Acayucan Rebellion

Acayucan Rebellion
Part of the prelude to the Mexican Revolution
Date 30 September – 3 October 1906 (1906-09-30 – 1906-10-03) Location Acayucan, Veracruz, Mexico Result Rebellion defeated
Belligerents
Mexican Liberal Party	Porfiriato
Commanders and leaders
Hilario C. Salas Roman Marin Enrique Novoa

The Acayucan Rebellion, also known as the Acayucan Uprising, was a brief uprising in Mexico, within the Acayucan municipality of the Mexican State of Veracruz, lasting from 30 September to 3 October 1906. It was part of a series of uprisings instigated by the Mexican Liberal Party, meant to start a revolt within Mexico against the regime of Porfirio Díaz. Though ultimately unsuccessful in its goal of igniting a revolt, the Acayucan Rebellion and the other uprisings before 1910 were early signs of the instability of the Porfiriato, and precursors to the Mexican Revolution.

Background

Since the middle of the 19th century, Veracruz had been one of the primary regions behind the Mexican Industrial Revolution, due to possessing valleys whose rapidly descending rivers made ideal sites for the installation of textile factories, and by 1845, Veracruz, by number of factories and spindles, was the third largest in Mexico. This industrialization was initially driven largely by capital from the Banco de Avio and the community of French investors in Mexico, and later by massive foreign investment expressly encouraged by the Diaz regime as part of their drive to modernize Mexico.

This in turn had spurred massive growth in the state, especially during the Porfiriato, which saw the population within the Orizaba valley doubling from 1887 to 1906, and even many smaller towns and communities in the region being home to major industrial facilities in the state. Though this growth had initially been accompanied by large scale growth in the worker's living conditions, which had increased by 15% between 1877 and 1898, conditions had collapsed by the turn of the century, with wages falling back to 1877 levels, by then barely enough to afford a day's worth of food, which, when accompanied by the arbitrary imposition of fines by supervisors, saw many workers unable to provide for their family.

Working conditions in the state were, by the standard of the day, not considered overly cruel, but debilitating to laborers, with a fourteen or fifteen-hour workday beginning at five-thirty in the morning in the summer, with only one and a half hours per day allotted for meals. Workers in settlements controlled by textile companies also had to suffer from insufficient schools provided for their children, company policies prohibiting the hosting of friends, and outright criminal behavior, including the employment of child labor, sexual harassment, and coercion.

These conditions resulted in the textile industry becoming one of the most strike prone industries throughout the Porfiriato, as well as, following global economic trends that saw a dramatic decline in the price of henequen and cotton during the five years before the Revolution, one of the most militant labor forces in Mexico, creating a large pool of recruits from which the PLM were able to draw membership and sympathizers from within Veracruz

The instigating force of the uprising, The Mexican Liberal Party, had been founded a year before the revolts in 1905 and had finalized their program on 1 July 1906, calling for the overthrow of the Diaz regime and enacting of a series of social and economic reforms to the Mexican state, which were considered progressive yet moderate. This ideological range allowed them to appeal to and recruit a wide array of Mexicans, especially among workers, motivated to action against the Diaz regime by either liberal or revolutionary ideals.

Ricardo Flores Magon, head of the ruling Junta of the MLP, which had been founded as a result of the politicization and persecution of Magon's newspaper, Regeneracion,had by then managed to settle in St. Louis, and used the publication of the party's program to usher in a period of increased growth in party membership, founding an auxiliary junta in Arizona, and many cells, organized around clubs, across Mexico.

The Governor of Veracruz during the revolts, Teodoro Dehesa, had been in power since 1892, and during his tenure had proven himself a strong advocate for conciliatory labor policy, having stepped into multiple labor disputes within the state, frequently managing to mediate peaceful settlements between workers and factory owners. This had made him both fairly popular within the state and had earned him the confidence of Diaz, who extended Dehesa a greater degree of autonomy in handling labor in the state than other governors. Dehesa, convinced that taking an intransigent attitude would only result in labor becoming further estranged from the government, chose to pursue policies that sought to co-opt PLM associated organizations, as well as ignoring orders from Diaz to perform mass arrests and surveillance of figures in the workers' movements, allowed for the PLM to propagandize and recruit to a greater degree in Veracruz than they were able to do in other non-border states, making Veracruz an important point in their planned revolution.

