Talk:Existentialism/Archive 5

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Changes to History

Throwing out a suggestion here. Instead of the geographical division, it might be more interesting and appropriate to do it chronologically. Working through the minor figures has really brought home to me the fact that Marcel, Shestov, Berdyaev, Buber and Unamuno had all arrived at substantive "existentialist" positions (and written some of their major works) by the early 1920s. By the end of the decade, you can add Jaspers and Heidegger. I could divide the history into "Introduction" (the material I recently provided about where the term came from), "Nineteen century", "Early twentieth century", "1920s/1930s" and "After World War 2" (can improve those headings, of course). Then we could show the simultaneous development of the themes across different countries. In any case, I can try it, and it will be the easiest thing to revert back to German, French, Other if it doesn't work out.KD Tries Again (talk) 22:03, 13 November 2008 (UTC)KD Tries Again

I agree, but I wouldn't make it too specific based on time. Perhaps simply the introduction Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Pascal, etc., then all those who were not directly related to the "modern" or "Sartrean" movement (Heidegger could lead from these pre-modern/pre-war to the modern version), and then Modern? Too many headings could make it seem like time is particularly important...

I was also thinking that instead of having separate headings for atheistic and theistic existentialists, we could just mention it in the history section in relation to each important philosopher, or as separate sub-headings?Der Zeitgeist (talk) 13:08, 14 November 2008 (UTC)

Yes. I think maybe those last sections can go altogether, once the key figures are properly explained.KD Tries Again (talk) 17:45, 14 November 2008 (UTC)KD Tries Again

Real life has been keeping me away, but I finally made the proposed structural changes to the history section and continued to develop the thumbnail accounts of some of the pre-Sartre existentialists. I will improve these and add cites, then work either on Kierkegaard/Nietzsche or the post-WW2 section. I think it's useful to make the chronology explicit in this way rather than have all the thinkers who actually preceded Heidegger/Sartre end up as a footnote to the better known writers.KD Tries Again (talk) 22:55, 21 November 2008 (UTC)KD Tries Again

The final sub-section under history needs to be deconstructed. I think Dostoevsky must be mentioned earlier, alongside Kierk. and Nietzsche (I am not sure about Kafka), and the other bits about the Beats should be dropped down to the cultural section later in the article. Dostoevsky was a fundamental influence on the first 20th century existentialists.KD Tries Again (talk) 22:57, 21 November 2008 (UTC)KD Tries Again

I think all four should be in together; What about Nineteenth century, with Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as one sub, and Dostoyevsky and Kafka as another? I'll make the changes to see how it pans out. 204.209.209.129 (talk) 07:46, 22 November 2008 (UTC)

Thanks, that's helpful - although I think the stand-alone quote from Kierkegaard should be merged into the Kierkegaard/Nietzsche section (I don't mind if that section is re-titled Nineteenth Century, or similar). I have some good material on the explosion of existentialism as a popular phenomenon in France between 1945 and 1947 and will amend that section accordingly - hopefully tomorrow. I also just added a bit from Camus' remarks on Kafka.KD Tries Again (talk) 22:38, 22 November 2008 (UTC)KD Tries Again

Added a new paragraph on the developments in Paris after Second World War. Will rewrite the following paragraphs accordingly, and also add something about Heidegger's reception in France.KD Tries Again (talk) 21:48, 23 November 2008 (UTC)KD Tries Again

I agree: That quote seems out of place, and doesn't really add much...Der Zeitgeist (talk) 14:00, 24 November 2008 (UTC)

Will get back to all this soon; busy with real life.KD Tries Again (talk) 14:51, 10 December 2008 (UTC)KD Tries Again

Angst, despair and all that jazz

I'm not really sure how these concepts are translated, and I am aware that angst is not despair, etc., but I'm also not sure that this article would benefit from stressing the distinction too much... they are quite similar concepts after all, and all are quite important. A full exegesis would be quite large...Der Zeitgeist (talk) 12:39, 5 January 2009 (UTC)

Nihilism Does Not Belong under Types of Existentialism

The section on Nihilism contains what I would call poorly done independent analysis, not to mention factual errors. Nietzsche isn't a nihilist, although he is frequently called one by people who don't understand his work. What he says is that you must create your own meaning. He does indeed reject the notion of an afterlife, but that does not make him a nihilist because in the next breath he urges the reader to create new values now, in *this* life. Clearly he finds tremendous meaning in the here and now... go read for example about the ubermensch.

Nietzsche might argue that Christians and many like them are the true nihilists, by sacrificing huge swaths of their real lives in the hope of maybe receiving some other one later from the God on high. He wants to shove the responsibility back on to the individual for creating a Heaven on Earth. This is bound to make him unpopular with the God fearing folks, but a nihilist it does not make.

It would be nice to get a professional to improve this section. My hunch is that it could be much improved simply by removing the whole Nihilism subsection. 148.87.1.169 (talk) 09:46, 12 January 2009 (UTC)

• I totally agree: nihilism is not a form of existentialism, and Nietsche was not a nihilist. Nihilism is the underlying crisis for which Existentialism is a response towards new forms of meaning. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.72.216.37 (talk) 07:12, 18 January 2009 (UTC)

In a sense you're right. The section's first sentence is: "Though nihilism and existentialism are distinct philosophies, they are often confused with one another." In other words, the text agrees with you: Nihilism isn't existentialism.

Furthermore, Nietzsche is mentioned as being a central philosopher both in existentialism and in nihilism, which he was, even though he wasn't a pure nihilist nor a pure existentialist. Nietzsche isn't mentioned after that. The section is about nihilistic existentialism, which is described in it.Der Zeitgeist (talk) 16:51, 18 January 2009 (UTC)

Repaired introduction

I tried to clean up the opening paragraphs of the article, which had been stable for a couple of months. Some comments had been introduced about compilations of theories and refining writings which didn't make much sense to me. Also, after much discussion, I thought we'd achieved consensus that Existentialism is not "a position" in philosophy.KD Tries Again (talk) 21:20, 26 January 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

• • I will change it back again. If an editor wants to state that existentialism is "a position", the right way to do it is to find a really convincing supporting citation. All the sources I have emphasize that there is no one position called "existentialism". What is the position exactly? Is there a cite to support the claim that existentialism is an "explicit conceptual manifestation..." etc? Difficulties are created when editors change the text of the article while leaving the sources unchanged; the sources support the old version, not the new version.KD Tries Again (talk) 15:37, 5 February 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

Webster's Dictionary: "position - one's attitude toward or opinion on a subject; stand [his position on foreign aid]". Hence, "sharing belief" = position. --162.83.222.192 (talk) 17:50, 5 February 2009 (UTC)

We know. So what is the position taken by existentialists? It's not a "movement" either in any clear sense. Most of the philosophers described as "existentialists" in the literature were working quite independently of each other, and as the article rightly says, the term was applied retrospectively to many of them by later writers. Again, it's not appropriate to just change a sentence which is supported by citations; it gives the appearance that the authors cited say something they in fact don't say.KD Tries Again (talk) 20:11, 6 February 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

Since "sharing belief" = "position" and they "shared the belief that philosophical thinking begins with the human subject" then they held the position "that philosophical thinking begins with the human subject". In other words, describing existentialism by the meaning of "position" defines it as a position. Hence, existentialism is that position being the characteristic element eventually recognized as such. --162.83.222.192 (talk) 19:36, 8 February 2009 (UTC)

Perhaps we can eliminate the problem simply by removing any allusion to there being some kind of shared belief or common position in which these philosophers stand? It seems to me that it would be more accurate to describe the existentialist philosophers' relationships as incidental. Perhaps something in the vein of "Existentialist philosophers take the human subject and its conditions of existence as a starting point for philosophical thought?"Der Zeitgeist (talk) 12:23, 9 February 2009 (UTC)

I am happy with Der Z.'s suggestion above. I would distinguish between sharing a belief about the starting-point for philosophy and sharing an actual philosophical position. As we know, the existentialists, despite some common themes and attitudes, arrived at startlingly different philosophical positions.KD Tries Again (talk) 18:54, 9 February 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

O.K., so "Existentialism is a term that has been applied to the work of a group of nineteenth and twentieth century philosophers who, despite profound doctrinal differences,[1][2] took the human subject — not merely the thinking subject, but the acting, feeling, living human individual[3][4] - and his conditions of existence as a starting point for philosophical thought." for the first sentence? --162.83.222.192 (talk) 02:16, 10 February 2009 (UTC)

Loose "group." Perhaps just "a number of?" Other than that, go for it!Der Zeitgeist (talk) 18:05, 13 February 2009 (UTC)

1. O.K., the latter; a repetition in the 2nd sentence removed, but...?

2. If the existentialists took the human object... as a starting point... then they shared that starting point as... = they shared the belief that the starting point is... = they held the position that... . As it was said above, describing existentialism by the meaning of "position" defines it as a position. Hence, existentialism is that position being the characteristic element eventually recognized as such. In other words, any commonality of thinking means a position. Hence, existentialism and any philosophy is a position... at least. --71.247.6.158 (talk) 20:12, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

Philosophers can agree on a methodological approach without sharing the same position. Is the phrase "explicit conceptual manifestation" a quote or very close paraphrase of Solomon, because otherwise I think it has to go? If it doesn't have support, it's O.R. (and it seems pretty meaningless).KD Tries Again (talk) 17:12, 20 February 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

1. Do you mean that, if "explicit conceptual manifestation" is a Solomon's quote or close, then it is O.K., but, if it is not a quote, then it "seems pretty meaningless", right?

