war (Lend-Lease, the Neutrality Patrol, reporting U-boats to RN, the "shoot on sight" order, none the actions of a true neutral). The conspiracy loons conveniently ignore all of this.
Beyond that, the benefit of a war with Japan would unquestionably fall on Germany, not Britain, & Hitler knew it. So did McCollum, author of that notorious memo the conspiracy loons use to try & defend their POV. McCollum wrote another memo (which the conspiracy loons conveniently ignore) in which he cogently & accurately points out what will happen if there's a war with Japan, hitting the exact points Hitler does in his own conference discussing the issue how it would benefit him; Hitler effectively says, "I wish." Then Japan gives him his wish. Unless FDR is a Nazi agent, unless everybody with access to ULTRA is a Nazi agent ('cause any one of them could have exposed the conspiracy)...it was legitimate strategic surprise.
One other reason? There were plenty of reasons to disbelieve an attack would fall there, or Japan would/could attack there, & even more reasons the Hawaii command was unprepared, all listed on the Attack page. Conspiracy is more fashionable, but plain stupidity is more common. So is luck. And so is the enemy being better prepared & taking an unprepared opponent by surprise. At bottom, the conspiracy loons aren't prepared to believe the Japanese could do it without help.
Or have I completely missed your point? Objectivity, to me, demands consideration of the credibility of the source. I don't, won't, give equal weight to a conspiracy loon as to a serious historiographer. They aren't functionally equivalent. If there's serious evidence it wasn't a genuine strategic surprise (which needs to take account of the above points), I'd favor including mention of it. I'm unaware of any. Absent any, the objective view is, it was a surprise. Absent any, saying it wasn't a surprise isn't objective, it's promoting a view contradicted by the overwhelming weight of evidence, & that's a small step from fiction. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 23:46, 18 July 2008 (UTC)
First, on my first reading of the above discussion, I mistakenly thought Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate would not be worth looking at--there's far more evidence there than I had expected. I agree that some of my comments above would be better there (or duplicate what is there)--especially Zinn's argument. I'm open to moving and deleting some. (but still am fuzzy on when it's better to delete or to use strikeout, etc.)
I also read the response of Trekphiler (thank you) and reviewed conspiracy theory (very interesting). (I did begin to respond to Trekphiler, but found I was sharing more of my personal views than I wanted to for such a public forum. I would be happy to respond in private.)
Second point: I continue to believe that Pokipsy76's questioning whether the word "surprise" is objective is entirely reasonable, and that the responses and evidence provided in the above discussion (was there any?) did little to convince me otherwise. For example, conjecturing that "an insignificant number of historians and military observers doubt that overwhelming surprise was achieved" is not convincing. Pokipsy76 asked for evidence and statistics on that and none were provided. I'm not saying that's easy, but without it, the unsupported statement remains conjecture, and sounds to me more like wishful thinking than something based on facts and knowledge (feel free to prove me wrong). I should also point out that one historian doing copious research can have a drastic effect on how academians and popular culture view something considered as certain and verifiable truth, but that such research and evidence when initially presented may be rejected by nearly all the "experts" of the day. Nicolaus Copernicus and the Copernican Revolution is a standard example. So insignificant to me would be 0.
I, therefore, suggest that a footnote be placed at the word surprise which refers reader to the lengthy dispute about whether there was fore-knowledge and let the readers come to their own conclusions about whether the entire discussion there is bogus rather than using the more heavy handed approach of deciding for them.
Third, I am troubled by the use of the term "conspiracy loon" to describe people who question certain assumptions and beliefs about the Attack on Pearl Harbor. I believe Pokipsy76 was correct is calling it an ad hominem attack and that Wikipedia discourages such patronizing, derogatory, defamatory statements to describe different arguments, positions or opinions. The use of an ad hominem attack generally causes me to have doubts about the ability of the author to listen carefully and perceptively and with some detachment and openness to an opinion he or she does not agree with. It suggests to me that their internal discomfort with hearing something they do not agree with overwhelms their ability to listen and discuss rationally the subject at hand, and that the ad hominem utterance is a way to vent intense negative feelings. I also think it is a form of might makes right, at attempt to use emotionally abusive language to attempt to get the recipient to back down, a bit like hazing. I would be happy to delete my personal views in this paragraph about ad hominem attacks--I just wanted those who spoke using those phrases to know why in my opinion they discredit the speaker of them more than the person being attacked.

--David Tornheim (talk) 08:43, 19 July 2008 (UTC)

<-- "conspiracy loon"? When there is what appears to be willful ignorance of overwhelming evidence & willingness to believe flawed, faulty, & incomplete evidence, I cannot help think it is nothing but a fringe element. I do not take that seriously, any more than I take seriously those who think Elvis is alive (or just went home), & I will not dignify them with the respect due serious commentators. They deserve ridicule. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 14:23, 19 July 2008 (UTC)