Preparations

By the summer of 1906, it was widely believed that a revolution was imminent, with even many in the United States suspecting an uprising was imminent, especially following the outbreak of a large scale strike in Cananea, which was widely reported in America, with some papers even reporting it as the beginning of a wider revolution, which they reported to be set to begin on 16 September, with speculation on whether the revolution would be led by the St. Louis Junta, or the recently politically exiled General Bernardo Reyes.

Though the Junta denied the rumored 16 September start, they made a concerted effort to keep the attention of the American public upon them, in the belief that doing so would prevent the U.S government from attempting to extradite their leadership, or attempt to intervene in the revolution. This in turn kept talk of a potential September revolution in the public sphere, despite fervent denials from officials and government backed reporters in Mexico.

Within Veracruz, Hilario C. Salas, one of the best organizers of PLM clubs in Veracruz, and a delegate to the drafting of the PLM program, was chosen to be the overall leader of PLM's main forces in Veracruz, and devised a plan involving three simultaneous assaults upon the settlements of Acayucan, Minatitlan, and Puerto Mexico. He also traveled to the mountains of San Pedro Soteapan, to recruit the Indians who lived within them. The Natives, hopeful that the PLM's promised restoration of their former ejidos would prove true, agreed to join Salas' force. By 30 September, Salas had assembled a force of about a thousand men.

Though the PLM had several regional headquarters, including Salas' group in Veracruz, the primary source of the revolts strength was meant to be the local clubs, which numbered around 40 by August. As part of the general instructions the St. Louis Junta issued to their cells within Mexico, attempts would be made to supply them with contraband arms from across the border, but cells would largely be expected to arm and supply themselves from the land they were expected to control. this material difficulty, as well as fear for the safety of the members of different cells, saw the PLM adopt a highly isolated structure for their cells in Mexico, with members of one group ignorant of anyone outside their immediate leadership, who in turn reported only to one of five zone chiefs in Mexico, who in turn answered to the Junta or the Junta's special agents. Thus, inter-group coordination was run directly through the Junta, and was thus largely insufficient

Despite the isolated structure and largely unprofessional makeup of their cells, the Junta hoped to be able to both recruit a large score of military deserters and members of the public to their cause, believing that the key to achieving this support would be in launching their risings simultaneously, to create both the appearance of greater strength and paralyze the regime's forces. To this end, cells were instructed to remain in wait until receiving a signal, either in the form of a direct date sent by the Junta, or in the form of an event outside the chain of command, in the form of another strike at Cananea, the arrest of any member of the Junta, or another group launching an insurrection.

The other major issue facing the Rebellion was the need to acquire weapons, with the primary means by which they had to acquire them before the rising being to borrow money on the promise of a successful revolution. Thus, plans for the seizure of assets in captured towns were drawn up, focusing on seizing the offices and depositories of government officials and favorites of the regime, while leaving the property of neutral foreigners alone. A plan was also devised to requisition funds and supplies from individuals, though cells were instructed to issue a receipt upon doing so, redeemable upon the revolution's triumph. This, alongside the institution of elections and labor reforms in areas they held, and trials of captured regime officials, were hoped to sway public opinion to their side.

The Diaz regime also made preparations for a potential uprising they feared would be underway, even while publicly emphasizing that no such events could be taking place. The government, using privately hired detectives, raids upon PLM headquarters in Mexico, and cooperation from U.S Postal Service in intercepting the mail of the St. Louis Junta, managed to build an efficient spy network centered on the Junta, and developed a decent idea of the scope of the PLM's planned revolution

Rebellion

Though the St. Louis Junta had originally planned to travel to the border to inaugurate the Revolution in September, Magon had grown concerned that the Diaz regime had received warning of an impending action, and wired Salas to instead go into hiding. However, Salas feared that such a delay would see his organization wither away, and believed that a rising would be joined by the rest of the country.

Before launching the main assault, Salas had a band sent out on 29 September to cut telephone wires and gather recruits in Pajapan municipality, and later sent them to seize the mail dispatched from Minzapan, and seized money bound for treasury officials in Chinameca, in an attempt to make up for the small number of forces and money they had.

Salas' assault upon Acayucan, composed of 200 men, beginning at 11:00 P.M, initially met with great success, but quickly fell apart when Salas' became injured, taking a shot to the abdomen, causing his inexperienced force to panic and carry him off the battlefield in retreat.

Though the assaults had meant to be simultaneous, the band who were meant to assault Puerto Mexico, under the command of Roman Marin, did not begin their assault until 3:00 A.M on 1 October, starting with the town of Pajapan. They soon managed to capture the town, arresting most of the authorities, seizing over $200, and installing their own officials in the town. they did not begin to set out for Puerto Mexico until 2:00 P.M, but partway through their march, became concerned about their lack of ammunition after seizing Pajapan, and, though they knew another armed band was awaiting them there, they turned back, and by 3 October had ultimately abandoned Pajapan and retreated into the mountains.