2. If: "position - one's attitude toward or opinion on a subject; stand" (Webster's Dictionary), hence, "sharing belief" = position,

then, how agreeing on a methodological approach cannot be sharing position on that approach? --71.247.6.158 (talk) 19:47, 20 February 2009 (UTC)

The problem is that the phrase indicates an affiliation between the existentialist philosophers that isn't there: While some of them have been influenced by preceding existentialist philosophers, each develops his own theory. While there are certain similarities in the assumptions underlying their philosophical works, this does not constitute sharing a position. Der Zeitgeist (talk) 12:40, 21 February 2009 (UTC)

Again, I'd recommend User 71.247.6.158 to open a Wikipedia account [[1]], otherwise it makes communication and following his/her edits very difficult. Although I don't know what Solomon means by that phrase, it is indeed his, so I withdraw my objection as to the citation. I am not sure the casual reader will get it outside of the original context.KD Tries Again (talk) 21:45, 21 February 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

1. No "affiliation between", but "to" or "with", so I reckon "connection between"? The phrase does not indicate an affiliation, because it only relates the philosophy to the attitude while being neutral on the content of the relation, i.e. it does not suggest any comparison between properties of such relations in regard to the different philosophers. But, considering the concern that it might be misconstrued as an affiliation (doubtfully) and to strengthen the original context, the meaningless phrase "a term that has been applied to the work" was substituted by the word "attitude" in the 1st sentence. So?

2. If, "sharing belief" = position (Webster's Dictionary), then sharing an attitude (which is a belief) is a position per formal logic: if a=b and b=c, then a=c. --70.107.168.124 (talk) 05:33, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

Aside from the fact that the meanings of neither "position" nor "attitude" or "belief" coincide in a way that makes it acceptable to equate them with each other (least of all using formal logic), the problem is with "sharing", not with "position". Der Zeitgeist (talk) 11:37, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

You mean correspond with (match) each other? ...they do not, but "position" ~= "sharing attitude" ~= "sharing belief". Since "sharing" is problematic then "position" is too (the primitive arithmetic was to get rid of "sharing"). Then, describing existentialism as an attitude, as Solomon did it, fits nicely? --70.107.168.124 (talk) 16:50, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

I've been watching this without taking part, largely because it seemed that KD and Der Z were working towards a sensible position. I am getting irritated by having to reverse attempts by IP addresses to directly edit the article while a discussion is taking place here when they clearly do not have agreement. Would one of the two named please summarise where they think we are on this? --Snowded (talk) 17:23, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

I wouldn't say we have arrived at a satisfying lead in this discussion yet - at least not one that is better than the one currently there. When it comes to the current proposition, that it should be termed "an attitude," I would say that first of all, there's a difference between talking about existentialist philosophy (the subject of the article) and existentialism as an "attitude."

As a philosophical field, it is very heterogeneous, and the works considered existentialist have mainly been called existentialist by people other than the philosophers themselves. As such, it seems more accurate to have the introduction contain some sort of indication of these facts. Thus far, I think this is best done by referring to "existentialism" as a term (a word which etymologically speaking has connections to boundaries, from Latin, terminus, akin to "terminal," etc.; calling it a "term" points towards the word being used to delimit (or "group together," which in this case means the same) something that doesn't have its own inherent limits).

When it comes to existentialism as an attitude, of course this is (or can be) something that has been largely influenced by existentialist philosophers, but it is more of a personal "philosophy of life" kind of thing, a general attitude towards life. Der Zeitgeist (talk) 18:23, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

I more or less agree with Der Z; I'd just add that "existentialism" is a very unusual case in the history of philosophy simply because the term was coined in the 1940s, then retrospectively applied to various authors working in different countries over the previous one hundred years. These authors hadn't regarded themselves as members of a movement, or thought of their philosophy as "existentialism". Thus it's quite unlike "logical positivism" or "phenomenology" or "neo-Kantianism" or "Oxford philosophy" or "post-structuralism", etc., where philosophers would have known that they were participating (or not) in a movement.KD Tries Again (talk) 18:21, 23 February 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

1. Since every word in a dictionary or encyclopedia is a term, and usually the standard phrase "xxx is a term that means..." is abbreviated there by "xxx - ...", how calling existentialism a term is nothing else that an empty phrase?

2. Since any philosophy implies attitude then calling existentialism an attitude is correct and supported by the citation of Solomon, hence it is better than nothing or the empty phrase of "existentialism is a term".

3. How the above statements: "it seems more accurate to have...", "Thus far, I think this is best done by..." even slightly resemble an attempt to meet the requirements of not providing arbitrary and personal opinions, but objective arguments that additionally have to be supported by a citation?

4. How a historic aspect has and can have anything to do with defining existentialism as an attitude that does not refer to time and is historically entirely neutral? In other words, what the historic background has to do with the 1st defining word that describes the discipline (meaning) in general? --70.107.168.124 (talk) 01:01, 24 February 2009 (UTC)

1: Not every word is a term. There are concepts, conjunctives, question words, etc. A term is a specific word for designating a particular kind of limiting.

2: As I said, there's a difference between the existentialist attitude and existentialist philosophy and literature.

3: Because I am not editing the page, but arguing for a position; we have to reach consensus before editing the page.

4: The thing is that existentialism isn't a discipline, it isn't a single set of statements about something, nor a method. It is simply a way of retrospectively grouping a bunch of philosophers together because one can find similarities or lines of influence if one looks.

Are you the same IP user from before? Der Zeitgeist (talk) 09:47, 24 February 2009 (UTC)

1. Not every word is a term, but every entry in encyclopedia or dictionary is since (!)term [is] a word or phrase having a limiting and definite meaning in some science, art, enc. ["tergum" is a zoological term] synonymous with "a name"(!) (Webster's Dictionary). Hence, terms (or names) for concepts, conjunctives, question words, etc.

2. Nobody questions a difference between the existentialist attitude and existentialist literature, but Solomon calls existentialist philosophy (existentialism) an attitude... that constitutes a recognized quotation required for defining terms in Wikipedia (superseding arbitrary and personal opinions). Where is an argument contradicting the contention that calling existentialism a term is meaningless since every entry in encyclopedias is a term by definition?

3. The implication: "Because I am not editing the page, but arguing for a position; we have to reach consensus before editing the page." is false, because there is no relation between the assumption and the conclusion; is the citation of Solomon not enough or is it questionable in any way?

4. The Solomon's definition of existentialism as an attitude just embraces that "It is simply a way of retrospectively grouping a bunch of philosophers together because one can find similarities or lines of influence if one looks". Doesn't it? --16:56, 24 February 2009 (UTC) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 70.107.168.124 (talk)

By the way, now the first sentence of the introduction is correctly punctuated, it is evident that the comment about "conditions of existence" is unsupported by citation; does it really add anything?KD Tries Again (talk) 19:16, 24 February 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

To out IP user. Just because you have a citation that uses a form of words, it does not make that truth (especially as you are reading it out of context) neither does it address issues of WP:WEIGHT. Basically you need to learn a simple lesson, which is that Wikipedia is based on a series of rules of which citation is one, but consensus and weight are others. At the moment you do not have support for your edits and you should cease if you don't want to be treated as a vandal. --Snowded (talk) 20:24, 24 February 2009 (UTC)

• KD, yes, it does, namely, it adds the human world (existence) aspect as a necessary condition, i.e. "the individual in the world" instead of just "the individual"; the phrase "and his or her conditions of existence" could be replaced by "or self-consciousness living in the human world" after Solomon...? --70.107.168.124 (talk) 05:11, 25 February 2009 (UTC)
• Snowded, it seems that your advise can be beneficial to... the author!!!

1. There is no context (condition) to "existentialism is an attitude" for it is unconditional (always true), nobody questions it (some may dislike its generality), and it is supported by the citation from Solomon, where it is unconditional too!

2. The current "existentialism is a term" is an empty phrase (platitude) not found in any (none whatsoever) encyclopedia (read: incompetent), and "existentialism is an attitude" is true and supported by reputable quotation, so how the WP:WEIGHT stands: behind the empty, incompetent phrase or the one that is truthful and supported?

3. The consensus pertains only to proposals with basis and not to baseless ones! Where is a basis for disagreement with the Solomon's "existentialism is an attitude". In other words, citations, consensus, weight, and other Wikipedia rules apply simultaneously. --70.107.168.124 (talk) 05:11, 25 February 2009 (UTC)

http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Existentialism&action=edit&section=26

Sometimes you just have to accept that other people don't agree with you and that you are not the sole judgement of what is or is not "baseless". Just repeating your arguments ad nausium is not helpful, neither is a seeming dependence on a single source. I am sure the opening phrase can be improved, but your proposal not. Of course any philosophy is an"attitude" not just existentialism and for a source to use "attitude" does not mean that it is the appropriate word for the lede. I suggest you go back to the welcome message and its links. Unless you have a new argument I think this is over. --Snowded (talk) 06:27, 25 February 2009 (UTC)

As far as I can tell (the google books link), Solomon doesn't characterise existentialist philosophy as an attitude (that just wouldn't make sense). He says something like "existentialist philosophy is the explicit conceptual manifestation of an existential attitude." In other words, existentialist philosophy is, according to Solomon, different from existentialist philosophy in that existentialist philosophy is the conceptual manifestation of the existential attitude. And that is the context, the thing you are missing. Der Zeitgeist (talk) 10:14, 25 February 2009 (UTC)

• Where is your basis for the disagreement, as DK asked in the original proposal? You quote some rules and regulations, but where is a substance as Der Z. just provided above?

