Credibility (international relations)

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In international relations, credibility is the perceived likelihood that a leader or a state follows through on threats and promises that have been made.[1] Credibility is a key component of coercion (i.e. compellence and deterrence), as well as the functioning of military alliances. Credibility is related to concepts such as reputation (how past behavior shapes perceptions of an actor's tendencies)[2][3] and resolve (the willingness to stand firm while incurring costs).[4][5] Reputation for resolve may be a key component of credibility, but credibility is also highly context-dependent.[6]

Credibility may be determined through assessments of power,[7] past reputation,[8][9] current interests,[7] and signaling.[10] Situational and dispositional factors may affect perceptions of credibility.[2][4] Misperception and miscommunication can lead to erroneous assessments of credibility.[11] Assessments of reputation may be linked to specific leaders,[12][13] as well as states.

Coercion[edit]

Main article: Coercion (international relations)

Much of the scholarship on coercion focuses on the credibility of coercive threats as a key component of the success of coercive diplomacy.[14][15][16][17][18][19] According to Thomas Schelling, a reputation for resolve "is one of the few things worth fighting over."[20]

Successful coercion frequently revolves around a demonstration of capabilities and resolve, both of which enhance the credibility of attempts to coerce others. According to Richard Ned Lebow, a credible threat entails:[19]

  1. A formulated commitment
  2. A communication of that commitment to the other side
  3. The capability to back up the commitment
  4. The will to back up the commitment

According to Robert Art, the perquisites for compellence success are:[21]

  1. Clear objectives
  2. Strong motivation
  3. Domestic and international support
  4. Strong leadership
  5. Clearly stated demands
  6. Creation of a sense of urgency in the other state's mind
  7. Making the target fear unacceptable escalation
  8. Asymmetry in motivation

Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd Sechser argue that there are three main components to credibility in coercion:[22]

  1. Ability to impose one's will militarily on the target
  2. The stakes in a dispute (to both the challenger and the target)
  3. The cost of military conflict (to both the challenger and the target)

According to Anne Sartori, states rarely seek to obtain goals through bluffing, because doing so undermines their reputation in future crises.[23] Survey experiment data from Barbara Walter and Dustin Tingley confirm the findings of Sartori's study, as they find that people "invest more heavily in reputation building if they believe a game will be repeated many times."[24]

Credibility (or reputation) refers to the degree to which an actor is expected to uphold their commitments based on past behavior.[25][26] In terms of credible coercive diplomacy, credibility entails that defiance will be met with punishment, and that compliance will be met with restraint.[27][15] One of the main problems in coercive diplomacy is that it is hard to credibly signal that compliance will not lead to punishment.[15][28][27][29] Some scholars have argued that when great powers increase their power, their credibility to engage in restraint decreases, which may lead weaker adversaries to be less likely to comply with great power threats.[15][30][31]

To enhance the credibility of threats, some scholars argue that audience costs are effective in doing so.[32][33][34] Other scholars dispute that audience costs enhance credibility.[35][36]

Some scholars question whether credibility or reputation matters in international disputes.[7][37][38]

States may be motivated to pay high costs in order to maintain reputations for resolve. They are most likely to do so when they expect that they will face future challenges where they will benefit from having reputations for resolve.[39]

Costly signaling[edit]

Main article: Audience cost

Some scholarship suggests that the credibility of threats is enhanced by costly signaling, which means that the threats themselves incur costs, which signify that the threats are genuine.[40] Other scholars argue that sunk-cost signaling is exceedingly rare in practice, as states prefer to signal credibility and resolve in other ways.[41]

A substantial literature points to audience costs as a meaningful form of signaling. An audience cost is the domestic political cost that a leader incurs from his or her constituency if they escalate a foreign policy crisis and are then seen as backing down.[42] The implication of audience costs is that threats issued by leaders (who incur audience costs) against other states are more likely to be seen as credible and thus lead those states to meet the demands of the leader making threats.[43][44] The term was popularized in a 1994 academic article by James Fearon where he argued that democracies carry greater audience costs than authoritarian states, which makes them better at signaling their intentions in interstate disputes.[45][46][47] It is one of the mechanisms for democratic peace theory.