The first major quote on the Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate is by Vice Admiral Frank E. Beatty, "Another Version of What Started the War with Japan," U. S. News and World Report, May 28, 1954, p. 48. Are you saying that the mainstream magazine U.S. News and World Report is just a bunch of "Conspiracy Loons" including the Vice Admiral himself? I looked in a history book, used in high school in the 1970's or 1980's, and it too mentioned that the U.S. suspected an attack was imminent. Are writers of children's text books generally no more than "conspiracy loons"? I assume there is more documentation on the Wikipedia site, but this should be enough for starters.
As for the Elvis being alive comparison, I have never seen any credible evidence of the quality I just referred to here, but if you want to maintain this comparison, please show me what evidence the "conspiracy loons" for that cause are citing that is of similar reliability. My hunch is they rely almost exclusively on unreliable magazines like The National Enquirer or the Weekly World News known for fabricating stories (or simply as a joke for amusement). In fact, the Elvis sights section of the Elvis Presley phenomenon has a picture from Weekly World News. Therefore, I think the comparison is not relevant at all.
--David Tornheim (talk) 20:24, 21 July 2008 (UTC)
Absent knowing what Beatty or USN&WR said, I reserve comment. And school texts don't rise quite to the level of scholarship I'd consider reliable; they're written for a broad consituency (a number of schoolboards, often with varying standards) & are little more than pablum, quite aside textbook printers being de facto compelled to include creationism. This does not rise to the level of even amateur scholarship. I think in particular of Stinnett, who ignores his own sources, & Toland, who plays Kreskin (or should I say (John Edward?) with FDR, ascribing FDR's very thoughts, while throwing everything he can find at the reader, hoping to conceal the paucity of his argument. I think especially of some of the commenators on the PHAND page, who simply refuse to even answer arguments, instead throwing out more complaints. (Have a look at the bottom of this page for another example.)
About Elvis, I put the 2 in the same class. There's no credible evidence for the conspiracy. There's a lot of conjecture & speculation & ignoring actual facts & actual evidence of what was really going on. By contrast, whatever its faults, Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History exhaustively deals with all the points raised by the conspiracy nuts & debunks them point for point. That is the standard against which the conspiracy theories & their evidence must be measured; they consistently fail to meet the test. Elvis is still dead. The grassy knoll is still unoccupied. And FDR was not a Nazi. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 02:21, 22 July 2008 (UTC)
Absent knowing what Beatty or USN&WR said, I reserve comment. I'm surprised that you have not looked at it. It's the first major quote on the PHAND page. Can you explain how you are able to dismiss what they say when you haven't looked at the initial page of the article. Or has it changed since you first reviewed it?
I will look at the "conspiracy section" below. I assume that the area you are talking about? As for the authoritative source you have talked about, I will admit no familiarity with it. If I have time I'll check it out.
I agree that textbooks do not rise to the level of high quality scholarship I would like to see. And their likihood of omission, in order to satisfy mainstream and cultural beliefs or to promote patriotic/nationalistic thinking is quite disturbing. I was a teacher once, and it really bothers me how much politicians interfere with subject matter, curricula and methods (e.g. they, unlike scholars, apparently think Americans are too stupid to learn more than one language unlike Europeans who learn 2, 3 or more), and worse, they do not generally focus their appointments on highly qualified scholars or teachers to the Board of Ed. in California, but instead campaign contributors or business people, like the head of the Gap, Fisher, or those who have a political agenda regarding curriculum similar to their own. On the other hand, I do get a sense local boards of ed. buy bad text books, because 1) They have no other choice or 2) the danger of offending narrow-minded parents and taxpayers may threaten the entire school with being shut down by those uncomfortable or intolerant of good scholarship and the truth. There's a reason well educated people often don't want to become teachers or quit--schools are so demanding on teachers and can be anti-academic environments, dumbed down so badly with half information, no wonder the kids are bored to tears. The specific example you cited above is particularly interesting. (Notice how I dodged taking any position on that one!) (Is it inappropriate to digress like this???)
As for the comparison with Elvis, you haven't convinced me there--I'd let that one go. I doubt you'll find any school text book or reliable mainstream magazine or newspaper (other than the tabloids) that would say Elvis is alive. I don't know who Stinnet, Kresin or Toland are. Are these sources or Wikipedia writers? David Tornheim (talk) 04:33, 22 July 2008 (UTC)
Surprised? Don't be. I came very late to the discovery there were people who genuinely believed there was a conspiracy, & have little (I'd say no, but I am spending effort to refute, so that's self-evidently untrue) interest in discovering how extensive the fallacious & ludicrous claims are. I've seen enough to give it no credibility. I don't draw a strong parallel to Elvis sightings, just put them in the same class: lunatic fringe. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 01:09, 23 July 2008 (UTC)
FYI. My main response is below at the end of the "conspiracy" topic. I also put a response on my talk page that I will probably edit & copy over here. I do see how it makes more sense to have it on the PFANK (sp?) page, but for some reason the discussion is here, so that's where my comments will probably be for now...--David Tornheim (talk) 01:23, 23 July 2008 (UTC)

Grammar and civility

Trekphiler:

First of all, I find your comment "is your grammar so bad you can't SEE it's wrong?" uncivil.

Secondly, I see now that you are using "launched" intransitively which, while grammatical (strictly speaking), is unusual, and also a bit confusing to readers, judging by the amount of discussion on the matter. By the way, the sentence "Two aerial attack waves, totaling 353 aircraft, were launched from six Japanese aircraft carriers." is also grammatical, contrary to your comment.

Best regards,

Qu1et (talk) 18:55, 15 March 2008 (UTC)

Call me uncivil if you like, but read the "were" post above if you think this is grammatical: "Two aerial attack waves, totaling 353[4] aircraft, were launched from six Japanese aircraft carriers, intending to reduce or eliminate United States' military power in the Pacific." I repeat, if you do, your grammar is terrible. Trekphiler (talk) 20:35, 15 March 2008 (UTC)
Perhaps so, but my edit was "Two aerial attack waves, totaling 353 aircraft, were launched from six Japanese aircraft carriers." I believe this is just as grammatical as "Two aerial attack waves, totaling 353 aircraft, launched from six Japanese aircraft carriers," and sounds less awkward, but if you prefer the second reading that's fine with me. Qu1et (talk) 23:08, 15 March 2008 (UTC)
This was debated fairly extensively above, & I thought it was settled in fave the 2d reading, because it isn't equally grammatical, for reasons noted. Trekphiler (talk) 19:38, 18 March 2008 (UTC)

News story vanished

The link in the message box at the top of this page leads to a "404 file not found" message. (I wonder if these codes really mean something...) Perhaps someone could look into this? Regards, Waltham, The Duke of 23:31, 6 May 2008 (UTC)thirsty

404 is an error returned by Web server software when a requested page can't be found. It is an indication of either hardware error (the directory has been damaged) or of sloppy system administration of the Web server. It may be evidence of a plot (to do quite what is unclear), but this appears unlikely. The canonical response for those troubled by getting a 404 message is to email the Webmaster of the site asking that the page be restored (from backups, perhaps). So, be bold and send an email. ww (talk) 07:41, 14 May 2008 (UTC)

Taranto not mentioned?