The third assault, led by Enrique Novoa, was also delayed until 1 October, though they never managed to engage any government forces, as Novoa, alarmed by government reinforcements, abandoned his planned assault in favor of setting up an ambush, only for most of his force to desert him for his perceived cowardice, forcing Novoa to abandon any attempts at continuing.

Several other cells, hearing of the rebellion in Acayucan, also launched assaults. One cell managed to seize the town of Ixhautlan on 1 October, though they were driven off by a force of soldiers under the command of the Jefe Politico of Minatitlan the next day, with some sporadic fighting occurring on the third. More far off risings in the states of Coahuila and Tabasco also struck, though these cells were soon put down by government forces.

The final battle of the Acayucan uprising took place on 3 October, when MLP forces who had retreated from the Acayucan assault ambushed the government forces who had followed them. Though at first the Rebels had gained the upper hand, the government forces surrendering and claiming a desire to defect to the revolution. When they led the rebels to the village of San Pedro Soteapan, they soon revealed they had no true desire to defect, and ran through most of the rebels with bayonets, with only a few rebels managing to escape.

A major factor behind the defeat of the rebellion was the Cells' lack of money, and subsequent dearth of both ammunition and weapons, as well as possessing only a small force of recruits, meaning they could only launch small assaults before being forced to retreat, and being too cautious with their forces.

Aftermath

Immediately after the Rebellion concluded, a period of mass arrests across the state followed for two weeks, with around 200 people sent to the prison of San Juan de Uliia, most without trial. The Diaz regime, taking advantage of damaged telephone wires and subsequent lack of information that had made it out, also sought to spin the rebellion off as a non-issue. the Regime used the involvement of Indians in the assault to cast the rebellion as simply a case of Indian discontent manifesting as a small thwarted attack, with no greater political motivation or revolutionary implications behind it. Many local American papers, eager to satisfy the curiosity over a potential rebellion, largely printed the government statement verbatim and unaltered as part of the front page story, even reprinting rebukes by Diaz affiliated papers of other local papers questioning the official narrative. Other Papers, further afield who were less attached to the potential significance of the rebellion reported more altered versions of the government line emphasizing the attack, while some who could grasp the political significance simply focused on reporting the core point of the governments story, that the event held no political significance This suppression campaign had the intended effect of downplaying American concerns about potential revolution, seeing an advance on the stock market of both Mexican bonds, and of some American companies that operated in Mexico, following concerns of the potential harm a revolution would have on American business interests.

Following his retreat and laid low by his injury, Salas spent the remainder of the year in the hills, and was unable to support the Rio Blanco Strike a few months later. The PLM in Veracruz entered a period of dormancy throughout the next two years. Salas would not return to revolutionary action until he began to support the Anti-Reelctionist campaign and building up arms for what he suspected would be an outbreak of violence. Many of his former followers ultimately joined the forces of the Maderistas when the revolution broke out.

Soon after the failed rebellion, Magon organized a meeting of the Junta, however their meeting location had been revealed to the Diaz regime by traitors, who in turn informed U.S authorities, who launched a raid upon the meeting. Though many members of the Junta were arrested, Magon managed to escape, and was soon able to reestablish contact with the rest of the Junta through codes and aliases, and began to rebuild the organization.

Following the failure of the rebellions of 1906, the PLM began to drift away from its founding moderate politics to an Anarchist organization with extensive plans for the restructuring of Mexican society. This was partly due to Ricardo Flores Magon blaming the lack of ammunition, which he viewed as the primary cause of the 1906 Revolt's failure, to a lack of financial backing by wealthy Liberals within Mexico.

Reforms made in light of the 1906 revolts, were ultimately a mixed bag for future PLM efforts. by 1910, economic reforms, as well as the upsurge in income from Regeneracion, and in contributions following the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution, left their cells much better off financially, though they still suffered from a dearth of recruits, with most cells still small in comparison to the regions they were expected to operate in, due in part to the greater organizational and financial systems the Anti-Reelectionists had access to, allowing them to attract a greater number of recruits. Further reforms also ordered revolutionary forces to not put down arms until the triumph of the revolution, which would ultimately be used to justify refusing to surrender to the Madero lead Interim Government, feeling that Madero had betrayed the revolution, helping to contribute to the next stage of the Mexican Revolution following Diaz's ouster.