Radical pro-Beijing camp

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Radical pro-Beijing camp
激進建制派
IdeologyChinese nationalism
Chinese neoconservatism
Ultraconservatism (HK)[1]
Factions:
Chinese socialism
Anti-Western sentiment
Right-wing populism
Political positionRight-wing to far-right
Factions:
Left-wing
Legislative Council
6 / 90 (7%)
District Councils
1 / 470 (0.2%)

Radical pro-Beijing camp (Chinese: 激進建制派; lit. 'radical pro-establishment camp'), radical pro-Beijing,[2][failed verification][3][failed verification] pro-Beijing radicals,[4] or pro-Beijing traditionalists[1][failed verification] is a Hong Kong political term, which means mainly a hardliner on pro-Beijing camp. They came after Leung Chun-ying took office as the 3rd Chief Executive of Hong Kong in 2012.

Political position[edit]

They generally express strong support for the Chinese Communist Party and the Hong Kong government, with some members supporting "one country, one system".

Although the radical pro-Beijing camp is loyal to the Chinese Communist Party, the main radical pro-Beijing camp is conservative, pro-business and anti-labor rights; in May 2020, when the Fulham Group [zh] was criticized for forcing workers to work without pay, members of the pro-democracy camp protested against the Fulham Group, but some radical pro-Beijing camp figures defended the Fulham Group.[5][failed verification][6][failed verification]

Some radical pro-Beijing camp use violence against the pro-democracy camp.[7][failed verification][8][failed verification] Organizations related to the radical pro-Beijing camp are distinguished from mainstream pro-Beijing camp, including Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong and business figures.[9]

Politicians[edit]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b Edward Vickers (2004). In Search of an Identity: The Politics of History Teaching in Hong Kong, 1960s-2000. Routledge. p. 2.
  2. ^ a b "Why Facebook is losing friends in Hong Kong". Rest of World. 2021-02-28. Junius Ho, a radical pro-Beijing lawmaker who once called for pro-independence activists to be "killed without mercy," has more than 1.1 million followers on Weibo, China's version of Twitter.
  3. ^ Stan Hok-Wui Wong (2015). Electoral Politics in Post-1997 Hong Kong: Protest, Patronage, and the Media. Springer. p. 162. ISBN 9789812873873. Their controversial tactics may help them draw media attention as well as political support from radical pro-Beijing voters, but their presence may also cause a backlash against the pro-establishment camp as a whole in the coming elections - exactly the same problem that has plagued the pan-democrats.
  4. ^ "Pro-Beijing radicals in weapons protest". South China Morning Post. 2014-06-09.
  5. ^ "工友抗議剝削 富臨報警拘兩人". Archived from the original on 2020-07-08. Retrieved 2020-05-10.
  6. ^ "工會質疑富臨申請保就業資助但要求員工放無薪假". 10 May 2020. Archived from the original on 2020-05-26. Retrieved 2020-05-10.
  7. ^ "「光復東涌」行動展開 撐內地旅客團體向記者起飛腳". 經濟日報. 2018-11-11. Archived from the original on 2018-11-18.
  8. ^ "稱被愛港力出賣 有氣難消 打記者梁粉判刑 「我似用完即棄紙杯」". Apple Daily. 2013-01-09. Archived from the original on 2015-03-21.
  9. ^ "立會選舉:激進建制派無市場 得票低賠按金". Oriental Daily News. 2016-09-05. Archived from the original on 2016-09-20.
  10. ^ "【佔中判刑】陳淑莊腦瘤壓腦幹 何俊賢:一到找數個個身患絕症". 香港01. 2019-04-24. Archived from the original on 2020-08-26.
  11. ^ "工聯會理事長暗喻首富李嘉誠為「曱甴王」 李氏商圈成下一打擊目標?". RFI - 法國國際廣播電台. 2019-09-16. Archived from the original on 2020-04-17.
  12. ^ "葛珮帆支持禁制令制止網上煽暴言論 有助於警方執法". 頭條日報 Headline Daily. 2020-01-09. Archived from the original on 2020-04-29.
  13. ^ "王國興、周融等組關注組 質疑放港獨分子入閘 香港等同緊急狀態 區選難言公正". 立場新聞 Stand News. 2019-10-25. Archived from the original on 2019-10-25.