I've just scanned the article and it appears that the Battle of Taranto is not mentioned anywhere. It appears from documantries etc what i have seen is the source for the Japanese plan for the attack.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:43, 31 May 2008 (UTC)

I am so sick of that piece of fiction. How stupid do you think the Japanese were? Incapable of figuring out a fleet in harbor was a juicy target? Incapable of seeing aircraft could attack successfully? OK, I'll grant technical problems might've gotten solved base on JUDGMENT, but seriously... Trekphiler (talk) 04:39, 27 June 2008 (UTC)
If Taranto suggested technical solutions to the Japanese then it warrants a mention in this article - particularly if some readers will have an over-inflated impression of Taranto's importance to Pearl Harbour. The Land (talk) 09:39, 27 June 2008 (UTC)
I won't argue against a mention, but IIRC (not having read the page just now), it's already there... Trekphiler (talk) 11:27, 28 June 2008 (UTC)

It is documented that the Japenese did use Taranto as the blueprint for the attack. German intelligence were contacted by the Japenese to collect detailed information on the attack from the Italians. The method of the attack ,devised by the british was novel. The use of a carrier to attack with combined dive bombers and torpedoes on a heavily defended port was new. It is NOT a piece of fiction to say that the Japanese studied this attack to help plan theirs. The intelligence on this attack was , in fact , relayed to US intelligence several months before the event by the British double agent Tricycle. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 218.214.164.36 (talk) 03:26, 19 July 2008 (UTC)

Tricycle... Next you're going to say FDR attended the planning conferences, I suppose? Prange et al. discredited Popov's claims to my satisfaction, & I repeat, how stupid do you think the Japanese were? The implication of reliance on JUDGMENT (& on Popov & Abwehr) is, IJN officers were incompetent. If you believe that, why not just say so? TREKphiler hit me ♠ 14:52, 19 July 2008 (UTC)
Mark Peattie and David Evans state in Kaigun, which is regarded as one of the most authoritative histories of the IJN, that Taranto didn't have a impact on the planning for Pearl Harbor. Nick Dowling (talk) 00:09, 20 July 2008 (UTC)
According to one source I've seen, apparently after the war Genda stated at the United States Naval Institute that Taranto had no bearing whatsoever on the plan for Pearl Harbor. That sort of statement should be relatively easy to check I would have thought. (Air Raid, Pearl Harbor!: Recollections of a Day of Infamy. p.74, recollection of Rear Admiral Walter C. Ansel) --Harlsbottom (talk | library) 04:01, 20 July 2008 (UTC)

Conflict of intent?

ww, your cleanup didn't change the meaning, but somebody sure did. I think it's less clear now than in the "wave" description, which details which forces were intended where (a format the source retains, but the article presently doesn't). Unless there are strong objections, I'm reverting for clarity's sake. Trekphiler (talk) 04:47, 27 June 2008 (UTC)

Trek, Some of those edits were bad English, others were confusing AND bad English. I translated them into good English and made guesses about the intent of the confusing bits. Reverting will leave confusion and restore some very odd English. Net, I think a loss. Better to remove the confusion from the better English we have now. I didn't want to change the meaning since I couldn't, of my own knowledge, correct it. The long edit summary was to alert someone who might know a better or a less confused account. Kind of fishing for an expert, as it were. ww (talk) 04:56, 27 June 2008 (UTC)
At risk of undue vanity, I might qualify. My thought was, just take it out entire. It doesn't add anything (I don't think) that isn't already in the "waves", it's ungrammatical & unclear. Let me have a glance at the page history & the current "wave" sections. If no objection, I'll cut the junk & incorporate anything new in the "waves". Trekphiler (talk) 05:03, 27 June 2008 (UTC)
On reflection, looking at the content of the section, there's really nothing there (except the CAP birds, maybe, & they aren't actually part of the attack) not already covered in the "waves", in another form. What "Tactical concept" has done is restate it in "layman's terms", is all, and introduced confusion & lack of clarity in the process. It's simpler to "call in an airstrike". Trekphiler (talk) 05:17 & 05:21, 27 June 2008 (UTC)
I had the same impression when I was editing it, but on the off chance that there was concealed beneath the impediments to understanding, something of substance, I left the content I could discern. If you, being knowledgeable about Japanese intent in various respects, think there actually is no particular content hidden here, well, Be Bold... I agree that a point about Nagumo's CAP wouldn't be particularly germane to the attack itself. Except that, possibly, his provision of carrier CAP left him with some tactical/strategic limitations. For instance, is there any evidence of a dispute about bombing shore installations that was resolved in favor of CAP? I would think not, since the CAP was almost certainly Zeros unsuited to bombing missions, but there's a lot I don't understand about the way the Japanese went about the Raid. For instance, those midget submarines. I have an impression, from one book or another (and not in others) that they were there only as a politics within IJN concession to the submarine folks. And maybe to the one Japenese sailor is the equal of 10 others because of the innate superiority and Divine mission of the Japanese military and the greater glory of the Emperor. It"s never made much sense to me. But I have limitations. I don't understand the midset that's resulted in some more recent military decisions, closer to home (US), either. Eg, at Tora Bora or in Iraq generally. I'm not so good at that side of making sense of that sort of thing. I like to think that it might be I have a less thalmic approach, but ... ww (talk) 17:24, 28 June 2008 (UTC)
Even a simple reverting of the recent edit mess leaves the reader gasping for clarity--before User:Ae7flux got to it the "Tactical concept" paragraphs already contained a great deal of changing tense, grammatical mistakes and conceptual gaps. I've taken a stab at trimming and rewriting the section so as to remove confusion and redundancy. Binksternet (talk) 18:18, 28 June 2008 (UTC)
BTW, Nagumo's defensive CAP over the Kido Butai was critical, especially after the first scouting reports that there were no carriers visible in Pearl Harbor. Without a CAP, Nagumo could be counterattacked very, very seriously by US carrier forces, whose location was a complete unknown. I still don't understand why the Japanese hadn't figured out that putting the surface combatants (8 battleships!!) around the carriers in a protective ring would have released more aircraft from CAP duties and allowed a stronger attack. Binksternet (talk) 18:25, 28 June 2008 (UTC)
Looking at it as is, I don't see anything but the CAP birds that isn't covered adequately below it.
Let me withdraw my claim to expertness... ;) I think the importance of the CAP is overblown. Recall, Nagumo only launched half his birds at any 1 time, & they'd have been tasked to antiship in the 2d wave (presuming the ABs were neutralized in the 1st). Even if Halsey stumbled into him, it'd have been a massacre, & the small number of CAP A6Ms wouldn't have been a big difference. The question is timing; without sources in front of me, I can't say if Nagumo risked a dilemma like Midway on launch/recovery if he was discovered. And maybe I was falling into the trap of hindsight. Knowing the risk was small, it's easy to overlook it.
That said, I wouldn't say deleting mention of CAP entire is a good idea, & Binksternet, you're right to note the issue. To my knowledge, there were no strength issues, tho I've heard it said Nagumo was concerned about retaliation (presumably because Halsey remained undetected; viz hindsight). If we're going to discuss that in the article, tho, we risk getting into major issues (as witness Midway on Yamamoto's dispositions) re recon practise & strength (did Nagumo have enough VSs?), doctrine (did IJN train for adequate pre-attack recon? provide for it?), & planning (on provision of VSs), just for a start. Is this really something we should take on? Or do it, but split out a "planning" page? Or an "IJN doctrine" page, which could also link in the Midway controversy?
On minisubs, I'm insufficiently familiar to say if it was political, but I do know at least some Japanese had high hopes for them, building two minisub tenders (disguised as seaplane tenders), & used here & Sydney Harbor (IIRC); they also lacked the imagination to deploy them in ways that might have actually influenced the outcome of the war, at SF (Hunter's Point), L.A./San Pedro, Dago, Puget Sound, VancouverCanada (yay!), or the Panama Canal.
Thinking about it, a split page that covers prep & intention, which could also discuss the motivation for using minisubs & how Nagumo got selected, to name just 2 issues, might not be a bad idea. To that end, I posted a request for comment on the MilHist project talk page. Trekphiler (talk)Canada 04:57, 05:02, & 05:14, 29 June 2008 (UTC)