The statement "Sometimes you just have to accept that other people don't agree with you..." is a dogma and not an argument (read: an implication). I repeated my argument just to make it easier to respond (to eliminate a need to jump back) and to point to a construction of argument... politely (see the following). --70.107.168.124 (talk) 16:34, 25 February 2009 (UTC)

• Der Z., you meant "existentialist philosophy is [...] different from existential attitude". Not necessarily. In the construction "xxx is a manifestation of yyy" xxx can differ from yyy, if they are not synonyms, e.g. "achievements are manifestation of wisdom", but they can also be synonyms, e.g. "sharing beliefs is a manifestation of a position". In other words, the construction is not an indicator of a difference between its components xxx and yyy. So, do we have an indicator of what Solomon meant on page 238? If only nouns are taken under consideration, then - no, but with pronouns - yes. Solomon wrote: "It is an attitude that...", where "It" stands for "Existentialist philosophy" from two preceding sentences, and that constitutes the missing link... prima facie. Good effort... though! --70.107.168.124 (talk) 16:34, 25 February 2009 (UTC)

Sorry, but the "It" refers to "existential attitude," not "existential philosophy" see original passage; but why the obsession - is anyone proposing a change here?KD Tries Again (talk) 18:23, 25 February 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

In your dreams; the subject from the beginnig (of the page 238 and chapter 14 of Solomon's) is existentialist philosophy (existentialism). If "It" referred to "existential attitude" then the sentence would be: "Existential attitude is an attitude that...". Who defines anything by itself... morons? E.g. "Brown dogs are dogs that...". Did you participate in the discussion not knowing its subject? The subject is to replace "Existentialism is a term that has been applied to the work of..." with "Existentialism is an attitude of..." (see current). --70.107.168.124 (talk) 00:40, 26 February 2009 (UTC)

STOP editing against consensus. i have placed a vandalism warning on your talk page. If this continues then the warnings will escalate and you will be reported to ANI. Please note that the 3RR rule is not limited to one day where the changes are persistent. --Snowded (talk) 05:49, 26 February 2009 (UTC)

No, for every case of a manifestation, it is such that the manifestation is manifestly different from the thing it is a manifestation of. Manifestation simply means "the way in which something becomes clear," but there is always a difference between "the way in which" and the thing that becomes clear; an illness becomes clear in its symptoms, but the symptoms are not the illness. If so, one could simply cool a person with a fever down to cure him of his disease.

When it comes to arguing over an "it," it just seems a bit futile; Solomon may have been more worried about style than content when he wrote those sentences (it seems that way to me, 'cause there's no other way to reconcile the two following sentences otherwise). Der Zeitgeist (talk) 10:19, 26 February 2009 (UTC)

"Existential attitude is an attitude that...". That's precisely what Solomon means - he's explaining what an "existential attitude" is; there's really no doubt about it. On a different point, if we are retaining the phrase about an "explicit conceptual manifestation...", I believe it should be presented as a quotation from Solomon; it's such a distinctive phrase, that to leave it as it is would amount to plagiarism.KD Tries Again (talk) 17:35, 26 February 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

• Der Z., thank God you can construct an argument, so we can have a discussion. Subject of manifestation does not have to differ from the object of manifestation, e.g. "water is manifestation of moisture" and "moisture is manifestation of water", because "water"="moisture". Object of manifestation can also have a broader meaning than its subject, e.g. "existentialism is manifestation of philosophy", but "philosophy is not manifestation of existentialism", because not every philosophy is existentialism. Hence, if object/=subject, then object of manifestation can be used to define subject, because it has a broader meaning, e.g. "existentialism is a philosophy". From your example that "fever is manifestation of an illness" we can define fever as an illness and say that "fever is an illness", but not otherwise, as you said it. Since Solomon said that "existentialist philosophy is the explicit conceptual manifestation of an existential attitude" on p. 238 then certainly a function of existential attitude defines existentialist philosophy, and it is safe to say that "existentialism is an attitude that... (function)". (B.t.w., the word explicit suggests that "existentialist philosophy" is "existential attitude", but it is just a digression.)

I think you underestimate Solomon for a self-serving reason. Because you did not think that "xxx is manifestation of yyy" => "xxx is a yyy function", you could not blame Solomon for a lack of diligence and effectively... intelligence. What about you accepting that new thought and becoming somebody enriched? "It" on p. 238 has to stand for "existentialist philosophy", as shown above, and everything on p. 238 is strict and logical. Solomon was not a moron. Hence, we can correct the definition of existentialism accordingly. ==70.107.168.124 (talk) 20:14, 26 February 2009 (UTC)

• DK, it is impossible to argue with “there's really no doubt about it”; you need to produce an implication. Quotation marks are owed… always. --70.107.168.124 (talk) 20:14, 26 February 2009 (UTC)

Well, no, I'm sorry, there's no way those sentences are correct. Firstly, moisture doesn't mean the same as water (you have to differentiate between meaning and reference; if you're sailing on the ocean, you wouldn't say you're in the middle of a lot of moisture), and you cannot define fever as the illness (that would land you right back in the trap I mentioned where you attempt to cure the illness (let's say you have pneumonia) by cooling the body). I think you can investigate those sentences on your own.

Secondly, nowhere has it been claimed that existentialism is a manifestation of philosophy, nor that philosophy as such is a manifestation of existentialism. Existentialist philosophy, however, is a philosophical manifestation of the existentialist attitude; the existentialist attitude precedes philosophy by being an attitude we can take towards our lives as they are lived and experienced. Following Pascal, for instance, the existentialist attitude is allowing oneself to focus on those uncomfortable things, angst, despair, etc., instead of keeping oneself distracted with parties. Allowing oneself to focus on them allows one to investigate them, to theorise about them. This theorising is different from allowing oneself to focus on them; I doubt very much that Kierkegaard wrote Begrepet Angest while in a state of perpetual angst, and even if he did, it wouldn't help his theoretical investigation of it; the work is a theoretical investigation of something that, strictly speaking, has no theoretical dimension; angst as an experience is a pure experience, a mute experience that doesn't have an inherent meaning to the person experiencing it while he's experiencing it. This is why simply reading Begrepet Angest isn't going to help a person that suffers from anxiety fight off the anxiety while being in its grip, but it may help him handle it in other respects. That the experience is mute doesn't, however, exclude the possibility of theorising about it, and it doesn't mean you can never be right about it. It simply means that what you say about the experience is not the same as what the experience actually is as experienced.

To sum up, then, the existentialist attitude is more of a pre-theoretical attitude, it's something for each individual. Existentialist philosophy, however, is a theoretical approach to these things, trying to get them to "speak" about their meaning. If we add to this the plethora of sources provided below, I do not think we need to discuss this issue much further. Der Zeitgeist (talk) 12:03, 27 February 2009 (UTC)

Skiing is a pleasant distraction that improves the focus:

1. The present 1st sentence of the lead follows the unsupported by any established and quotable standard (but the personal preference) choice of the first word defining existentialism as: or a very close synonym with the meaning limits exactly as existentialism, or a meaningless and - so - safe phrase, whereas Solomon - in opposition to such personal preference - successfully used a quite sophisticated and subtle method of defining existentialism.

2. He said ingeniously that: "Existentialism is not simply a philosophy... ." So, he said it is a subset of philosophy while also having an additional meaning, whereas you claim that existentialism cannot be called philosophy, because of that additional meaning, which contradicts the Solomon's definition calling it philosophy (apart from something else) in the words "not only philosophy".

3. Once Solomon defined existentialism as a philosophy, he then used the compound term of "existentialist philosophy" as a replacement for existentialism.

4. Based on 2 and 3, it is safe to call existentialism a philosophy following Solomon instead of using the present "a term that has been applied to the work of" - an empty, meninges phrase.

5. Then Solomon says that "existentialist philosophy [existentialism] is the explicit conceptual manifestation of an existential attitude".

6. Hence, following Solomon, it is safe to say in the 1st sentence of the lead that "Existentialism is not simply a philosophy, but a manifestation of an existential attitude".

7. I agree that philosophy is not an attitude and withdraw my assertion; disagree that "manifestation is the way..." for "it is itself making clear" without considering any aspect of such making, e.g. the way, though there is no need to dwell on it anymore.

8. B.t.w., the sentence "I am sailing in liquefied moisture collected in the middle of the geographic depression" is correct, because it is correct to replace any word by its definition in any sentence, as it has been attempted in the 1st sentence except that the chosen phrase is empty. Fever means (1) a body temperature that is higher than normal...; (2) any of various diseases characterized by a high fever; or (3) excitement... (Webster's Dictionary), but you try to limit meaning of words to just one, as in the case of "manifestation", resulting in difficulty following Solomon. Since manifestation means also (3) a form in which a being manifests itself (Webster's Dictionary), hence we could say that "existentialism is manifestation of philosophy" as being one of its form. A digression: doesn't an objective correlate provide a theoretical dimension?

9. Following 6, I suggest the lead to read as:

Existentialism is not simply a philosophy, but "the explicit conceptual manifestation of an existential attitude" applied to the work of a number of nineteenth and twentieth century philosophers who, despite profound doctrinal differences, took the human subject — not merely the thinking subject, but the acting, feeling, living human individual and his or her conditions of existence — as a starting point for philosophical thought. Existential attitude begins with a sense of disorientation and confusion in the face of an apparently meaningless or absurd world. Many existentialists have also regarded traditional systematic or academic philosophy, in both style and content, as too abstract and remote from concrete human experience.

--71.247.227.185 (talk) 16:37, 15 March 2009 (UTC)

Restoration and addition

I restore the very good edit of 151.59 although anonymous --Athex50 (talk) 12:05, 20 February 2009 (UTC)

And, above all, largely well-known and confirmed --Athex50 (talk) 12:15, 20 February 2009 (UTC)

I removed it, since it appears to be original research, which Wikipedia rules don't allow us to publish. If you do have a reliable source, though, feel free to restore it with the source cited. -FisherQueen (talk · contribs) 12:16, 20 February 2009 (UTC)

No, not blogs, real reliable sources, like a significant book or a journal article. -FisherQueen (talk · contribs) 12:29, 20 February 2009 (UTC)

Sorry! I think you are wrong, but don't insist neither argue about. Only I pray you to gather evidence, and after that I hope you'll restore. By --Athex50 (talk) 12:36, 20 February 2009 (UTC)

The text in question is false. First of all, Sartre considered the peculiar state of man to be for-itself, not by-itself, and this condition wasn't put into relief against animals, but rather as anything that could be said to be in-itself, most explicitly, at one point in Being and Nothingness, a statue, depicting a "perfect sadness" (I think it was sadness, at least). He doesn't mention animals. The rest of that first paragraph makes close to no sense. The paragraph on Camus is uninformative and written poorly, and I do not believe Michel Onfray is an existentialist philosopher. Der Zeitgeist (talk) 16:08, 20 February 2009 (UTC)

Murakami?