Alliances[edit]

The functioning of military alliances revolves around perceptions of credibility: whether an ally will honor alliance commitments. Alliances that are perceived to be unreliable are more likely to end up in war.[48] Scholars have argued that past reputation shapes whether alliance commitments are perceived as credible.[9][49] When allies are perceived not to be reliable, allies may make up for it by increasing the number of allies[50] and include "costly reliability-enhancing provisions such as greater precision in when alliance obligations apply, issue linkage, and increased institutionalization."[51] States with a reputation for upholding alliance commitments are more likely to be involved in future alliances.[52]

States may be more likely to honor alliance commitments due to costly signaling,[53] including audience costs.[54] Some scholars argue that indiscriminate alliance loyalty is not desirable (as that could raise the risk of conflict and entrapment),[55][56][57] and that hawkishness may also not be desirable.[58]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Jervis, Robert; Yarhi-Milo, Keren; Casler, Don (2021). "Redefining the Debate Over Reputation and Credibility in International Security: Promises and Limits of New Scholarship". World Politics. 73 (1): 167–203. doi:10.1017/S0043887120000246. ISSN 0043-8871. S2CID 230529327.
  2. ^ a b Mercer, Jonathan (2010). Reputation and International Politics. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-7489-7.
  3. ^ Crescenzi, Mark J. C. (2018). Of Friends and Foes: Reputation and Learning in International Politics. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-060952-8.
  4. ^ a b Kertzer, Joshua (2016). Resolve in International Politics. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-1-4008-8364-6.
  5. ^ McManus, Roseanne W. (2017). Statements of Resolve: Achieving Coercive Credibility in International Conflict. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-17034-6.
  6. ^ Kertzer, Joshua D. (2021-09-02). "American Credibility After Afghanistan". Foreign Affairs. ISSN 0015-7120. Retrieved 2021-09-02.
  7. ^ a b c Press, Daryl G. (2007). Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-7415-6.
  8. ^ Weisiger, Alex; Yarhi-Milo, Keren (2015). "Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics". International Organization. 69 (2): 473–495. doi:10.1017/S0020818314000393. ISSN 0020-8183. JSTOR 24758122. S2CID 145699686.
  9. ^ a b Reiter, Dan (1996). Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-3188-3.
  10. ^ Fearon, James D. (1997). "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 41 (1): 68–90. doi:10.1177/0022002797041001004. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 42473249.
  11. ^ Jervis, Robert (2017). Perception and Misperception in International Politics (new ed.). Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-1-4008-8511-4.
  12. ^ Renshon, Jonathan; Dafoe, Allan; Huth, Paul (2018). "Leader Influence and Reputation Formation in World Politics". American Journal of Political Science. 62 (2): 325–339. doi:10.1111/ajps.12335. ISSN 1540-5907. S2CID 158373803.
  13. ^ Lupton, Danielle L. (2020). Reputation for Resolve: How Leaders Signal Determination in International Politics. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-1-5017-4773-1.
  14. ^ Press, Daryl Grayson (2005). Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-4343-5.
  15. ^ a b c d Sechser, Todd S. (2010). "Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power". International Organization. 64 (4): 627–660. doi:10.1017/S0020818310000214. ISSN 0020-8183. JSTOR 40930451. S2CID 46107608.
  16. ^ Weisiger, Alex; Yarhi-Milo, Keren (2015). "Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics". International Organization. 69 (2): 473–495. doi:10.1017/S0020818314000393. ISSN 0020-8183.
  17. ^ Mercer, Jonathan (1996). Reputation and International Politics. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-3055-8. JSTOR 10.7591/j.ctv5rf1n9.
  18. ^ Schelling, Thomas C. (1966). Arms and Influence. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-00221-8. JSTOR j.ctt5vm52s.