Australian intelligence

Some sources state that Australian intelligence noted the movement of the Japanese fleet and attempted to alert Roosevelt in the days before the attack, but that Roosevelt dismissed the report. I cannot find any information about this in the article. Can this please be evaluated and added? Badagnani (talk) 05:43, 29 June 2008 (UTC)

I've read widely and systematically in the field (too bad my memory is a sieve) and the only connection that comes to mind is the Australian contribution to UK crypto at, for instance, Hong Kong and later Singapore. Thereafter, the crypto effort against Japan was mostly a joint US / Australian / New Zealand(?) enterprise under MacArthur at the Combined Bureau and elsewhere in the Pacific Theater. :No credible account of FDR ignoring attempts to alert him about the likely oncoming war is known to me; in fact, FDR and at least some of his advisors were expecting conflict, possibly actual war, with Japan as a result of what was obviously a consistent and serious commitment to agression starting in the 30's. And increasingly so in the spring/summer/fall of 1941 as Empire actions made conflict more likely, and the US (and others) progressively increased sanctions (economic and material) in an attempt to deter further Japanese actions. Hard to miss the early and strong commitment to expansion (if necessary military) when Japan left the League of Nations when it was criticized over its militaristic behaviro.
The Australian name usually cited is Rupert Nave (sp?), who was assigned to various crypto operational headquarters at various times during the war. There is a book, by Rusbridger, which makes claims somewhat related to the one you note, and which used Nave's diaries as a source (and perhaps Nave himself IIRC) but which has been criticized as making claims the diary does not support. It may be that your sources point to.
Nevertheless, if any credibly sourced information is found, it should certainly be added. Perhaps not to this article, though. There is an article about advance knowledge which deals with such issues and the assorted bits and pieces of evidence which are said to support various claims of foreknoweldge and conspiratorial silence. ww (talk) 16:52, 29 June 2008 (UTC)
Agreed. The Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate article would definitely benefit from such an addition. If enough material on Nave is unearthed, an article about him would be very helpful. Binksternet (talk) 18:05, 15 July 2008 (UTC)
Australia had next to no independant intelligance gathering capabilities in 1941, and obviously didn't focus its limited resources on the far-off North Pacific. Australian aircraft were shaddowing the Japanese fleet bound for Malaya in the days before Pearl Harbor, but the only intelligence focused on the North Pacific would have been Australians attached to the British SIGINT units at Hong Kong, and it's long-established that the Japanese fleet maintained radio silence. Nick Dowling (talk) 00:04, 20 July 2008 (UTC)

japs

                      Did the Japs ever attack California??  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 70.253.160.231 (talk) 20:48, 1 July 2008 (UTC)

Long count

Cited for the 29 lost in action is:

Ofstie, R.A., RADM USN, Naval Analysis Division, United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) (1946), The Campaigns of the Pacific War, United States Government Printing Office

Since it's not in dispute the total was 29, & since the question was, "lost in action, or including failures to recover & wrecked beyond repair", can somebody with access to Oftsie check & see which it is? TREKphiler 00:28, 2 July 2008 (UTC)

Strategic

I reverted the change made by ScienceApe; I consider the Pearl Harbor attack to be strategic in nature, validating a strategic evaluation of the results. Every initiatory battle planned and designed to commence large scale hostilities can be seen in a strategic light. Binksternet (talk) 05:03, 7 July 2008 (UTC)