Can we find a citation to support putting Murakami in the introduction? It's not so much that I disagree, but you could insert hundreds of novelists for the same reason. I think Dostoevsky and Kafka are special cases, because the existentialist philosophers write about them, you'll find them in existentialist anthologies, and they're obvious examples of the point being made. But if Murakami, why not Musil or Proust or Cervantes or Lewis Carroll? For Le Neant was a boojum, you see.KD Tries Again (talk) 17:15, 20 February 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

Looks like it can't be supported, then?KD Tries Again (talk) 18:23, 23 February 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

To the Anonymous IP User

It's evident that you are the same IP User who was warned repeatedly by administrators and other editors last year about civility and about working together with other editors to achieve a consensus. You forced debate about the precise wording of the introduction for weeks on end, ultimately accepting that you had nothing further to offer[[2]]. You now seem to want to repeat the debate, but I am still not clear what positive contribution you have to make. I would contact you via your talk page, but you have had four different IP numbers (at least) this year already, so it is impossible to maintain communication with you via a talk page. You have been advised by more than one administrator that there are good reasons to open an account, but you still haven't done so. Although the changing IP numbers make it difficult to trace your Wiki history, it is still fairly easy to put together a record which calls into question your good faith. Please stop questioning other editors competence and challenging other contributions as "baseless". And as Snowded advised, please learn to let go when there is no support for your position. Thanks. KD Tries Again (talk) 15:05, 25 February 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

You waist your time on the personal attack. We managed to eliminate significant mistakes from your original proposal, where you wrote: "please explain the basis for any disagreement", and we will continue to do so for the benefit of Wikipedia. --70.107.168.124 (talk) 16:43, 25 February 2009 (UTC)

Its not a personal attack, its a polite request for you either to create an ID, or use the same IP address. You need to address the basics of good wikipedia behaviour, something which is also present in the request above. Please address the issues of your identity, its not difficult. --Snowded (talk) 18:01, 25 February 2009 (UTC)

Just for the record, the original proposal was "Existentialism is a term which has been applied to the work of a disparate group of late nineteenth and twentieth century philosophers who, despite profound doctrinal differences, shared the belief that philosophical thinking begins with the human subject - not merely the thinking subject, but the acting, feeling, living human individual. Many existentialists have also regarded traditional systematic or academic philosophy, in both style and content, as too abstract and remote from concrete human experience." I am not sure what significant mistakes were eliminated. I am very much in favor of improving the existing article.KD Tries Again (talk) 18:17, 25 February 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

Sources for use on the lead

One of WP's core policies on reliable sources is turning to tertiary reference sources. The seven sources listed several months ago by JennaVecia are inadequate as very few or none of them appear to be drawn from reference sources written by the appropriate experts -- in this case, professional philosophers. I suggest at least the following sources:

Macintyre, "Existentialism" in Edwards, Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy

Guignon, "Existentialism" in Craig, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Cooper, "Existentialist Ethics" in Craig, ibid.

McBride, "Existentialism" in Audi, Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy

Baldwin, "Existentialism" in Honderich, Oxford Companion to Philosophy

Now, to just address the absurdly overwrought discussion of the genus of existentialism (as in, "existentialism is ..."), here's what the above sources say:

Macintyre: "doctrine"; "a historical movement"

Flew: "a philosophical trend or attitude"

Guignon: "a loosely connected group of thinkers"; "a backlash against philosophical and scientific systems that ..."

Cooper: "a tradition"

McBride: "a philosophical and literary movement"

Baldwin: "a loose term for the reaction ... against the abstract rationalism of Hegel's philosophy"

If we add introductory monographs, we could include

Warnock: "a kind of philosophical activity [with] common interests, common ancestry, and common presuppositions"

Cooper: "a relatively systematic philosophy"

Flynn: "a tradition"; "a philosophical movement"

So, in light of multiple reliable secondary and tertiary sources by experts, can we agree on something very close to "philosophical movement or tradition"? 271828182 (talk) 06:16, 26 February 2009 (UTC)

I agree with the comment on Jennavecia's suggestions. The above quotes are interesting, but I am not sure what conclusion you draw from them. It strikes me that Flew, Guignon, Baldwin and Warnock are pretty consistent with what we have (we could add them as cites). MacIntyre - "doctrine"? I think I need to see the context (I'll look for it). Agreed, some say it's a "movement." I the suggestion that we add that to what we have? (edit: we do call it a movement in the second paragraph)KD Tries Again (talk) 16:42, 26 February 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

Okay, putting MacIntyre's "doctrine" in context: "Ex. is not easily definable...It has been alleged in our time to be the doctrine of writers as various as M. de Unamuno and Norman Mailer. At first sight, characteristics of the doctrine are almost as various...Consequently, to define ex. by means of a set of philosophical formulas could be very misleading. Any formula sufficient broad to embrace all the major ex.ist tendencies would necessarily be so general and so vague as to be vacuous...(E)ven if two writers whgo are both rightly called ex.ist differ enormously in doctrine, they can be placed in the same family tree." (emphasis added) Enough copy-typing, I think MacIntyre is consistent with our approach, right down to profound doctrinal differences.KD Tries Again (talk) 16:47, 26 February 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

The only conclusion I was advancing was the justified use of "tradition" or "movement" (or some equivalent) to put an end to the disagreements over the opening sentence. While Flew (and Solomon) could be marshaled on behalf of "attitude", theirs seems a minority usage, and elsewhere in their discussions they adopt the tradition notion to narrow the field of definition. Time permitting, and if we can agree on this as a way to constructively solidify the lead, we can continue by discussing what each of these sources say about the differentia that identify existentialism. (Much of this is already in the lead, but evidently we need to make a concerted effort to scrupulously secure it with the best possible sources.) 271828182 (talk) 17:10, 26 February 2009 (UTC)

As I noted, it is referred to as a "movement" in the article, just not in the first sentences. We need to proceed with care with the sources: I happened to have the long MacIntyre essay right to hand, and he certainly doesn't call it a "doctrine" or a "historical movement" in any direct way. He, Mary Warnock, Guignon, Cooper (I believe), as well as Solomon, recognize that this is a loosely connected set of thinkers. MacQuarrie is in that camp too. I think it's hasty to dismiss this as a minority view.KD Tries Again (talk) 17:15, 26 February 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

Similarly for Flynn; do you have a page reference so I can get the context? In the preface to his little book, he described Ex. as a "manner of doing philosophy" and relates it to the "concrete individual". Not too far from what we are saying. Cooper says: "In short, existentialism was not only a philosophy but, as any potted history of our century will point out, a 'movement' and a 'fashion'." (The quotes around movement are his - the context is the black sweater/pants uniform of the Parisian intellectuals). I used Cooper for the current introduction; as he says, the term was coined during the war, "stuck on" writers, and the "next stage was to rake through the remoter philosophical past" and stick it on some more. Cooper repeatedly refers to existentialism as a "label." That's what I've tried to say, in more encyclopaedic language. Page 6, he agrees that existentialism is sometimes regarded as a "tendency" rather than a coherent philosophy; without minimizing "the differences" between writers, he wants to argue that there is a definable philosophy of existentialism. So within Cooper, who has his own position, there's a balanced recognition of views. I can support a balanced presentation of views. One difficulty I have with beginning the article with a phrase like "Existentialism is the philosophical position (or doctrine, or school which believes) that..." is I think we'll have a hell of time trying to complete that sentence. It's the view that man creates the meaning of his own existence and that God is the sole creator of meaning? That we are thrown into a meaningless world and responsible for our freedom and that we must make a leap of faith? The problem with this topic is that there's a massive chasm right in the middle, and it's easier to deal with if we start from the initial (and historically accurate) premise that "existentialism" was a term applied retrospectively to a very varied set of philosophers. Maybe we can then say it came to be thought of as a movement?KD Tries Again (talk) 17:29, 26 February 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

Images

A lot of images have been added to the article lately. Most are relevant, but I question the relevance of Gödel, Trent Reznor, the Edward Lear Cartoon under Absurdity, and the need for both individual photos and a photo of Sartre and Beauvoir together (it would perhaps be better to keep the one with both of them and loose the individual ones, as that would save some space? The images are taking up a lot of space, and shifting the links for editing the heading). Der Zeitgeist (talk) 13:49, 8 March 2009 (UTC)

Agreed, its approaching litter like proportions --Snowded (talk) 13:52, 8 March 2009 (UTC)

Ok. I will wait a bit before changing it, though... I want to know if anyone has any more ideas on what pictures to keep and what pictures to remove. Der Zeitgeist (talk) 14:28, 8 March 2009 (UTC)

For me, Lear, Godel and Reznor can go.KD Tries Again (talk) 19:21, 8 March 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

They're gone. Now what about Sartre+Beauvoir vs Sartre and Beauvoir? Der Zeitgeist (talk) 00:24, 9 March 2009 (UTC)

Nihilism

The Nihilism section has seen some changes, but I wonder if we should change it from being under "types" to its own heading along the lines of "relations to nihilism" or something? Also, I don't know how one decides whether or not the "issues" related to it have been resolved or not. Der Zeitgeist (talk) 13:49, 8 March 2009 (UTC)

There appears to be some confusion between the two in the current wording. A separate section makes sense and the "relations to" heading would mitigate the possibility of confusion --Snowded (talk) 13:53, 8 March 2009 (UTC)

Ok, then, that's done. Now the section just needs some expansion. Der Zeitgeist (talk) 14:26, 8 March 2009 (UTC)

Reference to Godel's theorems refuting positivism

I have removed the claim in the criticism section that Godel's incompleteness theorems 'epistemologically refute positivism'. I have no idea what it is for a claim to be refuted epistemologically but, those worries aside, the claim that Godel's theorems refute positivism is ridiculous. And yet, despite myself and someone else removing the claim, it has twice been restored with the suggestion that we read an article cited which says nothing to support the claim WHATSOEVER!