  19. ^ a b Lebow, Richard Ned (1981). Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis. Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-2311-4.
  20. ^ Schelling, Thomas (1966). Arms and Influence. Yale University Press. p. 124. ISBN 9780300002218. JSTOR j.ctt5vm52s.
  21. ^ Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC.
  22. ^ Sechser, Todd S.; Fuhrmann, Matthew (2017). Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 13–15. ISBN 978-1-107-10694-9.
  23. ^ Sartori, Anne (2005). Deterrence by Diplomacy. Princeton University Press. ISBN 9780691134000. JSTOR j.ctt4cgcgz.
  24. ^ Tingley, Dustin H.; Walter, Barbara F. (2011). "The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation Building: An Experimental Approach". International Organization. 65 (2): 343–365. doi:10.1017/S0020818311000026. ISSN 0020-8183. S2CID 12230887.
  25. ^ Sharman, J. C. (2007). "Rationalist and Constructivist Perspectives on Reputation". Political Studies. 55 (1): 20–37. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00643.x. ISSN 0032-3217. S2CID 143586272.
  26. ^ Weisiger, Alex; Yarhi-Milo, Keren (2015). "Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics". International Organization. 69 (2): 473–495. doi:10.1017/S0020818314000393. ISSN 0020-8183.
  27. ^ a b Cebul, Matthew D.; Dafoe, Allan; Monteiro, Nuno P. (2020). "Coercion and the Credibility of Assurances". The Journal of Politics. 83 (3): 975–991. doi:10.1086/711132. ISSN 0022-3816. S2CID 225429435.
  28. ^ Bowen, Wyn; Knopf, Jeffrey W.; Moran, Matthew (2020-10-19). "The Obama Administration and Syrian Chemical Weapons: Deterrence, Compellence, and the Limits of the "Resolve plus Bombs" Formula". Security Studies. 29 (5): 797–831. doi:10.1080/09636412.2020.1859130. ISSN 0963-6412.
  29. ^ Altman, Dan; Powers, Kathleen E. (2022-02-02). "When Redlines Fail". Foreign Affairs. ISSN 0015-7120. Retrieved 2022-02-02.
  30. ^ Reiter, Dan (2021). "Gulliver Unleashed? International Order, Restraint, and The Case of Ancient Athens". International Studies Quarterly. 65 (3): 582–593. doi:10.1093/isq/sqab061. ISSN 0020-8833.
  31. ^ Sechser, Todd (2018). "A Bargaining Theory of Coercion" (PDF). The Power to Hurt: Coercion in Theory and Practice. Oxford University Press.
  32. ^ Fearon, James D. (1994). "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes". The American Political Science Review. 88 (3): 577–592. doi:10.2307/2944796. ISSN 0003-0554. JSTOR 2944796. S2CID 36315471.
  33. ^ Schultz, Kenneth A. (2001). Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511491658. ISBN 978-0-521-79227-1.
  34. ^ Gelpi, Christopher F.; Griesdorf, Michael (2001). "Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918–94". American Political Science Review. 95 (3): 633–647. doi:10.1017/S0003055401003148. ISSN 0003-0554. S2CID 146346368.
  35. ^ Downes, Alexander B.; Sechser, Todd S. (2012). "The Illusion of Democratic Credibility". International Organization. 66 (3): 457–489. doi:10.1017/S0020818312000161. ISSN 0020-8183. JSTOR 23279964. S2CID 154325372.
  36. ^ Snyder, Jack; Borghard, Erica D. (2011). "The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound". American Political Science Review. 105 (3): 437–456. doi:10.1017/s000305541100027x. ISSN 0003-0554. S2CID 144584619.
  37. ^ Mercer, Jonathan (2010). Reputation and International Politics. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-7489-7.
  38. ^ Huth, Paul; Russett, Bruce (1988). "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation". International Studies Quarterly. 32 (1): 29–45. doi:10.2307/2600411. ISSN 0020-8833. JSTOR 2600411.
  39. ^ Sechser, Todd S. (2018). "Reputations and Signaling in Coercive Bargaining". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 62 (2): 318–345. doi:10.1177/0022002716652687. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 16739982.
  40. ^ Gartzke, Erik A.; Carcelli, Shannon; Gannon, J. Andres; Zhang, Jiakun Jack (2017). "Signaling in Foreign Policy". Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.481. ISBN 978-0-19-022863-7. Archived from the original on 2018-11-28.
  41. ^ Altman, Dan; Quek, Kai (2024). "Do States Really Sink Costs to Signal Resolve?". Journal of Global Security Studies.