Only one caveat. The effect was also grand strategic. And IIRC, the "effect" used to mention that. If it got reverted (I'd have to look...), that needs to be put back in. TREKphiler 05:44, 7 July 2008 (UTC)
Ignore. Fixed by revert... TREKphiler hit me ♠ 08:31, 15 July 2008 (UTC)
(Copied from here) Before you change the result to tactical again, will you consider a couple of things? First, the result had enormous strategic & grand strategic consequences. It started a war, for instance. And second, the objective was to achieve strategic aims, knocking out the Pacific Fleet. Either one qualifies for more than a simple tactical result. Both combined certainly do. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 00:47, 16 July 2008 (UTC)
Might he (ScienceApe) be saying that it was only a tactical victory because the U.S. carriers were not sunk? (I agree with you, Trekphiler, but a thought...the edit may have been in good faith) But ScienceApe, the attack wasn't just a tactical victory because A) it brought the U.S. into the war that was already going on, helping the Allies win (...does anyone actually think that Britain could have beat Germany and Japan and Italy without us? Not trying to degrade our pals across the pond, but Germany would have won eventually.) B) it forced the U.S. to test the limits of what its carriers could do (Doolittle Raid)--imagine if we had still had the battleships going into WWII...HMS Prince of Wales (53) anyone? the_ed17 04:24, 16 July 2008 (UTC)

<--Oh, i don't doubt it's good faith, or I wouldn't have bothered to try & persuade him. I think it's just ignorance (in the strict sense: lack of knowledge). If we can clear that up, it'll save having to keep reverting.

"does anyone actually think that Britain could have beat Germany and Japan and Italy without us?" Germany, yes. Once Hitler attacked the SU, it was a foregone conclusion Germany would lose (given Hitler is Hitler & we don't credit him with an abrupt & unhistoric attack of good judgement). Italy? Britain was well on her way to bringing Italy to a political disaster when Winston decided to send that futile expedition to Greece, & Italy was never the strongest player in the game. Japan? After Germany's defeat, or before? Before the SU decides to romp across the Mongolian/Manchurian border with Germany in ruins? (Make no mistake, IJA was about as capable of stopping ASU as Ethiopia was of stopping Italy.) And "test the limits of what its carriers could do"? True, but never forget, it was the Sub Force that brought Japan to her knees, & (IMO) the attack compelled Nimitz to rely on them in ways he wouldn't have otherwise. Don't for a second believe the Brits were incapable of applying the lessons they'd learned fighting U-boats, & IJN was doctrinally & organizationally incompetent to cope even with solo USN boats & lousy Mark 14 torpedoes, let alone real wolfpacks & good torpedoes.

Don't forget, either, it would have been more to Britain's benefit to have a couple of squadrons of B-24 in Newfoundland rather than in Australia in 1941. They would have been able to close the Atlantic Gap with 'em & neutralize the U-boat threat. Whether Winston would still have insisted on an Italian invasion, or if Brooke would have been able to talk him out of it (or stall him long enough for Italy to change sides), is an open question (though I'd be interested in seeing sources discussing the issue). It's far from as simple as "the U.S. won the war for Britain". TREKphiler hit me ♠ 21:55, 16 July 2008 (UTC) (P.S. The Doolittle Raid was tactically pointless & strategically unsound. Those carriers should have been at Coral Sea, & those B-25s could just as easily have bombed Truk, to more immediate advantage. Of course, that would have left Yamamoto with one less argument to attack Midway, and...)

Wow. This debate could go on for awhile (read: "Of course, that would have left Yamamoto with one less argument to attack Midway, and...")! Good point about the (Pacific) subs, though, and I completely agree with your logic on the Doolittle Raid part-->but remember what the mood in the U.S. was at that time...we had lost the Philippines, Wake etc. and the domination had no end in sight. We needed something for Americans to rally behind! It also caused the mainland commanders to move some units to defend the main islands, instead of sending them to outlying bases for attacks on the U.S. Also, B-24's would not neutralize U-boats; harass, yes, neutralize, no--U-boat submerges, B-24 can't hit it. It could call in a sighting, but a destroyer would have to be very near for anything to occur. Lastly, Yamamoto might not have attacked Midway with one less argument; it was far away from any other Japanese base, making the logistics a nightmare....but really, who knows? Anyway, have a great day! Cheers, the_ed17 22:57, 16 July 2008 (UTC)
Replied here.

More on the conspiracy.

If the conspiracy is for loons, explain these.

http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/pearl.html

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/invest.html <---Joint Congressional Investigation

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/army/chap_0.html <---Top Secret Army Board Report

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/narrative/index.html <---Navy Inquiry

Explain how CONGRESSIONAL COURTS were wrong about this. I could use a good laugh. :D 火の王国の王女 ~Fire Nation Princess~ (talk) 06:16, 15 July 2008 (UTC)