The two incompleteness theorems demonstrate that 1) for any formal system T (sufficient to capture arithmetic), there are truths in T which cannot be proved from T's axioms and a corollary, 2) T cannot prove its own consistency. The positivists were not in the business of creating formal systems of any kind! The only view which could be said to have been 'refuted' by Godel's theorems that I can think of is Formalism; and even that has modern proponents. The article cited in support of this claim is an interview with Rebecca Goldstein in which the claim that Godel's theorems refute positivism does not appear even once!

In short, it should be obvious to anyone who knows anything about positivism and Godel's theorems that this claim is patently false. Is there some way that this absurd claim could be prevented from being added to this page again?

Thanks —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.15.10.59 (talk) 17:05, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

And even if it wasn't nonsense, this is an article on Existentialism. I have posted a message at the editor's talk page. We don't even get to the question of whether the point is valid or not: I'd want to see a citation making a direct connection with existentialism, otherwise it's just not notable enough for this article.KD Tries Again (talk) 17:43, 13 March 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

It is not nonsense, assume good faith. If positivism is a refuted position then it too has no place in this article. If it as an invalid approach to existence it should not be included, as positivism is no longer pertient. Here is another example of [3]

And also what can be seen in this bookreview..

"It is Goldstein’s conceit that Gödel fell in love with Platonism in 1925 in an introductory course on the history of philosophy. According toher, this put him at complete odds with the logical positivists when he attended theirmeetings. ‘Gödel’s audacious ambition to arrive at a mathematical conclusion that would be a metamathematical result supporting mathematical realism was precisely whatyielded the incompleteness theorems.’ Goldstein claims that by 1928 this ambition had driven him to begin work on the proof of the first incompleteness theorem, ‘which he interpreted as disproving a central tenet of the Vienna Circle . . . He had used mathematical logic, beloved of the logical positivists, to wreak havoc on the positivistantimetaphysical position.’"

[4] LoveMonkey (talk) 18:04, 13 March 2009 (UTC)
Here is a section of the chapter of Goldsteins' book which she was discussing in the Edge article that I used as a source. [5] LoveMonkey (talk) 18:08, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

Whatever the merits of of your comments above this is an article on Existentialism not Positivism unless you can show a link and some appreciation of [[WP:WEIGHT] then the material has no place in the article. --Snowded (talk) 18:13, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

---

"Gödel claimed that he killed logical positivism---and this may be so---and in my own rejection of the position I have at the very least one thing in common with him."[6]

---

Again why is a position that has been epistemelogically disproven called logical positivism or positivism included in this article at all. And if it is included why is it's weigh implicit as being pertient. I added the comment and section to show how completely invalid the inclusion of logical positivism is to this article. As far as I can tell existentialism has not been invalidated, but positivism has. LoveMonkey (talk) 18:17, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

I am sorry but that is incoherent. Why do you think a claimed invalidation of positivism has any relevance to an article on Existentialism? --Snowded (talk) 18:23, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

Doesn't matter what I think. What matters is that Godel scientifically dispproved logical positivism. If the position is invalidated scientifically (think about how rare a philosophical position gets scientifically invalidated). Then why is anything about positivism being critical or invalidating another position let alone existentialism included in the article. Go read my comment that the anonymous editor is removing. LoveMonkey (talk) 18:29, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

I put the comment in because as the article stands it gives positivism a implicit weigh to be critical of existentialism that positivism does not hold in the scientific and or academic.

LoveMonkey (talk) 18:33, 13 March 2009 (UTC)
If a criticism of existentialism is going to be included in this article about existentialism a critism of existentialism from the position of logical positivism then the read who may not know needs to understand that logical positivism take on the understanding of "to be" has been epistemologically disproved. LoveMonkey (talk) 18:37, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

A sort of meaning starts to emerge, but its not easy. I think you are saying that (i) a logical positivist criticism of existentialism in in the article (ii) that logical positive has been disproved by Godel and therefore (iii) the section on Godel should be in the article. I response to that I would say that proposition (ii) has not been established by you or your citation and that even if it had then it would not be relevant. The article is about Existentialism, therefore the criticism of another school (LP) should be listed. Unless you can come up with something new I suggest this ends. You certainly do not have any consensus to insert the material in the article so please don;t --Snowded (talk) 18:43, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

BINGO on Godel. Existentialism is a valid philosophical position. Positivism is not. Why.....
Because positivism's ontology or "to be" of an object is "incomplete". This is what Godel proved scientifically with his "Incompleteness theorems". Positivisms should not be in this article at all as it is just taking up space and invalid. It is a bad thing to leave the article worded as it is now without a clarification on the invalidated positivistics definition of "to be". LoveMonkey (talk) 18:51, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

Nonsense, the Godel quote does not invalidate positivism, its a position you support not a proven fact. The edit you propose has no place here and you have no support that I can see. Unless other editors engage, or you come up with something new this is over. --Snowded (talk) 18:58, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

Godel's theorems show no such thing! What utter nonsense. Godel, as a Platonist, would certainly disagree with positivism but it is certainly not a result of his theorems that positivism is false. Unless you can say exactly what it is about the incompleteness theorems that refutes positivism, you should cease and desist. 86.15.10.59 (talk) 19:12, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

---

Here I'll let Stephen Hawking instead.

"What is the relation between Godels theorem, and whether we can formulate the theory of the universe, in terms of a finite number of principles. One connection is obvious.aCcording to the positivist philosophy of science, a physical theory, is a mathematical model.sO if there are mathematical results that can not be proved, there are physical problems that can not be predicted. One example might be the Golbach conjecture.gIven an even number of wood blocks, can you always divide them into two piles, each of which can not be arranged in a rectangle.tHat is, it contains a prime number of blocks".

[7] LoveMonkey (talk) 19:32, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

---

And again Godel himself (albeit via Philip J. Davis though)...........

"Gödel claimed that he killed logical positivism---and this may be so---and in my own rejection of the position I have at the very least one thing in common with him."[8]

---

LoveMonkey (talk) 19:34, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

Please stop inserting all these lines in your comments - basic editing. I think otherwise the most appropriate comment is "cease and desist" this is going no where. --Snowded (talk) 19:41, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

---

PS Snowded you'll have to also remove him from the Logical positivism article since it also valdiates what I am saying.

"Logical positivists' response to the first criticism was that logical positivism is a philosophy of science, not an axiomatic system that can prove its own consistency (see Gödel's incompleteness theorem)."

Poor Professor Rebecca Goldstein. Good to see the WP:OR rules the day. As for going no where the anoymous editor is edit warring with a 3RR. I was quoting Professor Rebecca Goldstein's work. You guys are now calling her wrong. LoveMonkey (talk) 19:44, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

Firstly, Stephen Hawking is not a philosopher. Secondly, all he has done is reformulate the Goldbach conjecture using blocks; that doesn't make it an empirical theory to be verified by the physical sciences. Thirdly, the positivists (as with all verificationists) claim that there are no truths which transcend our ability to verify them, so if you came up with a problem which could not be verified or falsified by the empirical sciences, they would simply reject it as meaningless. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.15.10.59 (talk) 19:53, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

Professor Rebecca Goldstein in her book on the subject seems to think that Einstein sure didn't. And if that is the case then Hawking I bet wouldn't either. This is an article about a metaphysical subject.

LoveMonkey (talk) 19:59, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

Sure didn't what? Reject anything that wasn't either analytic or verifiable? Of course not, that was the view of the positivists and Einstein wasn't a positivist. What exactly is your argument here? A bunch of clever people weren't positivists, thefore positivism is false? You still haven't provided anything cogent to support the idea that Godel's theorems refuted positivism. I think you're misunderstanding a lot of what's going on here and I was going to be rude about it but I'll restrain myself and suggest that you read 'Godel's Proof' by Nagel and Newman and 'Language, Truth and Logic' by Ayer for accessible introductions to Godel's theorems and positivism respectively. I'm outta here. Ruby Gottlob (talk) 22:18, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

It is that Godel scientifically dispproved logical positivism. If the position is invalidated scientifically (think about how rare a philosophical position gets scientifically invalidated). Then why is anything about positivism being critical or invalidating another position let alone existentialism included in the article. Go read my comment that the anonymous editor is removing.LoveMonkey (talk) 12:17, 16 March 2009 (UTC)

Because the criticism of existentialism by Carnap in particular is notable. Not right, not wrong, just notable. And the view that Carnap can't advance valid criticism of another philosopher's position because he was associated with positivism is a classic example of the ad hominem fallacy.KD Tries Again (talk) 14:47, 16 March 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

Removed Positivist criticism per WP: undue weigh

Since discussion is over according to Snowden, I removed the contested section according to undue weight. LoveMonkey (talk) 19:57, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

I reinstated it. You really need to learn how to edit and work with other people. Every other editor involved has disagreed with you, you have no support and yet you are still editing the main article. --Snowded (talk) 05:57, 14 March 2009 (UTC)

The point is that there is a difference between, on the one hand, (a) valid criticism and (b) invalid criticism, and on the other, (c) relevant criticism and (d) irrelevant criticism.

• a: Valid criticism is a critique that actually points out some error or inconsistency in what is said, either with regard to the criticised item itself or with regard to its relation to the world. In short, this critique can stand up to critique.
• b: Invalid criticism is a failed critique. In other words, it doesn't point out any errors or inconsistencies. In other words, this critique cannot stand up to critique.
• c: Relevant criticism is criticism that has importance to the position criticised. Criticism can be of importance to the position in many ways, for instance by being clarifying; you read the criticism and you understand the position that is criticised better. In this respect, the criticism can be both (a) and (b); even invalid criticism can help one to understand the position better.
• d: Irrelevant criticism is criticism that is so off the mark that it simply doesn't matter at all. How one decides what is irrelevant criticism will vary, but an example would be an existentialist critique of using formal logic as a tool for representing statements in a formal language.