  42. ^ James Fearon (7 September 2013). "'Credibility' is not everything but it's not nothing either". The Monkey Cage. Archived from the original on 18 May 2015. Retrieved 8 January 2014. I'm drawing here on arguments about what the IR literature usually calls 'audience costs,' which are domestic political costs a leader may pay for escalating an international dispute, or for making implicit or explicit threats, and then backing down or not following through.
  43. ^ Downes, Alexander B.; Sechser, Todd S. (2012). "The Illusion of Democratic Credibility". International Organization. 66 (3): 457–489. doi:10.1017/S0020818312000161. ISSN 0020-8183. JSTOR 23279964. S2CID 154325372.
  44. ^ Schlesinger, Jayme R.; Levy, Jack S. (2021). "Politics, audience costs, and signalling: Britain and the 1863–4 Schleswig-Holstein crisis". European Journal of International Security. 6 (3): 338–357. doi:10.1017/eis.2021.7. ISSN 2057-5637.
  45. ^ Fearon, James D. (September 1994). "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Dispute". American Political Science Review. 88 (3): 577–592. doi:10.2307/2944796. JSTOR 2944796. S2CID 36315471.
  46. ^ Schultz, Kenneth A. (2012). "Why We Needed Audience Costs and What We Need Now". Security Studies. 21 (3): 369–375. doi:10.1080/09636412.2012.706475. ISSN 0963-6412. S2CID 153373634.
  47. ^ Tomz, Michael (2007). "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach". International Organization. 61 (4): 821–40. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.386.7495. doi:10.1017/S0020818307070282. ISSN 0020-8183. S2CID 154895678. The seminal article is Fearon 1994.
  48. ^ Smith, Alastair (1995). "Alliance Formation and War". International Studies Quarterly. 39 (4): 405–425. doi:10.2307/2600800. ISSN 0020-8833. JSTOR 2600800.
  49. ^ LeVeck, Brad L.; Narang, Neil (2017). "How International Reputation Matters: Revisiting Alliance Violations in Context". International Interactions. 43 (5): 797–821. doi:10.1080/03050629.2017.1237818. ISSN 0305-0629. S2CID 49257491.
  50. ^ Narang, Neil; LeVeck, Brad L (2019). "International reputation and alliance portfolios: How unreliability affects the structure and composition of alliance treaties". Journal of Peace Research. 56 (3): 379–394. doi:10.1177/0022343318808844. ISSN 0022-3433. S2CID 116786802.
  51. ^ Mattes, Michaela (2012). "Reputation, Symmetry, and Alliance Design". International Organization. 66 (4): 679–707. doi:10.1017/S002081831200029X. ISSN 0020-8183. S2CID 154358095.
  52. ^ Crescenzi, Mark J.C.; Kathman, Jacob D.; Kleinberg, Katja B.; Wood, Reed M. (2012). "Reliability, Reputation, and Alliance Formation1". International Studies Quarterly. 56 (2): 259–274. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00711.x. ISSN 0020-8833. S2CID 154595753.
  53. ^ Morrow, James D. (1994). "Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 38 (2): 270–297. doi:10.1177/0022002794038002005. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 153652966.
  54. ^ Morrow, James D. (2000). "Alliances: Why Write Them Down?". Annual Review of Political Science. 3 (1): 63–83. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.63. ISSN 1094-2939.
  55. ^ Henry, Iain D. (2020). "What Allies Want: Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence". International Security. 44 (4): 45–83. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00375. hdl:1885/206720. ISSN 0162-2889. S2CID 215747296.
  56. ^ Kim, Tongfi; Simón, Luis (2022). "A Reputation versus Prioritization Trade-Off: Unpacking Allied Perceptions of US Extended Deterrence in Distant Regions". Security Studies. 30 (5): 725–760. doi:10.1080/09636412.2021.2010889. ISSN 0963-6412. S2CID 245085781.
  57. ^ Kim, D.G.; Byun, Joshua; Ko, Jiyoung (2023). "Remember Kabul? Reputation, strategic contexts, and American credibility after the Afghanistan withdrawal". Contemporary Security Policy: 1–33. doi:10.1080/13523260.2023.2253406. ISSN 1352-3260.
  58. ^ Krebs, Ronald R.; Spindel, Jennifer (2018). "Divided Priorities: Why and When Allies Differ Over Military Intervention". Security Studies. 27 (4): 575–606. doi:10.1080/09636412.2018.1483609. ISSN 0963-6412. S2CID 158264077.
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