You might try posting these here, instead. It's the place to defend conspiracy loons. You might also point out just which parts of them you're citing as your flimsy evidence, to save those of us who don't believe FDR was a lunatic or an idiot from having to wade through all of it. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 08:41, 15 July 2008 (UTC)
Well, aren't you a friendly fellow! *eyeroll* I put that there as support for the removal of the word "surprise," and I see no reason for you to have said this on my personal talk page, rather than the Pearl Harbor one. By the way, who is "all of us?" Do you have statistics on how many people who have read the article and the talk page believe the conspiracy or not? Did you even actually read the article(s) I posted, or even skim them? If you did, I don't know how you can call direct quotes and Congressional and military court rulings "flimsy," unless you don't think those courts are credible. ^.~; Also, may I suggest anger management courses, or maybe a stress ball? Most of your posts here seem terribly belligerent. Oh yeah, stay off my personal talk page. Keep it here, please. 火の王国の王女 ~Fire Nation Princess~ (talk) 10:44, 15 July 2008 (UTC)
Seeing how you were the one posting, a note on your talk page is to be expected. Don't like it, don't post. "All"? I see no mention of "all". As for "all", yeh, I'm not going to read the entire doc to find what you believe is so significant, when you start with "conspiracy". And "belligerent"? No, just impatient with people who can't see the forest for the blinders they're wearing. And "support for the removal of the word 'surprise'" is going to take rewriting a few million words of historiography, 'cause the consensus (& not just on WP) is, it was a surprise. Get over it. And you were the one who mentioned "conspiracy"; if you want patience for a POV, don't start off with a reference to the lunatic fringe. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 16:16, 16:17, & 16:21, 15 July 2008 (UTC)
No one said you had to read the whole thing. Can't see the forest for the blinders? WHOO, projection aplenty! Oh, excuuuuse me, I didn't realize that a qualifier for patience with a POV was accordance with YOUR POV. It was a suggestion. I don't know why you found it so threatening, but as for your belligerence, you have a bad attitude on this entire page, and I see that you've been called out for your "uncivility" before. As for the consensus, I wasn't aware that something being a consensus was immediate proof that it's correct. A consensus used to be that the world was flat. That wasn't true, obviously. You're the one who needs to get over it, and stop being a know-it-all. 火の王国の王女 ~Fire Nation Princess~ (talk) 02:47, 17 July 2008 (UTC)
"No one said you had to read the whole thing." You do nothing but post links, with no indication of what you want to call attention to. What else should I conclude but that's what you intend?
"threatening"? Fat chance. I'm just tired of stupid people spreading propaganda in the guise of historiography.
" immediate proof that it's correct"? Never said that either. You're the one trying to overturn the consensus, & "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence". You don't even have ordinary evidence.
"A consensus used to be that the world was flat" Only among the ignorant; sailors knew perfectly well Earth was spherical in the second millennium BC, & Eratosthenes proved it to within a few % of the modern figure around 300 BC. I don't count the ignorant; the consensus in question is among the informed, the professional historiographers, not people who don't know FDR wasn't President in the Civil War.
"stop being a know-it-all"? I see you don't answer the arguments, but resort to attacks, which is the traditional response of people without actual facts. Cf the "civil' comments on the PHAND page.
"Patience for a POV"? Previous incivlity? I'm short with people who make changes on settled issues without paying any attention to it being settled, & I reserve nothing for fabricators & charlatans. If I was being incivil to you, I'd tell you just what I think of your argument on "conspiracy". Or do you believe fakes deserve to be given the same regard as serious historiographers? TREKphiler hit me ♠ 18:46, 17 July 2008 (UTC)
FNP, The investigations you cite were not courts, indeed the assorted questions about US prior knowledge in the attack on Pearl have never been taken to any court, including a court martial. All were subject to political pressure (being carried out in several cases by politicians and in others by those who might be expected to have a bias toward or against one or another strategic policy stance). Further, all the contemporary ones, save the last, were distorted by attempts to conceal US code-breaking.
Assorted folks have felt, from early on (eg, Gillette, the next morning) that there was something fishy about being caught by surprise. Generally, such folks cite one or more statements from an investigation (such as those you cite here) or from a contemporary which support their doubts about the Japanese having actually achieved surprise. What is almost universally missed is that military intelligence is an inherently messy business.
In the aftermath of just about any action, it will prove to be possible to find that a proper (in hindsight) interpretation of the available data would have accurately predicted the enemy's action. This entirely neglects the mass of information pointing in various directions which was actually on hand prior to the action, with which intelligence analysts were actually attempting to cope, before the action. Failure to appreciate the actual circumstance of those attempting to foretell enemy actions is a logical fallacy in itself.
In addition, some observers (eg, Stinett in his book and Willets in his) simply get things wrong. One is the break status for JN-25, the highest security Japanese naval cypher. Willets even claims, incorrectly, that it was an obsolete code in the late 30s, its type having been abandoned by the US around 1900. Stinett claims that the existence of a manual containing procedures for breaking such cyphers demonstrates that it was actually broken well before the Attack. In fact, it was essentially the state of the art for such systems at the time (the British used one almost identical in operation throughout the War), and was not easy then, nor now with plentiful computer support, easy now, to break. Even with an adequate understanding of how to proceed while attempting to break such a cypher. Analyses based on such misunderstanding, confusion, ignorance, etc are themselves unreliable for at least this reason.
Still further, there is too often, a good bit of circular reasoning. For instance, Roosevelt (or someone) was intent on x, the meaning of this or that is interpreted in that light, thus showing that Roosevelt (or someone) was intent on x. QED. The logic is faulty and does not support, as claimed, the conclusion.
While I think loon is perhaps a bit too colorful, and likely to evoke some hostility, there is considerable difficulty with the position that the Attack at Pearl was understood beforehand, was encouraged, etc for any reason. Intelligence difficulties, bureaucratic rivalries (eg, between Army and Navy crypto groups in Washington), too much secrecy (eg, in Hawaii between the FBI and Navy re wiretaps on the Japanese consulate there), reluctance to watch the cable traffic of potential enemies (eg, in Hawaii, but not New York, per US statute), rivalry between Army and Navy generally (eg, in Hawaii, where friction amongst Block (local Naval District), Kimmel (Fleet command), and Short (Army command), and failure to properly use available resources (eg, both Army and Navy re recon flights in the period before the Attack, and for the army failure to fully use early warning assets like the radar installation), inefficiency (eg, Navy failure to react adequately to early warnings from eg Ward, and Army Air Corps failure to react adequately to those same warnings) are together more than sufficient to account for the surprise the Japanese achieved.
For the Wikipedia, and this article particularly, the issue is not truth (WP does not insist on truth, but only on good writing, and adequate citation to existing sources, especially in controversial instances), but rather an intelligible account. It was long ago decided that the controversy around the Attack was best handled in a separate article, as its inclusion lead to bad writing. Therefore, a lack of extensive support for conspiracy accounts of the Attack here is appropriate. Mention of the alternative accounts is here, as is a reference to the appropriate article. ww (talk) 17:38, 15 July 2008 (UTC)
THANK YOU for being OBJECTIVE and CIVIL. My post was a suggestion to be taken seriously or discarded, but CIVILLY. I still believe it was a conspiracy, but I'll certainly take your information into consideration, unlike certain people who just, well, attack without warning. xD Higashi no kaze, ame! —Preceding unsigned comment added by Firenationprincess (talk • contribs) 02:52, 17 July 2008 (UTC)
Looking a this, I see I was right, this does belong at the loonies page. It's fiction. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 16:25 & 00:38, 16 July 2008 (UTC)

And a fine time was had by all. To add just a pinch to this topic, some points to consider perhaps include:

A review of Safford's Exhibit 151 (Google gets you to the www.ibiblio.org website and this html document), shows "Reference (a) ... 'was exchanging technical information and translations ...' ..." where "Reference (a)" is cited as the US Navy document Opnav-242239 from November 1941. Opnav-242239 remains classified today despite numerous FOIA requests. N.B., "translations" in November 1941.