The matter at hand here is not whether or not a critique of existentialism is (a) or (b), but rather if it is (c) or (d). If you can make the case that Carnap's critique of Heidegger's use of the word "nothing" is _irrelevant_, you may have a case, but that is not done by "disproving" logical positivism; even the failed physics of times gone by have to be mentioned in a history of science; phlogistone is relevant to the understanding of science, but not _valid_ as a scientific statement. Der Zeitgeist (talk) 15:19, 14 March 2009 (UTC)

The article needs to represent history and not revise it. Carnap's criticism of Heidegger is famous, widely cited, and needs to be mentioned regardless of the status of Carnap's own work. As I said above, I don't think we even need to be debating this unless someone produces an authoritative reference linking a critique of positivism by Godel directly to existentialism. On a more substantive matter, the last part of the paragraph is not good: "Existentialists would respond to both claims by an appeal to the reader's intuitive understanding on the matter, which is guided to this end through the descriptive content of their works. They treat the matter as beyond the scope of argument and logic." As far as Heidegger is concerned, he explicitly agrees with Kant that being is not a property (in Basic Problems). The critics' knowledge of Heidegger is cursory. Now I just need to find a cite to support that.KD Tries Again (talk) 16:22, 14 March 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

No opposition to the proposal for changing the intro

Since there has been no opposition to the change of the intro, as proposed at the bottom of the Repaired introduction section or the text on green background, I intend to implement it. --71.247.227.185 (talk) 15:31, 23 March 2009 (UTC)

Here's some opposition for you. You haven't responded to our arguments at all, so I know I'm getting a bit tired, and I'm guessing everyone else is as well. You do not have consensus on your proposed changes, and the changes are disputed. I would urge you to not make them, and I'll let you know that if you do, they will be changed back. Der Zeitgeist (talk) 15:41, 23 March 2009 (UTC)

Concur with Der Zeitgeist and if you do implement them against clear consensus you will be subject to an ANI report --Snowded (talk) 16:44, 23 March 2009 (UTC)

I oppose the change. All it seems to do is make the sentences longer and state, awkwardly, that the "attitude" is somehow "applied" (how?) to the thinkers in question. I am surprised to see the IP editor suggest we begin by saying existentialism is not something. I thought his/her objection had always been that we were failing to say what it 'is'.KD Tries Again (talk) 18:13, 23 March 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

Opposed also. Sorry I haven't had time to develop any of the suggestions I made above w.r.t. sourcing the lead, or supply the page numbers. I hope it's of use to the editors trying to improve this page. 271828182 (talk) 23:41, 25 March 2009 (UTC)

DZ, I did respond to all, though certain arguments analyzing Solomon were not on the subject of utilizing the already existing material. The relation between existentialism and the existential attitude has not been questioned, but a lack of clarity and consistency of the language and a bad progression of the lead that does not require discussing the meaning of the word manifestation, the existential attitude, etc, but only using the existing material. The lead is confusing, because you took only a part of construction of the definition by Solomon and skipped the phrase "is not only a philosophy" in reference to existentialism. Without that phrase the definition does not work! Then, the existential attitude should be clearly described. I suggest the following progression of the lead:

Existentialism "is not simply a philosophy", but "the explicit conceptual manifestation of an existential attitude". "The existential attitude begins with a disoriented individual facing a confused world that he cannot accept." Since 1940s, the term existentialism has been applied to the work of a number of nineteenth and twentieth century philosophers who, despite profound doctrinal differences, took the human subject — not merely the thinking subject, but the acting, feeling, living human individual and his or her conditions of existence — as a starting point for philosophical thought. Many existentialists have also regarded traditional systematic or academic philosophy, in both style and content, as too abstract and remote from concrete human experience.

--

71.247.227.185 (talk) 01:25, 27 March 2009 (UTC)

"not simply a philosophy" - What does that mean? --Snowded (talk) 05:42, 27 March 2009 (UTC)

It's Robert Solomon, From Hegel to Existentialism (p238), but it's taken out of context. It follows two sentences which explain that existentialism is in part a continuation of certain themes in philosophy, and in part a revolt against philosophy. Then it says, it's not "simply" a philosophy. I think the quote from Solomon about the "attitude" is fine, but I don't see any need to paraphrase his introduction extensively.KD Tries Again (talk) 22:16, 27 March 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

• You cannot separate the 1st clause "Existentialism is not simply a philosophy," from the 2nd clause "but the explicit conceptual manifestation of an existential attitude" that explains it. The two sentences that Solomon preceded the 1st clause standing there separately, and - so - needing their support, are substituted by the 2nd clause eliminating a need for them. The 2nd clause explains existential attitude as a 'predilection' of existentialism Der Z. was talking about before accusing me above of not responding (I have considered, what he said).
• The present lead is faulty. It is not say what existentialism is. It starts from the sentence that is partially empty and partially containing non-prime info. Next, the clause "existential attitude[5] that begins with a sense of disorientation and confusion in the face of an apparently meaningless or absurd world" is badly written, because "that begins" may be confused as referring to "Existential philosophy" at the beginning of the sentence, and it does not say whose "sense of disorientation..." is referred to.
• Finally, the DK's statement "I think ..., but I don't see..." is not an argument, but... (De gustibus non est disputandum). It contradicts the Solomon's different point of view and suggests that a personal opinion can be superior to established quotations from prime authors. Sorry man. --71.247.227.185 (talk) 17:07, 28 March 2009 (UTC)

Ok, I know that this is contrary to all the wiki guidelines, but now that I look at it again, I think all this quoting of authorities has rendered the entire introduction damned near unreadable (nine quotations in the first paragraph?!). Furthermore, I think we're better off formulating a looser definition for the introduction rather than a more "accurate" one (zoom in too close, and you get pixels) — that's what the rest of the article is for. Perhaps we should move away from the philosophers and rather focus on the kinds of problems dealt with in the introduction, as that would remove the problems related to different authors calling it different things according to what field they're writing from, to and in? The philosophers call it a philosophy, the literary people call it a current, the historians call it a concept or term, the idea-historians call it an idea, and so-on. What is common across all these "definitions" is not the people working within the fields defined (Kierkegaard in one, Kafka in another, Sartre in a third, etc.), but rather the themes they deal with. In other words, if we were to go in the direction of "Existentialism is a term," and if you read past these first three words, IP, you will see that your recurring "objection" ("It is not say [sic] what existentialism is.") is invalid, "that has been applied to a loosely defined field of themes, problems and concepts mainly within philosophy and literature, but also in psychology [here referring to Yalom, May, etc.] and other arts [Munch, for instance, is said to have dealt with existentialist themes in his paintings, and theatre is not the same as literature]. These themes are" etc., etc. I'm not going to write it all out here and now, as I'm just suggesting a general direction we may want to consider. In any event, we cannot continue along this fruitless path of attempting to respond to a nonresponsive (there's a difference between responding and simply waving one's arms around to divert attention) IP. Der Zeitgeist (talk) 18:08, 28 March 2009 (UTC)

You wanted to have everything from citations, you have got that. The citations appeared, because of your (mainly of DK's) insistence. Every dictionary, encyclopedia, and Solomon states what existentialism is and nobody calls it "a term", because all entries are terms. It means the the beginning of the lead is bad. Everybody knows application of existentialism (emphasized and more by "is not simply a philosophy") and deals with that, but not in the first sentence (first - what, and only then - where). These are serious deficiencies I try to remedy.

Your statements I know that this is contrary to all the wiki guidelines, but [...] I think..., I think we're better off formulating a looser definition for the introduction rather than a more "accurate" one, etc. are not arguments (see the same about DK above). You need serious and relevant citations in support that complement each other and are not taken out of context. Accusing me of diverting attention is a personal attack. I produced a consistent and complete lead proposal per the standard you insisted upon, and now you cannot accept it! Since you ran out of arguments, just do accept the proposal... and then discuss how to improve it, because for now it is the best wherther you like it or not, and you have no valid arguments against. --71.247.227.185 (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 19:14, 28 March 2009 (UTC).

No, not everything. We wanted support for the sentences from citations, but there are limits (we may even soon start to infringe on copyrights); the article is supposed to be an article in its own right, and not a patchwork of citations from other authors. The way the citations have become so dominant cannot be said to be anyone's fault, as they have appeared in connection with editing sentences without looking at the whole.

When you say that "nobody calls it a term," that's both a false statement and an example of how you don't respond to what we say: Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy calls it "a term that belongs to intellectual history," and the philosophy dictionary calls it "A loose title for various philosophies that emphasize certain common themes." Furthermore, if you look at the section called "sources for use on the lead" above, you will see that what is said there is compatible with calling it a term. When it comes to not responding, the issue is that you are not reading past the word "term," so you're not really saying anything: It is defined as "a term that is applied to [...]"

Your argument that my arguments are not arguments is useless, and simply point to the fact that you do not know what arguments are: You attempt to latch on to a phrasing in an attempt to score some sort of rhetorical point, but the difference between "I think we're better off" and "we're better off" is negligible, even though the "I think" is what you're latching on to. The same goes for your attempt to construe this as a personal attack (an activity you're not entirely alien to yourself): I'm pointing out in what ways you are not actually responding to what we say. Furthermore, accusing us of running out of arguments, and then not managing anything better than "it is the best wherther you like it or not" is, simply put, pathetic. You talk about being constructive, but you simply want it your own way first, and then you may agree to certain cosmetic changes. I'm not going to go into another long, pointless "argument" with you over this, however, so this ends here. When you want to be constructive, and when you've learned how to speak proper English you may want to make a contribution, but up until then I would implore you to refrain from making edits to the English wikipedia. Der Zeitgeist (talk) 09:10, 29 March 2009 (UTC)

I would suggest it's unnecessary to engage in protracted dialogue with the IP user. He/she has been proposing re-writes to the first sentence of the article since October last year. That's six months on the same sentence, without ever bothering to open a Wiki account, and through several etiquette warnings. He/she is now reverting to [inappropriate personal remarks again], and also indulging in the old game of reversing my initials (a form of [indirect criticism]). As other editors have said above, there is no consensus for the changes proposed thus far. I think we should either leave it at that, or encourage these exceptionally prolonged dialogues be taken to users' talk pages.KD Tries Again (talk) 18:17, 29 March 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

• KD, don't be so touchy about reversing your initials (it is a typo caused by a keyboard sending some letters faster than others not caught by a spellchecker) especially when discussing bad language in the lead, which you wrote; not knowing your age I have no base of making fun of it. Again KD (that is a pun), your statements "I would suggest...", "I think we should..." are not arguments and do not belong is a discussion especially demanding one. Your recent change replacing is with is characterized by what has been called cannot be considered an achievement.
• DZ, you can do better than attacking my English; I agree that the text should be as original as possible and not only a patchwork of citations, and - so- maybe a little longer that a most efficient patchwork of shortest citations. I disagree that citations from one source tend to be mutually incompatible and contribute to a disregard of the whole picture, but on a contrary.