As to the website "www.ibiblio.org" - yes, a wealth of materials; however, it has does have gaps. Also, more recent sources have greater detail. For example, again using Google, compare Safford's SRH-149 from www.ibiblio.org (another html file) versus www.fas.org/irp/nsa/safford.pdf, noting the release date. SRH-149 has significant material redacted still; and yes, FOIA requests are filed to remove all of those redactions.

And of course, SRN-116741 persists —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.21.125 (talk) 14:37, 19 July 2008 (UTC)

And here I thought the Elvis sightings would be limited to PHAND. My mistake.
Re your vaunted SRH-149, I see no smoking guns. Nor I do see even a mention of J-19. I do see how limited crypto manpower was, considering the flood of traffic. (Oh, I'm sorry, you don't recognize overwork or lack of staff as valid causes for missing 1 signal in 20000, do you? My bad.)
Here, I do find this, from SRN-115435: "29 Nov 'All capital ships, destroyers, submarines of the South Sea Force and the Kukokawa Maru are to maintain battle condition short wave silence, starting 100 Nov 29.'" (Oh, I'm sorry, you think the Japanese don't know how to keep station or obey orders. My bad.)
Ibid., SRN-116741 says, "'Starting 4 December 1941, system #8 of Naval Code will be used and system #7 discontinued. (List 7 will still be used with some Japanese stations.)'" I confess, I don't see the startling significance. Of course, I don't believe the Japanese were incompetent or FDR was a Nazi, either. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 15:43, 19 July 2008 (UTC)

.. Psst ... suggest you re-read SRN-116741, or better still - get a true copy - as your quoted text is incorrect. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.21.125 (talk) 15:55, 19 July 2008 (UTC)

Hate to break it to you, but that was cut & pasted from the website you provided the link to. Who got it wrong? TREKphiler hit me ♠ 20:39, 19 July 2008 (UTC)
Did you miss the point about "gaps" ... Your quoted text for SRN-116741 is incorrect.
"Your quoted text for SRN-116741 is incorrect." The "quoted text" is a direct lift from your source. If there are "errors", they're in the original. (Oh, wait, I forgot. There's a conspiracy. They must have elided the website copy, too. My bad.) TREKphiler hit me ♠ 03:37, 20 July 2008 (UTC)
Actually the "original" is correct and can be found in the public domain.
"Actually the "original" is correct" Then perhaps you'd care to explain why the source you provided the link to got it so wrong, instead of complaining how "incorrect" it is? TREKphiler hit me ♠ 21:47, 20 July 2008 (UTC)
  • Including information on fringe theories of how Roosevelt knew of the planned attack and let it go forward to get the U.S. into the war is entirely inappropriate. Mainstream historical analysis rejects these allegations as nonsense. Too much of Wikipedia is devoted to fringe and pet theories: "It doesn't have to be true, it just has to be referenced." What poppycock. An encyclopedia should be as true as it is possible to make it. Scholarship requires more than Googling, it requires judgment.--Paul (talk) 19:49, 19 July 2008 (UTC)
Thank you! TREKphiler hit me ♠ 20:39, 19 July 2008 (UTC)
Seems fair - so Paul, please display your implied "scholarship" sans "Googling" 'cuz it ain't there: on what specific day (Washington, DC local time) did the United States State Department order its Ambassador (Grew) in Toyko to destroy all of its confidential/secret documents and all ot its coding/decoding paraphernalia (you know, that "GREY" code stuff)? [Bonus points - What exactly triggered this order?] —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.21.125 (talk) 23:27, 19 July 2008 (UTC)

Anon poster: you have committed a logical error in your implied argument. There are many possible reasons Grew was instructed to destroy that material, and many times when it might have been reasonable to do so. Including a mistake at the State Dept. In particular, any time after the army and Navy warnings to all commands (27 Nov, was it?) requires no particular explanation. And the lack of an explanation that satisfies you is NOT proof of conspiracy. On the question of WP being as truthful as possible, there arises the philosophical question of how to determine when truth has been found. Since there is no non-subjective answer for this (see discussion above for an illustration of a somewhat civil disagreement on such questions), and without an overall authority to settle such questions, WP must adopt the policy it has. If there is no citation for it, despite the possibility that it is true, it goes out if it's challenged. The biggest problem with this policy is what I've called drive-by taggers, who insist that such statements as 'iron is a solid at room temperatures' require a source citation. There is some discussion at the WP policy statement on Citing Scientific Facts (official title is close to this), but it's still a fuzzy and somewhat unsatisfactory policy around the edges. We are left with, cite it especially if challenged, and don't try to be correct regardless of citation. Someone will see it differently, especially if not cited, and will revert or edit it into a mangle. From a platonic ideal stance, this is not a winning policy, but WP is a very large furball (the largest the species has produced) and it's not a very good fit with Ideal Forms. Plato would be scandalized, most likely. And so goes the most recent episode of the 2500 year old debate over some philosophical notions. The study of the Classics is not irrelevant to modern life! ww (talk) 01:58, 20 July 2008 (UTC)

Well, what do you know. And I took it to fill a summer.
ww, you touch the fundamental problem with conspiracy theorists of all stripes (not least Oliver Stone): the refusal to accept plain stupidity is more common than conspiracy. I also think Damon Knight may've said something cogent on it (Why Do Birds, IIRC): because we're selected to believe things we can't see (we're told there's a lion over there that will eat us, but we can't see it; those who believe aren't eaten, those who go look are), humanity is genetically programmed to religion, & by extension, conspiracy theory.
I do sometimes worry about random tagging, especially by people who ignore sourced material in the linked articles (I came across one here), but also things that are only in question by people who know almost nothing about a subject, & worse yet, people who ignore citations & tag anyhow. (I've seen that, too, a couple of times.)
In this case, the willful unwillingness to accept evidence contrary to the conspiracy makes this an argument with the faithful, I fear, & you can't make a reasoned argument to someone who takes something on faith. The best you can do is answer the charges for those who are ignorant (in the strict sense: uninformed) but have an open mind, & ridicule the blind who have seen the facts & refuse to accept them (for which I will make no apologies).
I trust, in the market of ideas, & WP certainly is, the truth will out, for consensus is its own form of truth. I suggest it's the truth of science, which is also a furball, & has been on longer than WP, & is arguably bigger (if less concentrated). It gets to a consensus, & the consensus is accepted as truth, testable, repeatable, verifiable...& just like WP, the process is occasionally messy, & there are occasional gaffes, & sometimes fringe theory gets in. Eventually, the mainstream weeds it out, & the broad community marginalizes the absurd & unprovable. Sound familiar? TREKphiler hit me ♠ 03:37, 20 July 2008 (UTC) (P.S. ww, you're right, it's 27 Nov. For the conspiracy loons, & anybody who thinks they might be right: read it. The actual text, not what you've been told it says. Stinnett even reproduces a copy. And unlike Mulder, I'm prepared to believe he didn't doctor it.)
A simple question - a date. Points for why then. No, it is not November 27, 1941. This is not a presupposition, nor is it part of a syllogism - it is a simple question. And, yes, the quoted SRN-116741 remains incorrect.
Do you have difficulty reading what's actually written, or are the blinders getting in the way? The question of date ww raised (& I answered, correctly) was the date of the "war warning" message, not your putative conspirator's order. And yes, the quoted paste of SRN-116741 remains the same as it was when I copied it exactly as it was reproduced. I guess it was edited before your source got to it. TREKphiler hit me ♠ 21:47, 20 July 2008 (UTC)

The specific date requested was with regard to the United States Department of State, Cordell Hull (alumnus of Cumberland College, very famous for its football team) being Secretary of State and a Republican at the time. Added points to Paul should he also display "scholarship" in determining the trigger. [As a hint, and a very small one, for decades the United States Department of State produced, on an annual basis, a summary of its efforts. Those summaries for years, say 1930s and 1940s might - just might - be of help.

Your quote of SRN-116741 remains incorrect. I could point to citations of "printed books on the shelve" which seem immune to "bit-diddling" - but Paul's comment on scholarship provides a check. As a consolation, however, Willey did your "cut n' paste" and has SRN-116741 as incorrect as you do. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.21.125 (talk) 11:42, 21 July 2008 (UTC)

Trek got which date I was trying for, and a confirmation that my memory wasn't terminally leaky. I was indeed attempting to remember the date of the Army and Navy war warning messages to Pacific commands, after which any order to Grew to destroy sensitive material would have made good sense in the ordinary course of events, and could not reasonably be interpreted as evidence for conspiracy of some kind. I can't recall when Grew was told to or did destory his crypto material, but see no indication of conspiracy in it. Grew and Washington remained in communication until near the last moment which is just what they should have done were there no conspiracy at all.
There may have been a conspiracy, though I have seen no evidence which, fairly interpreted, points in that direction. To argue that the only interpretation of this fact or another is that it supports a conspiracy is sometimes called special pleading and is in this case and example of circular reasoning. It can't be relied upon to produce credible conclusions. Sorry, I rmeain unconvinced that there is any there there. ww (talk) 02:27, 22 July 2008 (UTC)
There's 2, actually, but that's the usual 1 considered the "'war warning' message" because it's the more proximate; the other was late Oct/early Nov (26 Oct, IIRC). TREKphiler hit me ♠ 02:49, 22 July 2008 (UTC)
Joint Congressional Investigation, Part 6, beginning say on page 2511 (not to hinder anyone's "scholarship" the following is a few pages after 2511, not Plato more Hegel). Kimmel speaking: " ... On the same day [sic 27Nov41 - the so-called "war warning" message] I received two other dispatches from the Chief of Naval Operations, which affected my current estimate of the situation, as well as my subsequent dispositions. ..."
And those two, after some "scholarship" were? [N.B., You now have the reference, +/- a few pages.]
Regarding the message date to Grew and its trigger, no - incorrect.
And, yes, SRN-116741 remains in error. Very telling. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.247.21.125 (talk) 03:15, 22 July 2008 (UTC)
"Joint Congressional Investigation, Part 6, beginning say on page 2511" Yes, that's extremely helpful to those of us without a copy in our own personal libraries, or easy access to the Library of Congress (which is only, oh, 5000km & an international border away). Nor do the web links offer any assistance where said P.2511 might be found. Nor, per usual, do you.
"27 January 1941, Dr. Ricardo Shreiber, the Peruvian envoy in Tokyo told Max Bishop, third secretary of the US embassy that he had just learned from his intelligence sources that there was a war plan involving a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor." (*sigh*) This is the caliber of evidence? Cocktail party gossip?
And SRN-116741, at the site provided, is the same today as it was yesterday: " TREKphiler hit me ♠ 09:04, 23 July 2008 (UTC)


I have read nearly all the “conspiracy” section above. I found it difficult to follow either side of the argument. Both sides immerse me in details without context and tit-for-tats. Both sides left me scratching my head about why I should believe you.

I did appreciate the initial four sites listed there, but I have to agree with the “surprise” side's request (Trekpelier) that without a summary of what we are looking for at each site and some guidance, it’s too much to ask us to read the entirety of what is shown on each site.

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