The full sentence Like "rationalism" and "empiricism," "existentialism" is a term that belongs to intellectual history. clearly indicates (by a direct implication) that existentialism is a philosophy (the lead is lacking), and the sentence is a base for the following and supporting it sentences, without which it does not work. The lead mixes fragments taken out of context from different and mutually incompatible definitions with very different constructions that indicates a lack of understanding of their progression: connections between the sentences or their mutual dependencies.

The current phrase existential attitude"... begins with a sense of disorientation and confusion [whose?] in the face of an apparently meaningless or absurd world misses the object (individual) making it unnecessarily difficult and much inferior to the snappy and brisk original The existential attitude begins with a disoriented individual facing a confused world that he cannot accept.

My proposal above was intended as a compact framework containing all necessary ingredients, connections between sentences and progression distilled from Solomon - an established author. We could elongate it, but not the KD's way replacing "2+2=4" with "2+2 is characterized by what has been called 4". It is a constructive step to a relatively original lead without elementary omission or empty phrases. Let's improve it. --71.247.227.185 (talk) 15:21, 2 April 2009 (UTC)

• Since there is no more opposition, I am implementing it. --71.247.227.185 (talk) 17:00, 9 April 2009 (UTC)

There is opposition, you are the only one supporting it if you implement it then I will reverse it and report you for edit warring --Snowded (talk) 17:12, 9 April 2009 (UTC)

I've read through the months-long discussion regarding the introduction, and seen some very helpful proposals from each of the main participants. I'd like to plead for at least a conservative interim revision of the unreadable and uninterpretable paragraph that is there now. By conservative, I mean to retaining the existing terminology, but to open with a positive declarative sentence without asides, exceptions and negatives. Hammer out the exact terminology later, and other contentious issues in continued discussion. That change will at least allow the visitor to orient on first arrival. Thanks! Phytism (talk) 03:49, 8 July 2009 (UTC)

Existentialism and positivism, historically.

Maybe it should be noted that existentialism was first propounded by the German physicist Gustav Kirchhoff, and later taken up with greater authority by Richard Avenarius and then Ernst Mach, as a reaction to Kant's thing-in-itself and Hegel's metaphysics for their fundamental failure to account for psychology. The slant taken was positivistic and had a great influence on a number of scientists, including psychologists, and philosophers, including Moritz Schlick and the Vienna Circle, John Dewey, William James, Charles Peirce, and F.C.S. Schiller.

At first blush, the relationship between Existentialism, the school of agony, and Logical Positivism may look strained. Nevertheless, although the main content of their themes diverge considerably, both rely on direct experience and discount as fanciful anything that cannot be identified positively.

Although Kierkegaard is now regarded as the patron saint of Existential devotions unto despair, melancholy, and the preoccupation with death, his work was little known outside of Denmark and Germany until well into the twentieth century and not well known within, until he was 'discovered' by those who were already calling themselves 'existentialists'. By contrast, the trend established by Avenarius was famous. Only later did he come to be forgotten and retired to the dusty aisles of the used book shops.

This, of course, brings up the side notion of what history really consists in, but that has to be saved for another day.

Uniquerman (talk) 18:03, 29 March 2009 (UTC)

I see this is your first Wiki edit, so we should welcome you. However, I think you would need to direct us to some supporting evidence for that summary. As far as I can see, Kirchoff did some work in graph theory, but Peirce's existential graphs are tools in modal logic, and have nothing to do with existentialism. Have I misunderstood? Kierkegaard was being read and cited by Unamuno and Ortega before 1914, and was being studied and taught by Jaspers and Heidegger by the early 1920s.KD Tries Again (talk) 18:07, 29 March 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

The best capsule account can be found in the Dictionary of Philosophy, Dagobert D. Runes, 1942 Ed., abstract written by Sigmar von Fersen. I'm not making a big point, and I certainly didn't intend to imply that Peirce, Dewey, et al., are existentialists. But, like many things, what starts out one way turns another. At one time, the words 'subjective' and 'objective' had meanings virtually opposite to their current use. Subjective meant pertaining to the subject at hand and objective meant having an object in mind. We're seeing this right now with the phrase 'in the tank [for]', which used to mean (not so long ago) 'losing without making an effort' and now means 'solidly in support [of]'. Kierkegaard was not well known outside of Germany and Denmark until well into the 20th century unless you wanted to read him in Danish or German. English and other translations were not at all common until the nineteen-thirties. Thus, Heidegger and Jaspers would have had no problems, and Unamuno and Ortega may have read German. I don't know. 74.95.93.186 (talk) 19:13, 5 April 2009 (UTC)

Rationalism and the Spanish school.

Although it is now taken for granted that psychology and epistemology are partially interdependent disciplines, it was not always the case, and existentialism is partly responsible. The Spanish school, exemplified by Jose Ortega y Gasset and Julian Marias, took it a step further, attempting to reconcile classical realism and Cartesian idealism into a unitary whole, bringing epistemology to the point where it meets ontology.

In his History of Philosophy, Marias made a frank but undeveloped try at melding realism and idealism into existentialism, especially in the person of Ortega, who was working toward a sort of neo-Platonic formalism of this world (rather than a shadow one) with his expression, 'me and my circumstances'. By this he did not mean circumstances accreted to the individual, but the definition of the circumstances as integral to the person. If you turn this around from the person to the world, you infer the existential moment ('reality') as an event whose veridical identity comes from neither the place or the thing nor the concept or the mind but the interdependence of person and world.

This is a strain of existentialist metaphysics which is not always recognized and is certainly not well enough explored. Hints of it can be found in the writings of the French anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss and the semiological aspects of the work of the French linguist de Saussure and more fully developed expositions in the essays of the American theoretical anthropologist Barbara Lee and the teachings of the nearly unknown American philosopher and anthropologist Mickey Gibson. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.95.93.186 (talk) 20:28, 5 April 2009 (UTC) 74.95.93.186 (talk) 20:32, 5 April 2009 (UTC) signed 74.95.93.186 (talk) 20:33, 5 April 2009 (UTC) uniquerman —Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.95.93.186 (talk) 20:35, 5 April 2009 (UTC)

The problem is that none of the standard textbooks on existentialism I've ever seen have much to say about Avenarius or Levi-Strauss or Saussure.KD Tries Again (talk) 14:55, 6 April 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

Since when has a standard textbook done anything but cover the conventional wisdom? It is not the conventional wisdom that existentialism could have a rationalist conception of metaphysics, either, since much of it disavows metaphysics completely and a great deal of it downgrades reason in favor of direct impression, but there it is in the person of Ortega. The standard textbooks aren't going to cover his breakdown of Descartes very well or the re-integration of Cartesian principles into his own system of thought, and not only because he doesn't seem to be in the mainstream. It's not always easy to see what he's getting at, and very few seem to have mastered it. For instance, most people think the The Rebellion of the Masses is a diatribe against institutional groupthink. They don't see its deeper implications. Same with Levi-Strauss, only more so. It's a dense subject to tackle and takes a lot of heavy wading. Same with Heidegger. Being and Time was not translated into English until 1962, and I doubt that many people have read it either way. Most people have read what other people say about it, and I suspect that there's a great deal of misunderstanding about it.71.191.25.34 (talk) 20:21, 7 April 2009 (UTC)

I'm sorry, but it's kind of hard to get at your point: What are you getting at here? Do you want the article to mention these things? The problem with your argument, as far as I can tell, is that it makes "Existentialism" a too inclusive term; sure, if you look at philosophers through the ages, you will find people who deal with certain phenomena in this or that way, and this way may appear to be, or may actually be, the same as some existentialist philosopher's way. The problem is that this does not make their philosophy existentialist; Hegel inspired Kierkegaard, both positively and negatively, and he dealt with some of the same subjects., He's also probably _the_ most mentioned philosopher throughout all the Existentialist philosophers' works (both Sartre, Beauvoir, Kierkegaard (although sometimes covertly) and Heidegger mentions him quite often), but Hegel still isn't an existentialist philosopher. When it comes to the Logical Positivists, for instance, they were _quite clearly_, explicitly even, opposed to the ideas of existentialism; Carnap's attempt at a critique of Heidegger would extend to most, if not all, of the other existentialists as well; the notion of [intet, nichts, neant, nothingness] is one of the most central notions of existentialist philosophy. When it comes to the influence of Kierkegaard, I know for a fact that Unamuno read Danish, that he taught himself Danish _in order to_ read Kierkegaard, so his influence cannot have been as small as you make it out to be; Unamuno must have known about him in order to have wanted to teach himself Danish so as to read Kierkegaard in the original language. I think you're mistaking the _general_ popularity of Kierkegaard for his influence in relation to the specifically existentialist philosophers; existentialist philosophy is, and has always been, a limited field of philosophy, so for each age, even if all philosophers haven't heard of some philosopher, he may still be important in existentialist philosophy; even if the logicians didn't bother with Kierkegaard, the existentialist philosophers may have. Der Zeitgeist (talk) 00:13, 8 April 2009 (UTC)

Despite appearances to the contrary, I'm not the least bit interested in a doctrinal debate on Kierkegaard's standing in the existential hierarchy.

What I am saying is that, if one is interested in a historical presentation of the notion, existentialism, and the use of the word, then Kirchhoff, Avenarius, and Mach, who were greatly interested in incorporating the science of psychology into philosophy, ought to be represented, if only in passing. If, on the other hand, the main interest is in the formal relation between the ideas of Heidegger, Jaspers, Ortega, Unamuno, Sartre, and others to the ideas of Kierkegaard, then the historicity has little bearing on the subject. Conflating the content with the process takes place at the expense of clarity.

For this issue, documentation is not the limiting factor. Emphasis is. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Uniquerman (talk • contribs) 19:20, 8 April 2009 (UTC)

If the 1942 edition of the Dictionary of Philosophy [Runes] incorporates a section on Existentialism, then neither the word nor the notion can have been coined in 1943, as has been alleged in another comment, and the subjects of that section, Kirchhoff, Averanius, and Mach, cannot be completely ruled out.Uniquerman (talk) 20:16, 8 April 2009 (UTC)

Rune's dictionary has an entry on existentialist philosophy; he doesn't call it existentialism. So the term was probably coined after that. When it comes to the kind of philosophy, sure, it was plain to see for everyone that Kierkegaard and Unamuno had influenced Heidegger, etc. The definition of existentialist philosophy in that dictionary is, however, just plain weird:

"Existential Philosophy: Determines the worth of knowledge not in relation to truth but according to its biological value contained in the pure data of consciousness when unaffected by emotions, volitions, and social prejudices." Link: http://www.ditext.com/runes/e.html Der Zeitgeist (talk) 21:22, 8 April 2009 (UTC)

I've looked at Runes, and not found it helpful in the past. As for what the standard source say, for better or worse that is precisely what Wikipedia is supposed to represent. I can give you a long list of what Wiki would consider reliable, authoritative sources on existentialism (Barrett, Macquarrie, Solomon, Kaufmann, Cooper), as well as standard encyclopaedia articles (Britannica, Macmillan) - all of which offer the conventional account of existentialism developing from Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Wikipedia isn't the place to offer an alternative account. We can only add information to the article which can be supported. The fundamental question is whether there's sufficient support for the claim that Avenarius and Mach, for example, were important for the development of existentialism. I suspect not. The article in Runes is out on a limb, and I'd oppose giving much weight to it.KD Tries Again (talk) 16:41, 18 April 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again All right, all right. Understood, one and all. However, however weird the style of the Runes definition of existential philosophy, it is not completely off the wall. It's simply peculiar and not all there. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard's fear and trembling, Heidegger's dread, Sartre's nausea all have a biological component, especially with regard to the certainty of death and the weakness of the flesh, and with Camus and his factual judgments in place of value judgments, all seek the worth of knowledge in relation to their unrationalized direct experience of life.Uniquerman (talk) 18:30, 10 May 2009 (UTC)

Heidegger's Influences

I removed the comment that Heidegger was influenced "much more" by Husserl than by Kierkegaard. Heidegger worked as Husserl's assistant, but the extent to which his work shows Husserl's influence is controversial; Husserl himself regarded Heidegger as having completely abandoned phenomenology. But more important, so what? Heidegger was probably influenced more by Aristotle than he was by Kierkegaard, but the only purpose of the sentence is to indicate why Heidegger has been regarded (rightly or wrongly) as an existentialist. One of the (few) common factors among the so-called existentialists was a debt to Kierkegaard.KD Tries Again (talk) 15:07, 19 April 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

Implied link between Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Nihilism

For Nietzsche, I am 100% certain there is no link, other than that Nietzsche provided a in depth refutation of nihilism. Implying a link reinforces the oft-repeated fallacy that Nietzsche was a nihilist. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.1.210.26 (talk) 02:19, 29 April 2009 (UTC)

Origins of Existentialism

Nietzsche and Kierkegaard were essential for the pursuit Italic textof theories on existentialism, however the credit for the birth of it lies with Rene Descartes; in Principles of Philosophy, I quote Descartes, in saying, "Cogito ergo sum," which means in english, "I think, therefore, I am."

(Wvxcjerk (talk) 03:13, 6 May 2009 (UTC))

No.KD Tries Again (talk) 14:37, 6 May 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

My thoughts exactly. Der Zeitgeist (talk) 19:51, 6 May 2009 (UTC)

Ortega would agree also. He spent a great deal of time on the subject, explaining that Descartes was a thinker of the future, but a man captive of history and his own theology. For Descartes, the ego in question was a reification of the thing that cogito proved the existence of. He didn't go on to the next step that the ego existed insofar as it thought. Ortega, of course, went on to the next step, the postulate that 'reality' is an event requiring both mind and world, his great contribution to the history of philosophy, as Julian Marias would have it. The truth is neither in here or out there but between the two, idealism and realism happily married. This is where people like Saussure, Barbara Lee, Levi-Strauss, and Mickey Gibson come in, confirming by linguistic and anthropological observation what Ortega proposed. Of course, none of this belongs in Wikipedia except as an aside.Uniquerman (talk) 18:50, 10 May 2009 (UTC)

Where is Musil, Proust and Joyce?

Why has this article ignored these three great existentialists? I haven't read much, but I do know that these three names are the most famous ones in existentialist and modern literature. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Pratinavanil (talk • contribs) 10:56, 20 May 2009 (UTC)

Please provide a reference to an authority which makes this claim. Proust was influenced by Bergson, Musil by Mach and to an extent, partly negatively, by Nietzsche. I don't agree that any of these authors are existentialists.KD Tries Again (talk) 18:44, 22 May 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

One would have a better chance making the case for Max Frisch, Heinrich Boll, Malcom Lowry, and Luigi Pirandello.Uniquerman (talk) 21:06, 3 June 2009 (UTC)

Origins: List of writers with existentialist themes in history of philosophy

I have reverted some recent additions to this list: Mulla Sadra, Averroes, Thomas Aquinas, The Bible.

First, Sadra and Averroes. Here I think it's a notability problem. I can see from the WP article on Mulla Sadra that one commentator noted existentialist themes in his work. The problem is that some commentator or another has found existentialist themes in the work of countless philosophers and writers, but they don't all need to be on this list. Is there any work on existentialism as such which mentions Sadra? Same question for Averroes. I think it's necessary to show that they are notable in terms of the origins of existentialism. Second, Aquinas: whether or not someone has detected existentialist themes in his work, he's out of place on this list: I'd like to see the same kind of support as for Sadra or Averroes.

Third, I removed The Bible, because it's not a writer, because I suspect you might find precursors for just about anything in the Bible, and citing Kierkegaard as support for the Bible displaying existentialist themes is an anachronism. "Existentialism" wasn't even a term when Kierkegaard was writing. More simply: how does it help a WP reader to understand existentialism to refer them to the Bible?KD Tries Again (talk) 17:33, 12 July 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

It's a list of examples, isn't it? In other words, it's not meant to be exhaustive. If there are tons of people who could be on the list, however, that could warrant giving it its own wiki-list-page thing, right? There are some like that already. Then we could just link that page. When it comes to anachronisms, however, isn't that what the list is supposed to be about? It says "In retrospect, other writers have also implicitly discussed existentialist themes throughout the history of philosophy and literature." That means that anything that could be taken as touching even remotely on an existentialist theme could be listed.. although not in a short list of examples. So the only objection to having the bible there is that there is no author, but I don't think that's a substantial objection. Der Zeitgeist (talk) 18:24, 13 July 2009 (UTC)

"despite profound doctrinal differences"

I agree that the first paragraph is terrible. It's vague. It led me to the discussion page instead of happily exploring Existentialism and Kierkegaard.

I can't tell what "despite profound doctrinal differences" even means. At such an early point in the article, it's a blank statement that has no relevance to the readers. You can't place a vague, no context, no reference breakaway statement in the middle of a definition and simply expect readers to follow. Nothing led us to the statement and the statement leads nowhere.

What do you mean by doctrinal? What were their differences? Why were they profound?

Those are just the problems you need to address in your literal statement, your logos. Beyond that, you need to explain to readers why that statement is even in there.

What was the result of their differences? Why did they have them? Is this statement even RELEVANT to an opening definition before you even define the terms?

THESE are the questions you need to ask yourself before writing a Wikipedia article.

It's saying that, strictly speaking, there's no _thing_ called existentialism. As people use it, it is a colloquial term, and not very well defined. Usually, one could determine what or who one is talking about from the context in which the word is used, but wikipedia lacks that kind of context. If you asked me to tell you something about existentialism, the first words out of my mouth would be "well, there are a number of different positions, but for Kierkegaard, for instance [...]" That's what it's about, and I would say it is a rather informative, although a bit disappointing, sentence: You're trying to find a definition for Existentialism with a capital E, but there is no such thing.

Now, what comes next is a short list of the things that these people _did_ share. That they share certain things does not contradict the first sentence: These things aren't particularly concrete; even though both Kierkegaard and Sartre deal with the concrete individual, what an individual _is_ and what things one can attribute to the individual is a completely different matter; while Kierkegaard's response to the human condition is to prescribe faith, Sartre's prescription is a playful attitude. Der Zeitgeist (talk) 23:24, 27 July 2009 (UTC)

Thanks for the comments. Believe me, editors contributing to this page have asked themselves those questions repeatedly. For myself, I can't see how the differences referred to can be described in the first sentence or two of the article. If you check standard encyclopaedia and dictionary sources, you'll find that they too generally begin negatively, stating that Existentialism is hard to define. By the way, please remember to sign your comments on the Talk Page, and it's also a good idea to consider establishing a User Account.KD Tries Again (talk) 05:03, 29 July 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

I may be so far off here but - here goes! To live is to learn!

Through experience we learn - that is why we are here - just wish we could take it with us! —Preceding unsigned comment added by 92.12.96.110 (talk) 22:11, 5 August 2009 (UTC)